

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THE CAVALRY JOURNAL




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UNDER THE DIRECTION OF

Field-Marshal The VISCOUNT ALLENBY, G.C.B., etc. (Colonel Life Guards and 16th/5th Lancers).

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Brigadier E. F. NORTON, D.S.O., M.C. (Royal Artillery).

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
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**THE 2nd DRAGOON GUARDS (THE QUEEN'S BAYS), 1850
FIELD DAY ORDER.**

King's Guard of the Household Cavalry.
 is riding at the head of the Regiment as is still done by the
 An interesting feature of the picture is that the drummer
 drummer of an error of the artist it is impossible to say
 drummer the soldier's stripe, whether this was a regimental
 1856 The men have the yellow cloth overalls stripe, but the
 troops and the uniforms overalls with soldier's stripe, worn till
 have the uniform bonnet belt, no epaulettes, the uniforms repre-
 tion, in what was later known as Field Day Order. The Officers
 The Regiment is shown on the march, evidently to an inspec-

Disson (1856), circa 1850.
 imagined, but attributed to Kewley, of the 2nd
 The frontiers are reproduced from an oil painting.

THE QUEEN'S BATT, 1820.



THE QUEENS BAYS, 1850.

The frontispiece reproduced from an oil painting, unsigned, but attributed to Fernely, of the 2nd

Dragoon Guards, *circa* 1850.

THE Regiment is shewn on the march, evidently to an inspection, in what was later known as Field Day Order. The Officers have the undress pouch belt, no shabraque, the undress sabretache, and the undress overalls with scarlet stripe, worn till 1856. The men have the yellow cloth overall stripe, but the trumpeter the scarlet stripe, whether this was regimental custom or an error of the artist it is impossible to say.

An interesting feature of the picture is that the trumpeter is riding at the head of the Regiment as is still done by the King's Guard of the Household Cavalry.

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

JANUARY, 1934

EDITORIAL.

THE Annual General Meeting of the Committee of the Journal was held in the Royal United Institution on November 16th. A report of the proceedings will be found on page 139.

It was decided that every contribution accepted for publication in the Journal should be paid for unless any contributor expressly stated that his article was "free," when naturally it would be gladly accepted. It is felt that if officers realise that the work they have done in writing an article will be paid for, more and better articles will be forthcoming and in addition it will give the Editor a freer choice and he will not be prejudiced in accepting a contribution because it is "free."

* * * * *

For guidance the following notes are re-published. The Journal is roughly divided into three sections.

1. THE SERIOUS MILITARY SECTION.

Under this heading will come articles dealing with the handling of forces of all arms; studies of Cavalry leaders of the past; studies of Cavalry actions; accounts of manœuvres, exercises and staff rides; articles on Cavalry matters from foreign countries, etc.

2. THE TRAVEL AND LIGHTER-READING SECTION.

Articles on shikar trips, shooting, fishing, hunting, pig-sticking, etc., will come under this section.

3. THE SPORTING SECTION.

Accounts of polo tournaments, horse shows, sports, etc.

The rates of payment for accepted articles are 7/6 a page, except in cases where, in the Committee's opinion, a contributor by the excellence of his article or by the amount of labour and time he has spent, deserves special consideration when the rate may be increased to 10/6 a page.

A page contains roughly 350 words.

The position as regards the number of serving officer subscribers was also brought up at the Annual Meeting and is frankly very disappointing. The Journal lost 69 subscribers last year and gained 10 new ones. An appeal is made to all officers to support the Journal. The Journal can only be improved and kept up to date by the publication of better and more interesting articles and by the encouragement of younger officers to submit articles and by the continued support of all Cavalry officers. The younger officers are the ones to whom we look to for new and advanced ideas.

* * * * *

Colonel W. W. Jelf, C.M.G., D.S.O., who died in his 54th year was the Royal Artillery Sub-Editor of the Journal from 1922-1932. He had a distinguished career in the Army and was well known in the field of sport. He was an attractive writer on hunting and other topics. Entering the Army in 1899 he served through the South African War and on the outbreak of the Great War he was Staff Captain to the Royal Horse Artillery in the 1st Cavalry Division.

After the war he commanded the R.A. of two Territorial Divisions; was A.A.G. in the War Office and finally became Garrison Commander and Commandant R.A. Depot at Woolwich.

One of his friends on the CAVALRY JOURNAL Committee writes :
 " Wilfred Jelf is a great loss, he was a regular attendant at

our meetings until he was forced to resign owing to illness. I feel that his death is a merciful relief to one of the best hearted and kindest of officers. He was beloved by everyone who came in contact with him. A year ago he knew that he could never recover, but never became down-hearted and his one ambition was to live long enough to see his sons started on their military career. When bed-ridden he carried on his literary work with increased enthusiasm and would write an account of a hunt or a point to point meeting, as if he himself was actually taking part."

* * * * *

By Army Order 169 of 1933 His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to approve the following alliances:—

The Alberta Mounted Rifles, Non-Permanent and Active Militia of Canada, to the 3rd The King's Own Hussars.

The 8th Princess Louise's New Brunswick Hussars, Non-Permanent Active Militia of Canada, to The Yorkshire Dragoons (Queen's Own).

* * * * *

We congratulate Lieut.-General G. A. Weir, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., on his promotion on October 1st to Lieut.-General. Lieut.-General Weir assumed command of the 33rd (West Lancashire) Division on September 14th, 1932, and relinquishes it on January 1st, 1934.

Also we offer our congratulations to Major-General R. G. H. Howard-Vyse, C.M.G., D.S.O., the Inspector-General of Cavalry, on his promotion to Major-General; to Colonel (temporary Brigadier) A. F. Hartley, D.S.O., on his appointment as D.M.O. Army Headquarters, India; and to Colonel H. C. L. Howard, C.M.G., D.S.O., A.D.C., on his appointment as A.D.C. to the King.

Major-General A. E. W. Harman, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding the 1st Division, relinquishes his command on April 21st, 1934, and Colonel (temporary Brigadier) C. L. Rome, D.S.O., relinquished his appointment as Assistant-Director of Remounts at the War Office on October 1st, 1933.

The following moves of Cavalry Regiments will take place during the trooping season 1934/35 :—

UNIT	FROM	TO
Life Guards	Windsor	Hyde Park
Royal Horse Guards	Hyde Park	Windsor
11th Hussars	Tidworth	Egypt
12th Lancers	Egypt	Tidworth
16th/5th Lancers	Tidworth	York
3rd Hussars	York	Tidworth
5th Inniskilling Dragoon Guards	Aldershot	Colchester
4th Hussars	Colchester	Aldershot

* * * * *

EXAMINATION OF OFFICERS FOR PROMOTION.

The following table shows the campaigns on which the military history papers will be set in March, 1934, for Lieutenants for promotion to Captain and Captains for promotion to Major.

DATE	CAMPAIGN SET FOR FIRST TIME	CAMPAIGN SET FOR LAST TIME
March, 1934	France and Belgium up to and including the Aisne	Egypt and Palestine as covered by History of the Great War—Military Operations— Egypt and Palestine, Vol. II, Parts I & II.

The following books are recommended for study :—

Egypt and Palestine—History of the Great War—Military Operations—
Egypt and Palestine. Vol. II, Parts I and II.

The Palestine Campaigns by Colonel A. P. Wavell, C.M.B., M.C.

France and Belgium—Official History of the Great War—Military Operations. France and Belgium, 1914. Vol. I.

Liaison, 1914—A narrative of the Great Retreat, by Brigadier-General E. L. Spears, C.B., C.B.E.

The Memoirs of Marshal Joffre. Vol. I. Translated by Colonel T. Bentley Mott.

CAVALRY EXERCISE ON SALISBURY PLAIN

September 4th-7th, 1933.

WE promised in our October issue to give an account of the exercise in which the 1st (Aldershot) Cavalry Brigade opposed the 2nd (Tidworth) Brigade, and which took place last September. Our excuse is a request from overseas readers for news of this sort. Some of those who took part in this battle may not know the whole story and, may therefore, find something of interest.

By the 3rd September both Brigades were established in their training camps on Salisbury Plain; the 1st Brigade on Windmill Hill Down between Tidworth and Ludgershall, the 2nd Brigade near Heytesbury (S.W. corner of the attached map). Previous to this no brigade training had been possible and it was perhaps a little unfortunate that the major cavalry exercise of the year had to take place right at the beginning of brigade training. But the requirements of the 2nd and 3rd Divisions, both of which were concentrated in the area, made a later date impossible.

The objects of the exercise were :—

1. To practise the co-operation of a mixed force of mobile troops, including tanks and armoured cars.
2. To study problems connected with the movement and administration of such a mixed force.
3. To practise the taking over of a position by infantry from cavalry.

The first part of the exercise was based on actual operations in August, 1914, when the 5th Cavalry Brigade was protecting the left flank of the 1st Corps during its withdrawal.

The General Idea was that Whiteland (S.E. England) and Brownland (S.W. England) had declared war early in August. Brownland, who knew that Whiteland would eventually develop superior strength, especially in mobile troops, attacked, but after some initial success their centre was penetrated and they were forced to retire, so that, by the evening of the 4th September, they were back on the line running generally north and south through Shipton Bellinger, with Whiteland advanced guards in touch with them.

BROWNLAND.

To deal with Brownland first, the northernmost corps (imaginary, of course) included the 2nd Cavalry Brigade (The Greys, 4th/7th Dragoon Guards and the 16th/5th Lancers) with the following troops attached to it :—

2nd Brigade R.H.A.

11th Hussars (armoured cars) (less one squadron).

A mechanised 18-pdr. Battery.

A Field Troop, R.E.

A mechanised anti-tank platoon from a battalion of the 7th Infantry Brigade.

On the evening of the 4th September, this Cavalry Brigade was supposed to be in billets behind the infantry outposts, whose northern flank was at Silk Hill. Actually, it spent this night on the Avon near Crossing "C."

At 10 o'clock the next morning (5th), the 2nd Cavalry Brigade Commander received a message from his Corps that Whiteland mobile troops had been heard of to the north-east and that the Brigade was to concentrate just north of Bulford by 12.30 p.m., the Commander reporting at that place at noon for orders. That was all the Commander knew, before reporting, except that no move was to be made before 1.15 p.m.

The instructions as given by the Corps Commander at 12 o'clock 5th September may be summarized as follows :—

"The Air Force discovered early this morning what was suspected to be the 1st Whiteland Cavalry Brigade moving north-west out of Whitchurch (14 miles east of Ludgershall). Another two Whiteland Cavalry Brigades and a tank formation

mobilizing round Aldershot (40 miles east of Ludgershall) are believed to be nearly ready to move.

"This threat has induced our Commander-in-Chief to continue the retirement, so as to get out of the Salisbury Plain area, which is so particularly favourable to Whiteland's superiority in mobile troops. My Corps is to be in a position south of the River Wylfe from Wylfe to Sutton Veny by 2 p.m. to-morrow.

"The northern division is to retire by two roads Amesbury-Maddington and Bulford-Tilshead and to start at 2 p.m., when its rearguard will be on the line Cholderton-Parkhouse Camp. It is to bivouac for the night between Stonehenge and Maddington. To-morrow, the retirement will be continued behind the River Wylfe.

"The task of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade will be to protect the northern flank of this retirement, the movements of its right being regulated by those of the rearguard. (The rearguard was imaginary; information about its movements were communicated by umpires to a real liaison detachment accompanying the imaginary headquarters of the rearguard cavalry.)

"Aircraft (4 sorties) for close reconnaissance are placed at your disposal."

The Corps Commander added that, besides the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, the Corps had only the 7th Infantry Brigade (this had mechanised transport and consisted only of 3 battalions), and the 5th Tank Battalion available to meet the threat to its flank. The latter could not come up in time to be available before to-morrow night and the former was for the present to be kept in reserve.

On receiving these instructions, the Commander of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, who had barely an hour in which to make up his plan, issue his orders and get his brigade on the move, considered that, if he had moved in force to the high ground about Ell Barrow, west of the Avon, the northern flank of the force he was covering would be insufficiently protected for at least two hours. He decided, therefore, to make his first movement east of the Avon, thereby effectively covering the flank from the start.

He ordered the 4th/7th Dragoon Guards, with one battery, to seize the line Sidbury Hill-Weather Hill, and to push patrols out to the east and north. The main body of the brigade was to move to the Dunch Hill area with protective detachments on both flanks. The armoured cars (11th Hussars less one squadron) were to reconnoitre the area Pewsey-Burbage-Ludgershall, paying special attention to roads running west and south-west through that area.

These movements started at 1.30 p.m.

WHITELAND.

Now, as regards the Special Idea issued to Whiteland and the initial dispositions of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, the situation of Whiteland mobile troops was assumed to be as follows:—

AT WHITCHURCH (14 miles east of Ludgershall) ready to move at any time after 5 a.m. on the 5th September:

1st Cavalry Brigade, which included:—

3rd Carabiniers.

5th Inniskilling Dragoon Guards.

7th Hussars.

“D” Battery, R.H.A. (a full composite battery formed from the 1st Bde. R.H.A.).

One section “M” Battery R.H.A. (mechanised).

One squadron 11th Hussars.

One mechanised 4.5 how. battery.

One Field Troop Royal Engineers.

AT ALDERSHOT (40 miles east of Ludgershall) not ready to move much before early morning 6th September:—

One battalion Royal Tank Corps.

The other two cavalry brigades and the remainder of the Artillery and the Tank Brigade, all of which were of course imaginary, were assumed to complete their mobilization between Aldershot and London by the 5th September.

On the evening of 4th September, the Commander 1st Cavalry Brigade received the following instructions (Special Idea):—

“The time has now come to exploit our superiority in mobile troops against the enemy’s northern flank.

"At present the fact that his main columns have not retired beyond the line Amesbury-Winterslow (7 miles south of Cholderton) and other indications point to his intending to fight where he now stands. But if he gets wind of our move, he may very likely retire further. In either case, he is pretty sure to protect his northern flank on Salisbury Plain with his mobile troops. For this we estimate that he cannot spare more than three cavalry regiments, two to four batteries, two to three squadrons of armoured cars and possibly a few mechanised infantry. We are confident that he cannot produce tanks before the morning of the 7th and then not more than a battalion.

"The rest of our mobile troops will begin to march to-night and can all be on Salisbury Plain by early morning 7th September. It is intended then to strike a decisive blow against the enemy's northern flank.

"Your mission is to prepare for this blow by driving in the enemy's mobile troops on this flank. In order to be sure of getting well on to his flank, you will move in the first instance to Savernake (north of map).

"The 2nd Battalion Royal Tank Corps will be moved up as soon as possible. It will not be under your orders for the present, but if nothing unforeseen occurs it should be handed over to you ready for immediate employment not later than noon on the 6th September.

"No aircraft are available for you but any air information which concerns you will be passed on."

In order to be in position for the start of the operations, the 1st Cavalry Brigade moved out from its camp at Windmill Hill on the afternoon of the 4th and bivouacked for the night in Savernake Park. It was not allowed to cross the Savernake-Ludgershall road before 1 p.m.

It should be noted that in his instructions the Commander was given no indication that Brownland intended to continue the retirement. In fact, the instructions perhaps implied that no action should be taken which might induce Brownland to retire. The Commander, therefore, considered that any wide turning movement, which would bring him towards the rear of the Brownland cavalry brigade, was inadvisable and would

reduce the chances of effective action by the rest of the White-land Mobile Division on the 7th September. He decided, therefore, to seize a position astride the R. Avon and secure Crossing "A," thereby enabling him to operate east or west of the river.

To put this plan into effect, he detached the 3rd Carabiniers, with one R.H.A. battery, and ordered them to move on the left flank via Burbage and Lower Everleigh to secure a position from Lavington Folly to Holmes Clump covering Crossing "A." The remainder of the brigade with an advanced guard was to move via Pewsey on Upavon. The task given to the armoured cars was to reconnoitre the area Upavon-Collingbourne Ducis-Tidworth-Bulford-Durrington.

These movements started at 1 p.m.

The Operations.

The course which the operations were designed to take were as follows :—

Firstly—gaining contact during the afternoon of the 5th September.

Secondly—the occupation of a short outpost position by the Brownland Cavalry Brigade during the night 5th/6th September, with imaginary infantry on either flank.

Thirdly—the withdrawal of the Brownland Cavalry Brigade on the 6th September to a position covering the River Wylfe in face of the increased strength of the White-land Cavalry Brigade, to which a tank battalion was added on the morning of the 6th.

Fourthly—a fight for the hills covering the River Wylfe from the north during the afternoon of the 6th September and in the evening the relief of the Brownland Cavalry Brigade by the 7th Infantry Brigade.

Fifthly—a counter-attack by the Brownland Cavalry Brigade reinforced by a tank battalion early in the morning of the 7th September.

The sequence of the operations will best be dealt with under these headings. Only the major moves can be described. Details of all minor encounters would take up too much space and be rather boring.

The gaining of contact during the afternoon of the 5th September.

From 2 p.m. onwards there were numerous encounters between the armoured cars of both sides and the move of the Whiteland Cavalry Brigade through Pewsey was delayed for about three-quarters of an hour. This was unlucky, as at 2.15 p.m. the Whiteland Commander was given an air report indicating that Brownland were retiring. By 2.30 p.m. Brownland Cavalry Brigade Commander had realised the general direction of Whiteland's advance and ordered his whole brigade to move via Crossing "C" to the west of the Avon; the 16th/5th Lancers, covered by one R.H.A. battery, to Nether-avon Down; the Greys to Ell Barrow, with the 4th/7th Dragoon Guards in reserve at Shrewton Folly. These movements were completed by 4.45 p.m. without opposition from Whiteland, except for an attack by their armoured cars at Crossing "C," which would have caused a certain amount of damage.

Meanwhile, the 3rd Carabiniers (Whiteland) had advanced as ordered via Burbage and Lower Everleigh and after some delay caused by fire from the battery with the 4th/7th Dragoon Guards (Brownland) occupied the position ordered astride Crossing "A," where they remained till nightfall. The 5th Inniskillings came up on their right and encountered the Greys at Ell Barrow. Brigade Headquarters with the 7th Hussars reached Enford.

Outposts on the night 5th/6th September.

About 5 p.m., Brownland Cavalry Brigade received orders from the Corps stating that the Northern Division would billet east and west of Shrewton and that from 7 p.m. onwards the Cavalry Brigade would be relieved of flank protection but would remain responsible for a section of the outpost line from about Greenland Farm to Tilshead inclusive. Infantry outposts (imaginary) would extend their line east and west. This Cavalry Brigade were to resume responsibility for the whole of the northern flank from 6 a.m. the next morning.

On these orders, the Greys, who were withdrawn from Ell Barrow, were made responsible for the left and the 4th/7th

for the right of the outpost line. The 16th/5th Lancers were then on the high ground north of Shrewton Folly. As this would have to be occupied again by 6 a.m. the next morning, it was considered inadvisable to withdraw them and they remained for the night near Shrewton Folly, being responsible for their own local protection.

Whiteland realised, from air information which was given them, that Brownland main columns were halting. It was decided that nothing much could be done that evening. The brigade, therefore, withdrew to water about Crossing "A," leaving the 5th Inniskillings in touch with Brownland with orders to capture Ell Barrow if they could. This they occupied on its evacuation by the Greys, whom they followed up and kept busy by active patrolling during the night.

The hospitality of the Blues, who, as divisional cavalry to the 3rd Division, were in camp at Tilshead and were taking no part in this exercise, was much appreciated by some of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade.

The Withdrawal of Brownland on 6th September.

During the night, Whiteland issued orders for an attack early on the morning of the 6th by the 3rd Carabiniers and 7th Hussars from Lavington Folly and to the north-west of it, with three objectives: first, Warren Down to Observatory; second, New Copse to West Down; third, The Rings to Copehill Farm. This attack was intended to pin the Brownland Cavalry Brigade so that later tanks could be used against them.

Between 6 and 7 a.m., Brownland detected these movements and ordered one squadron of the Greys to extend the left flank to New Copse and the 16th/5th Lancers to withdraw into reserve at Orcheston Down. The brigade managed more or less to hold the Whiteland attack and at 9.30 a.m. Brownland line ran from West Down Plantation to New Copse.

All this time the imaginary Brownland main columns were continuing their retirement and at 10.30 a.m. the rearguard was supposed to be just passing through Maddington. The flank guard, therefore, had soon to make a further move westwards. So the Greys and 4th/7th were ordered to withdraw at

CAVALRY EXERCISE ON SALISBURY PLAIN 13

11 a.m. to the line Breach Hill to West Lavington Down covered by the 16th/5th Lancers.

Meanwhile, at 9.30 a.m. the Whiteland tank battalion, which had moved to Crossing "A," was placed at the disposal of Whiteland Cavalry Brigade, who were also given information of the retirement of the Brownland Corps towards Chitterne. At 10.30 a.m. the tanks were ordered to move round by the right and attack the left flank of the Brownland Cavalry Brigade, but, before the attack could materialise, it had to be cancelled owing to Brownland's withdrawal. It is curious that this withdrawal should have happened just at the right moment, as, at the time it was ordered, Brownland had received no information that the tanks had joined Whiteland; in fact, they knew no more about them than was contained in the instructions given by the Corps Commander at the start of the exercise.

Brownland, therefore, escaped out of the net without prejudicing their task of flank protection and took up a position on the line Breach Hill-West Lavington Down, as already explained. Whiteland followed up by pushing on the 7th Hussars to the line Cornbury Farm to The Rings which was reached about 12.45 p.m. A further advance was then ordered to a north and south line through Imber.

By this time, however, Brownland knew all about the Whiteland tanks. The Directing Staff provided an air report that the tanks had been seen moving south-west from Burbage at 10 a.m. and a couple of reports from regiments received at about 1 p.m. located them moving forward from Ell Barrow. By this time the imaginary rearguard of the Corps was getting into position covering the Wylde crossings with its left flank about Knook Barrow. Further, a message from the Corps received at 12.30 p.m. stated that the 7th Infantry Brigade would probably relieve the Cavalry Brigade after dark, in order to free the latter to carry out a counter-attack next morning in conjunction with a tank battalion, which would arrive late that evening.

For these reasons and because the country where they were was ideal for tanks, the Commander of the Brownland Cavalry

Brigade ordered a retirement to the general line East Hill Farm-Scratchbury Hill, where some tank proof localities were to be found. This retirement was quickly carried out and completed about 3.30 p.m. The position was occupied with the 16th/5th Lancers on the right and 4th/7th Dragoon Guards on the left, covered by all the available artillery, the Greys being in reserve in Heytesbury Camp.

Later, the Corps (Directing Staff) ordered the left flank to be extended to include Battlesbury Hill.

The Fight for the Hills, afternoon and evening 6th September.

Whiteland Cavalry Brigade followed up on a two regiment front, 3rd Carabiniers on the right and 7th Hussars on the left, and having discovered the enemy dispositions ordered these two leading regiments to attack the Brownland position. The tank battalion were at first ordered to attack at the same time, but their orders had to be modified and their attack came in somewhat later.

The 3rd Carabiniers could not make much progress, but the right of the attack was successful, the 7th Hussars capturing Battlesbury and Middle Hills, thereby gaining observation down into the Wylve Valley. The Greys were in reserve at Heytesbury; they had had a hard 36 hours and had off-saddled, when the news of the 7th Hussars' attack arrived. As many men as possible were bundled into the transport lorries, which had just been unloaded, and were taken out to counter-attack, which they successfully did, recapturing Middle Hill. They were preparing to attack Battlesbury Hill when about 7 p.m. the Whiteland tank attack, directed on Middle Hill and the positions to the east of it, developed.

What would have been the result of this attack, it was impossible to judge. Both sides would undoubtedly have suffered heavy casualties. Actually, Whiteland tanks over-ran the position, Brownland cavalry withdrawing to tank proof localities in face of their advance. The tanks were not followed by Cavalry and on their departure the position was mostly re-occupied by Brownland. On the Brownland right, however, the White 3rd Carabiniers took advantage of the tank attack

to drive the 16th/5th Lancers from some farm buildings and on the extreme left the 7th Hussars still held Battlesbury Hill. Thus the situation remained till it got dark about 8.30 p.m.

And now to see what was happening to the 7th Infantry Brigade (Brownland), who were due to relieve Brownland Cavalry that night. Their training camp was at Tilshead from which, for various reasons, they could not be moved before the afternoon of the 6th September, that is after Tilshead had been occupied by Whiteland. However, Whiteland were well to the west of this place before the 7th Brigade had to embus, so that the situation was not too unreal. It was perhaps a little unfortunate that the order from the Directing Staff for them to embus seems to have been given by mistake to the Whiteland Commander. Eventually it reached the right destination and the 7th Infantry Brigade very quickly mounted their hired buses. They arrived at a concealed position about Stockton Wood at 5.15 p.m. where the Brownland tank battalion also arrived about 8 p.m. Both these units, of course, were supposed to have come up from the south.

From Stockton Wood, the 7th Infantry Brigade sent up reconnaissance parties to the cavalry. These became involved in the Whiteland attacks which were being made at the time, so that the take over was difficult but very real, as the situation kept on changing. By 11 p.m., the Cavalry Brigade had been relieved and were concentrated at Heytesbury. An imaginary field artillery brigade was supposed to have arrived to cover the infantry so that the artillery of the Cavalry Brigade could be withdrawn.

Meanwhile, during the evening the Directing Staff sent a message to the Whiteland Commander (as from his G.H.Q.) warning him of the arrival of Brownland's tanks and infantry. It also told him that the rest of Whiteland Mobile Division would be ready to advance from the line West Lavington-Tilshead at noon on the 7th (to-morrow) and that his rôle now became that of an advanced guard. This message, especially as it arrived late in the evening, when his troops had had a hard day with very little water, placed the Whiteland Commander in a difficult position. He decided to retain the positions

which he then held, with the 7th Hussars on the right, the 3rd Carabiniers on the left, and the 5th Inniskillings and tank battalion in reserve. Brigade Headquarters were at Imber.


The Counter-attack by Brownland.

About 10 p.m. the Director, representing the Brownland Corps Commander, gave the Brownland Cavalry Brigade Commander his orders for the following morning. These were to attack and knock out Whiteland before they could be reinforced. The tank battalion, then at Stockton Wood, was placed under his orders; the 7th Infantry Brigade, then holding the line, were to exploit any withdrawal by Whiteland troops opposite them.

The Cavalry Brigade plan was to advance northwards from the line Codford St. Peter-Upton Lovell on a two regiment front with the objective of the high ground about points 509-522, which was to be reached by 7 a.m. The tank battalion was to move to The Rings during the night and was to attack westwards at 7 a.m., just when Whiteland were likely to be fully occupied with the advance of the Cavalry.

Preliminary moves were made during the night, the Brownland tank battalion reaching its position by 3 a.m. It was, however, both heard and observed by a Whiteland light tank patrol, which remained in observation, so that by dawn Whiteland was able to put into position facing the probable line of advance of Brownland tanks, eight guns and seven anti-tank guns, supported by a section of light and by a section of medium tanks. The remainder of Whiteland's tank battalion was just north of Bowls Barrow, with a view to developing an attack from behind this feature.

The advance of Brownland Cavalry went according to plan and by 7 a.m. they had reached their objective on the high ground about points 509 and 522. But in view of the strong anti-tank defence on Whiteland's eastern flank, it would have been suicide for the Brownland tanks to attack on that flank. They, therefore, moved round behind the Cavalry to the other flank and towards Bowls Barrow. Meanwhile, the 7th Infantry Brigade had captured Battlesbury Hill from the 7th Hussars



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CAVALRY EXERCISE ON SALISBURY PLAIN 17

during the night and on the withdrawal of that regiment by the Whiteland Commander, were fast coming up into line with the Cavalry.

The operations ended with a battle between the opposing tanks just east of Bowls Barrow, on the result of which we will not be unwise enough to attempt a decision, but the umpires assessed the casualties at 25% against Brownland and 50% against Whiteland.

Generally, the exercise went according to plan and succeeded in giving most of those who took part in it a good run for their trouble. Throughout, most of them were kept pretty busy, not always an easy thing to arrange in a major exercise. The horses had a hardish time, since the exceptionally dry summer had made water scarce.

As to the lessons learnt, we hope that we have given sufficient detail to enable those interested to draw their own conclusions.



AN EYE FOR A HORSE

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL SIDNEY G. GOLDSCHMIDT.

PART V.

THE SURVEY OF THE HORSE IN MOVEMENT.

To obtain the next view of the horse we must have him run out in hand. This part of the examination can be carried out in two ways. The veterinary surgeon's method is to have the horse haltered or to insist that he has a bit in his mouth no more severe than a plain snaffle. The groom should hold the halter or reins at the extreme end and they should hang loose so that the horse's mouth is not interfered with (Fig. 36).^{*} By this means any irregular movement of his head, a sure sign of lameness, can be noticed. Slight lameness can easily escape detection if the horse's attention is taken up by a feel on a severe bit or if he is otherwise roused. For the same reason a veterinary surgeon whose chief duty it is to examine for soundness will begin with a slow trot, narrowly watching the first paces for that insidious form of lameness which wears off after a few strides, but which may be the forerunner of serious unsoundness. If he were to begin the examination at the walk, any irregularity might pass off before the horse had walked the usual thirty or forty yards away from the examiner and the same distance back.

The other method of running a horse out is to put on a bridle with the bit to which he is accustomed and then to make him trot right out with the groom restraining him with bit and rein (Fig. 37). In this instance it is wise to begin with the walk so that this pace can be judged while the horse is calm.

^{*} CAVALRY JOURNAL, page 530, October, 1933.

The question now arises, which of these two methods it is best to employ in judging the horse we are thinking of buying? The answer is that we should insist on both if possible. The first method shows us the natural gait of the horse and we can judge the natural action of his shoulders, hocks and knees, and also whether he is lame or sound; the second is to give us an idea how the horse will move when fit and full of vigour.

It is not always easy to get the seller to have the horse jogged out quietly and slowly with a slack rein. Often there is, except in young unworked horses, some leg weariness or stiffness, even if there is not some actual lameness; this is less perceptible if the horse is roused, and it can even be completely masked.




FIG. 37

It is therefore obvious that, in addition to the precautions mentioned above, quiet should reign; dogs, spectators, whips and noises of all sorts are distracting to the judges' attention, and, as they rouse a horse's interest, it is difficult to form a true estimate of his action, carriage and soundness. The ground over which a horse is jogged should be hard and smooth and there should be no loose stones.

The run out should be observed from the front and rear and also from both sides. This will necessitate at least four runs, out and back at the walk and the same at the trot, with the examiner standing directly behind and in front of the

horse, and then the same at the walk and trot with the examiner standing so that he sees the horse move past him. This should be a minimum and if any of the runs has not been carried out to one's liking, the fault should be pointed out to the groom and the faulty run repeated. Sometimes the horse's head has not been left alone, sometimes there has been a whip cracked or some other noise made to rouse the horse; only too often one's own attention may have been distracted by some chance remark or by the arrival of someone fresh on the scene. The absolute quiet essential to a thoughtful examination is for some reason, seldom easy to obtain.

The following points should be looked for in each of these views: As the horse moves away, first at the walk and then at the trot, the hind action should be watched for that particular vigorous hitch of the hocks which is an indication of good action in all paces. A dragging action is objectionable and if the impression is gained that the hind legs are being "left behind," it cannot be expected that the horse could move well in his other paces.

Stringhalt, that nervous affection of the hocks akin to St. Vitus's dance, can best be noted as the horse is walked away and the first few paces should be narrowly watched. Incipient stringhalt is often only noticeable in the first few strides, sometimes only as the horse is turned, while the slightest form is only detected as the horse moves forward after the rein back. The degree of detriment varies with the intensity and prevalence of this nervous spasm, which is usually confined to one leg and must not be confused with normal vigorous movement, and it tends to get worse with age and never improves. A horse with a marked stringhalt is unsightly and should not be bought by a horse-proud owner. Even a slight stringhalt is considered a reason for a substantial reduction in price, so a buyer who wishes to sell again should realise that there is a restricted market for a horse so afflicted.

The effect of bowed hocks and cow hocks can be noticed as the horse is walked or trotted away. With bowed hocks the hind feet are brought too close together and there is a risk of brushing or even speedy-cutting, *i.e.*, hitting one fetlock-joint or

hock with the opposite hoof. When bowed hocks and cow hocks are put into action it is easy to see that the incidence of weight, as the hind foot comes to the ground, places a strain on the hocks which they were never designed by nature to bear. Both these faults predispose a horse to spavin.

The hind foot should be raised and advanced straight to the front by bending the hock to clear the ground. There should be no trace of that circular outward swing which indicates stiffness due to old age, overwork or spavin. The tread should be light but certain and any twisting of the foot on the ground is again indicative of stiffness.

As the horse returns towards the observer—first at the walk and then at the trot—the action of the forelegs, a glimpse of which we have already had as the horse moved away, should be studied. Here let me say at once that any deviation from straight, true action at any of his paces will cause some unsoundness as sure as night follows day. Whether a horse has done much work or not, clean forelegs without splints, signs of brushing, hitting, cutting, ringbone or sidebone will be the accompaniment *only* of well-formed forelegs and true action. We cannot expect clean forelegs unless a horse is without malformation and without peculiarity of gait. Breeders cannot be too exacting in this respect.

The various faults of action visible from the front in this run out are dishing [Plate XXIV, Figs. (a) and (b)] and plaiting [Fig. (c)].*

The horse should then be walked and trotted past the examiner. Both the walk and trot should show great freedom, the foreleg well advanced without much knee-action, but there should be great movement of the shoulder. The toe should swing well forward and point as in Fig. 36.†

The hind foot at the walk should step well beyond the footprint made by the forefoot; in a good walker it should overstep it by 4 in. to 8 in., depending on the size of the horse. Although the horse should raise his feet high enough to clear all

* CAVALRY JOURNAL, page 533, October, 1933.

† CAVALRY JOURNAL, page 530, October, 1933.

inequalities, anything above this is useless, in fact, detrimental; it is a waste of energy, increases concussion and makes a horse slow and uncomfortable to ride.

It is important for a horse to be a good walker for two reasons. A free-striding brisk walk is usually an indication that the action at the other paces is good. Secondly, with a good walker one is content on the road with that pace for miles together, whereas if a horse is a bad walker, a rider is never content until he has pushed him into one of the faster paces, trot or canter. Four miles an hour is a minimum for the walk, but five miles an hour should be aimed at.

At the trot the hind legs should be smoothly flexed and well advanced with a good proportion of the weight borne by them, *i.e.*, he should be "balanced" and "light in front." If the horse has too great a preponderance on his forelegs it points to a faulty carriage of the head or to indifferent hock action, sometimes to a feeble constitution.

The impression gained should be one of freedom, lightness and crispness, the horse appearing to leave his feet on the ground the shortest possible fraction of time. His footfalls should be scarcely audible and the rhythm of his action mechanically even. "Sure, he wouldn't break eggshells" is an Irishman's way of putting it. Any tipping of the toe in front should be enough to condemn a horse, and if with the hind foot, we should suspect some disease or malformation—probably in the hock or stifle—and redouble our care in examining these joints. It is true that sometimes sound horses with well-shaped limbs and apparently good action tip or drag either one or both hind toes. Such horses, owing to wear and tear of the toe of the shoe, require to be reshod often.

The Horse Ridden.

The horse should now be saddled and bridled and he should have on his own bit, in other words the bit in which he goes best. I mention this because it often happens that when trying a horse, if he should fail to please, the owner will make the excuse that his own bit has been lent or is not available for some other

reason. One should be sceptical about these subterfuges. They can be called by no other name as it is hard to believe that a man wishing to sell a horse or to produce him in the show ring should not present him to the best advantage. One must assume, therefore, that whatever fault is noticeable at a trial is definitely a fault and not due to the horse being shown in the wrong bit.

It is advisable to be present when the horse is saddled and bridled so as to notice if he bears both with equanimity. Some horses are peevish about girthing and difficult to bridle. It is also prudent to see a horse ridden by the owner or his groom before trying him oneself, as this gives the opportunity of judging whether the animal is quiet to mount and quiet to ride. Some horses, not always those with youth and inexperience as an excuse, are either not trained to stand quietly while being mounted in the orthodox way, or have been made restless by inexperienced and careless handling; some are apt to buck when they first feel the weight of the rider. These are just two of the many vagaries that a horse may display and the precaution of studying the procedure of the man who is accustomed to him and to whom he is accustomed may obviate an uncomfortable experience. Further, a horse's action can be studied from the ground as well as his style of going and his way of carrying a man. Often the idea of purchase can be abandoned after seeing him ridden, and having made this decision it is unnecessary to ride the horse oneself, or at all events it becomes a mere matter of courtesy to the would-be seller, whose time has been taken up and who has probably been put to some trouble in the matter.

A horse should stand quietly to be mounted and show no resentment or nervousness during the process. Some horses have not been taught to stand still without being held, others object to a man holding the bridle. Some require to be put in a corner so that they cannot move away or run back, or the rider may even have to be lifted into the saddle. A young or badly broken horse may treacherously take a cow-kick as a man approaches or, what is more disconcerting still, will deposit the rider on his back by wheeling round when his foot is in the stirrup and he is half-way up. All these points should be

noted and good or bad marks awarded accordingly. If we judge that a horse is really difficult to mount we should seriously consider giving up the idea of buying him; it is a habit that may be difficult if not impossible to eradicate, is always annoying and can be dangerous.

We will suppose, therefore, that the horse has been successfully mounted and before the groom rides away out of earshot it should be made clear what kind of a show is wanted. There will be certain paces at which a horse shows himself to better advantage than at others. For instance, if a horse is a slow or unsurefooted walker the seller will see that he is put into a trot with as little delay as possible. Similarly if he does not trot out well he will be cantering before one has time to get much idea of how he moves at the trot. One should therefore be very explicit in one's stipulations and these should vary with the age and apparent experience of the horse and also with the size and shape of the ground at one's disposal.

One does not wish to be put into the uncomfortable position of wondering whether one is being deceived. If, for instance, the groom has been distinctly told "I want a show at the walk, trot, canter and gallop right round the field. Quicken your pace each time as you ride away from the gate, pull up at the gallop by that tree and walk quietly back here"; that would constitute a searching test of a horse's manners, but if the procedure is varied one would be left in doubt as to how much was due to a genuine misunderstanding of the instructions or to what extent a skilful and tactful groom was avoiding a difference of opinion with the horse.

But there is not always a paddock available, so it is difficult to generalise; but it will serve if I give a typical example of my experience.

There is a man in Dublin from whom I have bought many horses, whose yard is in the centre of the town. All he now has at his disposal for a trial is a narrow cinder lane about 150 yards long. The stable is at one end and the street at the other. Unless one insists that the horse is taken to some outlying paddock, this is the only place there is in which to try him. In

such a confined area it would be impossible to form a true estimate of the horse's action and manners in *all* his paces, of his temperament, his mouth and his carriage. As a preliminary it is, however, not a bad place and one could use it very efficiently for an eliminating test, deciding that if he does not please us in these surroundings he never will.

The points to be observed in this preliminary ride are many. One should get the impression of nimbleness and muscular harmony between all the limbs. The feet should be placed down flat, neither toe first nor heel first. Good action at the gallop is difficult to describe, but the footfalls should appear to be simultaneous and should not sound as four separate beats as the hoofs strike the ground.

As he moves away we should notice if there is any reluctance to leave the yard. Between this mere indication of reluctance and a downright act of rebellion, such as spinning round on his hind legs and rearing every time he is asked to face the exit, there are many gradations, and the would-be purchaser must judge for himself what he can safely put up with and what he feels himself to be horseman enough to cure. The capabilities of his groom must also be taken into consideration, but as said before it is well to be exacting on the score of "manners" as "nappiness" is more likely to increase than diminish with private stable feeding.

THE COLD RIDE

I call it "the Cold Ride" in contradistinction to a trial with hounds or at polo. It is easier to decide how we like a horse if we are fortunate enough to be given a day's hunting or a couple of chukkers of polo, but one may be tempted to buy a hunter in summer and a polo pony in winter, and real skill and judgment are called for if we have to make up our minds whether to buy or not after a mere ride in a paddock.

The trial in the saddle that we are able to get when we go to examine a horse may be short or long, but however inadequate it may be, the prospective buyer must accept what he notices during that short ride as the true form. It is not out of place again to emphasise the infallible test and guiding principle

from which one must never depart. Whatever fault a horse displays during the brief moment available for trial in the saddle, *that* must be taken as his failing, the weak link in the chain. If a horse shows a tendency to hang to the stable, if he should trip or stumble, if he should pull or put his neck in a bad position, if he should show reluctance to go forward, if he shies, bucks, plunges, or rears, it is important to take cognisance of any of these facts and at least to score a bad mark against him. It is within the knowledge of every horseman that faults noticed during a trial tend to become accentuated in the course of time, and that a horse that has displayed no fault, in spite of the expert tests through which he will have been put, will seldom develop any new ones given reasonable management. The seller will have plenty of excuses at hand to explain anything untoward that may have happened, but one should assume that the horse has been produced for the trial in the best condition possible, that the bit suits him, the saddle fits, his shoes are right, and that he is neither over-fresh nor tired. Want of condition, however, is a matter one must be able to estimate for oneself, and it is also necessary to differentiate between a horse that can be improved by rest or schooling and one that we can describe as a *constitutionally* bad ride, possibly because he is worn beyond repair. For immediate use I will admit there is not much to choose between these two kinds of "bad ride," so that in the show ring we should rule out both, although in buying it may be a matter of price. If the horse is cheap enough and we can afford the risk and spare the time for a prolonged rest, we may decide to venture on the purchase, but there is a type of bad ride that should be rejected outright under all circumstances. The ride is the most important consideration of all, for no matter how exacting we may have been on every point of conformation, unless the horse "rides well" he is inferior from every point of view. This therefore seems to be the appropriate place to issue another warning to the beginner.

It is annoying but nevertheless a fact that in isolated instances the ride belies what the eye can see. We may have to make up our minds whether or not to buy (or present with a prize) a horse that has failed to please us standing still and when

run out in hand but that gives us a good "feel" when ridden. Again, what appears a really well-shaped horse may prove on a trial in the saddle to be a miserable ride. I take it that any discriminating judge would reject the latter but that he might entertain the idea of buying the former. Perhaps it is the rarer contingency for a well-shaped horse to prove an uncomfortable mount.

I find a consensus of opinion among horsemen that we should differentiate in the matter of appearance between a hunter and a polo pony. While an odd-shaped pony that plays brilliant polo is always valuable and saleable, a hunter should be as handsome as possible. As a well-known polo and hunting man wrote in a letter to me on the subject, "You are only on your pony eight minutes at a time, are never seen standing still, and it is only the combined prowess of the two of you that counts. But a hunter is your companion for a whole day and you are standing and hacking about for so long in the public gaze that his beauty and suitability are important." From another angle, a matter of pure vanity, it is accepted that one's hunting kit should be as near immaculate as one's purse allows, so why should the effect be marred by a plain or common-looking horse?

The trial should begin at the walk, pass on to the trot, and then to the canter and gallop. Much will depend on how far the horse's education has proceeded. Naturally we would not attempt as much with (or expect as much from) a recently broken four-year-old as with an experienced horse of six or more. But the walk, trot and canter should be a minimum, and only if the animal inspires confidence should we proceed to the faster pace of the gallop. It is annoying to both buyer and seller if the horse should in any way get the better of his rider; he may be perfectly amenable to anyone who knows his peculiarities, but it is possible that he does not suit everyone's hands and everyone's style of riding. The dealer's groom will have already "given a show," and a fairly accurate estimate of the horse's paces, manners and degree of education will have been possible; but there are amongst the dealers' grooms many fine artists in whose skilful hands a half-broken horse looks like a "made one." Therefore if at any time during the trial at the walk,




FIG. 38

- SHOWS A SHOULDER SOMEWHAT THICK
- SHOWS THE BEST KIND OF SHOULDER
- SHOWS HIGH WITHER AND SHORT SHOULDER-BLADE TOO PROMINENT AT THE TOP

trot and canter you feel that the animal might get away with you or become uncontrolled, it is best to pull up, dismount and frankly to confess that he is too much of a handful for you or to stipulate for a further trial.

At the walk the rider should first look down the shoulder to see if it is not unduly thick through the top of the blade. There should, of course, be good muscular development in this region, but if the top of the blade just below the wither shows prominently, this is a fault in conformation and militates against speed and activity. A thick shoulder is associated with a lumbering action (Fig. 38, which I have adapted from "Points of the Horse" by Hayes). The movement of the shoulder should also be noted for that free forward action which enables the horse to swing his forefeet well out, and there should be little bending of the knee.

It is during the ride that we must confirm what the eye has seen. The "feel" must decide whether or not the shoulders are as good as we thought them from the ground and whether the length of rein is satisfactory, this desirable point, as said before, being derived from the slope of the shoulder rather than from the length of the neck.

The rider should then turn in the saddle and take stock of the loins. They should be broad, flat and muscular. Fig. 39, illustrating my meaning, has also been adapted from Hayes's book.



FIG. 39

- SHOWS A BROAD, FLAT MUSCULAR LOIN
- SHOWS WEAK LOINS

Length of Back.

This is dependent on one or more of three points of confor-

mation, the slope of the shoulder, the length of the pelvis and whether or not the horse is "well ribbed-up." It is against both weight-carrying power and endurance if the distance between the cantle of the saddle and the croup is excessive.

While still at the walk we should contrive to take the horse past the gate by which he entered the paddock, so that we may note whether he passes it unnoticed or whether he shows any tendency to be nappy. He may just look and hesitate, and in an extreme case he may stop and wheel round on his hind legs. We must score bad marks against him according to the degree of "home-sickness" displayed.

When, and if we are satisfied at the walk we should push him into a trot, and the best place to select for this is just after passing the gate, so that we may note any reluctance to increasing his pace while leaving home. The same instruction holds good for the canter and during the whole of this trial, which incidentally should not be in any way hurried or slurred over. We should exert our ingenuity to create situations that would cause a horse to show any tendency to nappiness. This can be displayed in countless ways, although the most usual sign is an attempt to cut off those corners which would shorten the way to the gate or towards any other horses there may be in the paddock.

It will be seen, therefore, that there is a world of difference between riding an animal that we wish to sell and one we are testing with a view to purchase. A seller, who presumably knows the horse and all his vagaries, will ride him so that he shows himself to his best advantage, avoiding situations which he knows may lead to a difference of opinion. The buyer, on the other hand, will be on the look-out for the slightest sign of waywardness and will then encourage or possibly not discourage him from showing just how far he will push his resistance.

If there is at hand a cinder lane, we should be wise to seize the opportunity to ride the horse at the walk, trot and canter on this hard surface, which is the best way of feeling how a horse moves in the saddle. The unyielding ground helps us to form a better estimate than we could on turf of his spring and

elasticity, of the lightness of his tread *and of his muscular co-ordination*. Softer ground would contribute a certain measure of elasticity of its own.

At Dublin Show the exhibitors will always try to get an intending purchaser to take a horse into one of the grass rings for a trial, but the knowledgable buyers are to be seen risking the annoyance of the show authorities by trotting and gently cantering a horse up and down one of the many gravel paths before taking him into the veterinary paddock for the test at the gallop.

If the dealer has a paddock at his disposal, as most of them have, it may not be easy nowadays to get the opportunity of this ride on hard ground, the ordinary roads being too slippery; but it may be that his stable yard is large enough for the purpose.

Most dealers' horses and privately owned horses that are for sale will have been taught to jump in cold blood for the purpose of giving a show in a paddock or school. It is useful to see and also to try a horse over a few fences typical of the country he is to hunt over, so that we may study his style of jumping and the "feel" he gives. Too much value, however, should not be attached to this jumping trial, as the presence of hounds changes the character of a horse to such an extent that a temperate horse may become hot-headed and a horse that has been made "hot" over fences in cold blood may jump more temperately when his attention is devoted to crossing an unknown country safely.

To make this part of the trial complete the horse should be ridden with others. It is not possible to foretell whether he will go better alone or in company, but in most instances there will be some difference. It is sometimes difficult to get a horse along without a lead, while others never give one a moment's peace in company, seeming to be imbued with an insane idea of competition.

With a polo pony purporting to be "made," we should call on our imagination to reconstruct the incidents in a game of polo. If possible we should have another pony galloping about and we should divide our trial into bouts of about three

minutes. Short, sharp spells will tell us more than a prolonged ride at a moderate pace. The pony should be pulled up over and over again to test whether or not he "loses his mouth."

FINAL PROCEDURE.

Caveat Emptor.

That ends the trial and there are now three courses open. Either we must refuse the horse outright, or we must make an offer for him (always subject to a veterinary examination), or we must stipulate for a further trial.

If we refuse the horse the decision should be conveyed to the owner firmly and I need hardly say with due consideration for his feelings. Actually the time for such decision will, in most instances, have come earlier in the examination.

If we decide to make an offer, we should make it as easy as possible for the dealer to reduce his price, and there is no need to be bashful. If your offer is not accepted you can always subsequently raise it and the dealer can reduce his price till eventually an agreement is reached. It is somewhat disconcerting to have one's original offer accepted out of hand and it is apt to leave a feeling that the offer was too high. For some reason it does not seem possible to close a transaction for a horse (as with a work of art) without bargaining. A seller will invariably ask more than he will ultimately accept and the buyer on his side will act on the principle that if he only starts low enough he can always "come up a bit." It is a technique usually associated only with bargaining in the Orient but has reached a point very near perfection in Ireland. It is well, therefore, to be quite sure that the horse takes your eye and that you really want him before making any sort of an offer.

Once at Dublin Show, long before the War, I was asked by a friend, a beginner at polo, to look at a pony he fancied. I rode the animal for him but she shook her head and fought against the bit when asked to stop. I decided that her bowed hocks accounted for this weakness and I advised him to have nothing to do with her. However, the owner, "X," never left

him alone, and finally on the Thursday evening he sent a note to my friend's hotel saying he would entertain an offer. On our way to the Show next morning my friend told me that anyway we should not be bothered by "X" *that* day because he had choked him off with an absurd offer of £75, the original price being £300. I had misgivings, and sure enough there was "X" waiting for us at the turnstile. He accepted the offer and my friend was landed with one of the worst polo ponies that ever looked through a bridle.

If the cubbing or hunting season has begun we can stipulate for a day's hunting, paying for it if necessary. If the owner will not agree to a day with hounds, it will be better than nothing to *see* the horse at the meet, at covert-side, and if possible in a run.

With a polo pony one has usually to be content with the "cold ride" and the sight of him in a game.

If a bargain is struck there only remains the veterinary examination, and it is advisable to be present when this is made, so that your veterinary surgeon can explain the significance of any shortcoming and any deviation from actual soundness.

We will now assume that the horse is yours, and if he appealed to you at first sight and has passed most of the tests of eye and touch, and if the actual ride pleases you, the odds are he will not disappoint you—much. You will probably not like him *quite* as well when you get him home, but if you have been exacting, especially over the ride, you will not have a bad horse. Anyway, if he subsequently develops faults you must blame your bad riding or the bad stable management of your groom. It ought to be possible to reproduce the good form that took your fancy when you made the trial.

You will, of course, rarely find all the good points discussed and described above combined in one horse, and if you refuse to buy anything that falls short of perfection you will have to pay a very high price and, further, you may have to examine very many before you finally make a purchase. There is no harm, however, in starting with a high ideal and then if you feel

impelled to buy a horse even should he fall short of that ideal, you will know in your heart that you have fallen in love with him.

And when he is yours for better or worse, you will be well advised to bear in mind Jorrocks' adaptation of Mathew Prior's couplet :

Be to his faults a little blind,
Be to his virtues ever kind.



THE BATTLE OF THE SHEEP

BY RISALA.

It will be deduced from its title that this story is concerned with sheep. It is concerned also with other matters, but these are necessary in order to introduce the sheep, for it would not be logical to produce large numbers of these animals, metaphorically speaking, out of the blue, though curiously enough that is precisely whence they arrived in this instance. But I am getting too far ahead. A certain amount of preliminary local colour is necessary in order to enable the reader to visualize the circumstances and surroundings in which these sheep occurred.

It will be remembered that during the summer of 1918 the right flank of the British line in Palestine lay in the valley of the River Jordan, with its right resting on the post of Rujm-el-Bahr at the head of the Dead Sea. Beyond this, far away to the east, over the Hills of Moab, our nearest allies were Lawrence and his Arabs, whose principal occupation, possibly because there is so little else to do in the desert, was blowing up sections of the Hedjaz Railway. Between the left of the line in the valley and the right of the line in the Hills of Judea, there existed a gap of some five miles, where the hills were so steep and rugged, and the country so difficult, that the area was deemed capable of defending itself. The valley sector, which was thus completely isolated from the rest of the front, was held by that body of horsemen known as The Desert Mounted Corps, which consisted of Yeomanry and Anzacs, already salted to the climate, and Indian Cavalry, who had just been transferred from France, where they had served since 1914.

After the raids of Es Salt and Amman were over, conditions in the valley settled down to a defence of the river line by means of bridgeheads and posts, while active reconnaissances were continually carried out by detachments of varying strengths. These reconnaissances were among the few bright spots in an otherwise dull and dreary existence, for the Turkish posts in the foot-hills of Moab were on an average five miles distant, and our patrols always went out in the hope of having the fun of hunting a Turkish patrol in the intervening space. On one occasion an officer who had gone out with one of these patrols put up a boar, which he rode until forced by the Turkish fire to abandon the pursuit! But such treats were rare. Few of those who served in that deathly valley during the summer of 1918 will ever forget the experience. It was alleged that prior to then, no white man had ever passed a summer there, and the saying "The flies die in June, the white men will die in July," was a common one. The white men however, proved to be of tougher substance, for very few of them died. But the heat, the flies, the mosquitoes, and the inevitable afternoon duststorms, which swept down the valley, forming at intervals gigantic dust-devils, carrying away boots, books, hats, clothes (and other articles) from out the very bivouacs, soon combined to tell on the health, not only of the white man, but also of the Indian soldier. Men who were accustomed to the fierce heat of a Punjab hot weather frankly gave the Jordan Valley best. Perhaps it was not so much the actual heat, as the intense oppressiveness of the atmosphere occasioned by living at a depth of several hundred feet below sea level, which laid such a strain on the health, but whatever the cause, this much at least is certain, that there exist few more unhealthy parts of the globe than the valley of the Jordan in summer.

It may well be imagined, therefore, that when a certain Indian Cavalry Regiment was informed, towards the end of June, that it would be withdrawn from the valley early in July for a spell of rest and recuperation on the coastal plain, the news was received with a riotous rejoicing. The prospect was all the more alluring because this regiment happened at the time to be holding the bridgehead of El Henu, with responsibility extending

down to the Dead Sea. This was the most southerly bridgehead, and therefore the lowest in altitude; it was also the most unhealthy, by reason of the proximity of its defences to the thick belt of rank vegetation bordering the river, which provided an ideal breeding-ground for mosquitoes. It was a small bridgehead, the defences being manned by one squadron, which was relieved every two days, for the myriads of mosquitoes contrived to render the nights so hideous that no rest of any kind was possible, and forty-eight hours was deemed to be the economic limit of endurance.

But the promised rest was soon destined to be postponed, for a cloud had arisen on the horizon, which necessitated a modification of orders. Information was said to have been received to the effect that the Turks were planning a grand attack which was to take the form of a drive straight through to the Jerusalem road, *viâ* the El Henu bridgehead, with the ambitious object of capturing the Holy City. The date of the attack was rumoured to be the day following the conclusion of the fast of Ramazan, which was now in progress. Higher authority therefore deemed it advisable to maintain extra troops in the Valley to meet this threat, and in due course the regiment in question was informed that it would not be relieved at the end of the conventional tour of duty, but would be required to hold its positions for a further period; in fact until the day after the breaking of the Ramazan. This news was not received with any obvious display of acclamation by the British officers, and the situation was one which called for a certain amount of tact in passing it on to the men. But the Indian soldier is highly susceptible to any form of flattery, and when it was explained to the men that not only was there every prospect of a pretty scrap, but also that it was quite obvious that the Brigadier had specially selected them to hold this bridgehead at the time of the rumoured attack because he wished to have at this important point a regiment on which he could place complete reliance, their vanity was touched, and the continuance of none too pleasant a duty came to be regarded as a high compliment. It was during this tour of duty that there occurred the affair of the sheep. It was one of those incidents, uncom-

mon in modern war, which lend a touch of humour and variety to an otherwise dull and stereotyped routine, and it appealed with irresistible force to a regiment, one of whose chief assets is a keen sense of humour.

A very few days after the regiment had taken over this portion of the line, the Rajput squadron found itself occupying the bridgehead. There was never any fear of the sentries relaxing their vigilance, for the constant attentions of the mosquitoes necessitated an incessant waving of the hands in order to keep these pestilential insects at a distance, and the possibility of anyone remaining anything but wide awake was simply non-existent. About half-past two one morning one of the sentries heard movement in the bushes outside our wire. Apart from a standing patrol at a ford over a wadi about a thousand yards away, none of our troops were at that time outside the bridgehead, so the possibility of the occupants of the darkness outside the wire being friendly was remote. The sentry quietly warned his comrades, and the parapets were manned in silence. No sooner had the men reached their positions, than into the bridgehead was hurled a bomb, which fortunately exploded harmlessly behind the parados. More bombs followed the first, and then the enemy opened fire, to which the squadron replied with rifle and Hotchkiss gun. A desultory fire fight continued for some minutes, then the firing gradually died away, and by three o'clock all was quiet. At dawn a patrol consisting of a troop was despatched to reconnoitre, and very soon fifteen prisoners were sent back with a message from the troop leader to say that the whole countryside appeared to be alive with sheep, which he was in process of rounding up. The prisoners were not Turks, as might have been expected, but armed Bedouin, one, who appeared to be the chief brigand, having received a flesh wound in the leg. The captives showed no unwillingness to loosen their tongues, in fact the difficulty was to stop them talking at the top of their voices, but as they were unable to understand our language, cross-examination proved entirely fruitless.

In due course the sheep were rounded up and brought within the precincts of our wire. It has been mentioned that the

bridgehead was a small one; it was only just big enough for the sheep! The commanding officer, crossing the river to investigate matters, had some difficulty in ploughing his way through them to the squadron headquarters. They were everywhere; they found their way into the trenches, into the squadron headquarters, into the thick scrub by the river, and those that could find no other place to go to remained huddled up in the open, while all kept up an incessant "Ba-a-a," "Ba-a-a," "Baa-a-a" until everyone became wearied of the sound.

It was obvious that the sheep had to be brought across the river, hence permission was requested to swing the bridge which for reasons of secrecy was normally only placed in position for use during the hours of darkness. This, however, was not granted, and it was therefore necessary to get them over in the ferry. The "ferry" consisted of a half-pontoon manœuvred by two sowars, but the average sowar is not an expert waterman, nor as a rule, has he had much experience of putting sheep into a boat. It may well be imagined therefore, that the task of getting some hundreds of sheep across a river with a swiftly flowing current by this method was likely to be a lengthy business. And sheep are unruly animals. You cannot expect them to clear the landing side in the same way as highly disciplined soldiers; nor do they always display that readiness to embark which is so essential to the smooth working of a transport service. And so it happened that when the Brigadier arrived shortly before midday to cross the river, he found the ferry and its immediate neighbourhood a seething, swarming, ba-a-ing mass of animated wool, while sweating sowars worked feverishly at the unaccustomed task of embarking and disembarking unwilling sheep. The Brigadier made a few terse remarks on the subject of keeping the approaches clear and getting the sheep back as quickly as possible, then passed on. By the time he returned the ferry was clear and all the sheep had been transferred to the western bank of the river.

They were a fine flock; big, fat-tailed sheep the very sight of which made the mouth water. The supply of all the necessities of life to the Desert Mounted Corps in the Valley by means of the one available road from Jerusalem to Jericho must always

rank as a fine administrative achievement, but the matter stopped short at necessities. Luxuries were beyond the capacity of the road, and fresh mutton was a commodity that did not occur in the Valley. It belonged to a period of our existence in the dim and distant past when we had been in England, while the New Zealanders had on occasions been heard to mention the words "Canterbury Lamb." But here were fresh muttons, several fat hundreds of them, waiting at our very bivouac doors. And the irony of it was that in accordance with orders received from the Brigade they were to be despatched without delay to Corps Headquarters. So much for our dream of a leg of fresh mutton for dinner in the near future—Unless? Even as the Adjutant stood with the Woordie-Major surveying the flock was the Great Idea conceived in his brain, for he remarked the fact that as the vast mass of sheep swayed this way and that, picking up here and there a nibble of barren grass from the parched and salt-soaked soil, some of the outliers of the flock strayed into the dense riverside scrub, now being lost to view, now reappearing, now becoming swallowed up again. "Woordie-Major Sahib," said the Adjutant, "these sheep have got to go to Corps Headquarters. Tell off the necessary escort and get them off as soon as possible. And Woordie-Major Sahib," added the Adjutant, with a faint flicker of his left eyelid, "some of the sheep appear to have strayed into the bushes; it will no doubt be very difficult to ensure that you have collected them all, that none remain behind." The Adjutant and the Woordie-Major had long worked in close partnership and absolute concord, and there existed between them a complete and thorough understanding. The ghost of a smile appeared on the Woordie-Major's lips, then died away. "Without doubt what the Sahib says is correct," he replied solemnly. "It will indeed be difficult to ensure that none remain behind—very difficult." And with that he departed, to arrange with the Police Dafadar for the despatch of the sheep—and we know not what other matters.

Meanwhile the Commanding Officer was considerably puzzled as to what construction to put on the affair. When a party of fifteen Bedouin, all armed to the teeth and accompanied by

some hundreds of sheep suddenly bumps into one of our posts and proceeds to throw bombs and open fire, it is difficult to draw any conclusion but that their intentions are hostile. It therefore seemed most likely that they had been despatched by the Turks, with the sheep as a blind, to gain information of our dispositions, and in view of the rumoured attack, this theory seemed all the more probable. The fact that they had been captured might have been due to some miscarriage of plans; moreover it was not possible to say that none had escaped with information. But the appearance and demeanour of the prisoners were not quite in keeping with such an explanation. They did not look the type who would subordinate themselves to the Turks, for they were fine, upstanding, aristocratic looking men, who bore themselves proudly, with the independent air of the true desert Arab, while all of them carried heavily embossed pistols and rifles and finely bejewelled swords. When questioned they had talked excitedly, in high-pitched tones and waved their hands towards the east, with gestures as if to indicate that they hailed from far away. Beyond this nothing could be gathered, and the result of their examination by an interpreter was eagerly awaited.

To the interpreter at Corps Headquarters, the leader of the party, his wound having been attended to, unfolded his tale. They had been despatched, he said, by the King of the Hedjaz, with five hundred specially selected sheep, a present to the British Government as a token of Arab loyalty. The enterprise had been a hazardous one, necessitating as it had done a long and perilous journey through hostile country at the time of the Ramazan, when the good Mohammedan may not take food or drink until after the sun has gone down. They had moved by night, remaining concealed during the daytime, often hard put to it to find water, frequently short of grazing for their flock. Emerging into the plain of the Jordan after crossing the Hills of Moab by a steep and tortuous path, they had been uncertain of their direction, and when they found themselves up against our wire they knew not whether they had met with friend or foe. Their method of announcing themselves had not been the one best calculated to convince us of their friendliness, but the

finger of the Bedouin is quick to the trigger, and—"He shoots best who shoots first" is probably one of their more common maxims.

Following hot foot on this information came a message to the regiment demanding an explanation of the deficiency in sheep. It appeared that only four hundred and eighty had reached Corps Headquarters, whereas the Bedouins swore that they had counted five hundred head the day before starting out on the last stage of their journey, and were quite certain that none had gone astray. What had become of the remainder? The regiment replied: (a) That a certain period of time had elapsed between the capture of the prisoners and the final rounding up of the sheep, and it was more than probable that some of them had strayed and become lost in the scrub in No-Man's Land. Patrols going out in this area would be warned to be on the look out for them. (b) That possibly some had remained concealed and got overlooked in the dense cover bordering the river, and that a careful search would be instituted in that area also. (c) That a report would be submitted forthwith if any more sheep were found.

Just about this time the quality of the meat ration underwent a curious change for the better. Instead of the tough and tasteless hunks from which the regiment had suffered for so long, there appeared on the table juicy and succulent joints the like of which had not been seen for months. Dinner, which had long since come to be regarded as a function, the performance of which was a necessary adjunct to keeping fit, reassumed the accustomed proportions of a pleasant meal, while in spite of the daily dust storms, it was even possible to derive a certain modicum of enjoyment out of lunch. About this time also, a rumour was current to the effect that a member of the machine-gun squadron, whose calling in civil life was that of butcher, had found material on which to practice his trade! Meanwhile the daily patrols scoured No-Man's Land without success, and the riverside bush had been carefully combed by a search party without any better result. A further enquiry as to whether any more sheep had been discovered was answered to the effect that

neither the patrols nor the search party had met with any success. This was perfectly true. They had not.

The days and the nights dragged out their weary hours until at last came the end of Ramazan. That night the atmosphere seemed charged with a certain tenseness and air of expectancy, for it was on the morrow, said rumour, that the Turkish attack would be delivered. But rumour was wrong, for dawn found the Valley quiet and peaceful from north to south, and nothing occurred throughout the day to mar the calm. The regiment was duly relieved in the bridgehead by a regiment of Imperial Service Lancers, and in the small hours of the following morning the Brigade began its march along the hot and dusty road towards Jerusalem. There was felt a general sense of relief at leaving the Valley, tempered only perhaps by the knowledge that a deterioration of the meat ration was to be expected. But after all, it was not to be hoped that the improvement could have been maintained indefinitely, and in any case the matter was a small one in comparison with the prospect of a spell of rest on the coastal plain, where the salt-laden breezes blow fresh and cool straight off the Mediterranean.

As the Brigade left the Valley and followed the road into the hills, a heavy bombardment broke out in the north. Down the Valley came the booming of guns, the sound duplicated and re-echoed by the hills, while the whole countryside in that sector was illuminated by flash of gun and burst of shell. As the Brigade rode further into the hills the sound of gunfire became fainter and fainter, until all that could be seen of the flashes was their reflection in the sky. Arrived at Taalet ed Dumm, the first stage on the road to Jerusalem, orders were received that the Brigade was to remain at half an hour's notice to move, in case the troops in the Valley should require reinforcing. It seemed as if for some reason the Turkish offensive had been postponed for twenty-four hours, and that this bombardment betokened the launching of their attack, which had been expected the previous morning. It was soon learned that a strong attack had been made in the northern sector, which had been repulsed with heavy loss to the enemy, many Germans, who complained bitterly of the lack of support afforded to them by the Turks, being taken

prisoners. Opposite the El Henu bridgehead a half-hearted attack by a force of Turkish infantry had been effectively broken up by a spirited and skilfully executed charge by six troops of the Imperial Service Cavalry, under a British officer. The news of the latter exploit came as gall to the regiment who had suffered all the unpleasantness of the protracted period of duty in that bridgehead, only to see the fun of a rousing gallop enjoyed by their successors.

In the excitement of these events the affair of the sheep died a natural, if somewhat lingering death, enquiries regarding the missing members of the flock ceased, and the matter faded, as most unimportant matters do, into oblivion. It was never known whether the story told by the Arabs was subsequently confirmed, or whether they were, as had originally been conjectured, "agents" in quest of information. Probably the only record of the incident now in existence is a short paragraph in the history of the regiment concerned, in which unit the affair is always referred to as "The Battle of the Sheep." It is termed by courtesy a battle, yet had the squadron standards, long abolished, still been in existence, perhaps the Rajput squadron would have laid claim for the inclusion on its banner of the device, "A Fat-Tailed Sheep, couchant, regardant."



THE SOMALI PONY

BY LIEUT. THE HON. A. F. PHILLIMORE, 9th Lancers.

THE Somali pony is a distinct breed of its own, though it is probable that it is partly descended from the Arab, to which it bears some points of resemblance. This is the more probable as the Somalis have always had much intercourse with Arabia and their ancestors are supposed to have originally come from that country.

The average height of the Somali pony is about 13.2 hands and 14.2 is about the maximum height to which they attain in Somaliland, although if reared on rich pasture, they would doubtless grow considerably larger.

In conformation and appearance the best of them bear favourable comparison with high-caste Arabs. They are sturdy, compact and set on short legs with plenty of bone. Many of them have splendid length of rein for their size, with long sloping shoulders and great depth through the heart. They tend to be better in front of the saddle than behind, though their hocks are generally fair and well placed.

This description only applies to the best of them as owing to their chance breeding one sees all shapes and sizes. Mares and stallions run wild together, coming into the nearest well to water of their own accord when they happen to feel thirsty.

The ponies bred by the Mad Mullah and used by him for his cavalry form an exception to this rule. For that astute old gentleman thoroughly understood the principles of horse breeding and the best blood in the country now is from his ponies.

The best ponies are all found in the eastern part of the Protectorate, those in the west having been crossed with inferior Abyssinian blood which tends to lack of stamina. The typical Abyssinian pony being a weedy beast not unlike an Indian Tat.

The Somali pony is in my opinion much superior to the Arab as a hack, because he has a good walk and trot and does

not stumble at those paces as an Arab does, while having an equally good canter.

They make excellent polo ponies being very fast for their size and naturally handy. They can be trained in an incredibly short time owing to their docile temperament, intelligence and perfect natural balance. A green pony that has been no more than backed can be trained and entered to fast polo in three months or even less. Moreover, fully ninety per cent. of the ponies trained make successfully.

It is extraordinary how such small ponies can carry a heavy man for two hard chukkas in an afternoon without becoming distressed. Especially as the grounds in Somaliland generally ride heavy owing to soft sand.

They are also excellent jumpers.

As mounted infantry ponies and for long marches in desert lands they are unsurpassed, owing to their hardiness and power of covering long distances with the minimum of food and water. During the numerous campaigns against the Mullah they proved their superiority over every other breed for the country.

There are at present about 150 ponies in the Somaliland Camel Corps. All officers and one complete company being mounted on them. Their normal ration is 5 lbs. of grain and 2 lbs. of bran per day with 10 lbs. of cut grass at night, but when on trek 5 lbs. of grain only is fed. In barracks they are fed twice a day, morning and evening, but on trek, at night only. During the middle of the day they graze loose under a guard. They are watered once a day generally during the afternoon. Stables in barracks are from 4.30 to 6 p.m.

They stand out of doors all the year round and are never rugged or clipped. Their coats never grow very long.

They are never shod, as the horn of their feet is so extraordinarily tough that they rarely become footsore even after marches over stony ground.

A normal day's march in the Camel Corps is 40 miles and the average pace 5 to 6 m.p.h. including halts.

The usual hours of marching are about 4—8 a.m. and 3—7 p.m., so that the march is performed in the cool of the morning

and evening, while the ponies rest, graze and water during the heat of the day and are fed on getting in at night.

The weight carried on the pony is reduced by having nine trotting camels with each pony troop, which carry rations, tools, trek line rope, watering sheet, dixies, greatcoats, dressings, lamps and 1,650 rounds of spare S.A.A. in mobilese. The pony therefore only carries the man with rifle, bayonet, 90 rounds of S.A.A., blanket, ground-sheet, grooming kit and one day's rations. A pony carries the Lewis gun with four magazines and another pony the ammunition, 16 magazines.

Given fair grazing and water obtainable once a day these ponies can keep up a rate of forty miles a day for many days. The company or troop forms a self--contained unit able to carry its own rations for three days.

It seems to me that these ponies used in this way might be extremely useful outside Somaliland where conditions of country and climate are similar. For instance, in Sinai, Palestine and Iraq during the Great War.

The Somalis' method of using his pony well illustrates its great hardiness. He does not use his pony as a rule for normal travelling, but only for raiding or to take an urgent message. On these occasions he will catch up his pony from grass, gallop it 50 miles and on reaching his destination turn it loose to fend for itself without so much as a rub down. The pony is seldom any the worse for this treatment and they never go in the wind.

The Somali on the whole has a good deal of affection for his pony and as a rule treats it well, except in his use of the bit. He uses an instrument of torture similar to an Arab bit. In normal riding he rides with an entirely loose rein, so that the severity of his bit does not matter. On special occasions, however, when he feels impelled to show off his skill in horsemanship, he will gallop his pony madly about, every few seconds jerking it violently on to its haunches. The result is appalling as the wretched animal's mouth is cut to ribbons.

The variety of colouring in these ponies is very great. Besides the more normal colours one sees every variety of duns and roans and pure cream-coloured ones are common. A dark bay is the favourite colour with Somalis.

“LAKE AND VICTORY”

Monson's Retreat.

BY COLONEL E. B. MAUNSELL, *p.s.c.*, late 14th P.W.O. Scinde Horse.

PART I.

THE general situation, as it was at the end of May, 1804, was roughly as follows:—

The Grand Army, enduring “indescribable misery” from the heat, was a week’s march from Agra, looking eagerly forward to obtaining sunproof cover in cantonments. Arthur Wellesley’s army in the Deccan was unable to move owing to the famine, and the General himself had been summoned to Calcutta to act as a sort of Chief of Staff to his brother, the Governor-General.

Monson, now reinforced by Don’s battalions from Rampura, was near Kotah, having departed from Lake’s instructions to block the line of the Bhundi hills. Before Lake’s protest could reach him he had actually moved further south, to the line of the Mokandra hills, some thirty miles south south-east of Kotah. He had with him five good Bengal sepoy battalions, some four thousand irregular horse and sundry contingents, furnished by the Rajput chiefs, a strong force if properly handled. These irregular horse were commanded by the ex-adventurers Lucan and Gardner, Gardner being in Jeypore’s service. Monson’s task, it should be emphasized, was not to pursue Holkar, but to block his return north into Hindustan.


The real pressure was to come from Murray, who was at Baroda, meeting with great difficulty in equipping his troops. His force consisted of eight companies of the 65th Foot, two companies being in Ceylon, the 84th Foot, the Bombay Grenadier Battalion, and three other sepoy corps, all good well-seasoned troops.

As war is largely a matter of character we will now study the leading figures of the drama to follow.

Colonel John Murray, 84th Foot, would appear to have been a staff officer rather than a commander—a distinction that is apt to be forgotten, and the mere fact that an officer is a success on the staff is frequently accepted as a guarantee that he can lead. He had done well on the Quartermaster-General's branch in Sir David Baird's expedition to Egypt in 1802. Napier, the historian of the Peninsular War, writing of him in command in South Valencia in 1813, where he proved, for the second time, a hopeless failure, states: "Although far from an incapable officer in the Cabinet, he showed none of the qualities of a Commander in the field. His indecision was remarkable."

Monson, on the other hand, was a soldier of the "damn your writing, mind your fighting" type so common at that period in the King's army, though not so common in that of the Company, where the officers, perforce, were better educated in responsible positions. Monson had displayed most extraordinary gallantry at Aligarh, where he was wounded. His experience, however, was confined to the "rough and toughs" of the 76th, and, like so many King's officers, he had little or no knowledge of sepoys. There were great numbers of King's officers who had been in India for years who knew nothing of the language even, and many merely regarded native soldiers as but differing little from the barrack hangers-on with the British corps, while a proportion were highly offensive into the bargain, beating and abusing any unfortunate who displeased them. Just at this juncture occurred an illustration of this in the Officer Commanding at Colombo ordering sepoys to attend Church parades. The Marquis Wellesley, not unnaturally, was furious at this stupidity and the officer was severely told off.

Although Monson paid the highest tribute to his sepoys, who thoroughly deserved it, it is evident that he knew nothing of their characteristics and distrusted them, and in this mistrust lay the whole germ of the subsequent disaster. His Brigade Major, unfortunately, was one Carr, of the 76th, as ignorant of natives as himself. Although Monson was a pleasant and amiable gentleman, popular both with King's and Company's



Col. the Hon.
William Monson
from a drawing by Lady Beresford,
at F. Weston (H. Hall).
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officers for this reason—there is an absurd picture of him at the mess table of the 76th on the eve of Deeg, when “the old boy,” as he is alluded to, was in a “mellow” mood—he was evidently one of the pig-headed type who would listen to no advice, and there were some excellent officers in his detachment who would have saved him. This characteristic was again noticeable after Deeg. He was, on the other hand, a great personal friend of both Lake and the Governor-General, and had shown himself to be a man of indomitable personal courage. He had only recently recovered from a spear thrust received at Aligarh, and had not taken part in the battles of Delhi, Agra or Laswari in consequence. He had not been tested in an isolated situation, but there were no indications of his being so utterly incompetent as he proved. He was, however, the senior brigadier in the army and this probably settled the matter, although Macan, a cavalry brigadier, would have been the best man for the job.

Opposed to these two mediocrities was Jeswant Rao Holkar, the most persistent, and, in a sense, the most formidable adversary with whom the British have had to cope in India, the first place being given to Hyder Ali, of Mysore.

In the operations about to ensue he repeatedly upset all calculations as to the course he was likely to take, deceiving not merely Lake, but Arthur Wellesley as well, a point worth noting. The latter, when war with this chief was threatening, fully appreciated his capacity and paid him the compliment of deeming him likely to prove a most formidable opponent.

Not merely was he a very brave man, tried time and again on the bloody field of battle, where he had suffered more than one disastrous defeat, but a very astute man to boot. His capacity for weathering adversity was astounding, and, had it not been for his predilection for cherry brandy—he could absorb nine bottles at a sitting, though his Prime Minister went two better with eleven—it is hard to say where he might not eventually have arrived. As will be seen, this kink was to prove the salvation of the British Raj in Hindustan, though, on the other hand, his extraordinary persistence eventually brought about his own salvation and the lowering of the British prestige in proportion—and this was not due to the soldiery, but, as usual, to politi-

cians. Thorn accurately summed Holkar up in the following words:—"His capricious disposition continually transported him to extremes. Sometimes he would assume the most stately deportment and array himself in most gorgeous apparel, with pearls and diamonds; all of which he would as suddenly, cast aside, and, with only a clout round his middle, ride a bare ridged pony through the camp. In the same spirit he was generous to his followers, though savagely inhuman to his enemies. It has been said, however, that amid this extravagance, bordering on madness, which was heightened by his immoderate drinking of brandy, he had a mind more fertile and quick of resource than any Mahratta, which made him an exceedingly dangerous foe."

The country through which Monson conducted his operations and the passes of Mokandra, Lakheri and Biana through which he fell back are now traversed by the B.B. and C. I. Railway. In 1804 the country was quite unsurveyed and but little was known of it to the Company's officers. The adventurers Lucan and Gardner, who were with Monson in the opening phases, doubtless knew it well. Under the crazy conditions of oriental politics, Holkar laid claim to much of it, while Scindhia did also, with the result that the unfortunate Rajput chiefs found themselves tributaries to both, and the area, none too fertile at the best of times, having been the scene of constant war since the memory of man, produced but little in the way of provisions. The two dominating factors, apart from that of supply, were the numerous rivers liable to flood in the rainy season, and the black cotton soil, which, when it became soaked, developed frequently into black bottomless bog. Only rough cart tracks existed and wheeled vehicles could only pass the lines of the Mokandra and Bhundi Hills at points several miles apart. These hills rise above the surrounding country to a height of four or five hundred feet only, but are steep, very rough and covered with prickly scrub jungle, the home of the bear, the tiger, and the panther. The inhabitants, as in most parts of India, differed in race in the most extraordinary degree, but most of Monson's earlier troubles in his retreat came from the Meenahs, a predatory tribe of some fighting value.

We will now turn to Murray, who, at the end of May, was, as we have seen, at Baroda. Arthur Wellesley, in his instructions, had given Ujein as the most suitable point to march on, and had bid Murray fight Holkar wherever he could meet him, deeming his detachment fully strong enough for the purpose. Lake, in the enquiry after Monson's debacle was well satisfied that Murray was sufficiently strong to give battle, even when Holkar's unexpected strength in infantry and guns subsequently became evident. The strength of the force was 5,800, including about 1,100 British infantry, that is to say, nearly as many as there were in the Grand Army. The fighting value of the Bombay sepoys, individually, was probably not as high as that of the Bengal, but as the discipline was better and as the men were less hampered with caste prejudices the collective value was higher. The Bombay Grenadier Battalion, on the other hand, which accompanied Murray, was as good a regiment as the Lal Paltan which was with Monson. Murray had no cavalry and he repeatedly complained of this, with same justice. A corps of irregular Mahratta horse, furnished by the Gaekwar of Baroda, our staunch but feeble ally, eventually joined him under a British officer, but these heroes spent most of their time plundering all and sundry and proved more bother than they were worth. Murray duly marched at the beginning of June and, by the middle of the month, had reached Dohad, some eighty miles from Baroda and nearly half way to Ujein. Here he dumped his heavy stores.

On June 30th he reached Badnawar, only forty miles west of Ujein. At Badnawar he received an important letter from Monson, and we now get an interesting insight into the old problem of “interior and exterior lines” as they were before the days of telegraphs and goods roads. We see “the fog of war” with a vengeance. He learnt that the Grand Army had fallen back to cantonments in Hindustan, while Monson proposed to halt on the Mokandra Pass, thirty miles south south-east of Kotah, pending further orders from Lake. Simultaneously, a report came in that Holkar was bringing an overwhelming force down to attack him. It would be of great interest to learn exactly the details of this report, but Murray's nerve failed him.

In Lake's words, written after full enquiry had been made into the circumstances:—"For reasons that have never been satisfactorily explained, Colonel Murray formed the extraordinary resolution of falling back behind the Myhee river, and fell back for that purpose." Lake was extremely angry when he heard the news. Holkar, in point of fact was the best part of one hundred miles off, near Mandasur, due north. Five days later, however, Murray heard that Holkar was moving north east, so he retraced his steps and reached Ujein, our ally Scindhia's capital, without incident, on July 8th, Holkar being then one hundred and twenty miles north, operating against Monson.

Murray's reasons for thus falling back in the first place were that he did not consider his force sufficient to meet Holkar at Badnawar, particularly as he had no cavalry owing to the irregular horse to be furnished by the Gaekwar not turning up. He had, moreover, lost many men from the intense heat. The 65th alone had buried twenty-one men in one day's march and nine the following day, the battalion having marched out five hundred strong. Altogether, he stated the march had cost him the best part of three thousand men—Arthur Wellesley was extremely sarcastic on this point. Murray had, for some time past, complained that he had not a strong enough force, but Wellesley told him, not in strict accuracy, that he had more Europeans than either he or Lake had had. The fact was, he did not possess sufficient confidence in himself, and lost his nerve. He does not appear to have been short of provisions and should have rendered a very good account of himself.

The rains began in earnest just before his reaching Ujein. His cattle were seemingly in a very exhausted state, though as to whether they were any worse than those of Arthur Wellesley in his Assaye campaign may be regarded as doubtful. As Holkar was now about the Mokandra, and no news of Monson being in trouble had reached him, Murray undoubtedly had some grounds for not moving far from Ujein. Later on he took over the whole of Holkar's possessions in that quarter, including Indore, his capital. Here the 65th Foot, during a violent

tempest, lost the whole of its camp equipage. The sickness in the battalion, great already, now almost prostrated it. When it marched out of Ujein in January, 1805, to proceed to Bhurtpore, the “fit for duty” strength was only 284, and in 1806, it had buried, since May, 1803, no fewer than 489 men, this number including the casualties in the Third and Fourth Assaults at Bhurtpore. Murray had expected to receive help from Scindhia’s officials at Ujein. Needless to say he was relying on a broken reed. That this officer had enormous difficulties to cope with is undoubted, a fact that Arthur Wellesley himself recognized very much later on. A more resolute officer would, however, have triumphed.

Turning now to Monson. He had halted at the Mokandra, thirty miles south south-east of Kotah to collect provisions. A reasonable precaution would have been to form a depôt at this point, but it was not done. The Kotah and Bhundi rajas were friendly and disposed to help by every means in their power. The Mokandra was an exceedingly strong position, unturnable by wheeled vehicles for at least ten miles on either flank and, in a technical sense, the line of the Mokandra range was considerably stronger for defence than that of the Bundhi Hills, the passages being fewer. There were great difficulties in communicating with Murray, whose movements were not accurately known and who was over one hundred miles away. The hirkaraks, or messengers, ran great danger in crossing the intervening country, which was full of Holkar’s predatory horse. Messages might take anything up to ten days or a fortnight to reach him. They took ten days, under reasonably settled conditions, to reach Lake at Cawnpore, three hundred miles off. The slow means of communication, which were, undoubtedly, of immense value to resolute, capable officers liable to interference from headquarters—for Arthur Wellesley had an absolutely free hand for this reason in the Deccan—was a disadvantage in the case of officers of the Murray and Monson type, the former of whom was a clever enough man, but with too much imagination, and the latter exceedingly stupid. As will be seen later, Monson was unable to differentiate between “orders” and “instructions.”

Although Lake had signified his disapproval of the move to the Mokandra he was a believer in "leaving it to the man on the spot"—and was thoroughly let down. As evil luck would have it, Monson, on reaching the Mokandra, was attracted by the bait of Hinglaisgarh, a small hill fort some twenty miles south west of the Mokandra Pass, an old heirloom of the Holkar family. He decided to seize it with the 2/2nd and Lucan's irregular horse, while the rest of the detachment, for some obscure reason moved to about Sonara, some twenty miles south of the Pass. Monson was evidently aware that Holkar was at no very great distance, for his despatch, describing the capture of Hinglaisgarh runs as follows:—"This detachment arrived within a mile of the fort at ten in the morning of July 2nd, when, from the circumstance of Jeswant Rao Holkar being within twenty-two kos (about forty miles), with the whole of his cavalry, brigades and guns, and it being the height of the rains, it became necessary that no time should be lost, and what can be done to-day should not be put off till to-morrow (*sic*)."

The place was carried by escalade at half-past two that day—the garrison was probably enjoying its normal mid-day sleep, as was the case at the storm of Seringapatam. Little or no loss was sustained, and, for a wonder, no British officer was hurt. It gives some idea of Lucan's magnetism as a leader that his irregular horse actually took part in the escalade dismounted.

The fort was of no value whatever, and the absence of Sinclair's battalion from the main detachment for the next five fatal days had most serious results. Monson, quite unnecessarily, had accompanied the attacking troops, probably from his extraordinary notion that, if there was a fight anywhere, he should be in it. Sinclair was an able officer who required no supervision. Hinglaisgarh taken, Monson rejoined the main body at Bhainsoda, some twenty-five miles south by west of the Mokandra. Then followed a series of inexplicable marches. "The tents were struck, sometimes in the morning, during the day, and sometimes at night," is the note in Don's Journal, to which we shall now make repeated reference. Monson's information at Hinglaisgarh told him that Holkar, with his whole force, was twenty-two kos off, a kos being a rather vague

measurement but generally reckoned as being something under two miles. This would indicate that he was well on the far side of the Chambal, a river which, even in the dry season, is some considerable obstacle owing to the rough and steep banks. As the rains had now broken it was filling rapidly, and the whole country was becoming difficult to move over owing to the universal black cotton soil. In strict point of fact, Holkar was only thirty miles off, close to the river.

On July 6th the detachment arrived at Peeplah—a very common name for Indian villages, merely indicating that it is a village with a pepl tree of peculiar sanctity, and here news came in that Holkar was at a passage over the Chambal nearest the small town of Rampura, which must not be confused with the Rampura of Tonk which had been taken by Don. In other words, Holkar was within twenty miles. The subsequent moves cannot be followed up with any accuracy on the map, but Monson apparently determined to give battle and attack should Holkar cross. The following day, July 7th, accordingly, he marched some seven miles to a village named in his report Goorah, but which Skinner, who was not present, tells us was Bhanpura. There had been heavy rain in the night. Here more news came in. Holkar was, undoubtedly, on the Chambal, and many of his horse, together with some of his regular infantry had crossed. At noon a second report came in that the enemy was hesitating and that numbers had re-crossed. At nine that night, however, came a third report. Holkar was, in person, at the crossing and, as the men crossed, was paying them out cash. His bankers had two lakhs of rupees in silver with them.

Just about this juncture—the actual date and time of receipt is uncertain—a report came in from Murray, over one hundred miles away, at Badnawar, stating his intention to fall back behind the Myhee. The message had taken over a week to get through, and the hirkarra had only passed through the enemy horse with great difficulty. Murray's message came as a shock to Monson, and the latter's ease was gravely disturbed by the alarming reports that came in of Holkar's quite unexpected strength. Each commander blamed the other, Murray being accused of falling back unnecessarily, while Monson, on the

other hand, was blamed for halting on the Mokandra, for Murray was, seemingly, under the impression that Lake had instructed him to press Holkar as far as Ujein. We get an admirable example of the fog of war, and those who have not experienced it—very few of those who have not been in battle have—cannot realize its paralysing effect. Men who are resolute enough when the situation is clear will often trend towards timidity when it is obscure.

We will now imagine ourselves in the Headquarter tent of Monson's ill-fated detachment, where a decision, or more properly, a series of indecisions, is being arrived at which is to bring misery to tens of thousands in Central India for the next fifteen years.

It is the night of July 7/8th, towards the height of the rainy season. The whole atmosphere is that of the steamy hot house. The tents are sodden and treble their weight when dry, and this, in the case of the big marquees in which the British officers live, is a most serious matter. The black cotton soil is already showing signs of degenerating into the bottomless bog it became within the next ten days, and men and animals slip and slither in all directions. Everywhere is the loud croaking of the frogs, while, round the candles dimly lighting the huge marquee flit innumerable winged insects, beetles falling with a thud on the table, flying ants and moths. Red-coated Monson, speaking bad Hindustani, or, as is equally possible, not speaking it at all, is entirely dependent on an interpreter to follow the clipped speech of Rajputana, and this is probably Lucan, the ex-adventurer, now of the 74th. Besides Lucan are Carr and Don, the latter one of the ablest of the Company's officers. The conversation is grave and earnest, but is interminable, for, from time to time, some new messenger is ushered in, usually a sardar of the irregular horse, interspersed with a hirkarra, in other words a spy, messenger or scout.

Outside is the sepoy guard, tall, fine looking Oudh Brahmins or Hindus, war hardened and wearing old, dirty uniforms—short drawers which were once white, tattered red coatees, squat, brimless shakos and black cross belts. The sentry stands at the "support," but the arms drill is not smart

as it is in the case of the more sternly disciplined Bombay or Madras sepoy.

Not far off is a group of irregular horse, the sowars—irregulars were termed sowars, but regulars, troopers—squatting by their ponies' heads, their lances stuck in the ground. Some wear steel caps with long spikes, and chain mail, but none are uniformly dressed. Their conversation is of loot and food. It is well on the cards that some talk of joining Holkar is starting already, for the troops have been marched, and counter-marched in a manner clearly indicating bad leadership. White soldiery would, under similar circumstances, be grouching without cessation and Monson would, without doubt, have earned some opprobrious nickname.

In the background are sundry hirkarrahs, all, or nearly all Hindus of high caste, frequently Brahmins, capable of bluffing their way where less saintly mortals dare hardly tread. Murray's man, hailing from Guzerat and therefore easy to mark down as of a different race, would, most certainly, be one. He has produced his chit from a quill hidden in his hair. The thin rice paper is barely three inches long and the message is in Latin or German. The hirkarrahs, irregular horse, deserters, prisoners, and flying peasantry all testify to the enormous numbers of the enemy. The exaggerations usual on such occasions make it difficult to sift the evidence of what is likely and what is unlikely, and Monson is not an officer sufficiently versed in his profession to be able to strike a reasonable balance, as would most of the senior Company's officers with much war experience. Don, unfortunately, has had no such experience, excellent soldier though he was to prove himself. One thing is evident, Holkar has checked his retreat and seems to be about to attack, though how and why a force which, only three weeks ago, was in what appeared to be in a state of utter demoralization, has recovered so quickly is hard to understand. The examination of a very black faced prisoner of the enemy horse, taken that afternoon, might have given a clue had time been available for his questioning. Monson, had he known anything of natives, might have recognized the man as having come from the Carnatic, and it is well on the cards that he had fought the

British under Tippu and Dhoondia Waugh, was at Assaye, and had only just joined Holkar, in company with a large and heterogenous force, with a great number of guns.

Monson, taking counsel of his fears, tots up the enemy guns to no less than 175, the regular infantry to 20,000, and the horse to anything up to 50,000. With the tales of Delhi, Laswari and, possibly, of Assaye, he pictures the formidable artillery of the European trained Brigades of Perron, deeming that Holkar's troops are of the same quality. The fact that Holkar is only paying out cash to those who venture to cross the Chambal does not occur to him as an indication of inferior moral.

It is, no doubt, pointed out that the best of armies, caught in the act of crossing such a formidable obstacle, is at an enormous disadvantage, but that a heterogeneous mob, such as that commanded by Holkar, must be in a state of confusion from which it will be impossible to extricate itself for many days. Not only Monson, but many others better versed in their profession, moreover, fail to realise that Holkar's artillery is only formidable if given time to deploy. Monson sees numbers only, a factor the most famous of our Indian soldiers, from Clive to Lake and Wellesley, have almost ignored.

Monson has, on that fateful evening, under his hand three and a half excellent Bengal sepoy battalions, with many first class British officers, a very fine corps of Hindustani irregular horse, under Lucan, and sundry other corps furnished by chiefs in alliance with the British, mostly unreliable in case of adversity. As to where Gardner is, with his corps, is not clear. He was somewhere in the neighbourhood, on Gardner's own showing. Skinner, who had no liking for him, confirms his being close to Monson. Monson's total numbers available probably amount to some 2,200 good sepoys, and about 4,000 irregulars. Looked at from the point of view of numbers the disparity is alarming, and one marvels at his having wandered about, within forty miles of Holkar, for five days minus Sinclair's battalion and another half battalion away on convoy duty.

On the other hand, the sepoy battalions are war hardened—in Lake’s words “a finer detachment never marched.” Used as a spear point, with the irregular allies kept for the time in the background, a bold advance might well result in driving in the head of Holkar’s horde and in the capture of many guns. Both Arthur Wellesley and Lake were emphatic on this.

Monson’s confidence in sepoys, however, is wanting. It is on the cards that, had he had his 76th with him he might have ventured, and we think that he would have. Officers with no knowledge of sepoys are often inclined to doubt them first of all, then to expect too much of them, and then to abuse them if they do not come up to the standard of the best British regulars. He is now thoroughly frightened, but, in the face of the above urgings to battle, has to find a still further excuse for not fighting. He discovers he has only two days’ rations. Possibly it is pointed out to him that the best way of getting more is to act boldly, for the local chiefs are not likely to assist a pusillanimous commander, and the enemy must have certain supplies which can be taken.

He will have none of it, and the unfortunate troops, for the third night in succession, are “lying on their arms,” which probably indicates that the outposts have been doubled and the men not on duty are accoutred, expecting attack. That the British officers are now becoming seriously alarmed at the incompetence of Monson is evident from a letter received at Bareilly by Pester about three weeks later.

Twenty-four years previously, certain of them remember, a Colonel Camac, at the head of 4,000 Bengal sepoys, had extricated himself by a bold night attack on Scindhia’s camp under circumstances not dissimilar to those existing at the moment, and Camac had been far harder pressed for provisions and allies than Monson is. Finally, after hawering the whole night, Monson gives orders for the baggage and bazaars to move off at four in the morning for the Mokandra, his bolt hole, the best part of fifty miles away, the first halt being at Sonara, about half way. The force will remain on its ground to give battle if Holkar attacks.

In the pitch blackness of a morning in the rainy season, accordingly, the menagerie of baggage animals of every type and description, and including quite a large proportion of elephants, started out. Swarms of women and children, and other hangers on accompanied it, and numbers of these unfortunates were destined to perish in the hardships to follow. When we reckon up Monson's force as amounting to about six thousand or so it is probable that the followers numbered some fifteen thousand or thereabouts. The numbers diminished as the allied contingents fell away until the followers and fighting men about equalled.

The fighting troops remained on their ground until nine in the morning, which would give the baggage a start of about seven or eight miles provided the going was hard and good, though, in the existing state of the soil the distance was probably nearer five.

The infantry and guns then moved off, there being no signs of Holkar's horse. Lucan, with the whole of the irregular horse, including the allied contingents, remained. As to what Lucan was supposed to do is not clear, and it is only fair to Monson to say that he may have only been intended to watch. Whatever the case, on Holkar's horse putting in an appearance, Lucan became involved in a fight with overwhelming numbers, a contingent, furnished by our supposed ally, Scindhia, under the command of Bapujee Scindhia, keeping well out of it.

Lucan was badly wounded and taken prisoner, and his own irregulars, having put up a magnificent fight, dispersed. Certain of the allied contingents, notably one furnished by the Rajput chief of Kotah, a Thakur of Coela, also fought well. Lucan fell into the hands of Holkar and was subsequently foully done to death by torture at Kotah. Thus perished this valiant free-lance, a man who, had fate been more kind, might have become famous, for not merely was he one of the bravest of the brave, but a skilled soldier into the bargain. Lake was much grieved that this officer, "to whose advice I was much indebted," had met his end.

Skinner, at this juncture in the Doab, but whose evidence is well worth studying, for he was in a position to get behind the

scenes in a manner impossible for most, states that Lucan could have got away almost unmolested, but “wanted to make a name for himself.” It is extremely probable that Lucan had been urging Monson to attack, and, in view of his repeated efforts, considered it his duty to show what could be done, but was let down by the defection of his allies.

Bapujee Scindhia now rode on to Monson, whom he caught up about noon, finding the troops halted. Monson, in his official report, made out that he was on the point of returning in order to extricate the cavalry, but Don tells us that the halt was merely made because the guns, all bullock drawn, had fallen to the rear in the heavy going. Bapujee, having broken the evil tidings, seemingly betook himself off altogether, and we shall hear nothing further of him for the next three weeks.

With regard to Gardner and his horse there is some mystery. Skinner, who disliked him, and this dislike was mutual, says he let Monson down. This is most improbable, for Gardner was a gentleman and an ex-King’s officer, though he was now in the service of Jeypore. It would appear that he was, at this juncture, on some detached duty, though at no great distance. He found himself cut off by the hordes of hostile horse, and it was only with great difficulty that he made his way back to Jeypore after his corps had dispersed.

His own account of how he finally joined the British is the most “tremendous” of all his tremendous adventures and capped all his previous efforts as a raconteur. Holkar was entering Jeypore territory and demanded from the maharaja “a certain European”—we see the touch of the dramatic so loved by Gardner. This was known to the British Resident, a Captain Sturrock, who was then living, as was very usual at this period, in a mausoleum near Jeypore city in default of a proper house. Sturrock, greatly to his annoyance, had an application made to him for a burial in the mausoleum precincts and had, perforce, to sanction it. The funeral cortege duly appeared, the bier being carried by Patans, in other words, Hindustanis. Instead, however, of moving to the grave, they moved into the building, when Gardner revealed himself as the corpse.

Monson duly reached Sonara at nine at night, the distance covered being twenty-nine miles, five furlongs, measured by Don's perambulator. Let those who know the muggy atmosphere of the rainy season appreciate what this distance means. The baggage, as might be expected, had strung out enormously, and the fighting troops passed cart after cart and bullock after bullock which could proceed no farther. The soldiery, fortunately, were in hard condition from much marching and there were few or no stragglers. Holkar's horse had not been seen and the march had not, in any way, been molested. It would, therefore, seem that Lucan had merely engaged a very advanced body.

Here Sinclair, with eight companions of his battalion, the 2/2nd, rejoined. Sinclair had apparently been ordered to leave a company at Hinglaisgarh, though for what conceivable reason it is impossible to understand, for, as we have pointed out, the place commanded no important route or passage. The garrison, moreover, was not fully rationed up. The two British officers left there did their best and begged the Kotah raja to assist them. That unfortunate chief, though willing to help, was so overawed by the approach of Holkar that he did nothing, and the upshot was the whole detachment fell into the hands of the enemy, seemingly when endeavouring to escape across country. The officers, Owen and Davidson, were put to death near the Bhundi Pass and the men were forced to take service with Holkar. It may have been these wretched creatures who, Shipp tells us, were all bayoneted by his comrades at the storm of Deeg. He describes them as drawn up with ordered arms, calling out for quarter.

The 2/2nd was a fine battalion, full of fight, and its arrival must have been welcome. The following day the detachment resumed its retreat, marching, once more, at four in the morning and the Mokandra was reached at noon, the distance being twenty miles. More baggage had dropped out. Camp was pitched behind a nullah, with the pass in rear. Again there was no sign of the enemy though small parties commenced to make their appearance the following morning, the 10th July. It had rained in torrents during the night and Monson had been

in luck reaching the Mokandra before it started seriously. The enemy numbers increased during the day and a detachment of a couple of companies of the 12th N.I., moving out to drive off a party of some 2,000, had some difficulty in extricating itself, Lloyd, the British officer being killed, though only half a dozen other casualties occurred. By evening the whole of the enemy, whose numbers were now estimated at something like 10,000 horse, drew off, though Holkar, in the meantime, had the temerity to demand Monson's surrender.

From the high ground on either side of the pass could be seen, at a distance of what cannot have exceeded a couple of miles, though Monson's report put it down at four or five, a large camp, with Holkar's flag conspicuous in the foreground. The British officers implored Monson to attempt a “beat up.” The sepoys were fresh and full of fight and, to still further favour the enterprise, a heavy storm of rain came on which lasted the whole night. Once more Monson havered, for identically the same reasons as before, and refused to risk it. Grave discontent arose among the British officers and the question of displacing him seems to have arisen. It will be remembered that Blair, then commanding at Agra, had, some twenty years previously, placed his commanding officer under arrest for incompetence and had thereby saved his detachment, and a not dissimilar situation was talked of at Delhi in 1857. In the latter case Nicholson would undoubtedly have been in the wrong. The matter can be argued out in many ways but, in the case of Monson, it is certain that enormous subsequent trouble and misery would have been averted.

Monson now fell back on his old argument about provisions, though Don makes no mention of any shortage and nothing is said of such in a letter received at Bareilly reporting Lloyd's death. The Mokandra was enormously strong, and, at that time of year, was the only route into Hindustan practicable for wheels for at least ten miles on either flank, and the distance would more likely be thirty. Skinner tells us that Monson “could have defied all the armies of India.” A couple of battalions, or even one, rationed up, could have blocked the pass completely, while Monson could have foraged and purchased rations in rear.

"After altering his plan"—a very significant remark in Don's journal—Monson again resolved on running away. Don was to act as rear guard with his battalion, the 2/8th, while Monson pushed on through the pass. The tents were to be left standing and fires were to be kept lighted. The abandonment of the tents, possibly, may have been due to their enormous weight when sodden, but the consequences were disastrous, for the men, in the drenching rain, went sick in shoals later on.

The Mokandra is one of the historic passes from Hindustan into Malwa and like sundry similar passes in Rajputana, is blocked by a high battlemented wall which climbs the heights on either side. The road goes through a gate which, when it rains heavily acts as a subsidiary sluice. On this fatal night there was a torrential downpour, accompanied by a terrific thunderstorm. The baggage and followers found it extremely difficult to get through the gateway, and it was only after superhuman exertions that the guns were worked through. Much has been written of the retreat from Kabul, but it cannot have exceeded in drama that night retreat through the Mokandra nearly one hundred and thirty years ago. The vivid flashes of lightning, the sheets of rain, the black rocks and jungle, with the heights on either hand, through which the sepoys had to force their way, impeded, at every step, by some baggage animal which had foundered. Let those who now pass through it in the comfort of a first-class railway carriage endeavour to visualize the scene. Meanwhile Don had moved back to the line of the parapet and was about to block the gateway with boulders when it occurred to him that he had not noticed two companies of the 12th, under Fetherston, which had been on duty at a ford in front of the camp. These were not under his orders and should have marched off with the rest of the detachment. It was found that Fetherston had been forgotten by the staff, and was still on the ford. On his coming in, Don had finished his barricading the gateway. At two in the morning, still in drenching rain, the rear guard moved off, but had not gone any distance before it found the whole of the guns, which the infantry had left behind. The gunners were vainly endeavouring to get them moved. This very factor gives some idea of Monson's state of mind. Don at once

got to work. Ordering the gunners to light their portfires, the sepoys hauled and dragged. The sight must have been an extraordinary one, the glares of the portfires spluttering in the rain, the straining men on the dragropes, the rocks and mud, and the rushing water. Over five hundred portfires were thus expended, and, after an infinity of labour, the guns were brought over the three miles of boulder-strewn track to the northern exit of the pass, where the rest of the detachment were halted.

The troops, as may be imagined, had passed a miserable night, soaked to the skin and unable to light fires to cook their food. A little after dawn the detachment resumed its march, and continued marching all day, the unfortunate half-starved bullocks dropping out every hundred yards, while the camels persistently split themselves in the greasy going, as camels will. By evening only fifteen miles had been covered, and nearly all the bullock carts had been abandoned, the Meenahs and other local inhabitants promptly plundering them. There was not a sign of Holkar's horse. The following day Kotah was reached, a total of thirty miles from the Mokandra, and by now no bullock carts remained at all. A more muddled and disgraceful retreat has seldom besmirched the British arms.


On arrival at Kotah, Monson visited the Regent, Zalim Sing, an able and honourable Rajput. This unfortunate chief must, indeed, have been edified at the conduct of the allies he had counted on, for, although the fighting troops had kept their formation and discipline, their appearance, soaked, hungry and mudstained, cannot have impressed him with the might of the great Company Bahadur. The tales of Holkar's enormous force, moreover, did not lose in the telling.


Monson asked for provisions, and requested the raja to take charge of a couple of twelve-pounders he found he could not drag with him. Don tells us the guns had been dumped there on the advance south.

We must remember that an officer, writing up his journal day by day, and under stress of great anxiety and hardship, will usually give vent to peevish utterances which cannot always be taken at their face value. Hence, when we read Don's

statement, " the raja acted with deceit, detaining some leagers of rum intended as rations for the European gunners," we must be cautious. Monson makes no accusation of treachery, but that the raja " equivocated," and Lake, writing to the Governor General on receipt of Monson's report, says " Zalim Sing has behaved nobly, and will, no doubt, suffer for it." Both in Skinner's memoirs and in Tod's Rajasthan it is apparent that the Rajput chief behaved both honorably and shrewdly in that he assisted Monson, and did so, moreover, in a manner which did not infuriate Holkar. According to Skinner the terms laid down by this chief were that Monson should fight, and that if he agreed to do so, he would be fully rationed up and would, moreover, be assisted with troops. Monson, terrified as before, persisted in his determination to run away. Even under these circumstances Zalim Sing helped the pusillanimous British commander. All honour to this Rajput chief, who was to suffer, as Lake foretold. A second phase of this disastrous retreat was now to open.

(To be continued.)





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THE PALESTINE POLICE AS A POST CAVALRY CAREER

By R. G. B. SPICER, M.C., Inspector General.

As a war time Cavalry officer, and since I now have the honour to command the Palestine Police, I think that an article on this Force may prove of interest. It is possible that the substance of it may be passed on to such men who are looking out for an appointment in which the horse can still be their best friend.

This Force maintains a mounted branch of 102 British Police. Vacancies are as a rule eagerly snapped up, but a few are generally available for the right type of man.

Below is the qualification paragraph of the Conditions of Service and I would point out that for the cavalry branch, the height standard is lowered by one inch, but beyond that there is no possible concession :—

QUALIFICATIONS.

“Candidates must be of good education, character and appearance. Age 20 to 25 and unmarried. Minimum height 5 feet 9 inches without boots. Ex-service candidates must have been N.C.O.'s with exemplary service characters and preferably with a first class certificate of education. When required for service in the mounted branch candidates who have served as N.C.O.'s or Troopers in the cavalry are considered. The minimum height for the mounted branch is 5 feet 8 inches.”

Applications to join the Force should be addressed to the Crown Agents, 4 Millbank, Westminster, who interview and select all candidates.

The starting pay is £P.11 per month, quarters, rations and uniform are provided, together with free passages after satisfactory completion of service. Leave is granted with free

passages every three years. Full information as to the conditions of service can, however, be obtained from the Crown Agents at the address given above.

Now as to the life, first let me say that a good athlete and sportsman is welcomed: Rugger, soccer, cricket, boxing, hockey and swimming, are all organised sports and play a very large part in our life; occasional station polo is organised in which all ranks take part, while those lucky enough to be stationed near Ramle are allowed to hunt their Government horses with the Ramle Vale Hounds.

The British Police live entirely apart from the Palestinian personnel, but work with them.

Each man on arriving whether mounted or foot is put through the Depot Training Course, this consists of instruction in every branch of Police duties, including the law, and lectures are given in the vernacular languages, Arabic and Hebrew, without a working knowledge of which no policeman can really be efficient.

To an ex-regular cavalryman no further equitation instruction is given, but having passed an equitation test, the ex-cavalryman is allotted a mounted branch vacancy and is posted to a station. Here he takes over his Arab horse, on which the whole Force is mounted, and straight away commences duty.

His duty largely consists of rural patrols. On these he goes out in a half-section with a Palestinian comrade, and patrols a large stretch of country visiting Arab villages and Jewish settlements, calling on the headmen or mukhtars, maintaining public security *en route*, and enquiring into such incidents or crime as requires police action. The routine generally is three patrols a week, two by day, one by night; his other days are free except routine duties, lectures, and standing by as a reserve. Each man does his own horse, of course, and no saises are provided. He gets one day's rest in seven.

After a year's service when he has time to acquire a knowledge of one of the two languages of the country he is given an opportunity of sitting for a proficiency examination with a prospect of increasing his pay by £P.1 per month if successful.

Generally, promotion is quick in the mounted branch, and



BRITISH MOUNTED POLICE, WINTER KIT



**SERGEANT CONOLLY, late R.A., CLEARING TRIPLE BAR
AT THE SPORTS, 1933**



BEST HORSE IN HAND, 1933



TENT PEGGING, 1933

keen intelligent young lads, as they become knowledgable, stand a good chance of advancement and may become Assistant Station Officers.

The married establishment, which is 15% of the Force, is now full, but vacancies occur from time to time, and in these cases free quarters or a separate allowance are given.

It is good riding country, and the horses are ideal for the work they have to do. Jumping and *haute école* are encouraged, and the British Police horses take a lot of beating in condition, turn out, and manners. The patrols are not by any means always hum-drum; highway robbers are often met, and dealt with, and the British Police have always shown up extremely well in these encounters. Mounted baton work in dealing with disorderly mobs is by no means infrequent, and I do not think any of the mounted branch could ever say their life is dull and without excitement.

We have men of nearly every regiment in the Force, and it is good to hear the old cries arising at boxing tournaments, football matches and the like, and it is good to see at our sports a real dapper little man come up for his cup and give that salute which only an ex-trooper can produce.

The mounted branch are nearly all split up into small police detachments of four to six or more, and attached to various stations and posts, and even so they produce an *esprit de corps* of their own. Our mounted men have on more than one occasion had the good fortune to win at the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force sports and have brought great credit to the Force in doing so.

Nearly every station has its own British canteen and billiard room, while there is organised sport at every post. Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa all have their picture houses, dances are the order of the day and the life is generally amusing.

I can recommend the life and the service for any keen cavalryman anxious to work and get on.

He will find himself back in the atmosphere of the Bible, he will patrol the Jordan, and the Dead Sea, he will move on his patrol through Jerusalem and the Mount of Olives, he will be stationed at Nazareth and stable his horse hard by Mary's well, he will probably help himself to a Jaffa orange as he trots

through the groves of Gaza and Jaffa, and at Tiberias, will as he works round the sea of Galilee, see descendants pulling in the same fish as those of the miraculous draft.

He will on patrol cover exactly the same ground as Allenby's cavalry, and will cross where the Bucks and Dorset Yeomanries made their famous charge.

It is not a loaf, it is real hard work, but as such it should appeal.





Madras Native Horse Artillery, circa 1820.
Note the blinkered horses, collar harness, and short jackets of the drivers.

OLD TIME MANŒUVRES IN INDIA

BY COLONEL E. B. MAUNSELL, *p.s.c.*,
late The 14th P.W.O. Scinde Horse.

As there is certain correspondence in the Press on old Drill Books, some account of early manœuvres in India, based on the book of 1792, colloquially known as the "Eighteen Manœuvres of Dundas"—and blasphemously by many other names—may be of interest. Soldiering in India being far ahead of that obtaining at home—there was "very great zeal for the Service" both among Royal and among the Company's officers—it is hardly surprising that attempts to work on this book were looked upon rather askance, and its merits were not recognised for some years. In 1802, however, we learn of what was probably the first attempt to enunciate its principles on a large scale in a big cavalry concentration at Kanauj, near Cawnpore. The whole of the cavalry in Bengal, with the exception of the 3rd Native Cavalry, the regiment destined, fifty-four years later, to set the ball rolling at Meerut in the shape of the Mutiny, were present. The camp would appear to have been the first of its kind in the history of the British Army. It was certainly the first in India and the total concentration would be a large one even as reckoned by present day standards, there being two

regiments of dragoons and five of native cavalry, not one of which corps is now existing. The fruits of the training were apparent in the great Mahratta War which broke out the following year, bringing Assaye, Laswari and Bhurtpore in its train.

We are indebted to a Captain Thorn, of the 29th Light Dragoons, an enthusiastic officer, for an account of the training, which was based on a "uniform system," in other words, Dundas.

The camp was commanded by a Colonel St. Leger, of the 27th Light Dragoons, a kinsman of the bibulous officer who was staying with our old friend Mr. William Hickey about this period, and Lake, the Commander-in-Chief in India, attended it.

The training was remarkable in that it was the first effort in the British Army to work horse artillery with cavalry, for it was, in the British service, a new arm. It took the form of two "galloper guns" attached to each cavalry regiment and manned by cavalrymen and not gunners proper. Thorn thus describes the success attendant on the work:—"Nothing could exceed the celerity and precision of the movements executed with them (the gallopers), by this vast body of cavalry, at full speed, whose combined movements, conducted in the most perfect order, and in a spirit of emulation, gave certain promise of the glory that was shortly to crown their labours." Those conversant with cavalry of twenty-five years ago will smile at the "full speed" in conjunction with "perfect order," what with mutton fisted dragoons and half-trained horses. To those who have sampled the comforts of present day manœuvres, with a waterproof sheet and a flea bag, with mud and slush in England or roasting sun followed by freezing night in India, the amenities of the Kanauj camp will be of interest, and, not improbably, of amusement:—

"The heat of the day was moderate, but the nights were cold, and many officers had not only glass doors to their tents, but brickwork fireplaces, by which they were enabled to enjoy the pleasures of an English fireside with their wives and families, who had been allowed to accompany them. These domestic comforts were heightened by the luxuries of the table,

where the finest wines of every clime, from the exhilarating Sheeraz of Persia, to the ruby carbonelle and the humble port abounded. In the evenings, the spacious ballroom, fitted up for the purpose, displayed an elegant assembly of youth and beauty, grace and hilarity, softening the cares of life, and removing every apprehension of danger. Between these enjoyments and discharges of professional duty, the intervals were filled in with field sports, to which the surrounding jungle of Kanauj offered ample scope. Here, amid lofty grasses, covering the ruins of splendid edifices and tombs of princes, lay concealed a variety of game, while beasts of prey, such as wolves, jackals and tigers, secluded themselves in retreats which formerly resounded with the voice of gladness, and witnessed the reciprocation of human kindness. On one of these occasions a tiger of the largest size was shot by General Lake, just as the ferocious monster was about to spring on Major Nairne, by whom it had previously been speared."

We learn, by a curious cross-reference in the journal of John Pester, that the tiger's skin, together with the broken spear head, were sent home to the Prince of Wales, the future George IV. That a kindly, courtly, much-beloved officer like Lord Lake was, indeed, the bosom friend of the First Gentleman in Europe is some indication that the latter was not entirely worthless.

Among officers present at this camp was a certain Carmichael Smythe, a young engineer. This was no other than the step-father to William Makepeace Thackeray and from him Thackeray is credited with having drawn much of the character of the immortal Colonel Newcome, for Smythe's financial ideas were much on a par with those of the Colonel. This Carmichael Smythe, incidentally, was acquainted with a Colonel Gardner, of Gardner's Horse, the present 2nd Bengal Lancers, a most fantastic raconteur—a polite term for liar—and from him was derived much of the skit "Major Gahagan."

With regard to the controversy regarding the two ranks of the American War, and the three advocated by Dundas, we have pointed out that soldiering in India was far ahead of that in England, and we find that the old Coast Army of

Madras had worked in two ranks for years. As early as 1780 Sir Eyre Coote had laid down this formation. In 1794, however, which would roughly correspond to the receipt of Dundas's work, orders were given that three deep should occasionally be practised, but merely for the purpose of assimilating to the Royal Army, and two deep remained the rule for all intents and purposes.

The association of the native cavalry with the dragoons worked wonders, for even the British officers had, for the most part, never so much as seen a British cavalry soldier. Only two of the six regiments in Bengal had been in existence for any length of time, and most only dated their raising back about five years. The two senior, moreover, had been irregular until 1796 and, as they were by no means the best, it is probable that they clung desperately on to all the objectionable traditions of irregulars as long as they could, for tradition, especially bad tradition, clings hard. These two corps, moreover, had disgraced themselves at Bittaurah, in 1794, when they bolted over their own infantry and had, thereby, nearly caused dire disaster. This affair brought about their "regularisation." On the other hand, it is evident that, at the outbreak of the Mahratta War in 1803 that the Bengal regular native cavalry regiments, despite the Kanauj camp, were deemed less efficient than the Madras. The explanation is easy. The Madras cavalry had been associated with the famous 19th Dragoons, the first Royal cavalry regiment in India, for over twenty years, and its imprint was firmly fixed on them. They had seen an enormous amount of service, while the Bengal regiments had seen little or none. The 27th and 29th Dragoons in Bengal, though good regiments, were by no means the equals of the 19th, which was, without question, the toughest and most efficient cavalry regiment in the British army at that period, for the cavalry at Home were by no means remarkable.

The training of the cavalry was for shock, pure and simple. Scouting and detached work was the function of irregular horse in the main. The lance had not come into employment with regular troops, though the 4th Bengal Native Cavalry were armed with lances some years later, largely as an experimental

measure. Dismounted work was not thought worthy of cavalry, for "jack boot prejudice," the inheritance of the Frederickian lines on which the British army was trained, was fast ingrained. It was not until the South African War, indeed, that this idea was finally killed. In any case, as only fifteen carbines per troop of seventy were carried much dismounted work was impossible. The upshot was that Lake suffered severe loss in a convoy which was scuppered *en route* to Bhurtpore in 1805, for the cavalry escort found themselves unable to protect it. In 1838 even, we find the 3rd Bengal Light Cavalry, with this fatuous armament, sent down the Haft Kotal in Afghanistan to escort a convoy from Peshawar to Kabul. The eyes of the officers were then opened, for they deemed it a mercy that the whole corps had not been destroyed.

The two best regiments of Lake's regular native cavalry were evidently the 3rd and the 4th, the 3rd being the regiment of which we hear most until and including the final explosion on that fatal day of May, 1857. Not one of his regiments survived the Mutiny. The Governor General's Bodyguard, formed in 1773, is the sole relic of the Bengal regular cavalry.

The galloper guns referred to were six-pounders, whose maximum accurate range with shot was about six hundred yards, and, curiously enough, we usually hear of them as firing shot only, rather than grape. It is essential to remember that they did not belong to the artillery at all as did the "battalion guns," which were attached to battalions. When the 8th Light Dragoons reached Lake in June, 1803, they did not take them over, ostensibly because they regarded working guns as no job for cavalry soldiers. In all likelihood the real reason was shortage of horses, combined with the fact that the men "had done but little in the riding way" as Lake's despatch put it. The regiment had spent three months on board ship *en route* from the Cape and another three months in the boat voyage up the Ganges, then the normal route up-country, and the class of man recruited was no horseman by nature.

The Experimental Horse Battery, the present "F" Battery, R.H.A. was, at this juncture, with Baird's expedition to Egypt and did not return to the Bengal Army until early in 1804. In

the opening phases of the Mahratta War it was the gallopers which did all the work. Fourteen years later, the gallopers, owing to unevenness in training and complications in command when working with Horse Artillery proper, resulted in their being all converted to Horse Artillery. Their history thus, in large measure, resembles that of the Vickers Guns attached to regiments in pre-war days.

The feminine society in the Camp of Exercise at Kanauij would be of interest to present day ideas. It would have included every grade of the female military hierarchy now to be found in India, plus one or two additions. Curiously enough we hear extremely little of up-country cantonment life in Bengal at this period, though the journal of John Pester, a Bengal infantry subaltern throws some light on it. That there were more ladies in the Upper Provinces than we would suppose, is however, evident. We know that Lake's wife and daughters were present, and it is almost certain that a certain Mrs. Carlton, the "dashing" lady of Colonel Carlton, of the house of Dorchester, was there also, for she was a dame who created a furore when she arrived at the Frontier station of Shikohabad in July, 1803, of all seasons on a globe trot across the Mahratta border to visit Agra. She was not the type to miss such an excitement as a big cavalry camp, and her husband was in the 29th Dragoons; albeit "he treated her very ill" (we are not surprised). These would have been the aristocrats, and would have been fawned upon by very many. The vast majority of the remainder, on the other hand, would probably be a good deal lower in the social scale than would be the case at present, when officers proceed Home more often and when more girls go out to India. The books of twenty years later teem with the termagants and viragos to be found among military ladies.

The most accurate pictures of military women, however, can be seen in Thackeray's works, though these omitted the half-caste element which was very common in India among officers' wives, for, in Bengal, though to a greater degree in Madras, there was evidently little or no objection on the part of most officers to marry girls "with a touch of the tar," and very many of the finest officers in the army of to-day are the outcome of

such unions. A further element were the "*chère amies*" who were to be found in most cantonments of any size. This element were quite distinct from the native women with whom most white men lived, and formed a small society of their own, which was, as a rule, far more entertaining than that of the "regular" ladies, who were, so often, obsessed with the importance derived from the shortage of white women in general.

We believe that Nairne's exploit in spearing the "tiger" is the first on record in India, though, from the Assyrian tablets it is evident that the Kings of Assyria indulged in the sport from chariots, an exceedingly dangerous pastime. Furthermore, as those of us who have hunted round Mosul are aware, the ground is stony, rough and full of holes in places. There panthers, presumably, came from the hills of Kurdistan, and we know that they were "bagmen," for the site of their dens is known under the mounds of Nineveh. The first officer to indulge in tiger spearing as a regular form of sport was that arch-thruster, Rollo Gillespie, "probably one of the bravest men who ever wore a red coat." While serving at Bangalore in 1807 with the 19th Dragoons he made friends with a neighbouring rajah, who arranged for a supply of tigers and panthers. The opening effort nearly proved a tragedy. Gillespie, a Colonel Welch and other officers had arranged for a tiger to be enlarged on Bangalore racecourse and the animal was duly brought on in a cart under a sepoy guard. When the cage was opened it refused to quit until poked at by a sepoy. It then took shelter under the cart and had to be poked again. It now became enraged and attacked the guard, who, most valiantly, attempted to bayonet it. After severely injuring four men it bolted, pursued by Gillespie, whose spear missed. It then took shelter under the race stand and injured a woman. It was then bolted and proceeded to chase Gillespie for a time and then honoured the bazaar, where an extraordinarily plucky native attacked it with a sword. It was finally shot. Several more tigers were tried later but panthers proved the better sport. Welch tells us that only one officer was badly hurt in this peculiar pastime.

*A PANTHER SHOOT WITH "RANJI"
IN KATHIAWAR.*

By COLONEL F. A. HAMILTON, late 3rd Cavalry.

"The beasts of the field and fowls of the air
And fish of the sea alike
Man's hand is never slow to spare
And ever ready to strike
With a license to kill and work our will
In season by land or by water
To our hearts content we may take our fill
Of the Joys we derive from slaughter."


—*Lindsay Gordon.*

ONE Christmas we stayed with a certain well-known Maharajah, at one time famous in the cricketing world, and afterwards a great patron of the game.

To start with we had some glorious days of mixed shooting, buck, chinkara, wolves, koolan, wild fowl, partridges and hares. The country and climate were delightful. We saw a lot of this fascinating country, travelling considerable distances each day in cars especially built for cross-country work. There hangs over Kathiawar, in Rajputana, a romance of its own, a country of kings and palaces, with memories of the chase and hard-fought battles. It has been the scene of much fighting in the olden days, and it is no uncommon sight to see a number of ancient tombstones, here and there, as you go along. These stones have a horseman carved upon them, such a stone marking the spot where some Rajput warrior fell in battle. Nearby will be another stone with only a hand carved upon it, showing the place where the warrior's lady committed "Suttee" by

throwing herself into the flames of her husband's funeral pyre, a custom now extinct. It was barbaric but none the less romantic.

After the third day's shoot His Highness said, "We must get you a panther before you go. I have sent the shikaries out to get news, and hope to be able to arrange a drive tomorrow." We spent a few hours on the following morning getting a mixed bag of partridges and other small game, had lunch by a lovely river, and were then taken towards the panther country.



"CARS ESPECIALLY BUILT FOR CROSS-COUNTRY WORK."

Typical panther country it was—sunburnt yellow grassy hills, covered with rocks and small bushes, intersected with nullahs, with some higher hills beyond, and on all sides with an occasional cave visible in their sheer and rocky sides. As we approached this country, passing through a village, we were hailed by one of the biggest men I have ever seen, the village giant, oldish in years, but gnarled and knotted like an old oak tree. He spoke in Gugerati, and told us that the panther had been located and marked down in a nullah, close to where he had killed a cow the night before; evidently a very big panther

as it was said to have carried the cow some considerable distance from the spot where it had been killed.

We motored on some distance and were met by the Maharajah's head shikari who led us to a small rocky knoll in the middle of some cactus where the kill was hidden, a dead cow, which by this time was distinctly elevated. He told me the probable line of approach of the panther, handed me a high-velocity Purdey rifle, and showed me a good rock to lie down behind. He then went off to start the beat.

To run a drive like this many beaters are required. From the rocky knoll on which we were, I could see hundreds of beaters, all in white clothing, at about 10 paces interval, many of them carrying kulharies (a weapon like a lightly made axe with a long staff to it). These kulharies have often been instrumental in saving a man's life when attacked by a panther or other wild animal. As soon as the signal was given for the drive to commence the beaters moved slowly in lines, selected beaters and shikaries being posted near where the panther had been marked. These latter throw stones at where they think he is. He is very reticent to leave cover and often takes a lot of dislodging. I was amazed to see the Maharajah's nephew in his leather coat and double-terai hat, quite unarmed except for a stick, coolly pelting stones at the panther, within fifteen or twenty yards of him. Throughout the time we were panther shooting, we were immensely struck by the bravery of this gentleman, and the gallant example which he set to the beaters.

Then began much noise, and throwing of stones, and beating of tom-toms, but still no panther came. Soon we heard a shout from one of the stops on a high hill away to our left, which told us that the panther had broken away in that direction. He had gone up a side nullah, we were informed later, and was very angry; so much so, that a wild sow who, inadvertently, happened to cross his path met with short shrift from him. He broke her back as a rat's might be broken by a dog. He was soon afterwards seen galloping towards a high hill in the side of which a cave was clearly visible. The beaters quickly headed him off, and turned him back into a side nullah, in the direction from which he had come. This necessitated us moving our

position to another point from which we could command his exit from the nullah.

The beat recommenced, giving us a thrill of excitement which was soon to pass away as we saw the beaters running back towards the cave for which he was again heading. We made for the hill as fast as we could, only to be met by the head shikari with a small piece of the panther's fur in his hand. The panther, which, he said, "was a big as a pony," had reached the cave, and rolled away the stone with which it had been stopped and which was supposed to be unmovable, and got in, leaving some of his fur on a sharp-edged rock at the entrance.



"PANTHER COUNTRY."

Great was our disappointment! It was too late to do anything more that evening, and, as we were due to go on to another Indian State next day, the only feeling left was that of an aching void. There was nothing to do but to drive home, leaving behind us abandoned hope, and a country which, in the winter sunset, looked stern and wild, but none the less vastly attractive.

But all was not yet over; we had reckoned without our host. This Maharajah does not like a failure, and would not have one if it could be avoided. On assembling in his ante-room before dinner, His Highness told us that we must stay another day and have another panther drive. He had arranged to send us next night, in his own private train, to D—, and we should reach there in plenty of time for the Christmas Day


duck shoot. "And now," said "H.H.," "what about some dinner, and I have some real Napoleon brandy which I should like you to try, come along." Then followed a most entertaining evening with a very charming host. The conversation was mostly of sport, and produced interesting and somewhat amazing stories.

Talking about failures in panther drives, it was related that on one occasion the Maharajah was very angry with one of his shikaries for allowing a wounded panther to break back through the line of beaters, and to take refuge in a small cave, more like a large hole. He accused him of being of no use as a shikari, and called him a chicken-hearted fellow, or words to that effect. "Your Highness," said the man in Gujarati, "I will show you that I am neither useless nor chicken-hearted." Thereupon he proceeded to enter the hole, and in due course was pulled out by the legs, bringing with him, by its legs, the wounded panther, which luckily for him, his fellow shikaries dispatched forthwith.

I asked Captain H., the Maharajah's nephew, about a dog which I had seen with the beaters that day. A large country dog with a hard rough coat. I was attracted by his very keen and alert look, and his almost uncanny behaviour during the drive, especially when the panther was anywhere about. "That dog," said Captain H., "was once snatched up by a panther and dropped after being carried a short distance, but not before he was badly mauled. He recovered in due course and now has an almost uncanny knowledge of the whereabouts of a panther, a knowledge born of hate and longing for revenge. He is indispensable to his owner, who is a shikari and devoted to the dog. This dog used to go for and maul dead panther, so that his teeth sometimes spoiled the skin. The Maharajah said that if this continued the dog must be destroyed. "Kill me if you like," said the man, "but spare the dog." Eventually, as a compromise, he was allowed to file down the incisor teeth of the dog.

Next day, at breakfast time, we were told that two panthers had been located some distance from yesterday's beat, and that one of them was our elusive friend, the big fellow, who had





OUR HOST—"RANJI."

beaten us the day before. He had left his cave during the night, and again killed a cow, at a place called Samana, and had been joined by a pal who was with him in a certain nullah. We started out at about 10 a.m. and reached the ground in two hours. The Maharajah was already there, and at once took us in charge, pointed out the beaters, hundreds of them, the place where the panthers were marked down in a deep nullah, and what he thought would be their probable line of advance. He then handed me his double-barrelled Purdey with which he had shot most of his big game. Another rifle was handed to B. He gave us his own special man to keep watch for us, and showed us the best place to sit and wait. After about twenty minutes a whistle sounded in the distance, which told us that the beat had started. From our place of concealment we looked down on a stony grassy nullah, with patches of water here and there, overhung with bushes, excellent cover for any animal coming up or down the nullah. Opposite to us was a sheer precipice which appeared to be insurmountable, even to the most nimble of animals. We waited for some fifteen minutes in intense excitement, and then I saw a movement in the long grass; but, surely, not of a panther, he could not keep as low as that. No, it was only a jungle cat, apparently quite unaware of the danger he would have been in had there not been larger game about. He was a pretty little creature, standing about twelve inches high at the shoulder and three feet long, with a beautiful silky coat. Was he the advance scout of the panthers? I had heard of them being so used by the larger animals. He sat down in the long grass just opposite to us and licked his paws. Let us leave him there for the present.

I turned again and looked up the nullah, and there approaching, crouching right down on his belly, was a large panther, his coat unusually dark in colour, and shining like gold in the sunlight. I let him come on, watching him as long as I could until he was in the long grass opposite to me. I dared not let him go further, and, seeing his head and shoulder clearly, I fired, aiming behind the latter. Then followed the quickest movement I have ever seen in any animal. He bounded up the rock face opposite, and along it until he came to the overhanging

branches of a tree, disappeared into the middle of it, and crash! down through the branches he fell with a thud, into the wet sandy part of the nullah, stone dead. The first shot had got him behind the shoulder and wounded him mortally. He lived for a few seconds only, during which short space of time he sprang and covered thirty yards along the rock face, in a mighty effort to get out of the nullah. It was a very unusual



"CARRYING KULHARIES."

thing to see a panther crash through the branches of a tree, and the final crash and thud of the heavy body was most thrilling. So much for number one! What about his pal? We had not long to wait, and in about ten minutes he came, a magnificent specimen, walking proudly and showing himself very clearly; no crouching or slinking about him; but then he had not been rattled about the day before like number one had. (We, after-

wards, discovered that it was our elusive friend of yesterday who crashed through the branches.) Number two, suspecting nothing, walked nobly past; when he had reached the limit of the margin of safety, a shot through the head killed him



"A VERY UNUSUAL THING."

instantly. Each panther measured exactly 8 feet from nose to tip of the tail. A very good measurement, and that they were both the same length was a peculiar coincidence.

But, you will say, what of the jungle cat? He never moved until we entered the nullah, and then he stole, silently, in the

open, down the nullah, stopping and turning once, as much as to say, "You are too much of a sport to put me in the bag; I must be off to my family." We let him go and tell his family a tale of two panthers.

SUMMARY OF RULES AND PRECAUTIONS TO BE TAKEN WHEN
TIGER OR PANTHER SHOOTING.

The following was given to me by a friend who had then killed 98 tigers. He was a well known conservator of forests, and had written them out himself.

SHOOTING ON FOOT.

1. Avoid firing at a tiger whose body is directed towards one, unless one is sure of one's aim; as a precaution allow him to turn to one side.
2. If a tiger is coming towards one, unless sure of one's aim, allow him to get to one side, or even past, before firing.

OVER A KILL.

3. At night if the demonstrations of a tiger prevent one's men coming to the foot of the tree, the sportsman who descends and returns to camp does so at his own risk.
4. A tiger which has been wounded over night, and has gone any distance to water, will probably not die, and is probably near the water.
5. A tiger which has been wounded over night and has made no attempt to reach water is probably mortally wounded. He will not tolerate being shifted much.

GENERAL.

6. Most accidents occur through surprise attacks.
7. In following up a wounded tiger let the shikari have as his object the locating and surrounding of the tiger before attempting to kill it.
8. Do not follow blindly along the trail with the chance of stumbling on to it, the tiger will move away until he makes up his mind to make his own attack at his own moment.
9. Wounded tigers lie up in cover which consists of nullahs, jungle, rock, grass or any combination of these four, in

fact, any spot which is more concealing than the general average of the surrounding country.

10. Approach all cover with caution and stone it before entering it, taking up a position of advantage beforehand.
11. A wounded tiger cannot be moved indefinitely from cover to cover; sooner or later he will turn.
12. A tigress will shift more often and more easily than a tiger, and is less inclined to charge home.
13. All tigers charge down hill much more readily than up, and are much more difficult to stop when doing so.
14. Look upon all tigers which show the slightest sign of animation as dangerous animals, and continue firing until all such signs have ceased.
15. All wounded tigers are dangerous; more so according as the wound is situated in the stomach, or low down in a limb, or is a flesh wound, or a wound in the liver (less so), or high up in the limb, or the lungs, or the back.
16. In following up a wounded tiger study all indications which show the nature of the wound.
17. Do not attempt to gather a wounded tiger at night or at dark; wait till next day.
18. If charged, stand still and reserve fire to the last moment, especially the second barrel.
19. When a tiger comes out, remember general rule 14 and thus if possible avoid a dangerous follow up.
20. If trustworthy men can be spared, have three or four men in trees at intervals of 100 yards behind to act as markers.
21. If there is time to do so, and one's temperament permits, delay some time before following up.

FOLLOWING UP WOUNDED TIGER AFTER THE BEAT.

22. Select three or four of the best men only to accompany you. Others follow at a distance behind. Insist on silence.
23. Do not attempt to track yourself; look out for the tiger instead.
24. Remember the general rules, especially 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 15, 16 and 18, as they will almost all be applicable.

25. If the tiger growls or shows up in any way, put a man up a tree; he can often see it and can be joined.
26. If the tiger has been located, or there is a strong probability that he is in a particular covert, surround it with men in trees, get into a tree covering the most likely track, and have the tiger stoned out from the safest side. Men can advance with comparative safety from tree to tree, after stoning, provided some remain up as markers.
27. Stone the opposite side of a nullah before crossing.
28. Do not follow a trail down the bottom of a nullah; stick to the edge of the bank opposite the tiger, and in advance of the trackers.
29. Never follow up a wounded tiger up a steep hill or ravine side. Put men in trees at the bottom; go round and come down from above, see general rule 13.
30. Be particularly on your guard against relaxing precautions after the hunt has proceeded some time and exhaustion has set in.
31. Use buffaloes or cattle to drive out a tiger located in otherwise impossible covert.



MODERN CAVALRY HEAD-DRESSES

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL J. E. N. RYAN, T.D.

PART II. DRAGOON GUARDS AND DRAGOONS.

DRAGOONS formed with Cuirassiers the earliest Line Cavalry in most European armies, their origin going back to the early seventeenth century. Originally French, their name is derived from that of their arm, a short musket called a "dragon." The earliest dragoons were mounted men trained to fight on foot, becoming during the course of the eighteenth century gradually transformed into Cavalry pure and simple. Their origin as a sort of mounted infantry is still, however, reflected in their modern uniforms, the scarlet tunic of the British, and "Pickelhaube" of German dragoons, closely resembling the respective articles of dress worn by foot-soldiers in these armies.

The seven regiments of Dragoon Guards and three of Dragoons which formed the Corps of Dragoon Guards and Dragoons in the British Cavalry before the re-organisation were raised as follows: The Dragoon Guards as regiments of Horse during the reign of James II (1685-1688), while the Royal Dragoons and the Royal Scots Greys were formed earlier in 1661 and 1678 respectively, and the Inniskillings later in 1689. The head-dress worn till 1812 was the cocked hat evolved from what was originally a round hat with a broad brim. In that year a leather helmet with a horse-hair tail, copied from the French model, was worn for the first time. This was changed about 1824 for a black glazed helmet of Roman form with a bearskin crest, which in turn gave place in different regiments between the years 1830 and 1834 to a brass helmet of similar shape the metal crest of which bore

in front a lion's head, which could be detached when the bear-skin crest was worn. During the period 1843 to 1846 a black horsehair mane was substituted for the crest.

In 1855 (during the period of general dress reform initiated by the Crimean War), a new type of helmet designed under the influence of the Neo-Gothic and which was the precursor of the modern dragoon helmet, was authorised. It was of brass or white metal, both front and back peaks being richly decorated. In front on a shield was an eight-pointed star, upon which was a garter bearing the title of the regiment and enclosing the Royal Cypher. Above the shield was a crown, and below curving upwards a wreath of oak and olive leaves. The helmet was surmounted by a horsehair plume varying in colour for each regiment.

The modern helmet (see illustration No. *I 2) was introduced in 1870, being modified in 1890 with less ornamentation and better shape and proportion. It is of brass for Dragoon Guards, and white metal for the Royal Dragoons, the only dragoon regiment whose full dress head-dress is now a helmet. Resembling in form the helmet of the Household Cavalry, it differs in certain details. The pointed front peak is separated from the body of the helmet by a wreath of laurel, and this with an oak leaf band extending down the back forms the sole ornamentation. The helmet badge—an eight-pointed star, in white metal for Dragoon Guards, yellow metal for the Royal Dragoons, having within it the Garter with motto—though so described in the Dress Regulations differs from the Garter Star proper as worn by the Household Cavalry, as the centre consists not of a cross, but of the regimental device or number.

Before the advent of khaki the helmet had in marching order a spike only, the plume being reserved for full dress.† This horsehair plume falls from a slender fluted socket supported on a cross-piece base as far as the bottom of the helmet, being secured by a rose screwed on to the stem of the plume.

* CAVALRY JOURNAL, October, 1933, page 586.

† The practice of wearing the full dress head-dress in marching order is still customary in the Household Cavalry, the helmet, which crumples easily if packed, being worn minus the plume with khaki, when changing station by road between Knightsbridge and Windsor.



1

2

3

VII

Germany—

1—9th (Hanoverian) Dragoons.

2—Mounted Grenadiers.

3—Bavarian Light Horse (Chevaulegers).



1

2

3

VIII

Russia—

1—Forage Cap (Officers).

2—Dragoons (Old Head-dress).

3—Cossacks—“Papácha.”

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL—No. 91.

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The colour of the plume varies for each regiment, being red for the K.D.G. and black for The Bays, the band in each case having a white plume. For the Royals the plume is black, with white band plume. In the newly amalgamated regiments the colours of the plumes are as follows : 3rd Carabiniers, black and red, band red and white; 4th/7th D.G., white, band black; and 5th Inniskilling D.G., red and white, band red plume. The curb chain chin-strap* is attached to the sides of the helmet by rosettes.

The Scots Greys, the only Cavalry Grenadier regiment in the British service, wore at first an iron helmet common to all cavalry of the period, until the blue cloth Grenadier cap, of which the Museum of the R.U.S.I. possesses a specimen, was introduced for this regiment about the time of the battle of Dettingen in 1743. The red flap in front has embroidered thereon the White Horse of Hanover given by George II for their service against the Jacobites. From 1768 the head-dress was a black bearskin cap with peak and a brass plate in front, and encircled by a plaited line. This cap was worn at Waterloo, which was commemorated by an Eagle badge on the head-dress. During the Crimean period the cap became like the present model which is a plain bearskin cap without peak, with a white hackle feather on the left side in a grenade socket. Worn in the back of the head-dress for the troops is the White Horse of Hanover in silvered metal. The band has a scarlet hackle drawn over the top of the cap.

The tunic is now scarlet for all Dragoon Guards and Dragoons, the blue tunic of the Carabiniers being merged in the amalgamated regiment. Dragoon Guards are, of course, distinguished from Dragoons by their velvet facings.

The eighteen regiments of Yeomanry Dragoons in the Territorial Force before its reconstruction were authorized to wear a white metal helmet similar to that of regular dragoons, except the Norfolk Yeomanry which had a black metal helmet of foreign shape with a yellow plume. The tunic was generally

* It is of some interest to note that although the curb chain chin-strap is universal on modern British Cavalry head-dresses, the Germans used only the older model of over-lapping metal scales, while the French employed the first on Light, and the second on Heavy Cavalry head-dresses.

blue after that of the Carabiniers, only six regiments having scarlet, and one—the Essex Yeomanry—a green full dress. The purple facings of the 2nd County of London Yeomanry (Westminster Dragoons) were almost unique, being shared by two other Yeomanry regiments only—one, lancers, the City of London (Rough Riders), and the other, hussars, the Oxfordshire Yeomanry. Three of the four existing dragoon regiments are authorized to wear blue. The uniform of allied regiments of Canadian Militia Dragoons is also similar to that of British dragoons.

The ten (now five) divisions of French Cavalry contained thirty-two regiments of dragoons classified with the cuirassiers as heavy cavalry. The senior of these, the 1st Dragoons, was raised as the Royal Dragoons in 1656 and is thus five years senior to its counterpart in the British service. The helmet introduced in 1786 was of similar form to that later given to the cuirassiers, but with a leopardskin mount instead of one of black fur. It remained almost the same for a hundred years, the principal changes being a bearskin crest worn instead of the horsehair mane for a short period after Waterloo, and a white instead of a red side-plume before the Revolution and during the Bourbon Restoration. The modern helmet taken into wear in 1889 resembles the cuirassier helmet already described, being of polished steel with brass crest and horsehair mane, the back peak being formed of overlapping metal bands connected by brass studs. There is, however, no front plume, and the side plume reaches only to the height of the crest. The helmet was similar for all French dragoons, the regiments being distinguished by a number on the képi and on the collar of the braided dolman.

The twenty-eight regiments of German dragoons ranked as light cavalry, although descended from mounted infantry armed with musket and bayonet raised by the first Hohenzollern of note, Frederick William, the Great Elector. In this capacity the Brandenburg dragoons came greatly to the fore in the victory over the Swedes at the battle of Fehrbellin in 1675. The cocked hat worn till 1808 was changed in that year for a shako resembling that of the infantry, having for the officers a plume

of cock's tail and for the troops a large cylindrical black and white pompon. The shako and coatee lasted in the Prussian cavalry till the period of general dress reform in 1842-1843, when the "Pickelhaube," higher than the modern model, was introduced with the tunic.

The modern head-dress dates from 1860, and is a black patent-leather helmet of burgonet shape, with the angular front peak of the old Prussian infantry pattern. Usually a spike only was worn, but for full dress this was replaced by a horsehair plume, white for Dragoon Guards and the Baden and 25th Württemberg regiments, and black for all other dragoons, the trumpeters having always a red plume. The badges and fittings of yellow or white metal corresponded with the tunic buttons, and the helmet for officers has four gilt stars on the plume base. The badge for the two Guard regiments was the Guard Eagle with Star, and for the Prussian line regiments the special Dragoon Eagle with Sword and Sceptre, excepting the 3rd Dragoons or Mounted Grenadiers who had the Guard Eagle but without the Star, and grenade rosettes for the chin strap. (See illustration No. VII 2.) The Eagles of the two Hanoverian regiments bore the inscriptions "Peninsula, Waterloo, Göhrde" and "Waterloo," recording their service in the King's German Legion. (See illustration No. VII 1.) The German dragoons other than Prussian had, as helmet badge, the Hessians the lion rampant, the Württembergers the lion and stag, and the Baden regiments the griffin, the Oldenburg and Mecklenburg dragoons being permitted to incorporate with the eagle badge the Arms of the Grand Duchies. There were no Saxon dragoons. The tunic was light blue, except for the Hessians who wore dark green. The head-dress for all reserve officers in the German cavalry was the dragoon helmet, with the "Landwehr" cross in the centre of the badge. (See illustration No. VII 1.)

The Bavarian Light Horse ("Chevaulegers"), whose name denotes their former connection with the Austrian army, comprised eight regiments corresponding to the Prussian dragoons. They wore a double-breasted green tunic resembling the "ulanka" of the uhlans, but with shoulder straps instead of

epaulettes, "Swedish" cuffs, and without the piping in the seams. *(See illustration No. IV 1.) The plastron of the colour of the facings is separate, and was worn in full-dress only. The "Pickelhaube" has the Bavarian heraldic double lion gilt or silvered, with the motto "In Treue fest," and for full-dress a white plume. (See illustration No. VII 3.)

All German cavalry wore on the right side of the head-dress a metal cockade in the Imperial colours, black, white and red, the non-Prussian regiments having in addition a cockade in the State colours on the left side. The round forage cap was light blue (Hessians, dark green) with band of the facings, and had always in front a double cockade.

The splendid cavalry of the Austro-Hungarian army, with a strength of eleven divisions equalling that of Germany, was recruited on the model of the Empire, on a racial basis, the dragoons being Austrian or Czech, the hussars Hungarian, and the lancers raised in Polish Galicia. They were clothed according to their nationality, the dragoons having light blue tunics worn with a pelisse and red breeches common to the whole of the cavalry.† Cuirassiers there were none, all of these regiments having been converted into dragoons after the war of 1866. All regiments wore in the field on the head-dress in summer a spray of oak leaves, and in winter a sprig of fir.

The Austrian dragoons were first raised like those of the other European armies in the latter half of the seventeenth century, and like them exchanged about the year 1800 the cocked hat for a helmet, which resembled that of the Imperial infantry with a small hair crest. The modern helmet was practically the same as that introduced about 1850. It is a light black enamelled metal helmet with a small front and back peak, and a black metal crest bound with brass. (See illustration ‡No. III 2). For officers the crest had gilt sides ornamented with a dragon. The helmet badge is the double eagle, representing the Germanic and Roman Empires united by Charlemagne in the year 800 as the Holy Roman Empire, the twin

* CAVALRY JOURNAL, October, 1933, page 587.

† The dragoons forming the Cavalry of the Austrian Bundesheer continue to wear a field grey pelisse with the steel helmet.

‡ CAVALRY JOURNAL, October, 1933, page 586.

heads being joined by the Apostolic Crown. On the breast is a heraldic shield with the initials F.J.I. surrounded by the Collar of the Golden Fleece. The eagle grasps the sword and sceptre in the right claw, and the orb in the left. The Cavalry forage cap for the troops was folding, of scarlet cloth.

The Russian line Cavalry became in 1882 composed entirely of dragoons, all the former line hussars and uhlans having been so converted. The uniforms of Prussian pattern which had been adopted by the Tsar Alexander II were changed to a general model consisting of a dark green double-breasted jacket of national cut fastening without buttons. An Imperial Edict of December 1907 abolished the loose uniform, and re-introduced German uniforms for parade with a grey field service dress.

The head-dress for all dragoons (Dragúny) before the last reorganization was a cylindrical cloth cap in the form of a truncated cone, of the same colour as the regimental facings, with sides of astrachan fur. (See illustration No. VIII 2.) There are lines of braid around the top and across the crown. The badge is the Byzantine double eagle adopted by Ivan the Great, Grand Duke of Moscow, upon his arms as successor to the title of Eastern Emperor after the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453; his grandson Ivan the Terrible was the first Tsar. It was in brass or white metal, and was distinguished from its Austrian counterpart by a shield with St. George and the Dragon. Certain regiments had above the badge a scroll inscribed "For Distinguished Service." The head-dress for the dragoon regiments not re-converted into lancers and hussars in 1907 was, except for three which had a round fur cap with a cloth top, a black leather helmet with a sausage shaped plume worn across the helmet, white for the regiments formerly cuirassiers, and black for the others. For the Mounted Grenadiers of the Guard the back of the helmet was prolonged as a red cloth bag-tail falling behind forming a unique head-dress. The other Guard Dragoon regiment wore a bell shaped shako.

The three Scandinavian countries have each regiments of dragoons in their cavalry. The Swedish dragoons wear in full dress a black "Pickelhaube" with a badge of the national Arms

and a black horsehair plume. For the Life Dragoons the plume is white. The uniform is light blue. A high "Austrian" cap is worn with service dress. The two Danish dragoon regiments have a black leather helmet with a forward curving crest after the Austrian model, bound with white metal. The helmet badge is a white metal Sun with the national coat of arms. It is also worn with a complete light blue uniform. The Norwegian Light Dragoon head-dress is a shako.

The cavalry of the countries of the Iberian Peninsula also includes dragoon regiments. The Spanish dragoon helmet is of steel with brass plate and spike and with in full dress a white plume. With it was worn, before the introduction of khaki service dress in the Spanish army, a light blue double-breasted tunic and scarlet pantaloons; in winter a dark blue pelisse trimmed with black fur was worn over the tunic. The round forage cap (see illustration* No. V 5) resembles in shape that formerly worn by the British Cavalry. The helmet of Portuguese Light Dragoons—Caçadores a Cavallo—is a black "Pickelhaube."

There remains the small but efficient Swiss Cavalry, consisting of Guides and Dragoons, whose full-dress head-dress before the Great War was a shako with a front and back peak like the postman's cap lately abolished, and which was worn throughout the Swiss army, the Guides having a white and the Dragoons a black drooping plume. A dark green double-breasted tunic was also universal. The present head-dress is a high képi resembling the Italian model worn with grey-green service dress.

* CAVALRY JOURNAL, October, 1933, page 587.

(To be continued.)



DIVISIONAL CAVALRY

BY MAJOR BALCK, 18th Cavalry, German Reichswehr.

(A translation by special permission from the Militär-Wochenblatt of 11th February and 4th March, 1933.)

I. FIGHTING TASKS.

TASKS, which involve fighting, must always enter into the duties of divisional cavalry; yet they constitute some of the most debated of tactical problems. Officially such tasks are regarded as not falling outside the normal, the only necessary condition being that an appropriate reinforcement of artillery, of heavier arms and of highly mobile infantry should be allotted to the mounted troops. Nevertheless, the opinion is often expressed that such missions should not be imposed on reconnoitring detachments, since, once the latter have been in any way battered in action, this precious arm may fail to procure information of real value to the higher command. In spite of such opinions reconnoitring detachments on manœuvres daily receive fighting missions, and this procedure is certain to recur on active service, for the question as to whether the reconnoitring detachment is to fight or not will always, on the spur of the moment, be answered in the affirmative. Consequently it becomes urgent to examine the problem as to what the higher command may well expect from the fighting activity of its reconnoitring cavalry.

Let us first turn to history. At the Battle of Tannenberg in 1914 we find that the Prussian Ist Army Corps, after breaking through the enemy at Usdau on 28th August was heading south towards Soldau in order to deal with the Russian Ist Army Corps, before beginning its pursuit in an easterly direction. As soon as it was recognised, during the early hours of the 28th, that there was no need to contemplate the possibility of any heavy fighting at Soldau, General von François set in

motion the cavalry of both his divisions, together with that of the XXth Army Corps, towards the east so as to cut off the retreat of the enemy in front of the advance of the XXth Army Corps.

The 8th Uhlans, reinforced to a strength of seven squadrons, together with one field battery—with twenty-four grenadiers seated on the limbers for the purpose of serving as escort—and one cyclist company, received their orders at 6.25 a.m. It was not until about noon, that is four or five hours later, that the detachment stood assembled west of Gross Koslau (*see Sketch No. 1*) and then advanced to the south of Neidenburg across the R. Neide against the road of the Russian retreat extending from Neidenburg to Mlawä. Further north the 10th Regiment of Mounted Jägers received similar orders. Both these regiments, supported by their artillery, forced the passage of the R. Neide in the face of Russian defensive posts, and then by means of artillery and carbine fire attacked the Russian transport columns as they were retreating southwards. The latter partly changed direction eastwards, partly remained under fire.

The night of the 28th-29th was spent by the 10th Mounted Jägers in Neidenburg, while the reinforced 8th Uhlans began to withdraw some $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles westwards at 7.30 p.m. in order to obtain an unbroken night's rest. As the roads were being used by the advancing columns of the Ist Army Corps, the Uhlans only reached their destination at 11 p.m.

Next day both these Divisional Cavalry units scored decisive successes. The 10th Mounted Jägers, reinforced by means of one battery, at 5 a.m. on 29th marched off in the direction of Willenberg. Three times during the course of the day Russian columns, which were attempting to cross the main road Neidenburg—Willenberg in a southerly direction, were attacked by artillery and carbine fire, as well as with cold steel, and forced to turn northwards: 300 prisoners were taken and Willenberg was reached in the course of the afternoon.

The 8th Uhlans, in spite of a fatiguing march after starting at 5 a.m., headed southwards over the main road Neidenburg—Willenberg. Its reconnoitring group reached Willenberg as

early as 6 a.m., when it reported the Russian main body as being on the march from Kannwiesen towards Willenberg. At Janowo the regiment unaided dispersed a flight of Russian aviators, and at Roggen obtained the surrender of a Russian column of about 1,000 vehicles which had evaded the German encircling manoeuvre on the Neidenburg—Willenberg road: 4,000-5,000 prisoners were secured.

While the Ist Army Corps was blocking the Russian retreat southwards, the XVIIth Army Corps moved down from the north to complete the encirclement. At a distance of one day's march in advance of it, the reinforced Cavalry Division was moving forward with the 5th Hussars, strengthened by means of one battery, pushed out on the right flank. Moving parallel to the main road Neidenburg—Jedwabno, then occupied by the Russians, this regiment on four occasions attacked Russian columns by means of artillery and carbine fire, as well as with the lance, while the enemy were attempting to swerve off to the east, and so forced them to turn back; all the villages became hopelessly blocked with the Russian transport. On the evening of the 29th the Hussars fell into the middle of the fleeing Russian columns and secured the important road junction at Kaltenborn after a dismounted action. This place was held during the night 29th-30th by the Hussars; and so this most important line of retreat was closed to the Russians. Throughout the night all the enemy's attempts to regain the place were beaten back by artillery and carbine fire, until at dawn on the 30th, their ammunition supply having failed, the Hussars withdrew with the loss of two guns.

In the case of the German 35th Infantry Division, which was making contact to the east, light columns were formed out of the squadrons of the 4th Mounted Jägers, machine-gun companies, field artillery and infantry carried on vehicles. These were rushed ahead of the main body and were able to attack the flank of the Russian columns retreating from Kaltenborn via Kannwiesen towards Willenberg. The Russians were thereby headed southwards into the arms of the Ist Army Corps.

Of particular interest is the activity of the most easterly column. Commanded by Major-General Hahn, a detachment, composed of the machine-gun company of the 176th Infantry Regiment, two squadrons of 4th Mounted Jägers, three batteries of light field howitzers, had pushed forward southwards via Ortelsburg. At Gross Schiemanen this detachment effected its junction with the 10th Mounted Jägers, who were advancing to this spot from Willenberg. At the former place these combined forces attacked some Russian columns who were struggling eastwards: 500 prisoners were taken. At the same moment gun fire from the northwards became audible. This was occasioned by the appearance of the Russian VIth Army Corps from the eastwards in an effort to relieve the situation in the direction of Ortelsburg. The Russians there struck the flank of the German XVIIth Army Corps, whereupon the 176th Infantry Regiment, which had been weakened by the withdrawal of its machine guns and unsupported by artillery, was threatened with disaster. The Cavalry Division then intervened decisively. Without receiving orders, marching to the sound of the guns, the 10th Mounted Jägers at about noon attacked the unprotected southern Russian flank. Very soon Hahn's detachment also appeared at that spot bringing with it 6 machine guns and 18 light howitzers. This attack, striking a most sensitive quarter, rolled up the Russian 18th Infantry Division, which disappeared eastwards.

The share of the Cavalry Division in the victory of Tannenberg is thus not small. From Sketch No. 1 it can be understood how the Russian masses were pressed back and huddled together by its action. It is certain that the detachments of field artillery allotted to the cavalry played a conspicuous part in these successes; still, it is clear that their participation in the fighting would have been impossible without the bold intervention of the mounted troops by means of lance and carbine attacks, as well as by their reconnoitring and defensive activity.*

* *Note.*—It is important to avoid creating the impression that the encirclement of the Russians was entirely due to the action of the Cavalry Division. It must emphatically be stated that this encirclement would never have become possible without the remarkable marching performances of the infantry in its efforts to reach the scene of action. Further discussion of this subject cannot be undertaken within the limits of the present article.

Another example.* On 7th July, 1918, the Italians set in motion an enveloping attack against the western wing of the Austro-Hungarian front behind the R. Vojusa. Whilst one Italian infantry brigade carried the weakly held sector Pojani-Levani, and repelled an Austrian battalion that had been launched to a counter-attack, the 22nd Cavalry Regiment (Cavallegieri di Catania) had ridden forward against Fieri making a detour to the north. Here this regiment destroyed an aircraft landing-ground, took the bridge over the R. Semeni at Brustar, and turned the headquarters of the 97th Infantry Brigade out of Fieri. Counter-attacks by 1½ battalions and 1 squadron, it is true, within a very short space of time drove back the Italian cavalrymen from Fieri. Yet in spite of this check the blow dealt by the Italian cavalry had gained the day.

Wild rumours concerning the capture of the brigade commander and the loss of the only road of retreat open to wheeled transport caused the entire front, which had, on the whole and up to that moment, held fast, to take to flight. As the belief gained ground that the crossing of the R. Semeni at Brustar had fallen into the enemy's hands, there was a rush to the eastwards. Thirteen guns, which could not be dragged away by the tracks that alone were open to the retreating Austrians, were abandoned and found by the Italians, after having been destroyed. The Italian cavalry had in spite of its tactical defeat, achieved everything that could be expected of it at so small a cost: that is an aerodrome and communications had been destroyed, headquarters driven back, the enemy's reserves drawn out against itself, and the hostile retreat forced into the most unfavourable direction.

The two examples of Tannenberg and of Fieri prove that the entry of the divisional cavalry into battle may be tactically desirable and can achieve great results. The objection may, however, be raised that in these instances forces had been involved from which better results could be expected than from the modern German reconnoitring detachments which now amount to one or two squadrons. Yet the German cavalry at Tannenberg and the Italians at Fieri had no machine guns at

* Note.—See Sketch No. 2.

their disposal. If we take into account the equipment of light and heavy machine guns, which is now possessed by a modern reconnoitring detachment, we may conclude that its fighting power has increased in spite of the lower number of squadrons which it possesses. It therefore follows that, when reinforced by artillery, it is capable of employment on similar tasks: it must be trained accordingly.

B. FRENCH VIEWS ON DIVISIONAL CAVALRY.

The centre of gravity of a German reconnoitring detachment is situated in its patrols, which proceed at a distance of 6 to 7½ miles in front of the main body of the detachment. All important lines of approach, that is roads, are occupied by patrols. These advance by bounds which have been calculated in advance; they report at stated times and to appointed places. The detachment follows the patrols as a reserve by a series of fixed bounds. The commander himself checks the progress of his patrols from the reports sent in to him; according to necessity the patrols can be drawn in, strengthened or driven forward. Action with hostile reconnoitring bodies is not to be avoided. There is a clear conviction that the best results of reconnaissance will be attained only by fighting. The results of any success must be quickly exploited; the mode of procedure must be essentially characteristic of cavalry action.

In contrast to German practice the French have evolved an entirely different system which must be taken into serious account.

A feature of the French divisional cavalry, *groupe de reconnaissance*,* is its lack of armoured cars and of armour-fighting weapons. The *voitures armées*, together with light machine guns carried on side-cars, constitute little more than a fire reserve that can be quickly moved at the wish of the commander of the reconnoitring detachment (Cavalry Regs., para. 39, Part II). The presence of heavy machine-gun ammunition to deal with "road armour," as recommended by military literature as late as 1932, may be taken as being rather a pious desire than any material reality.

Note.—See Appendix.

Whereas the Germans expect to receive information relative to the enemy from their reconnoitring detachment, a principle to which all else is subordinated, the French Inf. Regs. II, 88, state, "The reconnoitring detachment is above all else an organ of security. Under certain conditions it constitutes a mobile fire reserve of the division"—the same is found in their Cav. Regs. II, page 7, Preface. Accordingly, the *groupe de reconnaissance* becomes an advanced guard to the advanced guard; moving $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 5 miles in advance of the infantry point, its task becomes that of protecting the leading elements of the advanced guard against the fire of medium-calibre ordnance. Patrols are only pushed forward in order to protect the detachment against the surprise fire of hostile infantry. (Inf. Regs. II, 89.) On the two pages which are devoted to provisions for the use of the *groupe de reconnaissance divisionnaire*, there is only to be found the briefest reference to reconnaissance. Paragraph 91 runs: "If the *groupe de reconnaissance* comes into contact with the enemy, it will attempt to discover the main outline of the enemy's dispositions and the gaps therein."

What the French expect from their *groupe de reconnaissance* is something quite different from the results of reconnaissance; it is security. Under such conditions reconnaissance alone may yield its results too late. So an encounter action must ensue in which there is no true security; yet the latter has been sought at all costs. Then, in order to obtain such security against long range fire, the French cavalry division moves by detachments at a rate of 1 mile per hour across country. It should, therefore, be an easy matter in this age of motors to force the French to accept battle in unfavourable circumstances; yet it is desired to fight only under favourable conditions. The French wish to make the enemy first disclose his plan, so that the commander may then attack his enemy, in a position of his own choice, by means of a well concerted artillery and small arm fire-plan supported by good observation of fire. The enemy will finally be disposed of by a well calculated thrust of the reserve. Without any uncertainty, without taking any risk—Security! These conditions are to be brought about by the *groupe de reconnaissance*. At a distance of a few

kilometres in front of the advanced guard, moving by bounds from one commanding position to another, it is intended to grant the cavalry commander the choice between two or three battlefields, whereon he may carefully prepare his ground to receive the enemy's attack.

The old "army advanced guard" is resuscitated; we find it in military literature again in the guise of the 2-3 *groupes de reconnaissance divisionnaire* allotted to an army corps; it has been reinforced by a motorized battalion or by an infantry regiment with artillery (see Dambert; "Le groupe de reconnaissance," *Revue de Cavalerie*, 1932). In accordance with this all-pervading desire for security the *groupe de reconnaissance* is to adopt a special mode of procedure. Patrols in the German sense of the term are lacking. Alone on the main road, pushed forward a few kilometres, one can find a leading patrol. Next comes the mounted squadron deployed across the entire width of the sector under reconnaissance; the horsed heavy machine guns follow as the *échelon de reconnaissance*. The four troops of the squadron are kept close together side by side, and these comb out the ground in front and to the flanks by means of small, short-range patrols. The main direction leads from one observation post to another as previously arranged by the squadron commander. The entire *échelon de reconnaissance* thus proceeds by bounds from one prospective battlefield to another. At every halt contact is established between various elements by light-pistols and despatch-riders. Next comes another bound. The centre of gravity of the reconnaissance resides in observation.

This wave is followed by the leader of the *groupe de reconnaissance* with the cyclist squadron and the motorized elements in the guise of *échelon de combat*.

No portion is exposed to risk; security is sought even in trifles. If the enemy is discovered, it must be ascertained how many automatic weapons he has disclosed per kilometre of front: that will present some picture of his strength. If he is weak, a thrust must be made with the *échelon de combat*, otherwise the troops must go to earth and thereby allow the divisional commander a better prospect of selecting his battle-ground. By night, contact must be maintained.

In defence, when the enemy is as yet far distant, still no patrols are required. The *échelon de reconnaissance*, now styled *échelon de surveillance* and composed of cyclists and mounted men, is to occupy a line of commanding observation posts. The *échelon de combat*, now called *échelon de résistance*, is kept well back in a central position. With this reserve it is desired to sally forth and give the enemy his *coup de grâce*, when he has been fully reported upon by the *échelon de surveillance* and caught in its fire-plan. Security!

In August, 1914, these two French and German methods of reconnaissance stood in opposition. In advance of the R. Sambre stood the Cavalry Corps Sordet in a central position. At every report of the enemy it advanced and always arrived too late, until finally it disappeared behind the R. Sambre with worn-out horses without one single success to its account. On the German side, the cavalry corps of von Richthofen was always riding straight to the decisive point, and so able to gain clear information for General Headquarters, while it procured security for the following armies and saved its own horses.

Even in France criticism has arisen, and manœuvres have shown that in practice the command of the *groupe de reconnaissance* when practised according to French principles brings in its train not a few serious difficulties.

It is a grave handicap to the French cavalry that it should possess no armour-piercing weapons and no true armoured cars nor motor-cycles. The *voitures armées* can be of no value for reconnaissance; indeed, they would better be replaced by horsed vehicles, since the distances, which it is intended should be traversed by them, are too short for the speed of the motor car. (See Pichon: "*Les groupes de reconnaissance aux manœuvres de 1931*," *Revue de Cavalerie*, 1932, p. 65.) The cyclists can be excellent, but owing to the lack of cavalry protection on the flanks will remain inferior to the hostile horsemen. They could not parry any tank attacks owing to the want of cross-country reconnaissance. Only the horsemen and the horsed vehicles are really mobile over every nature of terrain and capable of action therein.

In the sphere of command also considerable difficulties have been discovered. At present it seems impossible to command the *échelon de reconnaissance*, as now proposed, in the guise of a single, homogeneous, unit. During the manœuvres of 1931 the unified command and direction of horsemen, motor cars and cyclists did not give satisfaction. The *groupes de reconnaissance*, according to the manœuvre in prospect, began to break up and work independently; they ended by finding themselves in those uncertain positions for battle which it had precisely been desired to avoid. In spite of these drawbacks, the French appear determined to cling to their system—and seem compelled to do so since they cannot get rid of the basic idea of security. The Frenchman serves but one year!

The deficiencies in armament may doubtless shortly be remedied, although in this respect it should not be forgotten that the difficulty, with which France is faced, during the present economic crisis and in view of the cessation of reparations, is that of equipping for battle an army of millions with the newest armament.

APPENDIX.

French Army Corps and Divisional Cavalry.

1. *The Groupe de reconnaissance de corps d'armée* is constituted as follows :

H.Q. Cavalry Regiment.
 Motor-Cyclist despatch riders—number varies.
 Squadron (independent—*hors rang*)
 $\frac{1}{2}$ Cavalry Regiment (*groupe d'escadron*) H.Q.
 2 Squadrons.
 1 Squadron (machine guns and special weapons).
 1 Cyclist Squadron.
 1 Motorized Platoon.

ARMAMENT :—

2 Squadrons	16 light m.gs.
1 Squadron	4 heavy m.gs.
					2 light mortars.
					1-37 mm. gun.
1 Cyclist Squadron	6 light m.gs.
					4 heavy m.gs.
1 Motorized Platoon	8 light m.gs.
					2 armoured cars, each with 2 auto- matic weapons*.
					2 motor cycles, with sidecar; each 1 light m.g.
					1 W/T lorry.

*Lightly armoured; only fit for use on good roads; not fitted with reverse gear.

2. The *Groupe de reconnaissance divisionnaire* consist of :

‡ Cavalry Regiment (*groupe d'escadron*) H.Q.

Motor-Cyclist despatch riders—number varies

1 Cavalry Squadron

1 Motorized Platoon

1 Cyclist Squadron

1 Motorized Squadron

} OR

ARMAMENT:—

1 Cavalry Squadron	12 light m.gs.
1 Cyclist Squadron	6 light m.gs.
				4 heavy m.gs.
1 Motorized Platoon	8 light m.gs.
				2 armoured cars, each with 2 auto- matic weapons.
				5 motor cycles, with sidecar; each 1 light m.g.
1 Motorized Squadron	6 light m.gs. motor borne.
				4 heavy m.gs.
With Special Platoon	8 light m.gs.
				2 armoured cars, each with 2 auto- matic weapons.
				5 motor cycles, with sidecar; each 1 light m.g.
				1 W/T lorry.

C. REGIMENTAL CAVALRY.

For many years the allotment of portions of the divisional cavalry to individual parts of the column of route, advanced guard, main body, and flank guard, has become a regular custom. In proportion as the infantry regiment grows into a mixed unit of all arms, in like measure does it need an increase in this mounted detachment: the latter must then become an integral part of the infantry unit, and can no longer be regarded as part of the cavalry division. The first to adopt this plan have been the French; on mobilization they allot a troop, composed of reservists and mounted on requisitioned horses, to each infantry regiment. These troops number 1 officer, 25 N.C.Os. and men with 27 horses. They carry sword and carbine but possess no automatic weapons.

It is not without interest to examine how the Frenchmen propose to employ their troop. In the "*Revue d'Infanterie*" (August, 1932), one Lieut.-Colonel Caille discusses the appropriate employment of that troop in a specific case; this study possesses great interest for German soldiers, since it throws

much light on the "approach tactics," *marche d'approche*, of the French.

The *groupe de reconnaissance divisionnaire* is holding a strong sector of a river front against an enemy who has been reported as approaching. The French division, 6 to 7½ miles in rear of its *groupe de reconnaissance*, is seeking to occupy this sector of the river. An infantry regiment on a front of 1½ miles advances. According to German views the cavalry troop would perhaps have been strengthened by means of cyclists, collected from all sources, while the three accompanying machine-gun sections (9 heavy machine-guns) and the one section of artillery would rapidly have been pushed forward to the river with a view to supporting the divisional reconnoitring detachment. At least one "wave" of patrols would have been sent to the river. But such measures are firmly rejected by the French, who consider that there is too little security for the patrols working on the front. The advanced guard throws out an *échelon de reconnaissance* composed of two companies, which will push forward four platoons according to the width of front occupied by them; and with these the possible scene of battle is combed out. The cavalry troop, after parting with a few orderlies, etc., for the battalions of the main body, is divided among the four leading platoons of the *échelon de reconnaissance*. In this manner the mounted men will in point of fact be used for the conveyance of orders within the platoons (!)* and companies. Even if the platoon leader sends forward a few mounted men for reconnaissance, he forthwith brings his three light machine guns into position so as to overlook the advance of his cavalymen. If a halt is made, it is proposed to send out a mounted post (strength 1 to 2 men) beyond the line then held. Here is the principle of security carried down to the very smallest unit; it is not necessary to go further into the matter.

The advantages that may be derived from the organic incorporation of mounted troops into infantry regiments is best illustrated by the following example. After the Battle of Gumbinnen the Prussian 1st Army Corps was withdrawn out

*Note.—This note of exclamation figures in the original.

of the retreat by railway. (See Sketch No. 3.) The entrainment was covered by the Cavalry Division, which consequently fell into last place at the end of this movement. It consequently happened that after its detrainment to take part in the Battle of Tannenberg, the Ist Army Corps was blind. But it was decided to prepare for a formal attack by the Ist Army Corps of the Russian position on the heights near Usdau. In the absence of every kind of reconnaissance, it was not discovered that this position came to an end to the north of Usdau, and that there was a complete gap many kilometres wide between the Russian Ist and XXIII Army Corps. The course of events was such that the Russians, growing anxious at this serious gap, withdrew in good time before the Prussian attack. Very different might have been the results of the affair if every infantry regiment of the Ist Army Corps had possessed its own cavalry troop. Judged by the happenings at Stallupönen and Gumbinnen, it might be assumed that as soon as the existence of the gap had been diagnosed, the Ist Army Corps would have exploited the occasion and carried out a destructive flank and rear attack against the Russian Ist Army Corps. The decision at Usdau would have been attained perhaps one day earlier; and in any case it would have been far more complete. In such event the Russian Ist Army Corps would not have been in a position, a few days later, to bring about the grave crisis in rear of the Prussian Ist Army Corps at Neidenburg, and thus set the results of the Battle of Tannenberg momentarily in the balance.



D. DIVISIONAL CAVALRY AND MOTORS.

Military literature of recent years has been flooded with proposals to combine divisional reconnoitring detachments with "light" regiments. On paper there have been seen numerous schemes of amalgamations of mounted men, cyclists, armoured cars, motorized artillery and "embussed" infantry. But the problem that arises as to how such a heterogeneous unit is to be handled over the area, which will probably be open to its employment, that is, some 18 to 24 miles in depth and 6 miles wide, has never been faced. The results might well show that,

in place of "light" regiments, there had been created "heavy" and "super-heavy" regiments, and that these have grown unable to fulfil their true purpose of supplying the command with essentially valuable and accurate information. Fortunately Germany will not, within the near future and as far as can be foreseen, be in the quandary of having to create such "light" regiments. The liberty of arming, which Germany is shortly to regain, will bring with it other material pre-occupations. Besides, if one visualizes the type of information concerning the enemy, which even the most highly motorized and strongest reconnoitring detachment could obtain, it may appear that such results will probably always run something as follows:—"The enemy is advancing from A to B. The front C—D is occupied by hostile troops. No penetration possible," or "The front C—D clear of enemy." More detailed information, such as strengths, disposal of forces, artillery, reserves, are, in war, only to be obtained by chance. If such results can be obtained by simpler and less costly methods, the latter should be preferred if only on grounds of economy.

It is also true that the mounted man, who possesses in like measure the necessary superiority of speed over the following infantry, still retains this advantage over motors and cyclists, namely, that he remains mobile across country—except in marshy and mountainous ground. Moreover, on the march he both sees and hears; he can be more readily handled and distributed into small units, even down to the individual horseman; lastly, it is exceptional for such mounted troops to be caught by emergencies. The conclusion is that the ideal reconnoitring detachment remains one that moves on horseback and carries everything by means of horse-draught; one that is of such size that even after sending out a strong wave of patrols, it remains of sufficient strength to send out a second such wave, and will still be able to penetrate the outer hostile reconnaissance screen at the decisive point. Even the allotment of a cyclist company may complicate the command of such a detachment, although this measure may not always be avoidable in view of the shortage of trained cavalymen. Motor cycles can render invaluable services for carrying despatches. How far they can be used

Sketch. 1



Sketch 3.
Tannenberg, 26-8-14

in the field in future, owing to their being so tied to the roads, can only be shown by a practical test. The road-using armoured car must find its limitations as soon as it meets the hostile armour-piercing armament. In spite of this handicap it will render invaluable services in sweeping away the enemy's foremost mounted reconnoitring organization; in watching unoccupied terrain; and in gaining contact with neighbouring bodies of troops. If these vehicles, which present large targets, which are audible from afar and deaf, whilst still all too blind and remaining incapable of subdivision, are to be launched on a frontal attack to penetrate far into the enemy's defences, there is a grave risk that these costly machines will be used up within a few days, and that this will involve other losses of a serious material nature.

Though not desiring to take up a position against the motor, the writer is of opinion that the use of armour-piercing armaments and the factors of limitation of space, that must enter into play when two armies are coming into contact, will effectually prohibit any such employment of the motor. Its high degree of mobility can then no longer be exploited. The motor is relegated for this very reason to strategic reconnaissance. Here there is a need that can be satisfied, since the cavalry division in this sphere is transformed from a reconnoitring organization to a collection of highly mobile battle units. Strategic reconnaissance on the ground henceforth falls to the share of the motor—always on the understanding that there exists a need for bringing in information of such value that the loss of a few dozen armoured vehicles is fully justified.



KILL AND CURE.

BY PHŒNIX.

"SHOOT him," said the Colonel. "Put the poor beggar out of his misery. Dammit, there's another good horse gone," and he turned away irritably.

I had taken over charge of the regimental sick lines a few days previously, and on this occasion had taken the Colonel along to the isolation stall outside the lines to obtain his permission to destroy an excellent young horse which after a fall on parade had developed tetanus. Everything possible had been done to save the poor beast. Our Salutri, a most capable and experienced man, had treated tetanus cases before, and with him I had been through the various treatments given in the volumes adorning the shelves of his small office alongside the regimental veterinary hospital.

To those not aware of the customs obtaining in the old Silledar Cavalry in India I must explain that the organisation we now have of Station Veterinary Hospitals presided over by officers of the Royal Veterinary Corps existed only for British mounted units. Silledar cavalry regiments were not served by the Veterinary Corps as all regiments now are. They each had their own horse hospital and their own Salutri or Indian Vet. An officer of the regiment was put in charge of this hospital in which everyone took a personal interest. The treatment of ordinary ailments and unsoundnesses was in every way satisfactory. There was no voluminous correspondence, no difficulties about feeding and rationing and none of the extra work unavoidable in the more comprehensive system now existing. It was a private concern of the regiment and the Salutri permanently in charge of the sick animals of the unit knew

the halt, the maimed and the sickly ones in a way which is not possible in a Station Veterinary Hospital in which the officers and staff change, and where, with the large numbers of animals treated, trace and memory of individual horses cannot be kept in the same way. It may have been that the treatment given was in some cases less scientific and less up to date, but on the whole the system was one which appealed to the regimental officer far more than the admittedly efficient and more economical arrangement we now have.

Every officer after the day's stables would as a matter of course go to the sick lines to see not only how the sick animals of his own squadron were progressing but also to see those of other squadrons and to discuss their treatment and veterinary matters generally. Nowadays when the Veterinary Hospital is often some distance away few can spare the time to go there often, and horses sent to the Station hospital are generally out of sight and out of mind till suddenly they reappear in the squadron. There are, of course, officers who make a point of a daily visit to the Station Veterinary Hospital but they hesitate to take up a deal of the busy Veterinary Officer's time and the latter certainly could not deal with practically all the officers of all the mounted units daily. The regimental hospital is undoubtedly better for the regimental officer, especially for the youngsters.

The unfortunate horse which was dying of tetanus was struck off the strength of the regiment next morning.

II.

An old fashioned custom prevailing in Silledar cavalry regiments was the Durbar. In early times it was among other things a form of orderly room or defaulters' parade. Later on it became less frequent and ordinary disciplinary cases were not dealt with at Durbars. These functions were in most cases attended by some little routine ceremonial. The British and Indian officers were seated to the left and right of the commanding officer, and around the open space before them would be assembled the men of the unit. It was in no sense a uniformed affair and the majority would attend in mufti. The occasion

began with a series of reports by various regimental officials. The Woordie Major (Indian Adjutant) would perhaps report the number of recruits and remounts under training and the number which had passed into the ranks since the last Durbar. After him might come the Quartermaster Jemadar reporting on the regimental workshops, bazaar and so on. Among the reports would invariably be that of the Salutri.

From this point the procedure would vary. It might be that certain promotions had lately been made. The men concerned, smart and uniformed, proud but self-conscious in their new stripes, would present the handles of their swords for the commandant to touch, thus confirming their advancement in the eyes of the world.

Thereafter, the commanding officer or others would bring up for discussion matters of general regimental interest, whether regarding games, or welfare, or future events. Naturally only those matters which were suitable for open discussion were permitted.

The commandant would often take this opportunity to influence the spirit of the regiment in some way. This direct touch with all ranks in Durbar is of inestimable value where orientals are concerned and in many units the custom of occasional Durbars is kept up.

This story is, however, of another matter.

Some months after the tetanus case mentioned above the Salutri made his report at Durbar. So many horses and so many mules were in the sick lines. Of these there were x cases of lameness, y cases of fever and z cases of colic, and so on. His report completed, the Salutri on this occasion electrified the Durbar by asking permission to show the commanding officer a horse there and then. This was a new departure.

"Why cannot I be shown this horse after Durbar?" demanded the Colonel.

"There is a special reason, your honour," replied the Salutri. "I wish to discover if any officer can recognise this horse."

An upstanding chestnut gelding in good condition was led up.

"What horse is that?" The Colonel was puzzled. "Why, dammit," he said, "I gave orders for that horse to be shot. Why was it not shot?"

It was no other than the animal which had been in the last stages of tetanus.

"I ask pardon for failing to obey orders. Your honour knows and the Captain Sahib can confirm that everything possible was done to save this horse by the usual veterinary methods. When I saw the Colonel Sahib's sorrow at the loss of such a good animal I recollected an old Indian remedy which is not known to many. I resolved to try it secretly. If it failed the horse would die and no one would be the wiser. But see, the horse is here. I have to report that I disobeyed the Colonel Sahib's order and I am prepared for my punishment."

His expression was smug, to say the least of it.

"What was the cure?" The Colonel was still angry.

"That," said the Salutri, "I cannot possibly tell. Even if the British Officers were to believe it they would laugh at me and my face would be blackened for ever."

No threat or inducement would elicit the cure. The Salutri on this matter was mulish to a degree.

III.

Some years later, with some confusion and much hesitation, he told me. There is, he said, a certain kind of lizard, not too easy to find, which must be caught and fried *alive*. It appears that there is no use in killing it first. The powdered lizard is administered to the horse in a drench, wherein lies, of course, the principal difficulty in the advanced stages of tetanus. I gathered that on this occasion he threw the horse before drenching it.

I have mentioned this cure to several Vets. and have been accorded the long-suffering look meted out to amateurs by the expert. Some of them agreed that Indian remedies were often efficacious but are none the less not to be taken seriously. None of them called me a liar straight out but even those who accepted the story as true classed the episode with other Indian remedies

such as ginger in the eye for colic, and the sheep's kidney method of removing splints. That is, they accepted the cure but ascribed it to action not necessarily attributable to the remedy applied.

A side-light on the lizard cure came to me unexpectedly.


I was travelling up country with a middle-aged Indian as my carriage companion. His expensive looking luggage was marked with P. & O. labels and on one I noticed an Edinburgh address. On entering into conversation I discovered that he had taken his medical degree at home but was not intending to follow up that line. He proposed to take up and develop the Indian system of medicine and use oriental drugs prescribed by Eastern medical lore.

I told him, somewhat doubtfully, the episode of the lizard and the tetanus case.

"Yes, certainly," he remarked. "That is a well known prescription and it is true that to be efficacious the lizard must be fried alive. Once dead, the particular property required seems to disappear."

"Then it is a common cure for tetanus?" I asked.

"As a matter of fact I had not heard of its use for that purpose," he replied, "but in the old days it was put into the food of old relations who had become useless and a hindrance to the family. They went to sleep quite peacefully and did not awake."



SEAT AND HANDS.

LIEUT.-COLONEL R. S. TIMMIS, D.S.O.,
Royal Canadian Dragoons.

THE technique of the Art of Riding is based almost entirely on the seat and hands of the rider, but it is suggested that in the past too little attention has been paid to the study of these, with the result that the art and science of riding has not made the progress that many other sciences have. The methods adopted have seldom been subjected to any critical analysis. The old methods have so strongly dominated the art that only comparatively recently have horsemen begun to question the rules that have been regarded as unsuitable. The forward seat has been adopted by jockeys on the flat for mechanical reasons, but there has been comparatively little advancement made in this direction in the show ring and hunting field.

Since the introduction of the cinematograph and particularly the slow motion film, the good and bad points of riding have been studied from a scientific point of view. Some thirty-five years ago British cavalry were shown, doing their training at Aldershot, on the screen at the Polytechnic, and it opened the eyes of many people who thought they knew all about riding. From this period the camera has revolutionized the subject; it has shown the many faults being practised daily in the saddle. These faults, even to-day, are clearly shown almost weekly in the illustrated papers and on the screen. Especially does this apply to steeplechasing, hunting and show jumping. Practically all unmask the incorrectness of seat and hands. The photographer has proved or disproved by the impartial medium of visible fact many of the theories of the few writers who have written on the subject.

Considering the age of riding, it is strange that it has not been studied more scientifically in the past, although Xenophon

who wrote his book about 400 B.C., which is still a text book on horsemanship, and whose views have in most part changed little, very little of value was written until quite recently. History gives us no continuity about the progress made in equitation. Many centuries before Xenophon, Asiatic barbarian herdsmen rode bareback. Of the civilized races, the ancient races of Egypt and Palestine rode bareback. The horse of those days was quite small. The seat adopted was a natural one and is beautifully typified in the equestrian statue of Caligula in the British Museum. Later the functions of the horse were devoted almost entirely to the uses it could be put to in warfare. He was not used for agriculture for long after. Homer tells us that the horse was exclusively used in harness for work with the chariot. Until the saddle was invented in the fourth century B.C., skins or blankets were used as saddle cloths, but stirrups were not known for another couple of centuries. A rope was used as the earliest form of bit. The nomads used neither; they guided their horses by voice and whip.

The British were the first to use the horse in sport; and no nation copied this for several centuries. They introduced hunting and later racing, both flat and over jumps. Their inborn love for sport of a clean nature and love for horses has doubtless been responsible for the great popularity of hunting. The Briton has always taken his sports as a real recreation, a complete mental relaxation; commercialization has always been distasteful to him, and may it long remain so.

But these sportsmen who hunted from boyhood, and sat on their free-going horses in hot blood, got it firmly embedded in their minds that they were masters of equitation, whereas they were certainly good horsemasters. The Briton is still the world's best horsemaster, but as horsemen we have much yet to learn. On the other hand, European nations, not having the advantage of the British, took up Haute École and studied equitation as a serious business, like a trade or profession, so that in a century their riding reached a high standard. In France and Austria Haute École became a fine art, an advanced science, and those of the hunting field, who scorned it as artificial and savouring of the circus ring, could have learnt much from it.

War has for centuries dictated the equipment worn by the horse. The introduction of armour, with its ever-increasing weight, produced the high pommel and cantle—the deep-seated saddle. Its purpose was to fix the rider on his horse. But it was not possible to ride a horse really well in such saddles. It was a case of necessity. Warfare demanded weight and solidity in the charge. The warriors of the middle-ages were mounted on draught horses carrying tremendous weight in armour, with the rider securely fixed in the saddle. The charges of Cromwell's day did not exceed the pace of a trot. The modern western cow-boy saddle is somewhat similar in seat and is invaluable for the purpose for which it was invented. Anyone who rides in a stock saddle for six months, will find, on returning to a hunting saddle, that he has completely lost all grip. Baucher, the greatest master of Haute École, never attempted jumping. He stated that it spoilt the horses' mouths. Newcastle and Xenophon admitted the fallacy of the straight leg in jumping. Cromwell's warriors could not jump, nor can the cow-boy, except over a low jump at a fairly fast pace. The seat is too short and the leg too long. The long leg used by the British and other cavalry in the early part of the nineteenth century was quite unsuited for jumping. It was for the use of the sword and lance in the charge. Previous to Waterloo the British cavalry rode with a hunting seat, but a Prussian riding master was brought over to teach the long straight leg, which lasted until the South African War. Our present cavalry saddle is much better suited for the old long leg seat and when the horse more resembled a Christmas tree when in marching order, than he does to-day equipped almost as lightly as a trooper in drill order.

Pictures depicting cavalry a hundred years ago show a seat that has now been adopted, in a ludicrous manner, by the riders of so-called modern American saddle horses. How long this absurd loin-pounding, saddle-polishing fashion will continue remains to be seen. How much more elegant and practical is the seat seen in the British Hack classes! English Hacks are identical to Hunters in utility and beauty. The English hunting saddle is the only one that will allow seat and legs to be close

to the horse. Special jumping saddles have been introduced by the French and Italians. These have a forward flap and knee pad to increase grip and security. They assist the young rider to acquire a firm seat in a shorter time, but artificial assistance is not to be recommended.

The common belief that there is a difference between military and civilian riding and between show and other forms of jumping should be exploded. There is no difference. To many it appears unreasonable to advocate revolutionary changes in the seat, even in the face of the verdict of the camera. There are many excellent riders of long experience who consider the old sit-back seat over jumps in the hunting field and the lay-back seat over the steeplechase jump the only correct seat. No seat is so good that it cannot be improved upon. The camera and experience have proved this. The fact that so-and-so won the National riding this way or that is no proof that his style is right. The subject is delicate; but an impartial examination should be given the various styles and methods in common use.

The origin of the lean-back seat over the jump was apparently due to the fear the rider had on landing of being pitched over his horse's head. The more he leaned back the safer he felt. Really, of course, a purely imaginary fear. If the horse stood still on landing there might be some excuse for this fear on the part of a timid rider.

From the rider's point of view this seat may be perfectly comfortable, but what about the horse? It is he who is doing the jumping, and it should be the aim of every horseman to consider his horse first and give him every assistance. Changes in the methods of riding are necessary in order to give every possible mechanical assistance to the horse and remove every abuse that he is subjected to by improper seat, hands and other errors. Hunting conditions and customs have had much to do with the popularity of the old hunting seat. Yet nothing has shown up the error of this seat than the hopeless attempts one sees, only too frequently, at jumping a horse in cold blood in the show ring. As long as many riders pick up their riding from those poorly qualified to teach it, and act as good, bad or indifferent passengers on their horses, progress in the most

modern, most successful and most humane methods will not be generally made. Like all diversions, to learn to ride well takes time; but there is far too great a tendency to scorn proper teaching and to look down upon the riding school.

As physical conformation is so varied, it is unwise to lay down hard and fast rules. General principles should be enunciated and the individual will have to find where he must make personal allowances. He must sit on the centre of the saddle and as near to the horse and to the centre of gravity as possible. There are three factors that determine the position in the saddle : balance, grip, and being in harmony with the motion of the horse. Balance and harmony are the most important. The latter comes naturally to many and is never properly acquired by others. Grip is only maintained strongly for certain short periods, otherwise it is resorted to very mildly. All muscles must be supple; there must be no forced muscles anywhere. Stiffness is quite contrary to horsemanship. Suppleness of the loins is essential. Perfect hands demand a perfect seat, but a good seat does not signify good hands. A cramped or forced position, immobility of the legs, lack of suppleness in the loins are fatal to a firm seat and light hands. We will consider hands later.

The body at the halt or walk must be vertical. Head held naturally and erect, shoulders open, loose and easy, arm hanging straight down, elbows lightly against the sides. Forearm horizontal; hands low, backs to the front, wrists rounded, maintaining a light and sympathetic feel on the reins. Back must not be hollowed, nor chest protruded. The open shoulder permits full freedom in the arms. Leg below the knee a little behind the vertical; ball of the foot below the front of the knee. Knees bent at all times, heels down and toes a little out. The knee is the fulcrum of the leg and seat; the thigh above this fulcrum must be kept close to the saddle, except when the seat is raised out of the saddle, as in jumping or at the gallop. At the trot the position remains the same, except the body is leaned forward and the seat raised at each stride. The weight of the body being balanced over the fulcrum. At the slow canter the seat is kept in the saddle and the body erect, as it assists in

lightness. At the gallop the body is leaned forward; the faster the pace the greater the lean, and the more the seat is raised; this lightens the hindquarters of the horse. In jumping, which we will consider later, the body is leaned forward to preserve perfect balance and harmony and to prevent abuse of any part of the horse during the flight.

In racing the seat is radically changed. The scientific advantages of the very forward seat with very short stirrups outweigh the loss of control this position gives to the jockey. The jockey's weight is carried right over the horse's shoulders. This increases the speed that the horse attains.

But off the racecourse the rider must be over the centre of balance, without stiffness or straining and always ahead of any movement the horse may make in any direction. This position can only be maintained with light contact between hand and leg and the horse. The rider must anticipate any movement made by the horse and place himself in the best position to aid the horse to overcome the inertia of his own (the rider's) weight. Hence the necessity for the forward seat in jumping. The foot is normally kept home in the stirrups, to save any straining of the leg muscles. Any attempt to turn the toes in unnaturally parallel to the horse's side is wrong and must produce contraction. The leg below the knee must move freely to and fro when required. There must be no involuntary movements of the legs, as lightness, firmness and absolute control of all muscles are essential. The rider must aim at straightness without stiffness, suppleness without slackness. Suppling exercises are invaluable for the learner and for those who are too stiff. Such exercises are: leaning down and touching the toes on either side, twisting the body around at the hips, leaning back on to the croup and forward on to the neck, swinging the legs below the knee, increasing and decreasing the knee-grip, mounting and dismounting without stirrups on both sides. Never attempt, however, to develop big muscles. Practice in jumping without reins, and later without stirrups is invaluable to improve balance, and strength of seat. Confidence is the first essential for the novice to acquire. He cannot de-contract until he has this. Position can then be attended to, and balance will rapidly

be acquired if the rider is not allowed to hold on to the reins. Modern methods demand quietness and horse-sense; none of the noise and roughness of the old school. The stirrups must be large enough to prevent the foot being caught in the event of a fall. And the catch on the bars of the saddle must be always open to allow the stirrup leather to come off easily. Stirrup leathers must be of equal length; their length must allow the knee to rest comfortably in the correct position on the saddle. The action of the horse and the kind of work being done may necessitate a slight alteration in their length. Shape of leg and build of body play a vital part in the progress made and in the ultimate standard reached. A moderately long thigh with flat inside muscles are the best; a short, round thigh, the worst. Practice will change the configuration in a remarkable way, but this will take two or more years.

The horse is controlled by leg, hands, rider's position and voice. The last seldom receives the attention it should, but it is outside the scope of this article. The legs are used normally, just behind the girth, together to create impulsion, singly to cause lateral movement away from the leg applied. With the leg held just behind the vertical, only a slight movement is required to obtain contact, but if carried stuck forward a considerable movement is necessary. In the correct position the calf is free from the horse and it is easy to mobilize the horse. As with hands, so with legs; there are heavy, weak and light legs. A heavy leg may be a greater fault than a heavy hand—it may be dangerous in jumping. For it is easier to ride through than over a jump; it may win races, but it will not have the same success in the show ring. A strong leg must not be confused with a heavy leg, nor a weak one with a light one. The light leg has power at its command, but its action is always sympathetic and under the will of the rider.

Good hands are a gift in a horesman as much as they are in a musician. Hands can be improved under proper instruction and by determination. Really light hands are rare. A rider with light hands has such control over them that an involuntary act is never made; no movement made by the horse will cause an unintentional change on their touch upon the horse's mouth.

This is, perhaps, as close a definition of Hands as it is possible to give. Yet perfect hands cannot exist without a firm and supple seat and perfect harmony with the horse's motion. Horsemen often, through fear of jerking the mouth and being accused of having bad hands, will leave the reins loose. This is obviously preferable to interfering with the horse's mouth and probably upsetting his horse's and his own balance—factors responsible for so many accidents. This type of rider has temporarily lost contact and might be termed "a good passenger." The fact that ladies, who ride side-saddle, have a firmer grip and therefore stronger seat is doubtless responsible for their so often having better hands. There are times when a strong feeling on the mouth is necessary, but this must never be dead and unsympathetic. Good hands are always sympathetic, and suppleness of the whole body is the key to their lightness and understanding. Lack of understanding is so often responsible for bad hands. A horse pulls and the bad horseman uses a more severe bit, whereas he should realize that the horse is doing something that the rider should understand, but fails to. The failure of many a young rider to succeed is due to a refusal to attempt to learn the character and individual idiosyncrasies of each horse.

Since the hands control the impulsion produced by the legs, the horse is lightly balanced in its movements between the rider's legs and hands. The rider must synchronize with the motions of the horse and not with that of the saddle. This is the fundamental reason for the forward seat in jumping. The legs and hands are quite independent of the rider's body or of the horse and, when required, quite independent of one another. The horse is controlled by equestrian tact, of which the seat, hands, legs and voice are the agents. No two horses can be ridden exactly the same, as no two horses are alike. Each horse has his key, just as a human animal has his own individuality, and the horseman must understand the psychological character of his mount. Conversely, to attain the best results, the horse must have complete confidence in and understanding with his rider. If a horse has to anticipate and realize that a jerk in the mouth or a kick in the side are no indications of the rider's intentions,

he will soon lose confidence and therefore cannot perform properly. Sharp spurs should never be used, they will prevent harmony between horse and rider, and they never did do any good to a sluggist horse. A hard-mouthed horse will soon stop pulling when handled by light hands—it takes two to pull always. Good hands give and take. Generally the reins should be held in both hands. Novices are inclined to think it correct to ride with one hand. Riding with one hand tends to make the learner ride with the left shoulder advanced—the body must be kept square to the front. The reins must be held lightly. The feel is made more delicate by holding them near to the ends of the fingers. Sometimes the rider has to let the reins slip through his fingers, when taken unavoidably unawares, to prevent jerking the mouth; this is very easily done if the reins are lightly held and the position of the hands are under perfect control.

Single reins should be held outside the little fingers or immediately between them and the third fingers. With double reins the bridoon or upper reins should be held the same way and the lower reins in between the next fingers towards the thumb. The ends of the reins are passed through the palm of the hand and held by the flat of the thumb. Experience shows that the upper reins should be held outside the lower or bit reins, to prevent the tendency of the feel becoming too strong on the bit reins. The reins must be held long enough to permit proper head freedom. Too short reins tend also to cause the rider to lean forward and bear on the horse's mouth. And if too long, the rider will lose control should the horse make a sudden move; the rider would be obliged to bring his hands into his stomach or high in the air to keep contact. The necessary length will vary from time to time. In jumping it is necessary to ride with shorter reins. The position of the hands over the jump varies with the horse and the obstacle, but they must always be forward, whether on the neck or clear of it. Some horses go better with very short reins and the hands right up their neck. The rider has to learn the horse's key.

Severe bits are as useless as sharp spurs and are more cruel and dangerous. The scrap-heap is the best place for them. A

snaffle or a double Weymouth bridle are the best. Some horses, however, go better on a Pelham, and therefore one should be used. The chief objection to the Pelham is that as there is only one mouth-piece it cannot function as a bridoon does when raising the head and at the same time remain in its correct place on the bars of the mouth with the curb-chain lying correctly in the chin groove, as in flexing for example. But with light hands there is little trouble in getting proper head carriage with either bit. Head carriage is vital, as it so affects the balance of the horse. The head should be moderately high and the neck flexed at the second vertebræ (the Axis), and the face at an angle of 50 to 60 degrees with the horizontal. As a rule direct flexions can only be made with a properly fitted bit; the curb-chain must lie smooth and flat in the chin groove and of such a length that when the bit rein is taut, the branch of the bit is at an angle of 45° with the line of the head. Indirect flexions are useful in educating the horse to a ready response to hand and leg, and in suppling the jaw, neck and forehead. They are made by first obtaining a bend of the head and neck at the poll and then flexion of the lower jaw. Care must be made directly the horse gives his lower jaw to the hand, to ease the hand and caress the horse. Martingales are not necessary, except in some cases where a horse has been badly handled. Generally the double bit properly handled obviates the continued use of the martingale. If used, the standing martingale is the best and the safest. It should be of such a length that it catches the noseband when the head is nearly in a horizontal position. Trial is the best method of determining its exact length. If properly fitted it is perfectly safe for any jumping. Although custom has maintained the sit-back seat in the hunting field, the camera has proved how wrong this seat really is, if the rider is to give the horse all possible help.

The jump of the horse, analyzed, is composed of three factors; his speed, his spring and his bodily exertions or maintenance of balance in flight. Each leap is made up of varying proportions of these three and each leap requires a different position of the rider upon the horse's back in order to give the horse the maximum assistance. The rider must be balanced and ahead of the

centre of gravity of the combined mass to prevent being left behind. The horse must not have any unnecessary inertia to overcome in his effort to clear the obstacle. When the rider uses the sit-back seat, every jump comprises degrees of thrust, depending on the jump and speed, that the horse has to compete with; this thrust is never zero. In the extreme case, where the horse stops and takes a standing jump, the rider who is sitting down on the saddle, will be catapulted over the horse's head.

In the opposite extreme, most favourable to the sit-back seat, where the jump is taken at a fast pace in the horse's stride, the thrust is comparatively small, the rider's body being already in motion, there is little inertia to overcome. The only way this thrust can be eliminated is by using the forward seat. As the horse rises at the jump, the seat is raised out of the saddle and the body leaned forward in relation to the angle of rise of the horse's body and the height of the obstacle, as well as the manner and speed at which the jump is taken. The forward position is maintained over the jump and as the horse descends the body is still kept ahead of the perpendicular. When the hind legs have cleared the jump and the forelegs are on the ground the seat is brought back into the saddle, and not before. With the raised seat the hindquarters are free to exert their maximum effort; but, on the other hand, if the body is crouched too far forward, the horse's forehand will be overburdened and interfered with on landing. The legs must maintain the bend at the knee throughout the leap. Once the horse has left the ground with the hind legs, any incorrect position of the rider's legs is not so serious as any incorrect position of hand or body; either may upset the horse's balance and his landing. A clever horse will not hit a jump unless he is thrown off his balance by interference; sitting back or too far forward are common causes of the horse hitting the jump. The best way to convince those, who fail to see the importance of these facts and who are prejudiced in favour of the sit-back seat, is to show them a horse jumping at liberty, then with a forward-seat rider up and finally with a sit-back-seat rider up. The results are so obvious that any doubt about the merits of the forward seat will be immediately removed.

There are two schools of thought in jumping; the one, adopted by the French, where the horse has a free head at the moment of jumping; the other, adopted by the Italians, and more or less by the British, where contact is kept throughout the jump. In the former the horse gets more freedom and more chance to use his initiative; in the latter the rider does most of the thinking. As horses vary so, it is not wise to lay down definite rules. The key of each mount must be discovered, and the one most suited to it adopted. I am certain that if a horse is properly taught to know what is expected of him and is made to like jumping he will generally go better with the French method. For one thing it requires much more skill and experience to jump with contact—not to be confounded with “strap-hanging,” at which anyone can excel. Horses ridden in snaffles often appear to become accustomed to being hung on to and to jump in spite of their riders, but no one could imply that they could do their best, even in hot blood at a fast pace. Proper contact is maintained by the expert with a silk-like hold on the reins. A free head at the moment of jumping must not be confounded with a loose rein during the approach and during landing. With wings to the jumps this is easy and is often used by riders on free-going horses. Then again, the strong feel the steeplechase rider has on his horse that is ridden in a snaffle is quite another thing. The jumps are taken fast and the hold is constant by a good rider that sits forward. The support to the forehand aids the ‘chaser, as it does the flat-racer. But the common daily examples we see in the sporting press and on the screen of riders sitting right back on the horse’s loins and strap-hanging in its worst form are merely examples of how *not* to help a horse over a jump. How some horses manage to keep their legs and clear the jump is amazing. Many accidents are caused by interference by the rider or by the rider being pitched off when the horse pecks or makes a sudden turn. Valuable momentum is lost at each landing, while the rider gathers up feet of rein and gets his weight once more forward ahead of the centre of gravity. This takes valuable energy out of the horse. Those who denounce the forward seat would change their minds if they saw the excellent performances of the Italian

and other European horsemen, on all types of horses over every variety of obstacle at various paces, with very few falls and very few accidents. Whilst with the old lay-back seat it is very common to see accidents at every meeting and often in every race.

Once the pupil has sufficient confidence, jumping should be taught concurrently with riding. Reins should never be allowed to be held until the pupil can go over a jump with control of the positions of the arms, to avoid the possibility of jerking the horse's mouth. By exaggerating the forward position and by pressing his hands forward on to the horse's neck, the pupil will soon learn how to keep ahead of the centre of gravity and not be left behind as the horse takes off.

The position during the approach is also very important. One school endeavours to place the horse at each jump, the other allows him to place himself. It is better to let a horse place himself, if he can and thus to encourage initiative on the part of the horse, who, after all, has to do the jumping. If the rider attempts always to place the horse, there is a tendency to cramp the horse's initiative. Here again the key of the individual horse has to be learned and the method best suited used. When a horse gets into difficulties it is nearly always wisest and safest to let him get out of it. The good rider gives him the necessary freedom to permit this. Novices so often bungle by trying to ride the horse over.

Hunting men, with practical experience with the forward seat, well know how much safer it is and how much more efficient. Anyone who has hunted with the continental army officers know that they ride difficult horses over any country very well and that their horses are in good condition at the end of a hard day; accidents, too, are very rare. Avoidable accidents happen with alarming frequency nowadays. Yet the abuses and faults in equitation continue and no one ascribes these accidents to the rider. Nearly everyone shares the opinion that the horse is the cause. Actually, very few accidents are the horse's fault. But this unfair blame on the horse will continue until riding is studied seriously and scientifically by all. This is necessary in the interests of sport and of the horse industry.

So far only the astride seat has been considered, but a few remarks on the side saddle will not be out of place. Since its introduction by a queen many centuries ago, it has been kept in use mainly by the dictates of fashion. We all admire a graceful side-saddle rider, but our object is utility, not beauty. If a lady prefers to ride side-saddle and makes more progress, it is her own affair, but if fashion is forcing her to do so, it is regrettable. Unfortunately the decrees of dictatorial fashion have had too much to say in the manners and methods of riding and have been responsible for far too much senseless and unjust forms of thinly-disguised cruelty. Sane reasoning and considered experience are at last getting the upper hand. Some argue that the majority of women have not the right conformation for astride riding. There may be some, no doubt, but there must be as many men who suffer from the same physical handicap and no one would advocate them riding side-saddle. In the modern show ring we rarely see the side-saddle in jumping classes and when we do, we see excellent examples of how not to jump. If the side-saddle is not suitable for jumping in cold blood, can it be really suitable for any other kind of riding? It certainly cannot be the most efficient. From the number of good performances put up by women astride at the International Shows it is obvious that women are suited to riding ordinary saddles. Their grip may not be as good as men, but even if so, balance is so much more important with modern methods, and in this they usually excel the male sex. Finally the side-saddle rider is completely at the mercy of her girths, she can rarely mount herself and in a fall is much more likely to be crushed. The purely utilitarian virtues of efficiency and adaptability should overrule all other considerations. The side-saddle and the lay-back seat will undoubtedly be scrapped in course of time.

In conclusion I submit that the modern forward seat has proved its efficiency and safeness overwhelmingly, and that its general acceptance is only hindered through the prevalent and bigoted attitude of those who are unwilling to change from old methods and long-established customs.

CAVALRY IN THE GREAT WAR.

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL A. G. MARTIN,
Formerly 6th Dragoons, German Army.

PART II.

THE operations in France started with a stupendous collision between the rival armies. "The Battle of the Frontiers" was fought simultaneously on a series of separate battlefields—Mons, Charleroi, Neufchateau, Longwy, Saarburg—extending from the River Sambre in Belgium to the Vosges Mountains of Alsace-Lorraine; or, if one includes the preliminary fighting at Liège and Mühlhausen, from Brussels to the Swiss frontier.

Nowhere on these 250 to 300 miles of desperately contested front do we find any large cavalry formations—divisions or Corps—exercising a decisive influence on the issue. Their vulnerability in the face of modern fire power, was too glaringly obvious for "Seydlitz stunts" to be attempted.

The German High Command (Moltke) very soon realised that cavalry divisions wedged in between the infantry during a battle were out of place, and endeavoured to reshuffle the cards by ordering Richthofen's and Marwitz's Corps to unite on the extreme right of Kluck's Army, from thence to operate against the enemy's flank and rear. (German Official History, Vol. I, p. 652.)

However, the Commander IInd German Army, von Bülow, frustrated these intentions by fettering Richthofen to his (Bülow's) right wing and actually prevented Kluck from dispatching Marwitz on this promising undertaking.

This was practically the first of a series of opportunities missed by the German cavalry; all more or less owing to von Moltke's lack of authority, and to the contradictory principles held by the commanders of the Ist and IInd German Armies.

While von Kluck strongly advocated strategical expansion, with resulting envelopment of the enemy wing, von Bülow focussed all his intention on tactical concentration, making thereby frontal attacks of nearly all his battles, and invariably coming too late to prevent a beaten enemy from getting away.

On the French side, General Sordet with his Cavalry Corps of three divisions, might have been expected to gather a few preliminary laurels before the general battle began, but the crop seems to have been meagre.

To start with, he made nothing of the favourable opportunity offered him to settle accounts with Richthofen. The Commander of the 1st German Cavalry Corps, undertook a reconnaissance, on August 15th at Dinant, and while busy with that ticklish problem, suddenly beheld Sordet appear threateningly in his left (southern) flank. However, the menace fizzled out. Sordet broke off the game, before it had even begun, and retired across the Meuse.

Evidently the French High Command, thoroughly alarmed by this time at the unexpected strength with which the German right was "steam-rollering" through Belgium, ordered Sordet further north.

On August 18th we find him in the neighbourhood of Gembloux (between Brussels and Namur) marching eastward to meet his other enemy, Marwitz, with the IVth and IXth German cavalry division coming from the opposite direction. Here now was a unique opportunity, one should imagine, for a regular cavalry fight.

General von Poseck, in his book "Die Deutsche Kavallerie in Belgien und Frankreich 1914" says :

"The Division (IVth) deployed S.W. of the village of Hedenge, and made ready to charge; Jäger Battalions III and IV securing the left wing. All ranks were highly elated, in hopes that the enemy cavalry would, at last, stand and fight it out in mounted combat. But that was not to be."

On reaching Grand Rosières, the enemy squadrons came under fire from German horse batteries, which caused them to retire through Perwez, leaving two guns, two machine-guns and a number of dead—men and horses—on the field. Other troops

that were holding the village of Geest-Gerampont, were driven out by the IVth Jägers.

The IXth German cavalry division, participated in the fight, by attacking the villages of Ramillies, Boneffe and Branchon and forcing the enemy to retire here, too.

The story of how a common hussar trooper, by means of his extraordinary personal courage, supplied the first evidence of the arrival of Sordet's cavalry corps in those parts, is worth recording here. I allude to von Poseck's book as reference again :

"On the morning of August 18th, the IVth squadron, XVth Prussian Hussars was posted south of Jauselette. The squadron commander pushed out a vedette in the direction of Perwez, from which again trooper Hübner was sent to take a closer look at the village. Hübner rode up to the fringe of the village alone, and saw, standing in a garden there, two Frenchmen with five horses. Without a further thought, he cleared the intervening fence, and charged. One of the French horsemen was speared,* the other took to his heels, whereupon Hübner galloped back to his squadron, bringing all five horses along with him.

"The squadron commander now examined the papers found on the captured charger—a fine chestnut thoroughbred—and discovered that it belonged to an officer of the French VIth Dragoons. This regiment was a unit of the Ist Cavalry Division.

"It was clear that the appearance of a French cavalry division on the scene was now to be reckoned with and, actually, at about 1 p.m. the advance guard of three or four squadrons was seen approaching Grand Rosières."

After this disappointing scrap, Sordet's division withdrew before the oncoming German IInd Army, to the neighbourhood of Maubeuge, where they formed the connecting link between the French Vth Army (now facing north) under General Lanrezac, and the British Expeditionary Force.

When the Allied retreat began, Sordet's Corps was pushed out to the extreme left of the British Army to act as flank guard.

(* Note: All German Cav. Regts., including hussars were armed with the lance.)

As such it did useful work in the ensuing battle of Le Cateau.

Mention perhaps also deserves to be made of the French IVth and IXth cavalry divisions, preceding the advance of the French IVth Army over the Semoise into the southernmost corner of Belgium.

On August 21st, at Longlier (a suburb of Neufchateau) they held up the advance guard of the German XXIst infantry division (XVIIIth Corps, IVth Army) and, little by little, engaged almost the entire enemy division before being forced to retire.

Having sufficiently "singd their whiskers" on this occasion, they made for cover in the Ardennes Forest, where they remained, behind the extreme left wing of their (IVth) army, during the great battle of the following day.

In every case, on both sides, where cavalry was called upon to take a hand in battle, it was on foot, shoulder to shoulder with the infantry.

Situations did arise, on occasions few and far between, when some energetic cavalry general would be inspired with the fleeting belief, that the moment so ardently desired was come. But invariably the intended charge had to be changed into dismounted action.

There is the experience, for instance, of the British IInd cavalry brigade at Mons. During the latter stage of that battle, the British Vth division was hard pressed, and in danger of being cut off.

To extricate them, General de Lisle, commanding 2nd cavalry brigade sent the 4th D.G.'s and 9th Lancers to the rescue. His orders were, to stop the enemy advancing from Quiverain towards Andregnies at all costs, even if it entailed a charge.

Debouching from the village Andregnies these squadrons were about to charge the enemy, about 2,000 yards away, when it was discovered in the nick of time, that the field of attack was obstructed by a wire fence. They promptly wheeled off to the right, took cover behind some big slag heaps and dismounted. From the position they took up here, assisted by two batteries,

they held the enemy in check for four hours. (From Hamilton : "The First Seven Divisions.")

During the retreat of the Allies from the Sambre and Meuse to the Marne, and the subsequent retirement of the German Armies from the Marne to the Aisne, the cavalry came in for one or two good opportunities, which however they seemed unable to profit by. This was far less the fault of the cavalry, than owing to erroneous dispositions, and instability of purpose on the part of C.'s in C. and Army Commanders.

The chance of a lifetime fell to the cavalry of the German right wing, when after the Battles of Le Cateau and Guise, a large gap opened between the B.E.F. and General Lanrezac.

It was on August 30th—"Dies nefestus," as General Groener calls the day, in his book : "Feldherr wider Willen.")—that von Kluck made his celebrated change of direction from S.W. to S.E., in order to head off Lanrezac's retreat. Luckily for Lanrezac, the diagonal march of the German Ist Army was detained by frequent collisions and scraps with British rear-guards, so that the only German force in time to be capable of putting a spoke in Lanrezac's wheel, was General Richthofen's cavalry corps.

On August 31st, when the French Vth Army was approaching Laon from the north, in a state of exhaustion, a large force of German cavalry (Richthofen) crossed the Oise, making for Vauxaillon and the lines of communication. The news fell like a bombshell in Lanrezac's headquarters, and the greatest apprehensions were entertained, that the army would be cut off.

However, nothing serious happened, and Lanrezac succeeded in getting his army safely across the Aisne; with badly shaken nerves it is true, and in some disorder (specially General Valabrégues' group of reserve divisions on the threatened wing) but without loss worth speaking of.

Friend and foe alike marvelled how the Germans could let this opportunity escape them. The reason is obvious enough. Unity of command was wanting.

Instead of sending the combined forces of Richthofen and Marwitz on this most promising raid, Richthofen was dispatched

alone, and Marwitz left to continue his bickerings with the British rearguards.

Had five cavalry divisions instead of two appeared in the neighbourhood of Vauxaillon and Laffaux, and thrust themselves in Lanrezac's path, regardless of cost, great results would undoubtedly have followed. But Richthofen made no attempt to force his way beyond Vauxaillon on the 31st, his horses being dead beat, and next morning von Bülow ordered him off to secure the Aisne bridge at Soissons for Kluck.

It must have been a heart-rending business sometimes, for the cavalry leaders to do what was expected of them, with the directions they got from their superior commanders so often at cross purposes. Perhaps when thoroughly annoyed with the useless waste of horseflesh, they did occasionally feign a little deafness.

General Spears, in his admirable book "Liaison 1914" makes the following rather amusing reference to the German cavalry at that time.

"We ended by forming a most peculiar picture of Richthofen and his command. He seemed a will o' the wisp always just escaping the grasp of Kluck or Bülow. The ether was constantly vibrating with the plaint of the German wireless: 'Where is Richthofen?' trailing off, when no answer was received into a querulous note: 'But where on earth does Richthofen now lie?' which literal translation from the German would make us laugh. Richthofen appeared to us in the light of comic relief; we saw him as a butterfly of war, flitting away gaily when Kluck or Bülow seemed about to bring down their nets on him."

Marwitz's bickerings with the British rearguards, included that most interesting episode, when the German IVth cavalry division made a surprise attack on the British Ist cavalry brigade in bivouac at Néry.

There are more lessons than one to be learned from the study of this action. Firstly, that to have enemy cavalry behind your front, is not, or need not be, half so alarming a predicament, as popular imagination supposes, provided you keep cool, and reply with immediate energetic countermeasures. Then, as in

the case of Néry, the tables are generally reversed, and it is the raider instead of the raided who finds himself in difficulties.

Secondly, mobility is not everything! It proved an error of judgment on the part of General von Garnier, commanding German IVth cavalry division, to leave behind his light ammunition column, in order to be able to advance quicker. The outcome of this was, that, at a most critical moment, the division found itself practically defenceless. The ammunition expended during the action, could not be replenished, and the fire power of 2,000 carbines and 6 machine guns was reduced to nil. This was a far greater calamity than the loss of 8 guns, which had to be abandoned when the division withdrew.

The German Divisional Commander was left no other choice, if he was to save his command, than to hide ignominiously in the woods, till 36 hours later the arrival of Kluck's infantry liberated him. All the same, however desperate their situation may have appeared to the German horsemen themselves, their mere presence—no one knew exactly where—exercised a disconcerting moral effect on the British retreat, as is shown alone by the hasty exodus of the C. in C.'s headquarters from Dammartin in the evening of September 1st.

Néry is a bright little feather in the cap of the British cavalry, and demonstrates very convincingly the excellence of the ancient motto: "Never say Die."

(To be continued.)



CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR, CAVALRY JOURNAL.

Dear Sir,—You invite remarks on the article on proposed Cavalry Dress; I therefore forward the following :—

1. The idea of introducing a slouch hat of any form would be detrimental to smartness and discipline, and we all know what a big part discipline plays in results and casualties in war.
2. It is suggested that the long shank spur be replaced by one of $1\frac{1}{4}$ " as is more commonly used by hunting men. The long shank was introduced when cavalry men rode as the modern American saddle horse rider, on his stomach with straight legs.
3. The suggestion to abolish the ground sheet and have a great-coat only, would leave the cavalryman without any protection from weather when in bivouac. The last eight months of the Great War the cavalry units never saw a billet and their only overhead cover consisted of two ground sheets made into a V shape tent for each two men. The ground sheet appears to be an essential part of the cavalryman's equipment in war.

Yours very truly,

R. S. TIMMIS, Lt.-Colonel.
Commanding, Royal Canadian Dragoons.

NOTES

CAVALRY JOURNAL ANNUAL MEETING

The Annual Meeting of the CAVALRY JOURNAL Committee was held in the Council Room, The Royal United Service Institution, on 16th November, 1933.

Present:—Field-Marshal The Viscount Allenby, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., D.C.L., LL.D. (in the Chair); Lieut.-General The Lord Baden-Powell, G.C.M.G., G.C.V.O., K.C.B., D.C.L., LL.D.; General Sir George de S. Barrow, G.C.B., K.C.M.G.; Major-General T. T. Pitman, C.B., C.M.G.; Lieut.-Colonel T. Preston, M.C., T.D.; Lieut.-Colonel W. G. H. Vickers, O.B.E.; Captain J. A. Paton.

The following is a summary of the proceedings:—

1. The Statement of Accounts for the year was examined and passed. The surplus of assets over liabilities on 31st October, 1933, was £708, a decrease over the previous year of £169 7s. 1d., due, for the most part, to loss of revenue from advertisements, but also to a falling-off in membership.

2. The following proposals were made by Major-General Pitman, seconded by Captain Paton, and carried unanimously:

- (a) That, in order to reduce the cost of publication, the coloured frontispiece should be omitted for the time being.
- (b) That, in future, all articles published in the JOURNAL should be paid for at a uniform rate of 7s. 6d. per page, except in the case of articles of exceptional merit, when a higher rate might be approved.

3. In order to increase membership, it was decided that a letter should be sent to all officers on joining, drawing their attention to the JOURNAL and soliciting their support.

4. The Committee decided that, in future, authors who desired to republish, in book form or in another magazine, other than their own regimental journals, articles which have been paid for by the CAVALRY JOURNAL, should be charged quarter-value of all blocks borrowed for the purpose.

5. The Committee passed a vote of thanks to the following voluntary contributors :—

Major-General Sir N. M. Smyth, V.C., K.C.B.

Major-General E. D. Giles, C.M.G., D.S.O., Major-General Cavalry, India.

Major-General Sir John Moore, K.C.M.G., C.B., F.R.C.V.S.

Brigadier E. Makins, C.B., D.S.O., Colonel, The Royal Dragoons.

Brigadier Godfrey F. H. Brooke, D.S.O., M.C., Commanding Cavalry Brigade, Egypt.

Lieutenant-Colonel R. S. Ellis, O.B.E., M.C., Royal Horse Artillery.

Lieutenant-Colonel O. J. F. Fooks, 14th/20th Hussars.

Lieutenant-Colonel W. G. H. Vickers, O.B.E., 13th D.C.O. Lancers, I.A.

Lieutenant-Colonel T. Preston, M.C., T.D., Yorkshire Hussars Yeomanry.

Lieutenant-Colonel R. S. Timmis, D.S.O., Royal Canadian Dragoons.

Lieutenant-Colonel L. F. Page, D.S.O., Lord Strathcona's Horse.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. G. Eady, M.C., Royal Engineers.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. E. N. Ryan, T.D., M.B.

Major H. W. Hall, M.C., late Queen's Bays.

Major L. P. Payne Gallwey, M.C., 7th Hussars.

Major H. Lumsden, M.C., 12th Lancers.

Major F. Thornton, 16th/5th Lancers.

Major C. W. Norman, 9th Lancers.

Major H. C. H. Robertson, D.S.O., Australian Staff Corps.

Major J. S. W. Stone, M.C., Royal Engineers.

Captain The Marquis of Cambridge, K.C.V.O., late The Life Guards.

Captain J. J. O'Beirne, 5th Inniskilling Dragoon Guards.

Captain H. B. Ellis, 15th Lancers, I.A.

Captain M. S. Bendle, Hodson's Horse, I.A.


Captain W. Porter, Royal Engineers.

Captain E. W. Sheppard, O.B.E., M.C., Royal Tank Corps.

Captain R. A. Riddell, Q.O. Royal West Kent Regiment.

Inspector C. D. La Nauze, Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
R. G. B. Spicer, M.C., Inspector-General, The Palestine Police.
Colonel A. G. Martin, formerly 6th Dragoons, German Army.
Godfrey Brennan, Esq.
Miss Tupper.
The Editor, *The Field*.
The Editor, *Wissen und Wehr*.
The Editor, *Militär Wochenblatt*.

6. It was proposed by Lieut.-General The Lord Baden-Powell, seconded by General Sir George Barrow, and carried unanimously, that a vote of thanks be accorded to Field-Marshal The Viscount Allenby for having kindly undertaken to preside at this Meeting.



HOME AND DOMINION MAGAZINES.

There is little of special interest to cavalry readers in this quarter's reviews.

The "Army Quarterly" contains a review of the new volume of the French Official History of the Great War dealing with the battle of the Marne and affords conclusive proof of the small part played by the French Fifth Army in winning the victory. Major Edwards contributes a sketch of the history of British regimental titles, in which those of the cavalry are fully dealt with. An anonymous author adds some wise words to the address of those thinking of sending in their papers—his advice being "Don't!"

In "The Fighting Forces" Major Burne has an interesting description of the German advance from Mons, and there is a somewhat depressing sketch of the present situation in Central Europe. Major Franklyn contributes some thoughtful remarks on the principles of war.

The cream of the "Royal Artillery Journal" is a brilliant narration of the Crimean campaign, of interest to cavalry readers if only for the new light thrown on Balaclava. A lecture by General Fuller on Sir John Moore and British discipline is also of much value. The history of Army education by Major Pemberton is concluded, and there is a further extract from Marshal Foch's "Conduite de la Guerre" dealing with the aftermath of the battle of Spichern in 1870.

Apart from an article on "The Duties of the R.A.M.C. officer to soldiers of his own corps" there is nothing in the "R.A.M.C. Journal" or in the "R.A.F. Quarterly" that calls for notice here.

E. W. S.

FOREIGN MAGAZINES.

The French " *Révue de Cavalerie* " for September-October contains yet another instalment of the articles by Lieut.-Colonel Pugens on the defence of the gap between the German First and Second Armies at the battle of the Marne. This new article deals with the 9th September. It shows clearly how the German 5th Cavalry Division virtually abandoned the crossings of the Marne at Château-Thierry. There was a strange lack of drive about the Allied pursuit also; yet it seems almost incredible that the French 4th Cavalry Division should have been so inactive in attempting to cross the river. The crossings were in fact being held by the remnants of the German *Garde Schützen* battalion at Château-Thierry. Behind, the enemy's 5th Cavalry Division seemed to be wandering about according to no fixed plan. It was perhaps this apparent lack of purpose which totally deceived the Allies as to its strength and intentions. The only defence worthy of the name of such was that put up by Kræwel's brigade of the 5th Infantry Division further to the west. Finally, the German general retreat began. This was directed on Coulombs, where the bottle-neck was soon choked with several German formations. General Marwitz commanding the troops in the " gap " had virtually lost control of the operations, and it was chiefly due to the lethargic Allied pursuit that he did not become involved in a heavy disaster.

Major Mariot follows with an interesting study entitled " The Problem of Cavalry," in which he traces the work of cavalry in battle from the Napoleonic period downwards. In future he concludes cavalry will only be able to act where " open space " can be found, however that may be produced—by the nature of the ground or armament. Napoleonic cavalry

was overwhelmingly strong compared to modern formations. The latter require more armoured fighting vehicles and more artillery to strengthen their fighting power.

Captain de Labouchere contributes a long detailed account of the cavalry action of Néry on 1st September, 1914. It is based on the British official and other accounts, and also draws on German sources. The resultant narrative is clear and readable, while doing full justice to the British troops concerned, particularly the Queen's Bays and "L" Battery. The main results of this action, which defeated the great German cavalry reconnaissance on Paris, is to be found in the fact that Kluck was most probably prevented from ascertaining the formation of Maunoury's Sixth Army then assembling.

The United States "Cavalry Journal" for July-August opens with a practical article entitled "What a cavalryman should know of the Air." This is an admirable summary which conveys a clear idea of what an air squadron can do in respect of bombardment; in pursuit; in attack; and in observation duties with the help of photographs. The latter paragraphs are replete with facts and figures; they also comment on the combined work of cavalry and aircraft with special reference to divisional reconnaissance. There are also two brief articles on the work of the Civilian Conservation Corps, which has been organized for work in the United States forests under the guidance of the Army. It is 275,000 strong and is proving remarkably successful.

The September-October number contains a lecture, delivered by Major G. S. Patton to U.S. regular officers in 1933, on the subject of mechanized forces. Speaking with personal knowledge of his subject acquired in the past War, the lecturer holds that tanks have, and will have, a special rôle to fulfil in war, but that the present tendency is to overrate their capabilities. In addition, he maintains that the "time lag," which must of necessity intervene in war, between the genesis of the idea and its realization on the field of battle, will always place the tank at a disadvantage: the tank will always be "obsolescent." He bases his arguments on a study of the results achieved by tanks in the War. In the future he regards a mechanized force

acting alone, as likely to be an exception; as a general rule mechanized forces and cavalry will be found acting together. He is a great believer in a mechanized force possessing some kind of infantry, to be carried with it, in order to do much of its work. "To me," he concludes, "it seems that any person who would scrap the old age-tried arms for this new *ism* is as foolish as the poor man who, on seeing an overcoat, pawned his shirt and pants to buy it."

A remarkable feature of this American journal is the number of articles which deal with crossing rivers by cavalry. There is no doubt that the Americans practise this part of the military art to good effect; they spend long hours in training their horses to swim rivers, and have devised many methods of putting whole regiments, transport and all, across unfordable streams. They make great use of tarpaulins for extemporising rafts for the purpose. Perhaps the American climate and the warmth of the water facilitate these exercises! Two articles in these numbers illustrate the ease with which American troops can cross broad streams.

The Austrian "Militärwissenschaftliche Mittheilungen" for September is much concerned with the 250th anniversary of the defeat of the Turks at their second siege of Vienna. First comes an excellent review of the events of 1683, which ended in the catastrophic defeat of the Turks by Archduke Charles, and their place in history. This is followed by a most interesting account of that same siege of Vienna from the pen of Major Necati Salim of the Turkish General Staff. His comments on the Turkish conduct of the siege are curious. The Turkish army took three months to march from Adrianople to Vienna; there were but 19 heavy guns for the siege—the rest had been forgotten! The relieving forces were allowed every opportunity of crossing the Danube in peace instead of being attacked while half-across. The Turkish failure sealed the fate of their Empire.

In the October number a lecture by Major-General M. Wiktorin dealing with mobile formations is reproduced. The main interest of the lecture lies in the fact that it shows how Continental opinion is looking to Britain for the conclusions

to be drawn from our motorization and mechanization trials. It is clear that on the Continent the same distinction is being drawn between "motorized" units, which employ the petrol engine for accelerating movement, and "mechanized" units, which are supplied with armoured fighting vehicles as is now being done in the United States. The importance of modern cavalry formations being organised and trained so as to be able to deal with infantry, on the basis of the cavalry regiment against an infantry battalion, is emphasized. In the same number Mr. Lloyd George's Memoirs are criticized from the standpoint of the old Austro-Hungarian Empire. It is stated that some of Mr. Lloyd George's utterances cannot be justified.

The November number opens with a scholarly article on "The Break Through," by the well-known writer, General Horsetzky. He compares the victory of Austerlitz (1805) with the German success at Gorlice (May, 1915) and other attempts of the Great War of a like nature including the German effort between Soissons and Rheims (May, 1918). He considers the effect of tanks and other modern arms on these operations, and concludes that the German attempts at a break-through in 1918 failed because directed in a direction parallel to the enemy's communications; the break-through of the Central Powers on the Eastern front, on the other hand, succeeded because they cut across the direction of the enemy's communications.

In the Swiss press the "Schweizer Kavallerist" contains a series of articles drawing attention to the diminishing attractions of the cavalry arm in Switzerland. This is ascribed mainly to the enlarged recruiting areas and the waning influence of cavalry associations in civil life. The "Monatschrift für Offiziere" publishes the first two instalments of a useful précis of Lloyd George's Memoirs. The "Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitung" continues an examination of the Sonderegger proposals for reorganizing the Swiss army; these are of interest in so far as they show a thorough-going scheme for the elimination of all sinecures in army appointments, while attempting to derive the greatest benefit from mechanization. But so far the plans have not advanced beyond the paper stage.

The Spanish "Revista de Estudios Militares" for September contains a scheme for calculating the effect of aerial attacks against troops, also those of gas and smoke. The rules that are based thereon appear logical and might be useful to officers entrusted with umpiring tasks.

Among the reviews of the past quarter there is a year book, issued annually, by the (cavalry) Yaguachi Regiment of Ecuador. It is not a work worthy of special note in the usual sense of the term, but as a picture of the daily life and work of a regiment of a South American army it is full of interest. The regiment is of historic standing in Ecuador and, according to this printed record of its life during a single year, it may well rest satisfied with what it has achieved—from quelling a mutiny by a well conducted warlike operation down to organizing a highly successful horse show. It shows what regimental tradition can do.



RECENT PUBLICATIONS

"Those were the Days." By H. Atwood Clark. (Philip Allan & Co., Ltd.)

Some people are inclined to be rather irritated by being reminded of the "good old days." They may, for this reason, pass this book by. We strongly advise them not to. Everyone interested not only in sport, but also in the charm of the country will find these reminiscences delightful reading. We may well envy the author his varied experiences in nearly every form of sport. Surely to catch a two and a half pound trout at the age of five must be a record, even though it was not landed unaided.

Most of the episodes took place in Wiltshire, many of them on what must now be government land; it must be a sad change for the author to witness. He deals chiefly with shooting and fishing and tells us some interesting and amusing anecdotes. The conversion of an out-and-out townsman into a keen fisherman is particularly entertaining. But we must confess that we should have liked to have heard more about hunting.

The book, however, does not confine itself entirely to reminiscences, but contains a great deal out of the author's very extensive knowledge of wild life in the country. With its attractive etchings it shows that, if only we are observant, the country holds more of interest than many of us imagined. To read it is not only a pleasure but a lesson as well.

"Old Soldiers Never Die." By Private Frank Richards, D.C.M., M.M. (Faber & Faber.)

If you think that the private soldier was one of the best parts of our army in the last war, then read this book, it will convince you that you are right. If you do not, read it all the same and it will make you change your opinion.

The book is crude, to say the least of it, and appears to be almost unedited. It is none the worse for that, probably the

better, because it is meant to show exactly how the war seemed to the private soldier, which it does most successfully. It tells how he took little thought for the future—just as well in the case of the infantryman—and how his main concern was to make the best of things, whether he was soldiering, scrounging or enjoying himself.

The author went to France with the original expeditionary force as a reservist and stayed with his battalion right to the very end, being demobilised soon after the Armistice. He seems to have shirked nothing and to have had more than his share of war's horrors—a record which anyone might be proud of and wish to write about. The book is not a connected story of the war, but really a series of anecdotes; and yet the writer avoids monotony. His views on the cavalry are :—

“We arrived some days later at a place named Basseux and passed some cavalry lined up on the road. The young soldiers who had never been in action were very optimistic and one of them said, ‘I expect they are getting ready for a break through.’ We old hands laughed like anything and Paddy said, ‘They couldn’t break through my granny’s apron-strings! And they might as well be mounted on bloody rocking horses for all the good they are going to do.’”

Such is the style of this book throughout. It is certainly refreshing and has the advantage of being able to be picked up, opened at random and re-read with interest, in much the same way that “Jorrocks” can.

“The Staff College Examination.” Lecture Series. By Brevet Lieut.-Colonel B. C. Denning, M.C., R.E. 8s. 6d.

This little book of 95 pages is a reprint of a series of lectures originally delivered by the author to assist candidates for the Staff College examination, by directing their studies into the right channels. The author’s method is to deal with each of the obligatory papers in turn, and to introduce to the reader subjects of importance on which it is not easy to find the written word.

The views expressed in the book are those of what is termed the “advanced” school, and the influence of modern inventions

and developments on every phase of military activity is examined. At the same time, the difficulties inherent in mechanization are not neglected.

Valuable hints on preparation, and on the best method of tackling an examination paper are given.

The book is stimulating to thought; and is obtainable through the author at:—

“Four Acres,” Velmead Road, Fleet, Hampshire. W. P.

“Sabre and Saddle.” By Lt.-Col. E. A. W. Stotherd. (Seeley Service.) 18s.

Lt.-Col. Stotherd has written an attractive book of service in out-of-the-way campaigns and of leave spent in foreign travel. The book is well illustrated with a number of photographs and some of his own sketches. Sandhurst in the early eighties was followed by Jamaica and then came his first active service in Burma, 1888-89.

In 1893 he was directed to return home on leave through Persia in order to survey certain routes. In those days this journey was exciting and extremely perilous. Near Shiraz he had a scrap—ten brigands against himself and his orderly—in which the brigands lost four men and two horses killed or wounded.

After his leave he was back again in India and was orderly officer to a brigade commander whose brigade Major was Capt. Douglas Haig. In 1897 came the Tirah expedition, which is well described and he had a wonderful view of the attack at Dargai as he was standing beside the mountain guns which covered the assault.

Two years later the author was in Peking when that city was occupied by the international force under General Count Waldersee. The rest of the book is an account of a trip round the world.

“Schneider Trophy.” By Wing Commander A. H. Orlebar, A.F.C., R.A.F. (Seeley, Service & Co., Ltd.) 12s. 6d. net.

Wing Commander Orlebar commanded the High Speed Flight which was formed to contest the Schneider Trophy in

1929 and again in 1931. He kept rough notes throughout and he has expanded them at different times, while retaining their essence and the result is this book which gives a vivid and continuous account of the preparations for the two contests and of the races themselves. He says in his preface "Being purely personal notes, they give a picture painted from inside the Flight and as seen merely through one pair of eyes" and it is this personal quality, combined with the fact that the pair of eyes belonged to the officer in command of the Flight which makes the story so vivid and intimate and gives the reader the impression of living with the Flight and sharing their experiences.

Wing Commander Orlebar made it a rule that he should be the first to fly any new type of machine so that he should be in a position to advise and instruct the pilot. He describes in very comprehensible language the behaviour of each new type and the special difficulties of flying it, and these passages are among the most interesting in the book since they give the reader an idea of how the machines were controlled and of the difficulty and danger of taking off and landing. Generous tributes are paid to the designers and mechanics of the civil firms which produced the machines. Mitchell, the designer of the winning machine in each contest is often referred to, and he never fails to produce an answer to every difficulty.

The personnel of the Flight was almost completely changed between the two contests but the spirit with which it worked remained the same, and service readers will agree that the splendid *esprit de corps* which existed, and the unselfish way in which officers and men worked at high pressure in spite of disappointments and difficulties to achieve a common end was almost as great a contribution to success as the design of the aircraft themselves. Above all, the influence of the leader, as shown unconsciously by his account, was clearly the chief inspiration of the splendid spirit in which the Flight worked, an influence which was so much the greater for the fact that all members must have felt that he was prepared to do all and more than he asked of them and that he had the knowledge and skill to do so.

J. S. W. S.

"Can We Limit War." By Hoffman Nickerson. (Arrowsmith.)
8s. 6d.

The author of this book has little in common with sentimental pacifists, who think that to declaim against war is to banish it for ever. For fighting is one of the primary instincts, and large sections of the human race have not, and presumably will not, in the future believe that war is an unmixed evil.

Mr. Nickerson regards war as inevitable, and in a study of the great conflicts of the past, he divides wars into two classes—limited and unlimited—and he finds that the unlimited periods have always arisen from some defect in our social order.

What then is this defect? The answer is democracy, for which "the impudent claim is made that it is a peaceful form of government." Democracy not only calls on the masses of its peoples by conscription to fight its wars, but is forced to imbue them with an intense sense of nationalism, in order to produce a human group conscious of unity. The consequence is the unlimited war having for its object the total overthrow of the opponent, and for its result the moral disunion of peoples.

What then are the forces making for limitation to-day? They are military, economic and moral. Mechanization will tend to limit the masses employed in war, but only by throwing them into the factory. The economic factor is strong, but war for many means food and clothing and relief from destitution. The moral factor remains. World Courts and Leagues of Nations have failed through lack of moral authority, but few would deny that in their success lies the chief hope of the world. Thus the author concludes that the moral limitation must prevail, or we are doomed to slip back into the miseries of the Dark Ages.

Many readers may disagree with Mr. Nickerson, but there can be few who will not find his book both stimulating and absorbing.

W. P.

"High Days and Bye Days." By Ralph Greaves. (Philip Allan.) 12s. 6d. net.

The central character of this book is James Cockayne, a well known provincial huntsman, who after fifty seasons with hounds, finally retired after the Great War.

The author has, however, not only described Cockayne's career, but has given a glimpse of the English countryside and sporting life in the days when small holdings and wire fences were few and far between. Light anecdotes abound and it will be seen that Cockayne had a ready wit. People are apt to look upon a huntsman's life as an easy one, but it should be realized that his life is, in reality, a strenuous one, and outside his hounds, his horses and his hunting days, there is much hard work to be undertaken throughout the year. Cockayne's career was no exception to this hard, but pleasant, routine.

"Phari." By M. E. Buckingham. (Country Life.) 7s. 6d. net.

Lovers of horses cannot fail to appreciate the adventures of the Thibetan pony "Phari," which, bred on "the roof of the world," eventually found his way down to the plains of India. His experiences were many and diverse; success as a racing pony amidst the nomadic mountain villages; success on the race-courses of India; success on the polo field. Perhaps the quaintest feature of all was the great friendship which existed between "Phari" and the mule "Thunder"—a friendship temporarily broken by vice on the latter's part, but renewed again by a coincidence on the battle field.

"Phari" possessed good and bad homes and he spent some months in the hands of one—Mirza Khan, a horse thief, who led the pony in disguise in an adventurous trip of 1,400 miles across India.

The authoress knows her India and her pony well. She writes convincingly and has instilled a great personality into her equine hero. This book will please both children of over ten and adults.

"Two Horsemen and Mabel." By Lieut.-Colonel M. F. McTaggart, D.S.O. (Country Life.) 5s.

This is an enlarged and cheaper edition (but is just as full of quality) of "From Colonel to Subaltern." Colonel McTaggart always produces books to interest horsemen, although they may be heterodox and contentious. This book is no exception.

The subject matter is dealt with by means of letters from father to son and *vice versa*, and to his son's "girl friend." The letters deal with buying horses, horsemanship, horsemaster-ship, show jumping, hunting, Points to Points, side saddles, dress, etc.

His main theme is "Think for yourself," and although the conclusions of *his* thoughts may not tally with those of his readers, yet they are certainly stimulating.

"Treat a horse as you would yourself" and "As you enjoy owning a horse, see that the horse enjoys being owned by you" are excellent axioms stressed by the author.

Every subaltern should study, and everyone interested in horses, should read what Colonel McTaggart says. His views give wholesome food for thought.

O. J. F. F.

"From Serajevo to the Rhine." By Arminius. (Hutchinson.) 18s.

In this volume there are contained seventeen character sketches of generals of the Great War—three Germans, three French, three Austrians, two Russians, two British, two Italians, one American, and a Turk. The translator has added an extra Englishman on his own. "Arminius," if one may hazard a guess, is an Austrian—at least his Austrian studies are far the best of the collection, but it must be said that none of them are in any way up to the standard of those, say in Captain Liddell Hart's "Reputations." The author's style leaves much to be desired; his method is to take a figure, label it with some more or less appropriate tag, and work the facts round to suit the label. This method loses in accuracy what it gains in vividness, so that while the figures of his portrait gallery are fully alive, their resemblance to the originals is more than doubtful. On certain points, such as the mission of Colonel Hentsch at the Marne, the picture given is definitely misleading. It is not unfitting that for the author the chief figures of the war should be Hindenburg, Ludendorff and Conrad von Hotzendorf—probably history will record to them a higher place than to any of the Allied generals; but it is not easy to agree with all his verdicts, and the reader will probably find

his greatest profit in making up his mind just where and why he differs from them.

“Jacka’s Mob.” By Captain E. J. Rule, M.C., M.M. (Sydney : Angus & Robertson.) 6s.

“Jacka” of this tale is Captain Albert Jacka, the first Australian V.C. of the war, and his “mob” is the old 14th Battalion, 2nd Division, Australian Corps. Captain Rule, the author, served with this unit from the end of the Gallipoli campaign, and remained with it till the end of the war. Originally intended for publication, they were so highly approved of by the official historian, before whom they were placed, that the author was persuaded to revise and rewrite them in parts for issue in book form, and readers owe both a debt of gratitude for this decision to rescue them from oblivion. Captain Rule writes admirably, he has a fine admiration for his comrades, a somewhat more discriminating one for his officers, and something akin to hero worship for the great Jacka, whose spirit remained to animate the unit long after he himself had been forced to leave it through wounds. The pictures of trench life and trench warfare are excellent—sober yet life-like, and the description of Jacka’s last days and death are worthy of the hero to whose memory they are dedicated.

“Midsummer Sanity.” By Kenneth Ingram. (Allan.) 7s. 6d.

Mr. Ingram, who has something of a name among connoisseurs of the detective story, here turns his pen to something after the Barrie manner. The chief rôle is played by the fairies who haunt a Dorset cottage and practise their pranks on the queer collection of humans who fall under their spell. The *parvenu* purse proud lady of the land, the mad doctor, madder than any of his patients, the parson and his wife and several children, are among the minor characters; but the leading parts fall, as of right, to the sylph-like young woman of the cottage, her long-lost lover, and the genial and argumentative little man who reunites them. The style and spirit of the book are charming, and the characters etched in with a hand of love and laughter.

"Garibaldi." By G. M. Trevelyan. (Longmans.) 8s. 6d.

Does anyone still recollect the thrill that in pre-war days came with the first publication of each successive volume of the immortal trilogy now reissued in one large omnibus volume? The very titles are an epic "Garibaldi and the Defence of the Roman Republic," "Garibaldi and the Thousand," "Garibaldi and the making of Italy." Here we meet again the lion-hearted hero himself and his lovely lost Anita, and all his great lieutenants—Il Re Galantuomo, Count Cavour, Louis Napoleon III, Pope Pio Nono, King Bomba of Naples, the great "Pam" and John Russell—an array of splendid and enigmatic figures, their common tale immortalised in brilliant prose by a master historian. Here it is, in a somewhat unhandily bulky form perhaps, with all the original maps, if not alas! all the old illustrations—and one can only hope and believe that it will find many a new reader to enjoy its pages and relish the heroic tale of the making of Italy, in which all the figures played so famous a part. A hero—one of the few of which modern history can boast—a heroine who might have come straight from a best selling novel—and many another figure of little less than heroic stature—what more can any reader desire to hold his enthralled attention?

"Marlborough; His Life and Times." By the Rt. Hon. Winston Churchill. (G. G. Harrap.) 25s.

In this the first of the three volumes of his long awaited life of his illustrious ancestor, Mr. Winston Churchill describes his hero's career down to the beginning of the years which made him famous. To this fact he has brought all the qualifications of filial piety, a deep knowledge of men, of war, and of politics, and a brilliant mastery of style. One of his main tasks has been to defend his hero from the slanders of Macaulay and the Whig historians, who have so shamefully traduced the greatest English soldier of all time. He has had no hard task to show that these libels are for the most part without foundation; in particular the famous letter in which Marlborough betrayed to the French the secret of Talmash's expedition to Brest is shown to be nothing but a clumsy forgery of Jacobite enemies. For

the majority of readers the greatest and best chapter of all is still to come—the story of the great victories of Blenheim and Ramillies, of Oudenarde and Malplaquet, and Mr. Churchill's second volume will be looked for with the greater anticipation for the brilliant performance of his first. In this we can already see the budding promise of the great military genius which was so sure to dawn. We have here retold the story to the point where Lord Wolseley left it unfinished—the careful apprenticeship of war, the campaign in Flanders and Ireland in which the young soldier played a brilliant subordinate part, and the commendations he won from the great soldiers from whom he learnt his trade. A wealth of portraits and maps illustrates it and the love story of Marlborough and his Sarah sheds a glow of romance over the whole. A great tale worthily told.

“The Ghost of Napoleon.” By Captain B. H. Liddell Hart.
(Faber & Faber.) 7s. 6d.

In this his latest volume Captain Liddell Hart describes the intellectual influences moulding the military genius of Napoleon—the writings of Marshal Saxe, of Guibert, of Bourcet, and du Teil—and explains how it came about that by study of their works he surprised the secrets of the art of war. Most of this ground has been already covered by Pierron and Colin in France and by Spenser Wilkinson in this country, but there is still room for the author's clear analysis and explanation. He goes on to show how Napoleon in the later part of his career allowed art to be overmastered by force and mass—a new development which found its apostles in Jomini and Clausewitz, who so powerfully and disastrously influenced 19th century military thought. Then, after a brief sketch of the development of military methods since early days, Captain Liddell Hart shows us the true way back to wisdom in the encouragement of mobility and flexibility of mind and method, which alone can save us from a repetition of the mass massacres of the past, and restore to generalship its lost place in the art of war. The whole book is admirably done in the author's best style; it will, one may hope, have a wide circulation and be read and pondered

by all and sundry, if the next war is not to see the horrors of the last intensified.

“Cricket and I.” By L. N. Constantine. (Allen.) 7s. 6d.

In this attractively modest little book the author sketches his cricket career from the days when as a very small boy his father taught him the game in Trinidad down to the time when he took service with the Nelson team in the Lancashire League. He gives full details of his personal experiences in inter-island games, in the West Indies, and with the touring teams in England, Australia and America—all in the most attractive blend of modesty and zest. Some valuable hints on technique, and a series of spirited action photographs, go to make up a joyous little volume in which the charm of the writer's personality enlivens every page.

“Foch, The Man of Orleans.” By Captain B. H. Liddell Hart. (Eyre & Spottiswoode.) 8s. 6d.

This is a cheap reissue of the classical life of Foch which was reviewed in our pages on its first appearance in 1931. In its new and cheaper guise it is sure to find many new readers. All the original features and maps have been retained.

E. W. S.

“The Ponies of Bunts, and the Adventures of the Children who Rode Them.” By M. M. Oliver and Eva Ducat. (“Country Life.”) 8s. 6d. net.

This is yet another of the very good horse stories for children which have appeared recently. For many years “Black Beauty” was almost the only classic of this type, but now with “Moorland Mousie,” “Jerry and the Joker” and many others which appear every Christmas the choice is as wide as the standard is high. The “Ponies of Bunts” is a safe Christmas present for any child between 8 and 13 years old. The style is pleasant and easy to read, the children and their adventures are plausible and possible—and incidentally there is quite a lot of useful information. It differs from the other books of its kind particularly in the illustrations. Grown-up people may hanker for the drawings of Lionel Edwards, G. D. Armour or Cecil Aldin but young people joyfully look at the

" 32 Snapshots from Jenefer's Camera " with which the book is illustrated; they make the children, ponies and places vastly more real and interesting—indeed, judging from the reaction of two children of our acquaintance who have lately read it, the illustrations may be counted as one of the chief assets of this book.

C. W. N.

" Sport in Silhouette." By Wilfred Jelf. Illustrated by Gilbert Holiday. (Published by " Country Life.") 10s. 6d.

Quite the most charming book I have ever read. The memories it brings back to one, little items long ago forgotten and such a joy to remember. But what else could you expect from an author who always saw the bright side of life, and had that happy knack of noticing the small details which appealed to his humour.

As a soldier and a sportsman, you will no doubt have witnessed most of the events chronicled, and if any book gives you a thrill, this one will. The illustrations by Gilbert Holiday complete the picture and are alone worth the price. The only sad part about the book is that, alas, the author has gone from us and we can no longer meet him and tell him what pleasure he has given us.

T. T. P.

" Red Letter Days." By M. J. Farrell and Snaffles. (Collins.) 15s. net.

" Red Letter Days " depicts the lighter side of Irish life, where the local inhabitants are brought up on the air of sport, whether it be from the hunting field, from the banks of the salmon river or from the snipe bog. The Irishman is an enthusiast, perhaps too theoretical and certainly too prone to exaggeration. He knows how to hunt happily, although his isle may be unhappy and beset by political troubles, Miss Farrell has succeeded in portraying the more cheerful features of the country and its inherent love of sport. The illustrations are by Snaffles, who, by the skill of his brush and pencil, has added a further charm to the book. " Red Letter Days " belongs to the class of books known as ideal Xmas Gifts.

O. J. F. F.

SPORTING NEWS—AUSTRALIA**AUSTRALIAN CAVALRY COMPETITIONS.**

The following are the results of the Australian Cavalry Competitions for the year 1932/33 :—

1ST CAVALRY DIVISION.**PRINCE OF WALES TROPHY.**

	<i>Points awarded</i>
(1) 4th Cavalry Brigade, No. 1 Troop, " B " Squadron, 1st/21st Light Horse Regiment, Kangaroo Valley, N.S. Wales	444
(2) 2nd Cavalry Brigade, No. 3 Troop, " A " Squadron, 16th Light Horse Regiment, Denman, N.S. Wales	390
(3) 1st Cavalry Brigade, No. 3 Troop, " B " Squadron, 2nd/14th Light Horse Regiment, Kalbar, Queensland	339

" LORD FORSTER " CUP.

(1) 2nd Cavalry Brigade, No. 2 Section, M.G. Troop, 16th Light Horse Regiment, Dungog, N.S. Wales	375
(2) 1st Cavalry Brigade, No. 2 Section, M.G. Troop, 5th Light Horse Regiment, Kandanga, Queensland	257
(3) 4th Cavalry Brigade, No. 1 Section, M.G. Troop, 1st/21st Light Horse Regiment, Parramatta, N.S. Wales	209

2ND CAVALRY DIVISION.**" HUTTON " TROPHY.**

(1) 6th Military District, No. 2 Troop, " A " Squadron, 22nd Light Horse Regiment, Scottsdale, Tasmania	375
(2) 3rd Cavalry Brigade, No. 1 Troop, " B " Squadron, 13th Light Horse Regiment, Stratford, Victoria	359
(3) 5th Military District, No. 3 Troop, " A " Squadron, 10th Light Horse Regiment, Wickepin, W. Australia	353
(4) 6th Cavalry Brigade, No. 3 Troop, " B " Squadron, 18th/23rd Light Horse Regiment, Victor Harbour, S. Australia	331
(5) 5th Cavalry Brigade, No. 3 Troop, " B " Squadron, 4th Light Horse Regiment, Camperdown, Victoria	320

" LORD FORSTER " CUP.

(1) 5th Cavalry Brigade, No. 1 Section, M.G. Troop, 4th Light Horse Regiment, Golac, Victoria	276
(2) 6th Military District, No. 2 Section, M.G. Troop, 22nd Light Horse Regiment, Longford, Tasmania	248
(3) 6th Cavalry Brigade, No. 2 Section, M.G. Troop, 9th Light Horse Regiment, Jamestown, S. Australia	244
(4) 3rd Cavalry Brigade, No. 2 Section, M.G. Troop, 20th Light Horse Regiment, Tatura, Victoria	232
5th Military District—did not compete	—



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**FIELD MARSHAL EARL HAIG RIDING "POPERINGHE"
IN FRANCE, 1917**

ANALYSIS

June 19, 1913.

[illegible][illegible]



FORB YOUR STATE PAP' HAVE RIDING "POPER" IN CH

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

APRIL, 1934

EDITORIAL

SINCE our last issue we have regretfully to record the deaths of the King of the Belgians, Brigadier-General A. G. Seymour, D.S.O., M.V.O., and Major R. L. Greenshields, King's Dragoon Guards.

The King of the Belgians, whose tragic death occurred on 17th February, whilst climbing in Belgium, was Colonel-in-Chief of the 5th Inniskilling Dragoon Guards and a Field-Marshal in the Army. His late Majesty always took a keen and energetic interest in the Regiment and as recently as the summer of 1932 had been down to Aldershot to inspect it. Seven officers and 140 men of the Regiment went especially to Brussels to attend his funeral, and the Belgian papers commented on the marching and smart appearance of the British detachment.

Brigadier-General A. G. Seymour, D.S.O., joined the Scots Greys in 1896 at the age of twenty from Sandhurst, and served through the South African War where he was mentioned in despatches and received the Queen's medal with four clasps. On return from the South African War he was appointed Adjutant to the Northamptonshire Yeomanry, which were re-formed at that time under Lord Annaly—returning to the Greys after four years. He had the misfortune to break a bone in his foot just before mobilization, but he went out to France in spite of this with the Regiment. In 1916 he was given command of the Northamptonshire Yeomanry and received the Distinguished Service Order for his good work at the Battle of Arras. After General Bulkeley Johnson's death at Monchy, he was appointed to the command of the 8th Cavalry Brigade, and continued in command until August, 1918, when his health gave out and he was appointed to the Staff of Sir William

Robertson. When peace was declared, he was given command of the 10th Royal Hussars and retired from the service at the end of his tenure of command. In 1929, Brigadier-General Seymour became Secretary of the Pytchley, and his death occurred in Northamptonshire with which he had had such long and happy associations. He was a fine man to hounds and equally quick and decisive in his actions in the field of battle or the hunting field. His untimely death will be very deeply regretted by all who knew him. Not only have they lost a staunch and able friend, but one under whom it was always a pleasure to serve. He leaves a widow and two sons.

The death in Egypt, on 2nd January, 1934, of Major R. S. Greenshields, has deprived the King's Dragoon Guards and the Army of one of the most popular officers, and one who was well known not only in the Army but in the hunting field.

* * * * *

We are glad to see that the International Horse Show is to be revived again at Olympia this year, and wish it every success. The show will open on Saturday, 23rd June, and close on Saturday, 30th June.

* * * * *

His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to approve of the designation of the "15th The King's Royal Hussars" being changed to "15th/19th The King's Royal Hussars."

All old friends of the 19th Hussars will be glad to hear of His Majesty's decision to restore the title originally given to the 15th/19th Hussars. Why it was ever altered will remain a mystery. Like all the other amalgamated regiments, one of the two were in the majority as regards present serving officers and men, which in this case was the 15th Hussars. The officers of the 15th no doubt thought that as the present serving members of the 19th had nearly died out, the time had come when the 19th could be left out of the title. Everyone will agree that this was an erroneous view. The two regiments were fused into one, fair and square, and the whole idea of amalgamation was that the spirit of both regiments should be kept alive and that the amalgamated regiment should carry on the tradition of both regiments in the past.

Should the occasion arise, as well it might, should another war break out, of more Cavalry regiments being required, the old 19th could spring into being in place of an entirely new regiment with no record behind it. Those of us who are proud of the doings of the British Cavalry in the last 200 years, can never forget the brilliant individual effort of the 19th Hussars.

* * * * *

WE offer our congratulations to Lieutenant-General G. A. Weir, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., on his appointment as General Officer Commanding the British Troops in Egypt; to Colonel (temporary Brigadier) J. Blakiston-Houston, D.S.O., on his appointment as Commandant of the Equitation School, Weedon and Inspector of Cavalry, which will take effect on 11th August, 1934; to Colonel (temporary Brigadier) G. F. H. Brooke, D.S.O., M.C., on his appointment as Aide-de-Camp to the King; and to Colonel A. L. I. Friend, O.B.E., M.C., on his appointment as Commander, Cavalry Brigade, Egypt, with effect from 22nd September, 1934.

* * * * *

An exercise without troops was held by the Inspector of Cavalry at Oxford from the 12th to the 15th March. Representatives from all the Cavalry regiments and from other arms attended. The objects of the exercise were to study:—

- (a) Delaying action to include the use of small mixed detachments;
- (b) Defensive dispositions;
- (c) Co-operation with tanks in an attack;
- (d) Methods of dealing with a tank attack.

* * * * *

The following are the provisional dates of Yeomanry Camps, 1934:—

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Camp</i>	<i>Dates</i>
Ayrshire	Doonfoot, Ayr	26th May to 9th June
Lanarkshire . . .	Wells (Hawick)	14th—28th July.
Royal Wiltshire ..	Muntham Court,	13th—27th May.
	Worthing	
North Somerset ..	Windmill Hill,	4th—18th May.
	Tidworth	

<i>Unit</i>	<i>Camp</i>	<i>Dates</i>
Shropshire . . .	Porthcawl . .	19th May to 2nd June.
Duke of Lancaster's Own	Lazonby, Pen-rith	15th—29th July.
Cheshire . . .	Colwyn Bay . .	29th July—12th Aug.
Yorkshire Hussars..	Scarborough Racecourse	16th—30th June.
Yorkshire Dragoons	Welbeck . . .	19th May—2nd June.
Nottinghamshire . .	Chatsworth Park	18th May—3rd June.
Northumberland Hussars	Alnwick . .	16th June—1st July.
Staffordshire . .	Wolverhampton	13th—27th May.
Leicestershire . .	Leicester (Stoughton)	6th—23rd May.
Warwickshire . .	Ragley Park, Alcester	11th—25th May.

* * * *

Army Order 5, of 1934, announces that it has been decided that the honours and distinctions, viz., the badges, battle honours and alliances of the 3rd Carabiniers (Prince of Wales's Dragoon Guards) shall in future be shown as follows:—

3RD CARABINIERS (PRINCE OF WALES'S DRAGOON GUARDS)
Two carbines in saltire surmounted by the Plume of the Prince of Wales. The Rising Sun in the second corner
and

The Red Dragon in the third corner.

"Blenheim," "Ramillies," "Oudenarde," "Malplaquet,"
"Warburg," "Beaumont," "Willems," "Talavera," "Albuhara," "Vittoria," "Peninsula," "Sevastopol," "Delhi, 1857,"
"Abyssinia," "Afghanistan, 1879-80," "Relief of Kimberley,"
"Paardeberg," "South Africa, 1899-1902."

The Great War—3rd Dragoon Guards (Prince of Wales's) and The Carabiniers (6th Dragoon Guards).

"Mons," "Le Cateau," "Retreat from Mons," "Marne, 1914,"
"Aisne, 1914," "Messines, 1914," "Armentières, 1914,"
"Ypres, 1914-15," "Nonne Bosschen," "St. Julien," "Frezenberg," "Bellewaarde," "Loos," "Arras, 1917," "Scarpe, 1917,"
"Cambrai, 1917-18," "Somme, 1918," "St. Quentin," "Avre,"
"Lys," "Hazebrouck," "Amlens," "Bapaume, 1918," "Hindenburg Line," "Canal du Nord," "Beaurevoir," "Selle,"
"Sambre," "France and Flanders, 1914-18."

Allied Regiments

Union of South Africa Defence Forces
1st Natal Carbineers, Pietermaritzburg
2nd Natal Carbineers, Ladysmith.

Lieut.-Colonel R. S. Timmis, whose article "Seat and Hands" was published in our last issue, writes that the type of saddle he refers to has the front of the flap cut well forward as we see in the Whippy saddles advertised. This type allows proper room for the knee and if the stuffing is thick at the edge, does not necessitate knee-rolls. The hunting saddle that is cut straight down in front does not allow the knee to remain on the saddle with the stirrup worn at the proper length.

* * * * *

We have received the Annual Report of the Ex-Cavalrymen's Association, from which our readers will be glad to hear that the Association registered in 1933, 507 men and found jobs for 444 (some of which were temporary only), as compared to 329 in 1931, and 246 in the exceptionally bad year of 1932. The total number of jobs found since the start of the Association in 1924 is 3,815.

This improvement is partly due to better trade conditions and partly to a valuable connection which has been formed with several film producing companies.

The Annual General Meeting was held on 31st January, 1934, when a discussion ensued as to the future of the Association. It was decided to continue on the same lines as hitherto.

The President of the Association is Captain H. R. H. The Duke of Gloucester, K.G., K.T., etc., and Major-General the Earl of Athlone, K.G., P.C., etc., is Chairman of the General Committee, who consist in most cases of the Officers Commanding the various regiments and retired officers or N.C.Os. The Inspector-General of Cavalry is Chairman of the Executive Committee.

The object of the Association is to find employment for ex-Cavalrymen and it is not concerned with the grant of benefits or pecuniary assistance, which are the province of Regimental Associations.

The address of the Association is 112, Belgrave Road, Victoria, S.W.1. Telephone : Victoria 8423.

* * * * *

The undermentioned have become subscribers for 1934 :—
 Capt. E. J. H. Merry . . . Royal Horse Guards
 Lieut. Sir Peter Grant-Lawson, Bt. . . do.

2nd Lieut. E. J. S. Ward ..	Royal Horse Guards
2nd Lieut. P. S. Morris-Keating	do.
2nd Lieut The Duke of Rox- burghe	do.
2nd Lieut. Hon. C. J. de C. W. Bampfylde	do.
2nd Lieut. A. C. S. Delmege	King's Dragoon Guards
2nd Lieut. T. E. Dimsdale ..	3rd Carabiniers
2nd Lieut. A. J. FitzWilliams Hyde	4th/7th Dragoon Guards
Major N. E. Weatherall, O.B.E.	7th Hussars
Major P. E. F. Chirnside ..	8th Hussars
Major J. W. S. Galbraith ..	11th Hussars
2nd Lieut. T. A. K. Hickman	13th/18th Hussars
Lieut.-Colonel J. A. T. Miller, O.B.E.	14th/20th Hussars
Lieut. S. V. McCoy	2nd Lancers, Indian Army
Lieut.-Colonel W. G. H. Vickers, O.B.E.	13th D.C.O. Lancers, Indian Army
The O.C. Detachment, Bally- gunge, Calcutta.	15th Lancers, Indian Army
The Adjutant.. ..	15th Lancers, Indian Army
Capt. G. P. Warden.. ..	Trans-Jordan Frontier Force
Colonel B. G. Baker, D.S.O.	Retired
Capt. W. D'Arcy Hall ..	Late 20th Hussars
Lieut.-Colonel A. R. Newling	Editor, The Military Musician, Kneller Hall
Lorne H. Hitchens, Esq. ..	

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A certain number of back numbers of the CAVALRY JOURNAL from 1906 to 1933 are on sale at 2s. 6d., post free. The years 1920 to 1923 and 1927 are out of print.

White forril covers with red design and lettering, price 3s. 6d., ready for binding annual volumes are also available on application to the CAVALRY JOURNAL, Royal United Service Institution, Whitehall, S.W.1.

THE CAVALRY IN FRANCE, AUGUST–NOVEMBER, 1918

By **LIEUT.-COLONEL T. PRESTON, M.C., T.D., Yorkshire Hussars**

PART I.

APRIL–JULY, 1918.

The Cavalry Corps, after helping to stop the German Somme offensive in March–April, 1918 (as already described in former numbers of this JOURNAL), did not confront the enemy again for exactly four months. The cavalry divisions remained in back areas, though certain brigades were sent up nearer the front from time to time in view of possible further hostile attacks.

The Cavalry Corps and divisional commanders remained the same as in April, but there were several changes in the brigade commanders. In the 1st Cavalry Division, Brigadier-Generals Makins and Beale-Browne handed over the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Brigades respectively to Brigadier-Generals Sewell and Lawson. In the 2nd Cavalry Division, Brigadier-General Rankin (who had been with the Ambala Brigade) took over the 4th Cavalry Brigade, replacing Major-General Pitman who had gone to command the division on 27th March; whilst Brigadier-General N. W. Haig—formerly commanding the Mhow Brigade—took over the 5th Cavalry Brigade from Lieut.-Colonel W. F. Collins, Royal Scots Greys.¹

There were also two changes in the 3rd Cavalry Division: Brigadier-General Portal handed over command of the 7th Cavalry Brigade to Brigadier-General Burt; whilst in the

¹ Colonel Collins had been in temporary command for some time as Brig.-General C. Campbell was ill in England.

Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Brigadier-General Seely,¹ who had been badly gassed, was promoted major-general and given a home appointment, his place being taken by Brigadier-General R. W. Paterson, of the Fort Garry Horse. The composition of the nine brigades remained the same, and an Order of Battle as it was at the beginning of August will be found on page 181.

The various units carried out much strenuous training during the early summer of 1918, but after the middle of June this was considerably handicapped by an epidemic of so-called P.U.O. ("Pyrexia, unknown origin"). This was really a form of influenza, which was accompanied by a high temperature and often by serious after-effects if men returned to duty too soon. One typical cavalry brigade, the 6th, had nearly 500 cases at the end of June in a special hospital at Belloy-sur-Somme, but the epidemic had mostly subsided by the middle of July.²

THE BATTLE OF AMIENS.

The Battle of Amiens, like that of Waterloo, must always rank as one of the decisive victories in the history of British arms. It was the battle which produced from the Kaiser an order to Secretary of State von Hintze to open peace negotiations. It was the battle which caused Ludendorff to tender his resignation to Hindenburg, and to write later in his memoirs that "August 8th was the black day of the German Army in the history of this war." It was the battle which restored to the Allies the priceless weapon of the initiative, and kindled hopes that the war might, after all, be won in 1918. It was a battle in which surprise, a sound plan, careful staff work, and the unconquerable heroism of the troops started the British Army on its march to the Rhine. And it was a battle in which the cavalry was privileged to play a notable and honourable part.

* * * * *

A few words are first necessary regarding the reasons for attacking east of Amiens. The Germans launched their last

¹ Now Lord Mottistone.

² It will be remembered that this epidemic spread over most—if not all—of Europe, taking toll both of the armies and of the civilian populations, and continuing long after the Armistice in some countries. The enemy countries being shorter of food suffered worse than we did.

offensive—against the French in Champagne—on 15th July, 1918, and three days later came the highly successful Allied counter-stroke south of the Aisne. It was now fairly certain that the enemy had shot his bolt and used up most of his reserves, whilst those of the Allies—including the ever-growing American Army—had greatly increased. Marshal Foch therefore, at a conference on 24th July, asked that the British, French and American Armies should at once prepare plans for local offensives ; in the case of the British, it was decided that the first operation to be undertaken should be an attack east of Amiens with the object of freeing the important Paris-Amiens railway which, like the city itself, had been under effective hostile gunfire since early April. The junction between the French and British Armies would also be made safer.

In many ways the sector held by our Fourth Army at this time was well suited to the staging of an offensive. Thanks to a dry summer and to the fact that it had been very little shelled, the ground was hard and provided good “going” both for tanks and cavalry. South of the Somme the country was flat and open, with no real obstacles except the little river Luce and its marshy valley. Scattered about at wide intervals were the various woods and villages—the latter also looking very like small woods at a distance, as they were nearly always surrounded by trees and orchards. Further, the enemy’s defences were by no means strong, their front line consisting of very rough trenches with no dug-outs worthy of the name, and few communication trenches. Behind lay two lines of old trenches dug by the French in 1915-16, of which one, known as the “Outer Defences of Amiens” or “Old Amiens Defence Line” calls for special mention, as it formed the final objective for our first day’s attack. Although dug more than two years ago, the Outer Defences were still in good enough condition to be easily recognised by troops on the ground ; they comprised front and support lines with a thick belt of wire on the far side, and lay, on an average, six or seven miles ahead of our then front line. East of the Amiens Outer Defences there was no organised trench line, but it should be noted that any troops advancing

beyond the Outer Defences would, after another four or five miles, reach a wide stretch of country which had been fought over in the 1916 Somme battles and was completely covered with shell-holes and pieces of old wire, overgrown with thistles and rank grass. This shell-crater area—the near edge of which was a line running roughly north and south through Foucaucourt—was extremely difficult for infantry and well-nigh impossible for tanks and cavalry. It is important to bear this in mind, for it explains why the cavalry, after their excellent work on the first day of the battle, were able to do so little in the later stages.

THE PLAN.

Sketch 1

The Fourth Army plan can be best understood by referring to Sketch 1. Briefly, it comprised an advance between the Amiens–Roye road on the right, and the River Ancre on the left—a frontage of 12 miles as the crow flies, and 14 measured along the British front line. This frontage was allotted to three corps as under:—

The Canadian Corps from (both inclusive) the Amiens–Roye road to the Amiens–Chaulnes railway.

The Australian Corps from the railway (exclusive) to the Somme.

The III Corps from the Somme to the Ancre.

On the Fourth Army's right, the French First Army was to attack with its XXXI Corps. Its role was to form a defensive flank on the right, whilst the III Corps fulfilled a similar role on the left. The main attack was to be delivered by the Canadian and Australian Corps (assisted by the Cavalry Corps) in the area between the Roye road and the Somme, the final objective being the Amiens Outer Defence line already described. Stated in its simplest terms, this meant an advance of from 6 to 8 miles on a front of $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

Secrecy was the basis of the whole plan, and it was therefore decided to follow the tactics used at Cambrai the previous November. There was to be no preliminary bombardment nor registration of guns, and the attack was to be led by tanks in

large numbers.¹ The artillery fire was to open at zero hour, one-third of the guns forming a creeping barrage to cover the infantry advance, and the remainder to engage hostile battery positions and places where enemy reserves might assemble.

THE TASK OF THE CAVALRY.

The mission of the cavalry was : *firstly*, to go through the Canadian and Australian infantry as soon as possible, push on to the Amiens Outer Defence line and hold it until the infantry came up ; and *secondly*, to move south-eastwards in the general direction of Roye and Chaulnes, with the idea of cutting the enemy's communications and easing the situation in front of the French. It will be seen later that this second task proved to be impracticable.

THE PRELIMINARIES.

The preparations for the battle were necessarily very elaborate, including as they did the strengthening of the Fourth Army by the Canadian Corps (four divisions), an extra Australian division, the Cavalry Corps, another thousand guns, nine tank battalions, and six Air Force squadrons. The fact that this was accomplished and the attack delivered without the Germans getting the slightest inkling beforehand, was one of the most wonderful feats of staff work in the whole war. Space does not allow of anything like a full description of the difficulties and problems involved, and the present story is only an attempt to give some idea of the doings of the cavalry ; but some of the steps taken to ensure secrecy are deserving of mention. One was the issue to everyone in the Fourth Army of a small printed paper entitled " Keep your mouth shut," to be pasted in the official small books carried by each officer and man.² Another was to tell as few people as possible of the impending operation, and to inform staffs and formations in sufficient time to make their preparations, but no sooner. The Fourth Army Commander's first conference was held on 21st

¹ Altogether, 456 fighting tanks (including 96 whippets) were available on 8th August. They were organised in 10 battalions—four with the Canadians, four with the Australians, one with the III Corps, and one in Army reserve.

² See page 181.

July, when corps commanders were told. Further conferences were held every few days, but in different places, so that the frequent gatherings of generals would attract less attention.

4th August
Sketches
1 & 2

The cavalry divisional commanders and brigadiers knew nothing about it until 4th August, when they were summoned to a conference at Cavalry Corps headquarters at Auxi-le-Chateau, and Sir Henry Rawlinson personally unfolded his plan, of which the outline has already been given. As regards the Cavalry Corps, the 3rd Cavalry Division would operate on the right, the 1st on the left, and the 2nd would be in corps reserve. As it was essential for the cavalry to pass through the infantry at the earliest possible moment, it was decided to place the 3rd Cavalry Division temporarily under the orders of the Canadian Corps Commander, whilst one brigade of the 1st Cavalry Division would similarly be under the Australian Corps Commander. This arrangement was to continue until the cavalry had passed through the infantry, after which they would once more come under the Cavalry Corps Commander, who was also given two battalions of whippet tanks to assist his mounted troops. These whippets could do seven miles an hour on good ground.

General Rawlinson told General Harman (commanding 3rd Cavalry Division) that he wished that division to cross the River Luce at Ignaucourt if the bridges there were reported intact ; if not, the division was to move along the north bank of the Luce and pass round the village of Caix to get on to its final objective. It will be seen later that the first plan was the one adopted.

6th August

The various cavalry divisions and brigades, which had been billeted in the Somme valley between Flixecourt and Amiens, marched after dark on 6th August and assembled in close billets and bivouacs immediately west of Amiens. On the next night, starting at dusk (about 9 p.m.), they marched through the town to a pre-arranged assembly position in the fork between the Roye and Villers-Bretonneux roads. To reach this, only one road was available out of Amiens, and all three cavalry divisions rode down it in one long column of sections, the horses

7th August

being closed up nose to croup. Only the most careful timings and march discipline enabled the cavalry, with their attached whippet tanks, to complete this movement during the dark hours of the short summer night.

It had been necessary to construct a special "cavalry track" leading forward from the assembly position to the front line, so that the cavalry, when they advanced, should not interfere with the masses of infantry reserves and guns which were crowded behind the front. This track was started about 7 p.m. on 7th August by the Cavalry Corps engineers assisted by an American infantry battalion, which had never been under fire before, and was so well made that wheeled vehicles and armoured cars were able to use it next morning. The mounted troops were quick to realize this, and several of them gave the working parties thanks and cheers as they rode past them.

* * * *

The night of 7th/8th August was fine. The absence of any hostile shelling or aerial bombing seemed to show that the enemy had no warning of the impending blow. Nothing that foresight could suggest in the way of preparation had been overlooked. The men of the Cavalry Corps snatched what short periods of rest they could before the dawn.

Four months ago these cavalymen had helped to save their Army from imminent defeat, almost on this very spot. Now they were to bear their part in a resounding victory which, though they could not then know it, was within a hundred days to bring down the German Army and Empire in ruin.

THE BATTLE OPENS, 8TH AUGUST, 1918.

Zero hour had been fixed for 4.20 a.m.—just over an hour before sunrise—the idea being that the infantry should break through the enemy front line under cover of darkness, and that there should then be enough light, before they had gone far, to enable them and the tanks to maintain direction.

Punctually at zero, the artillery opened fire with a crash and the tanks moved forward followed by the infantry. There was a thick mist which did not really clear until 10 a.m., and

8th August
Sketch 1

this made it difficult to keep direction ; but the issue of the day was never in doubt. The Germans were, so to speak, swept completely off their feet, and our infantry made rapid progress.

The Cavalry Corps assembly area was some four miles in rear of the front line, and soon after zero the leading units started moving forward along the cavalry track already mentioned. By 5.20 a.m. the heads of the 1st and 9th Cavalry Brigades (1st Cavalry Division) were about a mile north-east of Cachy, whilst the Canadian Cavalry Brigade (3rd Cavalry Division) had reached a point just west of that village. Let us first follow the fortunes of the latter division.

ACTION OF THE 3RD CAVALRY DIVISION.

6th August
Sketch 2

The task which confronted Major-General Harman was to pass his division through the infantry and then, as quickly as possible, to push on to the right-hand or southern half of the final objective, the Amiens Outer Defences. This meant an advance of about seven miles as the crow flies after passing through our front line, and General Harman had already gone carefully into two alternative plans for carrying out his mission : (1) if the Ignaucourt bridges were reported intact, in which case he would cross the Luce there ; and (2) if the bridges were destroyed, in which event he would have to go round by Caix.

Ignaucourt was some three miles ahead of the front line, and an officer's patrol from the Fort Garry Horse was detailed for the important mission of finding out whether the bridges were passable or not. Assuming that they were, the divisional commander decided that the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, closely followed by the 7th Cavalry Brigade, would make its first bound to the south bank of the River Luce, where the two brigades would form up side by side facing south, with the Canadians on the right. As soon as both brigades had thus formed up they would, without further orders, push straight on to the final objective, the Canadian Brigade passing if possible south of Beaucourt Wood and the 7th Brigade north of it. The 6th Cavalry Brigade would follow on in divisional reserve. It will

be seen that, except on the extreme right, this operation worked out almost exactly as planned.

By zero hour on 8th August, the Fort Garry officer's patrol 8th August
Sketch 2 was close up behind the Canadian infantry, whilst as an additional precaution a squadron of Lord Strathcona's Horse, which was to be the leading regiment, had ridden to Cachy and sent more patrols up to the infantry. At 5.40 a.m. General Harman opened his advanced report centre at Cachy and had to wait some time for any definite news, and at 7.25 the remainder of Lord Strathcona's Horse, with four machine guns and "B" Battery, Royal Canadian Horse Artillery, were ordered forward to Morgemont Wood to find out what the infantry were doing. The other two regiments of the Canadian Brigade followed twenty minutes later, and at 8.30 a.m. Morgemont Wood was reported clear of the enemy, whereupon the Canadian and 7th Cavalry Brigades rode forward to a point just east of it.

At 9.15 a.m. came in the vital information from the Fort Garry Horse officer's patrol¹ that two crossings at Ignaucourt were fit for cavalry and that one was fit for tanks: this meant that General Harman could go ahead with his first alternative plan, and he at once gave the order to advance. Within five minutes the Canadian Cavalry Brigade (with Lord Strathcona's Horse as advanced guard) began crossing the river; almost immediately they passed through the leading Canadian infantry and took prisoner forty-five Germans, with a field gun. The brigade then formed up just under the crest of the southern bank of the Luce valley, facing south.

The 7th Cavalry Brigade (temporarily commanded by Lieut. Colonel E. Paterson of the Inniskillings) commenced to cross at 10.30, and half an hour later was formed up on the Canadians' left.

The ground over which the two cavalry brigades were about to advance was undulating and unfenced, with steep rises having small narrow crests on top: there were numerous small copses as well as the larger Beaucourt and Cayeux Woods, but otherwise the country was well suited to mounted movement.

¹ The name of the officer who led this patrol has not been ascertained. Perhaps some reader could tell us.

8th August
Sketch 2

Both brigades started off at 11 a.m. or soon after. As the various squadrons and troops topped the rises they could easily be seen by the Germans on the main crest from Beaucourt Wood to Cayeux Wood, who opened upon them with bursts of artillery and machine-gun fire; but owing to the rapid pace of the horsemen and the short time it took them to cross the exposed ridges, very few were hit.

The Canadian Cavalry Brigade (Brigadier-General R. W. Paterson) rode forward with Lord Strathcona's Horse on the right, the Royal Canadian Dragoons on the left, and the Fort Garry Horse in reserve, each with some machine guns from the Canadian M.G. Squadron. Two troops of the Strathcona's had already gone on ahead on the right: they reached the main Amiens-Roye road without difficulty and gained touch at Maison Blanche with the Independent Force.¹ Then they pushed on over the road as far as Fresnoy-en-Chaussée, where 125 Germans surrendered to them.

Beaucourt village and wood, however, were strongly held by the enemy, and the Canadians were checked here for some time. The Royal Canadian Dragoons, with eight whippet tanks, were held up north-west of the wood by Germans in a line of rifle-pits, and when the whippets tried to reach the wood they were driven back by field-gun fire, whilst a plucky attempt to gallop Beaucourt Wood was also unsuccessful: this was about midday. Thanks to gallant efforts by the regiments and machine-gunners, the Canadian cavalymen got possession of Beaucourt village; but they found it impossible to advance east of it, as the ground between the village and wood was quite open and was swept by hostile machine-gun fire. The situation here remained unchanged until the afternoon, when the 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade came up and, after stiff fighting, managed to clear Beaucourt Wood by 4.30 p.m.

In the meantime the 7th Cavalry Brigade had advanced from the Luce valley with the Inniskillings on the right, the 7th Dragoon Guards on the left, and the 17th Lancers in reserve

¹ This was a force under Brig.-General Brutinel consisting of Canadian motor machine-guns, cyclists and trench mortars. Its role was to operate along the main road so as to form a flank to the Canadian Corps' attack, and if possible to help the cavalry.

behind. The former regiment came under artillery and long-range machine-gun fire almost at once, but increasing their pace, managed to gain a small copse just north of Beaucourt Wood, where they were held up by the enemy in the latter wood who, as already noted, were also holding up the Canadians. Seeing the fire to which the Inniskillings had been subjected, the Brigadier ordered the 7th Dragoon Guards to change direction half left ; this brought them facing nearly due east, towards the stretch of open ground between Beaucourt and Cayeux Woods. The two leading squadrons of the 7th Dragoon Guards which had been level with one another, now became echeloned, with the leading squadron some 150 yards ahead. This squadron, with drawn swords and a loud cheer, charged down a slope, up a rise and into a small copse south of Cayeux Wood, capturing some fifty Germans, with two field-guns and some machine-guns. A few moments later the second squadron (by order of the regimental commander, Lieut.-Colonel Sparrow) galloped up on the left of the first and also secured a number of prisoners and machine-guns ; unfortunately, however, they came under fire from Beaucourt, had to withdraw slightly below a crest line, and could not help letting some of their prisoners go.

8th August
Sketch 2

Colonel Sparrow now directed the third 7th Dragoon Guards squadron to go up on the left of the other two, to the south-west edge of Cayeux Wood. This they did, advancing under fire and capturing a German field battery with further prisoners ; whilst a litter of equipment inside the wood showed that a large number of the enemy had evidently run away rather than meet the cavalry attack.

The 17th Lancers (Lieut.-Colonel T. P. Melvill), who had been in brigade reserve, were now sent up at the gallop with squadrons in echelon from the right ; coming up in turn on the 7th Dragoon Guards' left, they gained possession of the remainder of Cayeux Wood.

These two regiments having secured this favourable position on the high ground, the Brigadier was anxious to recall the Inniskillings from the right flank and use them to exploit the success at Cayeux Wood. Orders were, therefore, despatched

8th August
Sketch 2

to them by one of their officers who was attached to brigade headquarters as galloper ; his horse, however, was shot under him and he was rendered unconscious, so he never got through with his message. A second officer¹ who volunteered for the same task was killed, with his orderly, by long-range machine-gun fire. In the end the brigade major was sent to find out what had happened to the Inniskillings ; he ascertained that they had been asked to cover the left flank of the Canadians who (as noted above) were heavily engaged in Beaucourt village. However, the situation was now such that the Canadian Brigade commander agreed to the release of the Inniskillings, who thereupon joined up with the rest of the 7th Cavalry Brigade near Cayeux Wood.

Here the Brigadier had already prepared to push forward to the final objective. His artillery ("K" Battery, R.H.A., under Major R. L. Palmer) had come into action in rear, and the 7th Dragoon Guards, notwithstanding the stiff fight they had just been through, had remounted their horses and formed up for moving on. Before they could do so, however, the enemy launched a counter attack from Beaucourt Wood : this delayed our further advance for a time, but was successfully beaten off with the help of the Horse Artillery and 7th Machine Gun Squadron. The 17th Lancers were then ordered to picquet the north-eastern edge of Cayeux Wood lightly and then continue the advance ; the bulk of this regiment, therefore, formed up on the west side of the wood. When they moved forward east of the wood their leading troop came under heavy machine-gun and shell fire from the direction of Caix, suffering considerable loss ; whilst the acting Brigadier, Lieut.-Colonel Paterson—who had ridden forward to see the situation for himself—had his own and his orderly's horse killed.

The enemy had evidently posted a number of machine guns on or near the Cayeux-Caix road, and a squadron of the 17th Lancers was ordered to move out from the north end of Cayeux Wood and outflank them. This was successfully done, and the

¹ Captain Maurice Gray (Queen's Bays, attached M.G. Corps), who was in temporary command of the 7th Machine Gun Squadron.

17th, followed by the remainder of the 7th Cavalry Brigade,¹ moved on south of Caix on to the final objective (the Amiens Outer Defence line), which they reached about 2.30 p.m., capturing on their way thirty-eight more prisoners, two field guns, three machine guns, and two complete field hospitals. Altogether, this brigade had every reason to be proud of itself. Its capture of the Cayeux Wood position in the face of machine-gun and rifle fire showed, once again, what cavalry could do on ground that permitted of rapid movement. Their captures during the day totalled over 200, with numerous field and machine guns, but it must be noted that, throughout this battle, the cavalry often had to push on and hand over their captures to infantry coming up from the rear, who in consequence added them to their own "bag" and got the credit for them in the official returns compiled afterwards. The officers of one Canadian infantry battalion which came up in the afternoon, stated that since capturing the enemy's front line at daybreak they had not set eyes on a German and thought they had all gone for good; it was only as they went further and came upon the dead horses in front of the positions taken by the cavalry, that they realized what had happened.

It will be remembered that Major-General Harman had kept the 6th Cavalry Brigade (Brigadier-General A. G. Seymour)² in divisional reserve. It was not called upon until 1 p.m., when the Royals (Lieut.-Colonel F. W. Wormald) were ordered forward to help the 7th Cavalry Brigade, and "C" Battery, R.H.A., came into action north of Beaucourt. At 1.40 the remainder of the Brigade was ordered to turn Beaucourt Wood from the north and north-east, but this order seems to have been cancelled later, for at about 2 p.m. the 6th Brigade moved

¹ The 7th Cavalry Brigade casualties during the battle, nearly all of which were sustained in the fighting described above, were:—

	Officers		Other Ranks			Horses K. & W.
	Killed	Wnd.	Killed	Wnd.	Missing	
Brigade H.Q.	—	—	—	1	—	—
7th Dragoon Guards	—	9	5	36	3	120
6th Inniskilling Dragoons . .	—	3	4	37	16	117
17th Lancers	1	1	4	22	5	62
7th Machine Gun Squadron . .	1	—	—	1	—	4
"K" Battery, R.H.A.	—	—	—	—	1	—
Total	2	13	13	96	26	303

² Died 30/12/1933.

8th August
Sketch 2 .

to a point east of Cayeux Wood, the Royals having by then reached "E15 Wood," a mile south of Caix. Here they were held up by fire from the high ground between Le Quesnel and Beaufort, and in spite of the 10th Hussars being sent to reinforce them, very little further ground could be gained at this point. It was now about 4 p.m., and shortly afterwards General Seymour was compelled by influenza to hand over the command of the 6th Cavalry Brigade to Lieut.-Colonel F. H. D. C. Whitmore, O.C. 10th Hussars.¹

At 5.30 p.m. General Harman issued orders that the Amiens Outer Defences (i.e., the Blue line) would be held for the night, and that no further advance would be attempted yet. On the right, the Canadian Cavalry Brigade was relieved by infantry of the 4th Canadian Division, who took up a line from the Amiens-Roye road north of Fresnoy-en-Chaussée (where they joined the French) along the southern edge of Beaucourt Wood, to a point north of Le Quesnel, whence the 6th Cavalry Brigade held about a mile and a quarter of line with a series of posts, to a point east of "E15" Wood, with "C" Battery, R.H.A., covering the exits of Beaufort. On the left (south-east of Caix) the 7th Cavalry Brigade occupied their portion of the Amiens Outer Defence line until relieved by Canadian infantry at 9 p.m.

General Harman fixed his advanced headquarters for the night at a spot west of Cayeux Wood.

* * * *

As darkness fell on this memorable day, the men of the 3rd Cavalry Division had good cause to be content. Since crossing what had been the front line trenches in the morning, they had advanced to a depth of some seven miles, a feat not accomplished on the Western Front since trench warfare began close on four years ago. They had taken many prisoners and guns and had reached their final objective except just on the right, where the Germans were still holding Le Quesnel.

Further north, the 1st Cavalry Division had been no less successful, as will be seen in the next part of this story.

(To be continued)

¹ Colonel Whitmore had previously commanded the Essex Yeomanry, and has the distinction of being the only Yeomanry officer who commanded a Regular cavalry regiment.

On 15/8/18 the 6th Cavalry Brigade was taken over by Lieut.-Colonel Ewing Paterson (Inniskillings).

APPENDIX I

(Text of printed paper issued to all ranks in the Fourth Army in July, 1918, to be pasted into Army Books 439 (officers) and 64 (other ranks).)

KEEP YOUR MOUTH SHUT!

The success of any operation we carry out depends chiefly on surprise.

DO NOT TALK.—When you know that your Unit is making preparations for an attack, don't talk about them to men in other Units or to strangers, and keep your mouth shut, especially in public places.

Do not be inquisitive about what other Units are doing ; if you hear or see anything, keep it to yourself.

If you hear anyone else talking about operations, stop him at once.

The success of the operations and the lives of your comrades depend upon your SILENCE.

If you ever should have the misfortune to be taken prisoner, don't give the enemy any information beyond your rank and name. In answer to all other questions you need only say " I cannot answer."

He cannot compel you to give any other information. He may use threats. He will respect you if your courage, patriotism, and self-control do not fail. Every word you say may cause the death of one of your comrades.

Either after or before you are openly examined, **Germans, disguised as British officers or men**, will be sent among you or will await you in the cages or quarters or hospital to which you are taken.

Germans will be placed where they can overhear what you say without being seen by you.

DO NOT BE TAKEN IN BY ANY OF THESE TRICKS.

APPENDIX II

CAVALRY CORPS ORDER OF BATTLE, 8th AUGUST, 1918**CAVALRY CORPS**

G.O.C. Lieut.-General Sir C. T. McM. Kavanagh, K.C.B.,
C.V.O., D.S.O.

B.G.G.S. Brig.-General A. F. Home, C.M.G., D.S.O.

D.A. & Q.M.G. Brig.-General J. C. G. Longmore, C.M.G., D.S.O.

G.O.C., R.A. Brig.-General H. S. Seligman, D.S.O.

C.R.E. Lieut.-Colonel W. H. Evans, D.S.O.

Corps Signal Troops : Cavalry Corps Signal Squadron.

Cavalry Corps Wireless Squadron.

" AD " and " GG " Cable Sections.

Cavalry Corps Bridging Park, R.E.

Cavalry Corps Troops M.T. Company.

Attached :—

No. 6 Squadron, Royal Air Force (R.E.8).

3rd Tank Brigade (Brig.-General J. Hardress-Lloyd, D.S.O.).

3rd Tank Battn. } Whippets.
6th Tank Battn. }

1st CAVALRY DIVISION .. Major-General R. L. Mullens, C.B.
 G.S.O.I. Lieut.-Colonel R. E. Cecil, D.S.O.
 A.A. & Q.M.G. Lieut.-Colonel J. Blakiston-Houston, D.S.O.

1st Cavalry Brigade (Brig.-General H. S. Sewell, D.S.O.).
 Queen's Bays. 5th Dragoon Guards. 11th Hussars.
 1st Machine Gun Squadron.
 1st Signal Troop.
 " I " Battery, R.H.A.

2nd Cavalry Brigade (Brig.-General A. Lawson, C.M.G.).
 4th Dragoon Guards. 9th Lancers. 18th Hussars.
 2nd Machine Gun Squadron.
 2nd Signal Troop.
 " H " Battery, R.H.A.

9th Cavalry Brigade (Brig.-General d'A. Legard, D.S.O.).
 8th Hussars. 15th Hussars. 19th Hussars.
 9th Machine Gun Squadron.
 9th Signal Troop.
 " Y " Battery, R.H.A.

Divisional Troops :

7th Brigade, R.H.A., and Ammunition Column.
 1st Field Squadron, R.E.
 1st Signal Squadron.
 H.Q. 1st Cavalry Divisional R.A.S.C.
 1st Cavalry Divisional M.T. Company.
 1st Cavalry Divisional Auxiliary (Horse) Company.
 1st, 3rd and 9th Cavalry Field Ambulances.
 1st, 10th and 39th Mobile Veterinary Sections.

2nd CAVALRY DIVISION .. Major-General T. T. Pitman, C.B., C.M.G.
 G.S.O.I. Lieut.-Colonel M. Graham, D.S.O.¹
 A.A. & Q.M.G. Lieut.-Colonel Hon. G. V. A. Monckton-
 Arundell, D.S.O.

3rd Cavalry Brigade (Brig.-General J. A. Bell-Smyth, C.M.G.).
 4th Hussars. 5th Lancers. 16th Lancers.
 3rd Machine Gun Squadron.
 3rd Signal Troop.
 " D " Battery, R.H.A.

4th Cavalry Brigade (Brig.-General C. H. Rankin, C.M.G., D.S.O.).
 Carabiniers. 3rd Hussars. Oxfordshire Hussars.
 4th Machine Gun Squadron.
 4th Signal Troop.
 " J " Battery, R.H.A.

5th Cavalry Brigade (Brig.-General N. W. Haig, C.M.G.).
 Royal Scots Greys. 12th Lancers. 20th Hussars.
 5th Machine Gun Squadron.
 5th Signal Troop.
 " E " Battery, R.H.A.

¹ Died 14/8/1929 from injuries received at Dublin Horse Show.

SKETCH 1

AUGUST 1918.



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Divisional Troops :

3rd Brigade, R.H.A., and Ammunition Column.
 2nd Field Squadron, R.E.
 2nd Signal Squadron.
 H.Q. 2nd Cavalry Divisional R.A.S.C.
 2nd Cavalry Divisional M.T. Company.
 2nd Cavalry Divisional Auxiliary (Horse) Company.
 2nd, 4th and 5th Cavalry Field Ambulances.
 7th, 8th and 9th Mobile Veterinary Sections.

3rd CAVALRY DIVISION .. Major-General A. E. W. Harman, D.S.O.
 G.S.O.1. Lieut.-Colonel G. P. L. Cosens, D.S.O.
 A.A. & Q.M.G. Lieut.-Colonel T. W. Pragnell, D.S.O.

6th Cavalry Brigade (Brig.-General A. G. Seymour, D.S.O.).¹

3rd Dragoon Guards. 1st Royal Dragoons. 10th Hussars.
 6th Machine Gun Squadron.
 6th Signal Troop.
 " C " Battery, R.H.A.

7th Cavalry Brigade (Brig.-General A. Burt, D.S.O.).¹

7th Dragoon Guards. 6th (Inniskilling) Dragoons. 17th Lancers.
 7th Machine Gun Squadron.
 7th Signal Troop.
 " K " Battery, R.H.A.

Canadian Cavalry Brigade (Brig.-General R. W. Paterson, D.S.O.).

Royal Canadian Dragoons. Lord Strathcona's Horse. Fort Garry Horse.
 Canadian Machine Gun Squadron.
 Canadian Signal Troop.
 Royal Canadian H.A. Brigade.
 (Two 4-gun batteries).

Divisional Troops :

4th Brigade, R.H.A., and Ammunition Column.
 3rd Field Squadron, R.E.
 3rd Signal Squadron.
 H.Q., 3rd Cavalry Divisional R.A.S.C.
 3rd Cavalry Divisional M.T. Company.
 3rd Cavalry Divisional Auxiliary (Horse) Company.
 6th, 7th and Canadian Cavalry Field Ambulances.
 13th, 14th and "A" Canadian Mobile Veterinary Sections.

¹ Went sick on evening of 8/8/18 and succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel F. H. D. C. Whitmore, D.S.O. (*temp.*). Brig.-General E. Paterson, D.S.O., took over on 15/8/18.

² Was on leave during Battle of Amiens, the 7th Cavalry Brigade being temporarily commanded by Lieut.-Colonel E. Paterson, D.S.O., Inniskillings.



JUDGING IN THE SHOW-RING

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL SIDNEY G. GOLDSCHMIDT.

IN a review of my book "An Eye for a Horse" it is written "we should have welcomed a chapter on judging in the show-ring which would appear to be promised by the title." I always welcome constructive criticism so I will, to the best of my ability, remedy what my critic considers a deficiency.

It is important to realize that the main object of horse and agricultural shows is the improvement of the various species exhibited. The fact that the raisers of stock, both animal and vegetable, have the incentive of a prize to be won is a secondary consideration. Another and hardly less important object is educational. The visitors whether they be exhibitors or merely spectators should look on the shows as a guide to what is considered the best that can be produced. When, therefore, a man is chosen as a judge he should bear these two points in mind and he should school himself to be severely judicial not only in his decisions but in his demeanour also.

In judging the horse classes, with which we are concerned at the moment, he must not be influenced by any knowledge of the previous performances or the prize-winning records of the animals appearing before him. He must form his opinion solely on what he actually sees in the short time at his disposal and on the impression of "the ride" he obtains and that opinion must be his own personal one. It is to obtain this opinion that he has been chosen to adjudicate. I mention this as a judge often may feel that it is invidious to depose a horse he knows to be a noted prize-winner but which does not fit in with his ideas or does not appear to be going well enough on that particular day to beat some other horse—one perhaps new to showing. It may even come within a judge's experience that he

has to reverse his decision from one show to another. I remember a pony coming before the judges on the first day of the show after it had had the bad luck to be stabled just alongside the bandstand. Shortly before she was due in the collecting ring, the band had struck up and the groom had found her with her forefeet in the manger in a terrible state of trepidation and excitement. When she appeared in the ring she was beside herself and almost uncontrollable. The next day after having been allotted a box far enough away from the music, she put up a wonderful show against many of the same ponies but in another class, was placed first and awarded the championship.

Another difficulty is presented when championship cups have to be awarded for the best animal in a group comprising several classes. This difficulty sometimes seems insuperable. My colleague on a certain occasion was the judge who had been selected for the Hackney classes, and a cup had been offered for the "best light horse in the show." We had therefore to decide between the merits of the winners of the light and heavy-weight hunter classes and the winner of the harness class. We agreed that the heavy-weight was the better of the two hunters but the utmost value I could place on him was £250, whereas my colleague assured me that the owner of the Hackney had refused £1,200 for his noted prize-winner. We agreed to leave the decision to the president of the society who incidentally had presented the cup. He considered that it was an instance when money value could be ignored and decided in favour of the hunter on the score that it was an animal of some practical use and not just kept for show purposes. The correctness of this decision, however, was in my opinion open to doubt.

The choice of suitable judges is always a knotty problem for Agricultural Societies and Horse Show Committees. They have to consider that unless a judge has a reputation for knowledge and integrity the classes will not "fill." There is no doubt that the leading dealers are the best judges but the objection to their appointment often raised, is that it is felt that they have a tendency to be biased in favour of competitors that they have once owned themselves, and also that they find it invidious to pass over a horse owned by one of their customers. Both of these

objections are, in my opinion, unworthy of consideration. The dealers are very jealous of their reputation as connoisseurs of horse-flesh and for probity and the fact that a horse has been previously bought by them is simply a proof that he represents a type they prefer. As said before, it is to get a personal opinion that the judges are chosen. A professional therefore is more likely to have the courage of his opinion and to be less diffident about passing over a habitual prize-winner in favour of a less known but to him a more pleasing rival. A noted exhibitor sums up the question tersely: "If I have to appear before an amateur I know I have no chance unless my horse conforms to the particular type he buys for himself and is one he can ride; whereas a dealer is used to riding almost anything and knows the comparative values of *all* types." It would appear that the ideal is a combination of two judges—one an amateur and one a professional.

It is unwise to select a man to judge a class of horse which comes outside his experience, and equally unwise for a man to accept such a duty. I think a judge should firmly say "No" to such an invitation. It happens too often at country shows that there is one judge for all the saddle horses, light and heavy-weight hunters, breeding stock, hacks, children's ponies and polo ponies. It is a disheartening experience for instance for an exhibitor to see his highly-schooled polo-pony being inexpertly ridden by a man who has never played polo, or for a breeder to submit his yearling to the judgment of a man unused to young stock.

It sometimes happens that a light weight man may find himself in the position of having to judge a class of weight carriers and *vice versa*. He must, in these instances, give rein to his imagination and not be guided implicitly by his own predilection.

The method of selecting a horse for a prize in the show-ring should not differ in any way from that of making a purchase. A judge has indeed to ask himself this question: "For which of these horses before me to-day, would I to-day give the most money?" This horse when selected should be the first prize winner. Then by the same process of reasoning the second,

third, reserve, and commended horses, should be chosen. It is the money value that must decide because there is no other criterion.

The routine of examination described in "An Eye for a Horse" can therefore be followed in all its detail. Too much time, however, must not be spent on the survey or the examination, or the time at the disposal of the judges will be too short. However, as men of wide experience are, or should be, chosen to judge at shows, the careful scrutiny required by the less experienced will not be necessary.

There should be, however, one important variation in the procedure if the judging is for a prize in the show-ring; a different order in the routine is then adopted. There are the spectators to consider and not only must their interest in the judging be stimulated but they must also be able to follow the judging which then becomes both interesting and instructive to the onlooker.

The method of judging saddle-horses in the show-ring has become an established custom based on the practical experience of competent men. The horses appear in the ring with the owner or his representative in the saddle and they are walked round in single file. When the judge has had time to form an opinion of the competitors at this pace and has roughly eliminated in his mind those he thinks not worth considering, he asks one of the stewards to order the trot. He should then verify the opinion of the horses he has formed at the walk. Twice round the ring to each hand at these paces should suffice and a steward should then be instructed to put the competitors into a canter and then to quicken the pace to a gallop.

The next item of procedure admits of alternative courses; many experienced judges adopt the following method. The competitors again through the intermediary of the stewards, are called into the centre of the ring one by one, as far as possible in their order of merit, and about six (depending on the size of the class and the number of awards to be made) are lined up in this order. The remainder are next called in and placed apart in a group. The other way, and the one which I prefer, is to begin by calling in what one may call the ruck;

these are adjudged by comparison to be unworthy of consideration and by this process of elimination the best horses are left still moving round the ring and the judge can concentrate on them without his attention being distracted by animals he is unlikely to consider in any circumstances.

Each of the candidates should be ridden by the judges and it is best that this should be done in the order in which they have been placed. If there are two judges they should each ride the first two before proceeding down the line to the others, so that they can compare notes while the impression of the "ride" is fresh in their minds. This part of the examination should not be slurred over. Each horse should be walked, trotted, cantered, and galloped, circling to the right and to the left. Their demeanour at the entrance gate should be noted as well as any tendency to hang to the horses standing in the middle. If the selected horses are more than five or six in number it is safest to take written notes in the book usually provided by the show authorities for the purpose and in it should be recorded briefly particulars of the judge's impressions of each part of the examination.

In the polo classes each competitor should be asked to give an individual exhibition of the handiness and control of his pony. The judges, when they ride them, should do so in pairs and put them through a searching test, using their imagination to reconstruct the incidents of a game of polo. Amongst other tests, they should be roused and pulled up on to their hocks at speed, over and over again. It has become an established custom thus to try out a polo pony, although hunters are never asked to prove their jumping powers except in the so-called hunter trials.

The saddles should then be removed and each horse studied from the side, back and front, and then in full view of the spectators, walked away ten or twelve yards, trotted back past the judge and then away from him for about fifteen yards. It should only be necessary to see a horse walked away once and back once to decide whether the action is free and untrammelled and whether the horse is a straight mover. The judge will know just where to stand and how to move to get

the various views necessary to determine these points. Briefly, the procedure is as follows. He should stand behind for the few paces the horse walks away from him and in front as he returns; he then steps aside and takes stock of the walk as the animal passes. He then places himself behind. The same procedure should then be adopted as the horse is turned and trotted back, first towards the judge, then past and lastly away from him.

The saddles should then be replaced and the competitors should remount. The next step is one I advocate although it is often omitted in this country. The judge should by now have settled the order and decided on first, second, third, and so on, and the competitors should be sent round the ring again in this order at the walk, trot, canter, and gallop—one circuit to comprise all these paces being enough. This is of the greatest help and interest to the ringsiders who have been trying to follow the judging and it helps them to understand the deliberations and conclusions of the judges. It may, moreover, be found in exceptional circumstances that on this final inspection it is desirable to reverse the order of some of the horses.

They should then be called in in their final order, the rosettes and cards distributed and the result entered in the judge's book and signed.

In the breeding classes, that is the young stock, brood mares and stallions, the course should be the same, but the canter, gallop, and the trial in the saddle are, necessarily, omitted. At some shows there is a rule that stallions may be cantered on the lunge-rein at the judge's discretion but in my opinion this should be compulsory so that their action at this important pace can be judged.

Some horses do not walk out freely and others do not show themselves well at the trot. The groom exhibiting them, in his anxiety to show them off to the best advantage will try to cover up these deficiencies. He will cut off corners so that a slow walker will not be left behind. If the trot is his horse's faulty pace, he will have him so worked up and excited that he will not trot more than a few consecutive paces without breaking. In those classes where the horses are only shown in

hand the judge will have no other opportunity of seeing them in movement so he must not allow himself to be deceived by these artifices, for besides having to satisfy himself and the competitors he must remember that there will be critics just as keen, if not keener than himself, at the ring-side.

There are certain important points to bear in mind.

A judge should insist that there is nobody in the ring other than competitors, stewards, and officials on duty.

If the class is not large and time allows, it is a kindly act and much appreciated by unsuccessful competitors if he rides *all* the horses whether he considers they have a chance of a prize or not. Anyway, it is a wise precaution if he runs his eye over the group he has relegated to the ruck in order to make sure that there is not some horse that has been inadvertently passed over.

The judges should confer and decide definitely on their procedure beforehand and thus avoid any appearance of doubt, hesitation, or difference of opinion. By this means the spectators will have a better chance of following the judges' mental process and to understand their conclusions, and competitors will feel that they are being judged by competent persons.

Judges should avoid speaking to the riders but should communicate with them through the stewards.

They should not waste time but on the other hand they should not arrive at their decisions too quickly. It sometimes happens that they know some of the competitors through having seen them at previous shows. In this instance they may feel they can come to a decision quickly but here again the spectators have to be considered and they must have the opportunity of forming their opinions also.

The time taken to judge a class has to be nicely balanced between three factors—the time at the judge's disposal, the time requisite for him to come to a decision, and finally time has to be allowed for the spectators to be interested and to follow the proceedings.

A judge should never give a prize to a lame horse, to one wrong in the wind, or to one with some other obvious unsoundness, but he should never decide these points himself. Should

his suspicions be aroused the procedure is to ask a steward to send for the society's veterinary surgeon who should be asked a specific question. "Is that horse lame or sound?", "Is that horse a whistler?", or "Has that horse a curb?", etc. At some shows, notably those in Ireland, every horse selected as eligible for a prize is examined by a veterinary surgeon and unless it is passed sound it does not appear again before the judges, the instructions being that the examination should be as rigorous as if the horse were for an intending purchaser.

In a class where there is a height limit or an age limit a judge must assume that the heights and ages have been verified before the horses appear in the ring. It is the duty of the show authorities and no part of a judge's duty to arrange for this and it should not be left to a defeated competitor to lodge an objection to an animal he considers over size or of the incorrect age. A most invidious proceeding.


It is a matter of opinion whether a judge should discuss with unsuccessful competitors his reasons for placing the horses in a particular order. I consider it his duty, but many judges refuse to do so. Much heart-burning is avoided by this explanation and the instructional value of a show is enhanced. If, for instance, a judge tells an unsuccessful competitor that his horse persistently led with the wrong legs, or carried his head too low or seemed afraid of his bit, these are faults that can be remedied before the horse appears again in the show-ring.

This article would be incomplete without a special word on judging children's ponies. In these classes a strict observance of the conditions should be insisted on. Grooms, friends and relatives should be rigorously excluded from the judging ring. It must be assumed that rider and pony suit each other, and if the pony cannot be ridden, saddled and unsaddled or run out in hand without help or supervision, then it is not a "Child's Pony" and should not be eligible for a prize.

As the ponies are too small for the judges to ride, they are obliged to form their opinion of temperament on what they *see* and further, as they are dealing with the rising generation of horsemen and women, it is doubly important to be severely judicial and entirely uninfluenced by the demeanour of the

spectators. There is a tendency for the smallest and quaintest child to evoke the greatest applause regardless of the excellence of the pony and the child's ability to ride it and many judges are weak-minded enough to give them a prize both for their pony and for their riding. I once acted as steward at a local show and helped to catch one of the children's ponies that had unshipped his rider (actually he threw himself off) after first bolting with him. He pluckily remounted and came in for a great ovation. This was, of course, very good-natured of the spectators but when the pony got second prize and the youngster was presented with the cup awarded to "the best rider" it must have been very discouraging for the owners of entirely suitable ponies, prettily and expertly ridden. It is no doubt delightful to give happiness to an attractive child but there are the other competitors to consider.

Here again, I would emphasize that the conditions regulating the height of the ponies and the age limit of the riders should be rigidly enforced by the show authorities and verified before the ponies appear in the ring. The unsuccessful competitors may be friends or neighbours of the winner and loathe to lodge an objection to an ineligible pony or to a child of incorrect age.



“LAKE AND VICTORY”

Monson's Retreat.

By COLONEL E. B. MAUNSELL, *p.s.c.*, late 14th P.W.O. Scinde Horse.

PART II.

IN the last chapter we showed how Monson, having been instructed by Lake “to block the return into Hindustan of Holkar” had displayed a remarkable interpretation of these instructions by wandering some fifty miles south of the Mokandra Pass after the outbreak of the monsoon rains. He found Holkar with a very numerous force crossing the Chambal to attack him, and resolved on running away forthwith, urging the weakness of his force and shortage of provisions as the excuse. Abandoning the immensely strong position of the Mokandra on the latter score, he fell back to Kotah without striking a blow, and then approached the Regent, Zalim Sing, an able and honourable Rajput, with a view to obtaining provisions. That chief demanded that Monson should fight, when assistance not merely in the shape of provisions, but of troops would be given. The detachment had arrived at Kotah after a fifteen mile march over tracks sodden with rains, all the carts having been abandoned *en route* and all the tents left standing on the Mokandra. The troops were tired and hungry, and the British officers thoroughly angry, the question of placing this incompetent and pusillanimous commander under arrest having arisen.

Monson was now thoroughly frightened and saw the only solution to his troubles in running away forthwith. In the meantime, however, an incident of great administrative importance had occurred, which had it been carried through properly might have saved much hardship afterwards. Pay had been issued by the Field Treasury to the pay havildars, for, in the

days of which we write, it was not the custom, apparently, for British or native officers to issue it in detail. Before the men could be paid out the drums were beating the "General," or warning for parade. Many pay havildars promptly made themselves scarce with their company's cash and were not seen again. The sudden and unexpected orders to march, in addition, prevented the high caste Hindus preparing their food with the lengthy formalities deemed so essential by these caste-ridden men when herded together in large numbers. It was upon occasions such as this that the Bombay and Madras sepoy scored, for caste has considerably less power when there is a large admixture of degrees. There being no time allowed for the issue of pay, moreover, had serious consequences, for the bunnias and hucksters of Kotah, on learning that the troops had cash to spend, would have flocked to the camp like flies to the honey pot, and the men could have purchased many small luxuries and necessities. It is on the cards that Monson, an exceedingly stupid King's Service officer, did not realize that native soldiery did not have rations issued like British troops, but had to fend for themselves. A delay for two or three hours would have made an infinity of difference.

The troops, some cramming the tepid dough of their uncooked chupattis in their mouths, marched at seven in the evening, the British officers roundly cursing another deadly night march in prospect, for they fully realized the wearing effect on underfed soldiery of moves in the dark, and Lake, writing to Monson later on, directed him to make his marches at the normal hours.

As the force moved off the fort of Kotah sent up blue lights, the croakers deeming them to be a signal to Holkar, while others hit the nail on the head in saying that they were more likely to be sent up as precautions against attack by the British. The unfortunate troops had marched until eleven when it was discovered that one guide had lost his way, and the battalions had separated. A little later a drenching downpour came on, and a halt was made till daylight, when the march was resumed. By eight o'clock Ganesh Ghat, a few miles downstream of the present railway bridge and, in those days, a famous point of

passage over the Chambal on the route to Hindustan, was reached. Thirteen hours had been taken to cover a total of ten miles and the troops were, by incompetent badgering about, being rapidly reduced to exhaustion.

The Chambal was rising. The water rose three feet in the course of the morning, but, in the early stages, could be forded by horses and camels. Gradually the depth and force of the stream was such that elephants only could do so, and it was in no small measure due to these animals that valuable stores were saved. Had it not been for two large ferry boats it would have been impossible to get the guns over.

On the far bank of the river was the small town of Patan, historic as having been the site of the first great general action fought by de Boigne's famous First Brigade in the service of Mahdojee Scindhia. The battle was between the allied Moghul and Rajput forces and those of the Mahratta chief. It resulted in an overwhelming victory for de Boigne, and was followed up by another, at Merta. As a result de Boigne made his master paramount throughout the whole of Rajputana and Hindustan, a territory as large as France and Germany combined. Serving under de Boigne were sundry other Europeans, notably Robert Sutherland, a young man of twenty-one, just cashiered from the Black Watch. In July, 1804, Sutherland lay on his death-bed at Muttra. Another officer was Vernon, who then joined the 12th Madras Infantry which lost 228 men and six British officers at Assaye, fighting the selfsame First Brigade. A few weeks later Vernon was wounded at Argaum. Skinner had not then joined de Boigne's service as he was too young. The fame of the adventurer, by virtue of Patan and Merta, reached the House of Commons, where it was pointed out that vast prizes were in store for those possessed of stout hearts, sharp swords and ability to use them. A very important outcome of these victories, moreover, was the recognition of the value of Europeans to lead and train the armies of native chiefs and soon no chief of any standing whatever was without them. Hyder Ali of Mysore had recognized the value of Europeans as fighting men and leaders, but not the value of native troops trained and disciplined on the European model.

Zalim Sing had promised to have supplies collected in Patan, and, to do him justice, sufficient for two days were found there, though four days were promised. The whole of July 13th was occupied in getting the fighting troops across. The followers and baggage, strewn over the forty miles between Ganesh Ghat and the Mokandra, were, to a very large measure, lost, falling into the hands of the Meenahs and local inhabitants, for there was still no sign of Holkar's horse.

The river was soon in high flood and only a few succeeded in joining the detachment on the 14th, when Monson sank the boats—and did so before he need have. The rain poured down the whole of July 14th, the troops, now almost tentless, cowering under such improvised shelter as could be found and many getting into the town of Patan, which, however, was walled like every other in the country. A great number of such tents as existed were merely glorified bivouacs such as were used by the native cavalry in 1914. They had, however, the great advantage of lightness. Monson, in his official despatches, stated that he endeavoured to obtain more provisions from the neighbouring villages, for the supplies in Patan were exhausted by the evening of the 14th. He had, we know, “a full treasury,” and the district in which he then was is now famous as a wheat growing area. Making every allowance for the fact that the local inhabitants probably only grew enough for their own requirements and a little over, the lubricating effect of ready cash in India is amazing.

Patan now being drained dry and Monson's half-hearted efforts at accumulating more supplies proving fruitless, this incompetent officer resolved to resume his march, “notwithstanding that it rained, and had continued raining, the whole night” is Don's disgusted entry in his journal. Strong foraging parties, accompanied by a gun or two, with double teams of bullocks, would, without doubt, have compelled the neighbouring villages to disgorge sufficient to enable the force to tide over till the weather moderated. By paying for provisions after taking them the inhabitants would have been mollified and might, indeed, have been exceedingly happy.

The country hereabout is flat black cotton soil of the heaviest and worst type when thoroughly soaked, as it then was. The miserable march was accordingly resumed. The track was knee deep in mud. Hutchinson and his gunners, having, with the utmost difficulty, covered six miles only between ten in the morning and seven in the evening, found it impossible to move further. The bullocks were unyoked and the wearied and dripping men disposed of themselves in the various huts and hovels of a small village about a mile ahead where the whole force had herded in, officers, sepoys and all conditions of followers promiscuously, to escape the deluge. No baggage was up and the men were nearly starving. The British officers now had the additional pleasure of lice, fleas and every other noxious bug to cope with, for such is the inevitable result of taking shelter in native villages.

The following day, it being impossible to extricate the guns, they were spiked, and the ammunition was destroyed as effectually as possible without actually blowing it up. It is difficult to understand why it was not blown up, for there was little or no hope of our being able to retrieve it. The shells were subsequently used against us at Deeg, and the guns were actually in action against us at the battle, all being recovered. The march was worse even than that of the previous day, “the only objects to be seen were distant scattered villages, but sometimes at such distances that dry land was almost out of sight.” The state of the ground can be gauged when we learn that fifteen elephants and more camels were sloughed. Don had to abandon a favourite horse, five camels and all his kit except a little he was able to carry in a palaquin. This last included five changes of linen—a feature of interest as giving us an idea of the transport and material a senior officer carried with him on service in India. Pester started the second campaign, now about to commence, with twenty-four changes. The senior Company’s officers were often men with a scientific turn, and Don included astronomical instruments, a “perambulator” for registering the length of marches and much other gear in his outfit. That evening the only article of camp equipage pitched was the fly of a double-poled tent, everyone in the most deplorable condition.

On July 17, having marched consistently for three days over this appalling country, in the deadly hot steamy atmosphere of the rainy season, the detachment reached the Mej, or Chambali river, at the south end of the Lakhairi Pass, the troops half starving. A little wheat was obtained, but this was all the sustenance the sepoys had. The British gunners killed a bullock, the officers sharing it and actually dressing the meat themselves for some reason, probably owing to the fact that eating beef was not usual and the native cooks would not handle it. Pester commented on the luxury of eating beef on his entering the Lower Provinces in his voyage downstream in 1805. The Mej was one hundred yards wide, six feet deep and running like a mill race. A certain Captain Dalton, of the 1/12th, who had lost his leg at Laswari eight months before, had been drowned the previous day. This officer was accompanying a treasure convoy of five companies of the 14th which was coming down from Agra, under a Captain Simpson. Simpson heard that the detachment had been cut to pieces after he had crossed. He then retraced his steps, and, in doing so, Dalton and his elephant were swept downstream, the water running six miles an hour and the bank sheer. A one-legged officer serving regimentally would appear curious, and he must have been a man of considerable stamina, after the crude surgery of the day, to have been reckoned fit to rejoin, particularly at such a season as the height of the rains, following the deadly hot weather.

The detachment, perforce, halted, and the stream lessening a little on the 18th, Wimbolt and Hutchinson, with the British gunners, were crossed on elephants, and moved on to Rampura, where we still had a small garrison. The shortage of grain can be imagined when it is stated that wheat sold at five shillings a pound, and this was usually brought across the Mej by men, supported by earthen pots, swimming the torrent.

The British officers and Mussulmans lived on slaughtered gun bullocks, but the Hindus, to all intents and purposes, starved. The whole were in a state of the acutest discomfort, there being but one fly of a tent, on an average, per battalion, and hardly any officers having a change of clothing.

Don persuaded Monson to allow him to march his battalion a few miles downstream, where there was supposed to be a passage, and that officer succeeded, by the fairly obvious process, of “scattering to live,” in procuring food for his men till he could cross.

After being held up for four days, news came in of a village about six miles from camp which had provisions. That it took Monson four days to make such a discovery gives some idea of the futility of this officer, for Holkar’s horse had not yet put in an appearance. He accordingly ventured to risk a foray, as to why he had not done so before seems incomprehensible. Collecting forage and corn by force was almost an everyday procedure with every type and kind of army in India, the Company’s troops, in friendly country or in country which seemed likely to be so, paying for the stuff, while native armies merely took it. Monson had, in Lake’s words, “a full treasury” and, by dispersing his detachment somewhat, he could have subsisted without any undue risk. Such was his dread of Holkar, seemingly, he would venture nothing, and, in consequence, starved. The foraging party consisted of four companies, probably about two hundred and fifty men or so, and the news that it was going out attracted all sorts and conditions of miserable followers, who dogged its footsteps.

Opposition was expected, but the Meenah inhabitants, after firing a few shots, bolted. The grain was, after some search, duly discovered, but the starving camp followers succeeded in plundering a very great part of it. While returning, on the 22nd, some 500 hostile horse approached the raiders, but were easily driven off. The following day Monson learnt that these horse were camped about eight miles off, and, at last, he took heart, and determined on a “beat up.” The flank companies of the 12th, 2/2nd and 2/21st were placed under Captain O’Donnel—the intermingling of units should be noted, for it would have been simpler had he taken his own corps, the 12th, alone. A second point worth noting is that O’Donnel was only a captain, and in command of quite a respectable mixture of corps. On the other hand, he was an officer who had distinguished himself at Laswari, and had twenty-three years’ service, giving some idea

of the slowness of promotion. The affair was a complete success, the troops, now boldly and ably handled, displaying great dash. When we remember that the sepoys had been half starved, and had been perpetually soaked without a change of clothes, and that at night they had merely wet mud to lie on, usually without covering, all honour must be given them. Some forty or fifty of the enemy were bayoneted and fifty camels and ponies captured.

After a week by the Mej, the water began to subside sufficiently to allow the men to cross on elephants, though still too deep to ford. The 2/21st were thus crossed on July 25th. The crossing continued the whole of the 26th, entirely by elephant—Monson would seem to have had a large number with his force—but in the afternoon, owing to some mishandling of the picquets, a body of horse, estimated at 2,000, carried off a number of camels. The last unit passed on the 27th, again on elephants. As a result of not waiting until the river had subsided a great number of unfortunate followers, including many women and children, fell into the hands of the Meenahs, and practically all the baggage and cattle.

Don had crossed at the lower passage on the 27th, O'Donnel, with the 1/12th, following. Here five elephants had been used. The Meenahs annoyed the troops in their passage through the Lakhairi Pass, it being covered with wood and thick jungle, with the result that a good many wretched sepoys and followers had their throats cut. A Lieutenant Simpson and Don's battalion sergeant-major were wounded. On Don reaching the northern end of the pass, he found Monson had pushed on for Rampura with the 2/2nd, in order to counteract strong anti-British propaganda that was being spread, and in order to overawe the country people who had been instructed by the Kotah raja—under pressure from Holkar—to oppose the troops. The killadar at Indergarh, a small fort north of the Lakhairi, had already started giving trouble. The inhabitants, in point of fact, wished to help the British, and did so in a very marked degree. In Monson's letter to Don, a significant passage occurs, namely, that he was sending off to secure the boats over the Banass. The extraordinary feature in his haphazard and unskilful operations

is that three weeks later he had still no boats over the Banass, with the result that he met with complete disaster. A further extraordinary passage is : “ I am not able to say more, my mind is so distracted ”—and he spoke the truth.

The situation at Rampura, indeed, was astonishingly good. Provisions came in without difficulty and the bazaar was full. The Jeypur raja had issued orders that every assistance was to be given. News had arrived from Agra that 8,000 maunds of grain were on their way, and that strong reinforcements were on the march south. There were, also, contingents of Jeypur troops a few miles away. A bold, able commander could well have pulled things together and achieved victory, for the spirit of the troops, in so far as fighting was concerned, was excellent. The casualties had been almost entirely those of sickness and hunger. There were now at Rampura the five battalions of the original detachment, the garrison of Rampura, which was quite fresh, and five companies of the 14th, also quite fresh. All the men wanted was rest, good food and shelter, for new tents had now to be made. Lake had sent orders forbidding a retirement beyond Kotah, which, unfortunately, had only just arrived. As to where Holkar was, is not known, but he would appear to have halted at Kotah, diverting himself torturing poor Lucan and the two British officers of the Hinglaisgarh detachment. His guns had certainly not crossed the Chambal. The state of the country in general effectually prevented any rapid moves.

We will now return to Holkar, and endeavour to give a solution for his sudden return to strength.

It would seem that one of the subsidiary causes of his becoming hostile was the fact that, early in 1804, he had had a stroke of luck in being able to “ levy a contribution on ”—a polite term for loot—the enormously rich town of Muhesar, on the Nerbudda. The place is said to have yielded not less than ten million rupees. It is probable that the native bankers in the neighbourhood of Burhampur, on the Tapti, had transferred their cash to this town owing to the inconvenient proximity of Scindhia’s and the Berar raja’s armies which had been confronting Arthur Wellesley.

At this juncture, in consequence of the victories of Assaye and Argaum, these chiefs had been discharging numbers of their soldiery, who now found their swords for sale. Holkar, being in the unusual position to actually pay them, and not to merely owe them pay, was a willing purchaser.

Arthur Wellesley, we may assume, was too engrossed in his dealings with Scindhia and the Bhonsla, as the Berar raja was also known, to take much notice of Holkar having made such a haul. It is well on the cards that he deemed the tale of the plunder merely a very normal native exaggeration. At all events it is significant that there is no record in the Wellington Despatches. It being the fashion, at the present day, to seek scapegoats after disasters, we would deem it not unreasonable to fix the blame for the general ignorance of the state of affairs on the future victor of Waterloo.

When Lake's operations against Holkar opened in mid-April, this force was coming into being in the southern quarter of Holkar's dominions and its very existence was evidently unknown. Murray, at that period in the neighbourhood of Baroda and, therefore, closest to it, would appear to have had some inklings. Arthur Wellesley, who seemingly suspected him of being a timid commander from the start, put his reports down to nerves. The loot of Muhesar sufficed to keep Holkar's force reasonably amenable on its march north, but, by the time it had interposed itself effectually between Monson and Murray, the cash was running out. Holkar now had another stroke of luck. He found the rich town of Mandisor, about fifty miles south of Neemuch, and successfully squeezed this place. The cash, or most of it he kept in reserve, with the object of only paying it out when some definite task was required of his horde.

Now Monson's advance south, in the words of Lake's despatch, "threatened the most cherished possessions of Holkar, and, had it continued, had been entirely destructive of whatever confidence his followers yet retained." The loss of Hinglaisgarh, an utterly useless gain for the British, had a peculiarly irritating effect on Holkar, for it had been in the possession of his house for generations. The astute chief, moreover, could not fail to note the exposed position of Monson's detachment, some fifty miles from its bolt hole, the Mokandra.

This detachment, moreover, was weaker than that of Murray—about half the strength. It was, in addition, some two hundred and fifty miles from Agra. Above all, it comprised none of the dreaded “gora log,” of whose power in battle Holkar had heard innumerable tales, though he had never yet encountered them.

We may take it that Skinner’s explanation that Holkar’s threat against Murray was mere bluff is correct, and that it came off is no small tribute to Holkar’s capacity as a soldier.

With regard to the composition of Holkar’s force an interesting point is that the most detailed information on record comes, not from Lake, who contents himself with saying that it was not really formidable—about all it was really necessary to know—but from the Marquis Wellesley in distant Calcutta. It is in the form of a “note,”—“the voice of Jacob, but the hands of Esau”—in other words, the voice of Arthur Wellesley, for identically the same wording occurs in certain of the latter’s letters in the Wellington Despatches. Holkar’s horse were, in general, Patans, in other words, Hindustani Mussulmans, for what we now term Pathans were known as Afghans. These included a number of Rohillas. In addition, as indicating the manner in which soldiers of fortune wandered over India, there were men who had quitted the service of the Nizam, the Nawab of Arcot and even that of Tippu Sultan. Although the war is generally known as the Second Mahratta War but few Mahrattas accompanied Holkar, the bulk being allied to the British, serving them with varying degrees of unreliability.

Holkar’s “brigades,” or regular infantry, now had no European or half caste officers, for Holkar would have no truck with Frenchmen after certain experiences with Dudrenec, who was thought to have played him false when in his service. The British had either escaped, like Gardner, or had been duly murdered by their employer. They had never, in any way, approached the discipline and efficiency of the famous brigades of de Boigne and Perron. At the opening of Monson’s retreat Lake estimated them at only about three hundred per battalion, though they had subsequently been reinforced. Their discipline was bad.

The Governor-General's "note" goes on to say that Holkar's artillery, although very numerous, was not supposed to be formidable. On the other hand, the known stubbornness of the native of India as an artilleryman might render engaging it a serious proposition, as was proved, to Monson's cost, on the Banass. Two dominating factors, however, existed. First, the force was not paid. It existed solely on plunder and exiguous doles of cash resultant on plunder. Second, and most important, "No principle of union could exist. The Patans and Mussulmans can have no attachment to Holkar, and most have probably no knowledge of each other, and the whole force must have collected round Holkar as a chief of note, and with the sole object of gaining subsistence." (This sentence occurs, *in toto*, in one of Arthur Wellesley's letters, thereby clearly indicating the origin of the "note.") "A single defeat would shatter it."

As to whether Monson ever had the sense to inform himself on these points is exceedingly doubtful, but any officer of intelligence, conversant with Indian war would at once attempt to.

Lake had received the first news of Monson falling back on July 18th, the hirkarra taking ten days to reach Cawnpore, a distance of 350 miles, with the rivers, in some cases, in flood. He at once took steps for the despatch of grain and reinforcements, and sent orders for Monson to halt at Kotah. Monson was instructed to occupy some position where he could make a stand. As we have seen, it was too late, and the detachment had reached the Mej before the orders reached it. The reinforcements ordered were two battalions from Agra, together with Frith's irregular horse. The time factor now intervened. Cawnpore was 150 miles from Agra. The battalions at the latter place had, doubtless, sent their leave men away and were very short of strength. Much delay occurred in collecting the necessary transport, which, in those days, was all requisitioned from the country people, or furnished by contractors who continually failed in the contracts. An unfortunate colonel in the Deccan had incurred Arthur Wellesley's wrath owing to a failure of this type, with the result that he was despatched on a secondary mission and missed Assaye. It was not until August 14th that the 2/14th and 2/9th, under Ashe and

M'Culloch respectively, arrived at Rampura—but without the grain convoy which was more than a week behind. Rampura is 150 miles from Agra and probably ten days were required to get there. Taken on the whole, when the delay in despatching reinforcements even in the Great War is remembered, there would appear to have been but little undue loss of time in this case, particularly when it is remembered that the news of Monson falling back came as a complete surprise. The Marquis Wellesley had advocated the despatch of British troops. These were all back at Cawnpore and, when it would take a week to prepare a sepoy corps for the march, it would have taken two, or possibly three, for a British.

Considerable dissatisfaction at Murray's remaining in the neighbourhood of Ujein during this period is evident from Lake's letters. This officer was able to occupy Indore by August 24th, despite the black cotton soil and the weather, and there would appear but little reason why he should not have moved north instead of south and therefore imposed caution on Holkar.

Meanwhile, Monson's force was slowly recovering at Rampura. The men had obtained some material for the construction of shelters. For the first few days however, the “camp” had been nothing but a collection of sheets and blankets stretched on sticks, and it had on occasions been necessary to bale the water out in order to be able to light a fire. Clothes could only be dried piece by piece.

On August 2nd, Sinclair, with the 2/2nd, had moved out towards Bhundi, Monson having been requested by the raja to send him some troops. As to what one battalion only was expected to do is impossible to conceive. Shortly after he had marched, Monson changed his mind, and sent out to recall him. In the drenching rain the messenger lost his way, and it was not until Sinclair had made two marches that the message reached him. That officer, an able soldier, had, however, suspected a trap, for he learnt of the presence of five hundred of Holkar's horse in the Bhundi Pass, of which the raja had said nothing, and was already retracing his steps, and rejoined at Rampura on August 5th.

The confused state of Monson's mind can be illustrated by a letter to Don, dated August 3rd, in which he states his intention to leave the 2/8th and 2/21st at Rampura, while he marched with the 1/12th, 2/12th and the five companies of the 14th the following day, Sinclair seemingly being isolated with the Bhundi raja.

In the afternoon, however, he cancelled these orders. A curious feature is that Monson should have taken the trouble to write to an officer who cannot have been more than a couple of hundred yards off. From Blakiston's memoirs, however, it would appear that staff officers and commanders of the day would continually commit to paper what might equally well have been communicated in an interview, followed up, if necessary, by written confirmation. In this letter Monson states that he had not received any dawk from the Commander-in-Chief for three days, "which gives me much uneasiness," but the last letter received, dated July 21st, stated that orders had been given for the Agra troops to be in readiness to move. If troops were preparing to march, the idea of Monson quitting Rampura was, obviously, ridiculous. On August 14th, the reinforcements, the 2/9th, 2/14th and Frith's irregular horse, arrived. Unfortunately they brought no convoy. This had evidently started later. Frith's corps had been in existence for some years and differed in this respect from the normal scallywag body raised only on the outbreak of war. It contained, it would seem, the elements of two old formations of relatively some repute, namely, the Kandahar Horse and de Boigne's Bodyguard, the last named having been taken over by the Company in 1796. Despite this, the corps maintained the normal tradition of irregular horse for worthlessness.

Although Monson now had a body of horse, it would seem that his information was purely from native sources. Arthur Wellesley was of the opinion that he barely knew what was going on within five miles of his camp, if that. On August 18th, news arrived that Holkar was through the Bhundi Pass, advancing on Rampura, while Bapujee Scindhia, who had disappeared south of the Mokandra, was through the Lakhari. It will be remembered that these were the passes Lake had instructed

Monson to block. It had taken Holkar over a month to pass from the line of the Mokandra to the Bhundi hills, a distance of only 50 miles. The soundness of Lake's instructions is abundantly illustrated. The line of the encampment was changed to meet this menace. Now Lake had instructed Monson, as soon as his reinforcements reached him, that he was, if possible, to fight. If, however, he did not consider himself strong enough, he was to fall back, slowly and in order, but before the enemy could press. A garrison, well rationed up, was to be thrown into Rampura. Monson had now fourteen days' provisions in hand. He had seven battalions, and both officers and men were now full of fight. At Deeg three months later, Fraser attacked a much more formidable enemy, in a very strong position, with only eight. Attack would, in all likelihood, have met with great success, for, as we have stated before, Holkar's artillery required much time to deploy, and, until it did so, it was not formidable. Once again this hawing officer waited, undecided. The following day, the 19th, news arrived that Holkar had levied a contribution on Bhundi and that Bapujee Scindhia was within fourteen miles. Apparently in terror of this last leader of horse only, the troops were kept under arms that night.

The 20th passed quietly, and a letter arrived from Lake, dated the 13th, instructing Monson, if he felt anxiety over his provisions, to fall back towards Jeypur. Arthur Wellesley seemed to be of the opinion that this letter, written under circumstances which Lake deemed entirely different from those prevailing, influenced Monson's determination to retreat. This would not appear to have been the case at all, for no orders were given to move and there was no hint of such a thing.

On August 21st, news arrived that Holkar had camped ten or eleven miles off, at Merwah, and a salute was heard in Rampura. The advanced picquets were in sight of each other at Oniara. This decided Monson. He would again run away. The 2/8th and four companies of the 2/21st, under Hutchinson, together with the four six-pounders that had accompanied the reinforcements were directed to garrison the fort. Don was sick and was to accompany the detachment in retreat. The actual orders to march were not issued until late in the afternoon, with

the result that a number of men of the 2/21st who should have marched were left behind in the fort—there must have been extraordinary laxity in this occurring. It is quite on the cards that the men preferred the relative comfort and security of Rampura to another abominably conducted retreat. The battalion was composed of very young soldiers, not a man, except the N.C.O's. being over 22, who, as a general rule are exceedingly easy to handle as "old soldier" habits have not had time to develop.

The baggage started at six in the evening, great confusion no doubt resulting from the short notice to move. Nicholl, with six companies of the 2/21st, pushed ahead on the Agra road, and not that to Jeypur. The main body followed at seven, accompanied by two howitzers. A little after sunrise on the 22nd, the detachment reached the Banass, a tributary of the Chambal, after a march of twenty-four miles. The rains had slackened off appreciably during the halt at Rampura and the river had been fordable when the reinforcements had crossed ten days before. Recently, however, there had been more, and the stream was found to be unfordable. Monson had then been at Rampura for three weeks. The possibility of his having to retreat again had seemingly not occurred to him, and he was, possibly, content with hearing that there was a ferry. With his experience of the Chambal and Mej it might have been supposed that any man of normal intelligence would have taken steps to get more boats and post a guard. There was a company of the 1/12th at Khushalgarh for instance, which might have been employed better on the Banass. The whole detachment, perforce, halted, for even the largest elephants could not cross.

Three leaky old boats were patched up—they were found sunk—and Nicholl, with the treasure, was ferried over on the 23rd. His orders were to move on to Baroda, or Batoda, some twenty-four miles on the Agra road, where there was a small fort, and wait for the rest of the detachment.

Frith, with such elements of his irregular horse as had not already deserted—for a great number had promptly quitted when they learnt of a renewal of the retreat—considered the baggage in danger and wrote to Monson asking for reinforce-

ments. The 2/12th were sent across, the men fording with their arms and accoutrements on their heads. It would seem that, about this juncture, the enemy infantry put in an appearance in increasing numbers. Despite this, Monson pushed the remainder of his infantry over, until, by mid-day, the whole of his baggage was across and only the picquets and 2/2nd were left. He attributes his having to leave these to the fact that the enemy was so close that they could not withdraw before nightfall. From the small eminence on the right flank the officers could see a long column, from which the teams of grey bullocks appeared from time to time. Holkar's artillery was now coming up. Despite there being no particular difficulty or danger in fording at this moment, Monson did nothing to reinforce his picquets by recalling troops from the far bank. The picquets, it should be explained, amounted to one company per battalion, each under a British officer, for the battalions all had from eight to nine British officers apiece—a strong cadre as things were reckoned. By four o'clock the enemy guns had commenced to come into action, and, an hour after, the enemy attacked, “making a hideous noise.” The troops held firm and repulsed the assailants with much spirit.

Sinclair, a brave, able officer, now came to the conclusion that it would be impossible to cross unless air space was gained. In conjunction with the picquets, therefore, he counter-attacked, and carried eleven guns. The move was made in inadequate strength, unfortunately, and the troops came under fire from more guns in rear. Being “faint, worn out, and in disorder owing to the roughness of the ground,” and Sinclair, unfortunately, being wounded at this juncture, the enemy rallied, and, advancing in overwhelming numbers, swept the whole back into the river. The hostile horse, now in their element, cut in, slaughtering the disordered sepoys right and left. Only the fire from the opposite bank prevented their crossing as well.

Only one British officer of the 2/2nd out of eight, and some seventy sepoys, many wounded, remained to tell the tale. The picquets shared a like fate. The total loss amounted to twelve British officers dead, with five wounded, while the sepoy casualties amounted to something between 600 and 700, all

brought about by the utter ineptitude of the commander, who had actually allowed himself to be ringed round by a vastly superior artillery, without which the enemy infantry would have done nothing.

On this occasion Monson, one of that amazing genus who comes to his own in the hour of supreme danger, displayed the utmost gallantry, and was slightly wounded. The most conspicuous case of gallantry and devotion, however, was that of a native officer of the 2/2nd, carrying his battalion colours, who was observed defending himself with one hand and carrying his charge into the water, where both were swept away by the current. The whole affair displayed incompetent leading of the worst possible kind. For the best part of two hours the British officers had watched the lumbering, clumsy, bullock-drawn guns of the enemy coming into position, not simultaneously, but one after another, and sometimes at long intervals, amid the yells and shouts of their gun lascars and bullock drivers. Despite it being obvious that the rear units must be destroyed unless air space were gained, Monson persisted in sending battalion after battalion across the river, and the final attack by the 2/2nd was made in insufficient strength. With the five and a-half battalions he had with him there is but little doubt that he could have extricated himself had he only attacked in strength.

Monson, unfortunately, was not seriously enough wounded to induce him to hand over command. Ashe, Don and M'Culloch were all three good officers, and could, no doubt, have saved the force, even at this juncture. The enemy infantry did not follow across the ford, and, at seven in the evening, the retreat was resumed.



A SPY STORY

BY MAJOR H. C. H. ROBERTSON, D.S.O.,
Australian Staff Corps.

THIS story is rather against myself, but, as far as my memory serves me, it is true in every particular.

In September, 1917, the Yeomanry Mounted Division was camped near the Wadi Shellal on the right flank of the British forces. Advanced troops were across the Wadi out towards Beersheba, in touch with the Turks. The Yeomanry Mounted Division had relieved Anzac Mounted Division on this duty. Later on, Anzac and Australian Mounted Divisions were to be concentrated behind the line in preparation for their wide turning movement round the south of Beersheba which was to open the big battle. For the main attack, the Yeomanry Mounted Division would start in corps reserve, and would menace Beersheba from the west. The three mounted divisions, the 7th Mounted Brigade, and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade made up the Desert Mounted Corps, commanded by General (then Lt.-Gen.) Sir H. G. Chauvel, G.C.M.G., K.C.B.

The British forces had three alternatives in attacking the Gaza-Beersheba line. They could launch a heavy infantry attack against the strong entrenchments about Gaza, and, pushing up the coast, try to drive the Turks inland towards waterless country; a second alternative was to pierce the enemy's centre about Sharia, and, having divided the Turkish army, defeat each part in turn; while the third course, and the one adopted, was to use the British superiority in cavalry for an out-flanking move on Beersheba, and so roll up the enemy's left flank.

General Allenby, having decided to attack towards Beersheba, it became important to make the Turks think that the blow would fall on Gaza. The Turks, on the other hand, were anxious to find out where the strength would be. If the British forces were concentrated towards Gaza then that place would probably be attacked; if, however, strength was collected on the British right, then an attack on Beersheba might be expected.

The late Colonel (then Lt.-Col.) W. J. Foster, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., was G.S.O. I of the Yeomanry Mounted Division and I was G.S.O. III—two lone Australians with a British division. Never, however, did we feel “lone”—we were made to feel thoroughly at home at all times. How we came to be with this division is not of great importance, but I believe it was due to the definite policy of the then Chief of General Staff, Egyptian Expeditionary Force. There had been complaints that British army officers held many Australian staff appointments, and, consequently, Australian staff officers had few opportunities for staff work. The C.G.S., therefore, decided that Australian staff officers should have equal opportunities with British staff officers for all staff appointments, and he appointed Lieut.-Colonel Foster and myself to the Yeomanry Mounted Division, when it was formed in June, 1917.

Yeomanry Mounted Division H.Q. was connected with Desert Mounted Corps H.Q. by telephone line and we had our own divisional telephone exchange. One day, in September, Yeomanry Mounted Division moved out in full strength to drive in the Turkish advanced troops, and push reconnaissances close to Beersheba. As it moved forward the Divisional Signal Squadron put out a telephone line to keep touch with the telephone exchange in camp. Someone had to stay behind to see that touch was kept with Corps and to transmit important messages, and I was detailed for this duty. The only people left in camp were therefore enough signallers to man the exchange, an odd batman and groom, and myself.

Divisional Headquarters Camp was well back from the Wadi Shellal, and all the brigade camps were between it and the Wadi. It was so safe that no one ever carried arms when

at H.Q. With usual British thoroughness, however, all headquarters were well labelled, and anyone coming along could tell at a glance that he was in Yeomanry Mounted Division's camp.

During the morning telephone messages came in frequently, and I rang up Division and told them of any which were important. I also kept Corps advised of Yeomanry Division's movements. Then a despatch rider arrived from Corps with a sealed package, marked SECRET and URGENT, addressed personally to General (then Major-General) Sir G. de S. Barrow, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.—the divisional commander. I rang up Corps and spoke to the B.G.G.S.—Brig.-General R. C. H. Howard Vyse, C.M.G., D.S.O. He did not say what was in the package but told me that he thought General Barrow might like to have it while he was out near Beersheba.

I then rang up Division and told Lieut.-Colonel Foster about the package, and he, after speaking to General Barrow, told me to open it and see what it contained. It was the proposed plan for the attack on Beersheba, and it gave details of Yeomanry Division's tasks—quite a dangerous document for a young staff officer to be walking around with unsealed, and one which it would be fatal to lose. In a very round about way over the telephone (since one could not risk describing it openly) I made Lieut.-Colonel Foster understand what it was about. General Barrow, when told what the package contained, apparently decided that no man can do two divergent tasks at one time and do them well, and, as he had quite enough on his hands with the divisional reconnaissance on which he was engaged, he said I was to hold the package until he returned. I put it in my pocket, and, that evening, with a sigh of relief, I handed it over.

Just before lunch I was working on some maps in the general staff tent, when I heard a horse come to the opening and stop. I went out to find what appeared to be a British staff lieutenant-colonel mounted on a nice upstanding bay horse. He was pink-cheeked, very well dressed, and, to me, looked like a Guards officer. He appeared to be in a hurry, and, without dismounting, said: "Can you tell me where the 53rd Division are?" Waving my hand towards a camp a mile or so to the left front I said: "Over there." He thanked me and rode off at once

towards the camp I had indicated. The whole episode occupied only a few seconds.

Then I noticed a mounted orderly ride forward and follow the officer. He had been keeping in the background, but now had to ride past me. The orderly was dressed in a rather crumpled Australian uniform, which was much too big for him; he was dark complexioned and he avoided my eye. I was bare-headed, but I had Australian badges on my uniform. It occurred to me that any average Australian soldier meeting another Australian in an unexpected place would be almost certain to show some sign of recognition—he might even salute! I also knew that no strange British army lieutenant-colonel would have an Australian orderly—I knew all the British army officers who were with the Australians, and this was not one of them. The orderly was also *too* untidy. The Australian dresses for comfort, but he does it by leaving off unnecessary clothes when the weather is hot—his uniform is not several sizes too big for him, nor does it look as if it has been stuffed in a bag for weeks.

I was, by now, getting thoroughly suspicious, but the strangers were already a couple of hundred yards away and travelling at a trot. I was totally unarmed, as were the signallers in their tent fifty yards in the opposite direction. I was still not sure that anything was wrong with the officer, but I was fairly certain that this orderly was not an Australian. There had been no report of spies on our front, and I was thoroughly puzzled. I did not want to make a fool of myself by raising a scare about a senior British army officer. My horses (unsaddled) were on the lines but by the time I could get one the strangers would have already vanished in the forest of tents. It was, further, my duty to stay at the G.S. office—communication between Corps and Division depended on me. The thought of the vital plans in my pocket also made me cautious. If those fell into wrong hands the whole plan of attack must be abandoned. All these thoughts passed through my mind, and, consequently, I went back into the office, rang up Corps, and told them the story, asking if they would speak to 53rd Division, as we had no telephone line to them. I said

the officer seemed correct, but I was certain the orderly was not.

I heard nothing more of the incident for a few days, except that the officer had not gone to 53rd Division H.Q. Then reports came round from G.H.Q. that a spy was operating in the British lines, and warning all ranks of his presence. Descriptions were printed in all orders and a careful watch was kept, but with no success—both “officer” and orderly had vanished. It appeared that he had been seen several times, but each time had got away before suspicions were properly aroused. G.H.Q. receiving the reports, linked them up with reports from other sources that a German major, who spoke English perfectly, was with the Turkish army. There is no doubt that the German was spying in our lines and I am quite certain he was my visitor. I consoled myself with the thought that, as he was seen in other places, he must have found out from other sources the information I gave him.

The spy must have been a very brave and quick witted man. Our divisional H.Q. was at least ten miles behind our forward troops, and the spy must have come round the outer flank in a car or aeroplane, dressed for the part, met the horses and ridden in. The Turks probably knew that Yeomanry Division was in that sector. The spy therefore dressed his orderly as an Australian so that he might pass without suspicion among British army troops. If visiting Australians, the orderly would probably have been dressed in British army uniform.

I imagine the German suffered a shock when he found himself speaking to an Australian officer at Yeomanry Divisional H.Q., and the speed with which he left after getting one answer makes me think that he realized the danger. Perhaps, however, it was merely his carefully thought-out plan of appearing to be in a hurry and never giving time for close examination.

Luck sticks to a brave man, but his arrangements must be good. Reviewing the meeting later, I realized how the spy had placed himself on the east side of the tent door, so that I must face in that direction as I came out. The orderly, behind the corner of the tent to the west, was carefully posted to be behind me and to cover both of us. Perhaps, from aerial reports that


morning, the German knew that Yeomanry Division were out, and he took advantage of their absence to fly over to a place where the horses were waiting, and ride into an empty camp. I am inclined to think that it was merely luck. Had Yeomanry Division been in camp, his risks would have been greater, as British staff officers would have been wondering where he belonged, and what was his regiment, while I might have had time to speak to the orderly. There would also have been plenty of troops and motor cars to give chase, and I should have been free to join in the chase.

I should like to meet that German, if he is still alive, to hear his side of the story.

NOTE.—The above story was submitted to Gen. Sir George de S. Barrow, who has kindly added the following:—

"I remember this case. The German officer referred to by Robertson was seen by several persons. He was very well mounted, and whenever he was followed by anyone who tried to get up to him for a closer inspection he always increased his speed, walking when they walked, trotting when they trotted and galloping only when they galloped. He always managed to keep about 200 yards ahead of the men who followed him, and at the same time never gave the appearance of being hustled. I remember F.M. Sir Philip Chetwode telling me that he had once followed the German officer but could not get level with him. No information could be obtained concerning this errant enemy officer from Bedouins, and it was supposed that they were in his pay. Information was received on one occasion, from whom I do not know, that he was staying in a certain cave. A round up was arranged and a surprise visit paid to the cave one morning at dawn. A breakfast and signs of habitation were found there, but no German, and it is probable that he had been warned by Bedouins. He was never caught, and what became of him in the end we never heard. He was certainly a cool and brave man, and we all admired his intrepidity.

"I write from memory after several years, but I am sure that what I have written is substantially correct. We should all be greatly interested if the officer concerned would come forward and give his story."



MECHANIZED FORCES

BY MAJOR GEORGE S. PATTON, JR., 3rd Cavalry.

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MANY soldiers are led to faulty ideas of war by knowing too much about too little.

A picture without a background is both uninteresting and misleading. Hence, in order to paint an intelligent picture of mechanization as it exists to-day, we must provide an historical background. The appearance of armoured fighting vehicles in the World War was a striking reaffirmation of the old adage: "There is nothing new under the sun." After the failure of the German attacks of August and September, 1914, first political and then tactical considerations arose, which made the resumption of a successful offensive well nigh impossible. Neither valour nor ballistics could overcome for long the heightened power of resistance inherent in automatic weapons, barbed wire and trenches. Now this ascendancy of the defence over the offence was not new; all through history victory has oscillated between the spear and the shield, the wall and the charge, tactics and technique.

Because of their truly startling parallelism let us investigate two sets of cases. In 1096 B.C., nine years of Hellenic valour had failed to breach the Trojan walls. Then came the Wooden Horse, which by carrying men unscathed within that impregnable circle destroyed in a night Priam's mighty fort. Again in 318 B.C. the walls and ditches of Tyre withstood for a year the furious assaults of the best troops of the day only to fall in their turn before the moving towers of Alexander.

Now let us turn to 1914-16 A.D. Here we find that the inverted wall (the trench) and the inverted ditch (barbed wire) had again rendered assaults abortive until in their turn they succumbed to the modern version of the wooden horse and the moving tower, which during the winter of 1915-16 had been simultaneously evolved by England and France. The striking circumstance that, thousands of years later, necessity had again begat of invention identical solutions for identical problems is truly arresting.

The French, following the lead of Ulysses, thought of their *chars d'assaut* as armoured carriers destined to transport groups of infantry, unscathed, across No Man's Land, through the wire and over the trenches and then disgorge them in enemy's rear. The British, on the other hand, followed the Macedonian idea and constructed not carriers but mechanical fighters whose duty it was to shoot down resistance, smash wire and bridge trenches so as to render the infantry assault less impossible.

Unfortunately for the French plan, that mutual esteem and confidence usually existing between allies prevented either nation from informing the other of its invention so that, when the French had some hundreds of machines almost ready for a surprise attack, the British spilled the beans by jumping off on the Somme on September 15, 1916, with a handful of tanks. Since surprise, on which the French had counted for success, was then impossible, they had to convert their carriers into improvised fighters. The results of this change were the ponderous St. Chaumonds and feeble Schneiders in which many valiant Frenchmen were roasted and from which few Germans were killed.

The British idea having triumphed, the Allies and later the Germans made more and more tanks but, due to the lag phase of about a year which always intervened between design and production, the tanks were always just inadequate to the complete accomplishment of their tasks. The Mark VIII or, as we call it, the Liberty was the crowning glory of this lag business, in that, while much money and effort were expended on it for the specific purpose of forcing the Hindenburg line, the war was over some months before the first tank appeared. It is

pertinent to remark that for the future a similar fate probably awaits machines.

As the war progressed a doctrine for the use of tanks was evolved which was officially stated as follows: "Tanks are an auxiliary arm whose mission it is to facilitate the advance of the assault infantry. To do this they must so act as to bridge the gap between the lifting of the barrage and the arrival of the bayonet." Towards the very close of the war a corollary was added to the effect that, since machine guns were the enemy to tactical manœuvre and tanks were the enemy to the machine gun, tanks had the added function of restoring manœuvre to tactics. Within its limits the tank achieved the results above set down.

After the Armistice the natural antipathy aroused in the public mind by the appalling losses of a war of attrition, coupled with the belief that their reduced and dwindling manpower and horse-power would prove inadequate to another such struggle, caused the British to expand the idea of mechanization to the field of strategy, in the hope that by its use they could restore movement and so pave the way for shorter and more decisive wars. While other nations have failed to visualize identical means they are all more or less alive to the necessity of devising some form of warfare which will prevent stabilization. For example, we find General von Seeckt writing: "When recourse must be had to arms, is it necessary that whole peoples hurl themselves at each other's throats? Can masses be handled with decisive strategy? Will not future wars of masses again end in stalemate?" "Perhaps the principle of the *levée en masse* is out of date? It becomes immobile; cannot manœuvre. Therefore it cannot conquer; it can only stifle." Elsewhere he says: "The *levée en masse* failed to annihilate decisively the enemy on the battlefield. It degenerated into the attrition of trench warfare. Germany was beaten down, not conquered. The results of the war were not proportionate to the sacrifices."

Writing in 1930 General Debeney says: "Germany has in effect 250,000 regulars of long service. We are prone to believe that this is the best modern form." As a reason for this state-

ment he says that small armies of regulars are always ready for war and can manœuvre fast.

With the possible exception of England most of the thought expended on solving the problem of avoiding stabilization has been concentrated on a solution for the situation as it exists in western Europe. No notice has been taken of the fact that in practically every other possible theatre of war physical conditions exist which of themselves preclude stabilization. For example, in western Europe there is one mile of improved hard surfaced road for every six-tenths of a square mile of country. In the north-eastern United States, the next best roaded area, there is one mile of improved road for every one and eight-tenths square miles—only one-third as good. For the United States as a whole, the ratio is one to four and a half. In Mexico we find one to five hundred and thirty; in China one to one hundred and twenty-three.

Now we know that in order to maintain the man density necessary to stabilization, even on the relatively short battle front of western Europe, we used the roads to their maximum capacity. Without pressing the discussion further it is therefore evident that, in bigger theatres of war with poorer road nets, the masses necessary for the holding of continuous lines cannot be supplied and hence cannot be used. Where continuous lines are not occupied, flanks reappear and bring with them their natural corollary, manœuvre. In spite of this fact the want of perspective I have alluded to still induces most of us to visualize future battles as simple repetitions of the butting matches of the World War, while soldiers who talk of forces smaller than groups of armies are considered pikers. However, within the last few years certain signs have appeared which indicate that the tide has turned and that some thought will henceforth be given to fighting wars of manœuvre. Let me explain my personal views as to the way mechanized forces will be employed in such wars. We will start with an approved W.D. definition. "A mechanized force is one which is not only transported in motor vehicles, but also fights from some or all of them, the vehicles themselves having armament and protective armour." Further, the War Department has decided that

the allotment of fighting vehicles to arms shall be along functional lines. That is, vehicles appropriate to the traditional tactics of cavalry shall pertain to the cavalry, those appropriate to the traditional functions of the infantry to the infantry, and so on.

Due to the fact that we entered the World War in the middle, we had no experience of those secondary but none the less vital operations incident to the opening phases of all wars and to the entire duration of those waged on the manœuvre basis. Since cavalry is the arm chiefly used in these so-called minor operations, I shall begin by discussing it and shall point out my conception of how mechanized and horse cavalry will function in such operations.

The chief advantages of mechanized units are :—

1. They possess, under many conditions of terrain and weather, a wider range of strategic and tactical speeds than do any other ground troops.

2. They possess, again under suitable conditions, more rapid tactical mobility than do any other ground troops.

3. Their armour gives them such immunity to many present types of small-arms fire that they can develop a maximum of tactical effect in a minimum of time.

Their principal disadvantages are :—

1. Being blind, deaf, and having no sensory nerves nor instinct of self-preservation, they are very fatiguing to operate.

2. At night, in the presence of the enemy, they are practically incapable of independent movement.

3. They are extremely sensitive to ground and weather conditions.

4. They are no longer a novelty.

5. The increased use of large calibre anti-tank machine guns and the reported invention of a 5,000 foot second .30 calibre bullet will increase machine casualties.

Remembering these things let us see how we may employ machines in minor operations. Heretofore such tasks as reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, the seizure of critical points, delaying actions, flanking operations, and the combats incident to the same have devolved on the cavalry and the air corps.

For the purpose of strategic reconnaissance the armoured car occupies a position intermediate between the airplane and a horse patrol. When terrain and weather permit, armoured cars can go far and fast; they can secure both positive and negative information and obtain identifications. Their radio equipment should permit them to make prompt reports. On the other hand their inabilities at night limit their employment.

Armoured cars can locate the critical points on the contour of the enemy advance when such points occur on the roads but they cannot trace the curve between the highways nor can they maintain continuous observation. Hence, when the enemy is distant their observations are adequate; as he draws nearer and more minute information is important, they need help.

As the opposing forces approach each other, both sides will attempt to veil their movements by the use of counter-reconnaissance. It will then be necessary to fight for information. In 1914 the British state that all the information they got had to be fought for. Where the resistance encountered is of a minor nature, armoured cars can brush it aside. Where it is more serious or where the country is wooded, full of tall crops, or mountainous, the cars lack the necessary combat power and must be helped. The form in which this assistance should be supplied depends on the distance to the front at which the contacts occur. If close in, horse cavalry is best; if farther out, light tanks or, as they are called in the cavalry, combat cars, will be needed. Moving on roads already patrolled by the armoured cars, the tanks can go faster than horses and for a longer time. When they arrive they have sufficient cross-country power to make limited turning movements and so compel the enemy to either pull out or show his strength.

For distant reconnaissance against a determined enemy and for pursuits, still another type of mechanized unit is necessary.

Any stream large enough to be shown on a one-inch map is an obstacle to machines; if it is defended it is a serious obstacle. Many motor maniacs do not admit this, but talk largely of using their speed to go around. When, however, we consider the difficulty of getting orders to mechanized units, the time necessary to determine on, and then reconnoitre, new

routes and the delays incident to enemy actions, it is certain that mechanized units must often choose between forcing a passage or abandoning a mission.

To force a passage a bridge head must be established; to do this we must have footmen and in considerable numbers. If these men are transported in trucks much time is lost in de-trucking on the road, often at the limit of artillery range, and then deploying into approach formation and walking to the firing line while carrying their accompanying weapons. For a force which must depend for success on celerity such a procedure is too slow. To be available in time, these foot fighters or *portée* troops must be conveyed in light unarmoured track-laying vehicles which can move across country when that country is covered by the armoured cars and tanks. Moving fanwise, these carriers deploy under cover close to the scene of action, and their crews (less the driver) have only a short walk into combat.

Before leaving the question of mechanical reconnaissance, it is useful to point out that in horse cavalry we have at all times the three types of units so far described. Patrols equal armoured cars, mounted reserves equal tanks and dismounted troopers equal foot fighters. As ever, there is nothing new. Only the speed, ranges and universality of employment differ somewhat. Next, it is interesting to recall that in war the maps are of small scale, signs missing or in a foreign language and the people often hostile and always dumb. Try driving at forty miles an hour in a strange country without signs and see where you get. Finally, let me remind you that since for the immediate future, at least, the major parts of all armies will be muscle-propelled, information of conditions miles in advance will often be stale before those needing it arrive.

A British writer states that, had mechanized forces existed in Palestine and Mesopotamia in 1917-18, the greatest distance to the front at which they could have been usefully employed would have been 150 miles. Beyond that range the number of supply trains doubles, and intermediate camps must be established.

For counter-reconnaissance, armoured cars are adequate on the roads by daylight. Off the roads, or anywhere at night, neither they nor tanks are useful. Without lights they are stationary; with lights they can be avoided. A fair sort of screen could be made by establishing a line of standing patrols from men in the *portée* echelon. However, better results will come from using horse cavalry for counter-reconnaissance and backing it up with the mechanized forces as a fast reserve to move rapidly to any point where a penetration threatens. You will notice that, since the horse cavalry covers the front, the mechanized force is immune from the need of reconnoitring for itself, so can go fast. Where columns of machines must move without previous reconnaissance, their rate is very slow as they can be so easily ambushed.

All operations incident to the seizure of critical points, delays, flanking operations, and pursuits demand for their successful accomplishment rapid reconnaissance, fast marching, short violent attacks, and the holding of delaying positions. A command consisting of armoured cars, tanks and foot fighters carried in track-laying vehicles possesses all the elements save one necessary to the accomplishment of the above tasks, either alone or in conjunction with horse cavalry. The missing element is, of course, supporting artillery.

On the offensive a mechanized force such as just described would work in general as follows: cover its defensive flank with armoured car patrols, dismount some of its *portée* elements supported by the attached artillery to execute the holding attack, send the rest of the *portée* elements and all the tanks by road preceded by the armoured cars as advance guard to some place from which this manœuvring force can launch an attack against the enemy's flank or rear. When the attack starts, the armoured cars, relieved of advance guard duty, assume the role of flank patrols. Here we have the tanks as the charging element, the *portée* troops as the dismounted cavalry, and the armoured cars as patrols.

On the defensive, the foot fighters, deployed at very wide intervals, hold the line; great extension is permissible as the carriers are deployed behind the line like lead horses and no

ployment is necessary in withdrawing, as is the case where infantry have to converge on trucks. The artillery supports the line. The armoured cars cover the flanks, and the tanks act as a mounted reserve.

Thus far I have confined my remarks chiefly to machines acting alone, as this is the most novel and least well understood problem now confronting us. It is my opinion, however, that such operations will be the *exception* rather than the rule and that in general mechanized and horse cavalry will operate *together*. When the two types are combined we have nothing complicated to distract us, since both possess identical tactical and strategic characteristics, the relative advantage shifting from one to the other according to the nature of the terrain in which the actions occur.

Very often it will be necessary to form composite commands in which combat cars and carrier units operate directly with horse cavalry. Think, for example, of the possibilities of a combat car charge instantly exploited by horsemen. Or of a pivot of manœuvre formed by *portée* troops, while the combat cars and horsemen move out rapidly to clinch the victory by a flank attack.

For night marches—and there will be many of them in the next war—machines must *always* be *preceded* by horsemen or else become the victims of ambush.

Coming now to major operations and still remembering the functional distinction of which I have spoken, we find that machines used in major operations act as infantry and belong to it. In offensive battles it is my opinion that tanks should be held as an offensive reserve for the delivery of the main blow. The timely employment of a reserve composed of footmen in a force the size of a division is most difficult due to the lag which exists between the moment when the situation indicates its use and time it gets into action. In the corps the conditions are even worse.

Geographically, the area occupied by a tank unit is much smaller than that occupied by an equivalent force of infantry. Hence the tanks are easier to hide and can come closer to the front.

Tanks move at least four times as fast as infantry.

Tanks develop the full power of their blow at once, infantry must build up its attack.

When tanks are used in this way their assault must be prepared by the greatest possible artillery concentration. If an air attack using bombs and smoke can just precede the tanks, so much the better. Tanks need all the help they can get. Anti-tank weapons are improving daily, and the novelty which saved us in France no longer exists.

On the defensive, infantry tanks and cavalry mechanized forces will be used for offensive returns against enemy enveloping movement or for direct counter-attacks against penetrations.

The *portée* units of mechanized cavalry will also be very useful in filling temporary gaps in a line of battle, though horse cavalry is generally more suitable, since it is even less a slave to roads.

Possibly some of you may have noticed that so far I have not dealt with the famous American pastime of raids. A moment's reflection should convince any one that the advent of the radio and the airplane have made this always dubious operation still less promising. Secrecy, night marches, the ability to live off the country, avoid roads, and swim rivers, are more important than ever. Mechanized forces have none of these qualities. The operations of large independent mechanized forces much heralded abroad are nothing but big raids and are discarded for the same reason.

Next it is pertinent to consider the question of where the machines we talk about are coming from. At the moment the United States possesses some old Renault tanks and some Mark VIII. While neither make has any of the characteristics of a modern fighting machine, as *hoped for*, except armour plate, they will be used in an emergency—at least they will draw fire.

Of the few machines built since the World War only about one-half have armour plate. The procurement of such plate is most difficult, and this fact will materially limit the speed of hasty rearmament.

Certain writers have said that just as the Mongols conquered by exploiting their resources in horses and horseman-

ship, so should modern industrial nations conquer by exploiting their supremacy in the automotive world. The comparison is not exact. The Mongol used in unaltered form his normal means of transportation and food—the horse. Had some abstruse military reason made it necessary for him to fight only on “Gray Mares with one China eye,” his style would have been cramped, his numbers reduced and his replacement problems augmented. Armoured fighting vehicles are Gray Mares. They are special, costly machines with no commercial use. Hardly a part of them is standard. Also, they become obsolescent before they are finished. For this reason no nation will ever start a war with many machines. Those that exist will be expended rather rapidly. Suppose we put the date of their final extinction at three months. Those who know state that a period of from twelve to fifteen months will elapse before replacement machines laid down at the beginning of the war will become available. This means that, for a period of from nine months to a year, mechanized forces will cease to exist except for some extemporized armoured cars on commercial chassis. Yet fighting will still go on. God takes care of horse replacements.


In closing, let me remind you of just one more thing. When Samson took the fresh jawbone of an ass and slew a thousand men therewith he probably started such a vogue for the weapon, especially among the Philistines, that for years no prudent donkey dared to bray. Yet, despite its initial popularity, it was discarded and now appears only as a barrage instrument for acrimonious debate.

History is replete with countless other instances of military implements each in its day heralded as the last word—the key to victory—yet each in its turn subsiding to its useful but inconspicuous niche.

To-day machines hold the place formerly occupied by the jawbone, the elephant, armour, the long bow, gunpowder, and, latterly, the submarine.

They, too, shall pass. To me it seems that any person who would scrap the old age-tried arms for this new *ism* is as foolish as the poor man who, on seeing an overcoat, pawned his shirt and pants to buy it.

New weapons are useful in that they add to the repertoire of killing, but, be they tank or tomahawk, weapons are only weapons after all. Wars may be fought with weapons, but they are won by men. It is the spirit of the men who follow and of the man who leads that gains the victory. In biblical times this spirit was ascribed and, probably with some justice, to the Lord. It was the spirit of the Lord, COURAGE, that came mightily upon Samson at Lehi which gained the victory—not the jawbone of an ass.



SEEDS

A TRUE STORY

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL ARDERN BEAMAN.

It was ungraciously reputed of Maurice John Prout among the casual labourers of the village that "Farmer Prout, 'ee do make a lot o' cider out o' very few apples."

He was, indeed, a hard, shrewd, skin-flinting sort of fellow, who would sooner part with a back tooth than a halfpenny. But then Maurice John knew the slippery nature of money—how easy to let go, how elusive to lay hold of. Started on a smallholding by his father with an overdraft at the bank, he had spent his early manhood in unremitting toil, sixteen hours a day, seven days a week, fifty-two weeks a year. Slowly but surely he had gone forward to big and bigger farms; and when a couple of years ago Sir William had died and the estate had been sold up to pay the death duties, Maurice John had bought his own farm and two more of the pick for his sons, amounting in all to some 800 acres. The quondam smallholder had become a personage of consequence in the locality, a special juror, a district councillor, a substantial man of property—one of the few among his confrères who could still, as he put it himself, "pay twenty shillin' in the pound."

A robust, square figure, with a strong square face and a slight cast in the left eye, Maurice John stumped round his yards, his sheds, his stalls, experiencing that oldest and keenest of human satisfactions, the ownership of land. He gazed lovingly on the efficient orderliness of the place, at the lordly ricks which stood taut and trim to the leeward of the barn. Maurice John, though a big landowner now, had stood himself on each of those ricks while it was building, "sweatin'-pourin'" with the long, long

labour until the last lingering afterglow had faded out of the summer sky. He yearned on them with fatherly pride.

"There's not no tidier lot o' ricks in Morchestershire," he told himself complacently.

A spud in his hand, with which he vigorously assaulted any rare weed that dared to show in his path, he tramped out of the yard across the fields, observing with the same savour of satisfaction the good heart of the plough ground, the close-grazed pastures, the striation of neatly cut and laid hedges above their tidily riddled rhines. A picture to gladden the eye. Not a strand of wire on the whole of his property. Little wonder that Maurice John had taken the first prize of the St. Merryion Hunt Agricultural Society for the best kept farm in its country—there was not another even to approach its perfection. The prize was a very tidy lump of money. Even so, Maurice John did not like the hunt. He hated the way people made a mess of the edges of his wheat, putting him to the expense of re-harrowing; he hated to see great gaps made in his beautiful fences, often within a few yards of an open gate. Sometimes they left gates open; sometimes they galloped his heavy stock, so that heifers and ewes aborted; once or twice they had trampled down his boundary fence, with the result that Maurice John had been summoned for allowing his cattle to stray on the highway, and Lord St. Merryion, Chairman of the Magistrates and Master of the Hunt, had imposed the usual fine. True enough, Commander Gregson, the Hunt Secretary, had quickly come round with a brace of pheasants and refunded the fine; but it wasted a day, hanging around the court till his case came up. And recently, when the fox had taken twenty-three of his prize pedigree pullets, the young lady who did the poultry claims had first been rudely sceptical, and then refused to pay more than two shillin' a head—the birds being worth more than ten bob. Taking it all in all, and in spite of his innate conservatism, Maurice John had no love for the hunt.

He stood on a headland, surveying with critical acumen a piece of rich clover seeds, when a small russet animal crept

through the hedge and, with tail draggling and tongue out, laboured diagonally across the field.

“Dang it!” cursed Maurice John.

Cocking his ears, he caught the cry of hounds coming down on the wind; the twang of a horn; and soon the whole colourful and exhilarating panorama of the chase began to unfold before his view. The hounds, melodiously throwing their tongues, flowed over the fence and away across the field, hot on the fox's line. A scarlet, velvet-capped figure soared over in graceful rhythm, turned his horse sharply to the right, and, shouting something back over his shoulder to the approaching cavalcade, galloped on up the headland. On the far side of the fence another velvet-capped figure, whom Maurice John knew to be Lord St. Merryion, the Master, roared out: “Seeds!” and inclined his horse to a gate up at the corner. Maurice John stood watching this wheel of the great medley of horsefolk in the Master's wake, pink coats, black coats, top-hats, bowlers, ladies on side-saddle and astride, farmers, children on ponies, grooms, publicans, people and horses of every degree. He watched the strenuous lolloping horsemen, heard the stirring thunder of all those galloping hoofs, he saw the clods of his good turf flying, he appraised—with a half-reluctant eye—the quality of some of the horses; but soon his grudging tolerance turned to wrath. A sound behind caused him to turn sharply about.

A few gay, independent-spirited young sparks had been riding wide on the flank of hounds; maybe they saw that the Master's sudden turning movement would throw them hopelessly into the tail of the chase; or perhaps, simply, the invitation of the lovely fence ahead proved too strong. Maurice John turned to see them sailing over, and go thudding on across his precious seeds.

For a moment he stood speechless; then he lifted up his voice and began to bellow. He had a fine bull-like voice, a fine vocabulary. A flapper passed within a few yards of him, hurtling clods into his face. She cried:

“What a nasty rude man!”

On the next day Commander Gregson, looking a bit white about the gills, called in to see St. Merryion.

"It was an awful job," he groaned. "Two' hours palaver—two bottles of whiskey, practically neat. I've got a splitting head. But in the end I managed to pacify him."

"Well done, George."

"But," the Secretary added, "old Prout swears that if the hunt ever misuses his land again, he'll bar up all his gates and boundaries, and shoot every fox on the place."

"H'rumph!"

St. Merryion's face reflected the gravity of this threat; for Prout's covers always held a fox and his property was the cream of the Tuesday country.

"If Prout says so, he will."

"Although I says it who shouldn't," went on St. Merryion, who had a farmer's heart, "there's a sort of mass arrogance about a hunting field which must be hard to bear by those who don't care for hunting."

He rambled off into a long and boring story about a young soldier from Tidworth who had come out with his hounds and had, deliberately, galloped over a piece of *his* winter beans. George Gregson, who was a busy man and had heard this story once or twice before, got up to go.

"Anyway," he grinned, "I fancy they'll be pretty careful about Prout's land in future, after the way you told 'em off yesterday."

A couple of Tuesdays later the fox again took the same line over Prout's land. Mindful of the previous disaster, mud-splashed faces grinned significantly at each other as the fateful field of seeds drew near. After the rating which the Master had inflicted, impartially, on the whole hunt, no one, they thought, could conceivably be such a criminal or such an imbecile as to transgress again, at least in that particular place.

Again hounds towled across the seeds; again the Master wheeled off diagonally to the gate up at the corner, followed with self-conscious alacrity by the field—when, before the

eyes of all, three young farmers' sons, who had not been out on the previous occasion, flipped over the magnetic fence, ploughed on in the track of hounds through the luscious seeds.

Subconsciously, almost, people pulled up their horses to stare aghast. Even the youngest child on the scene experienced the sense of passing through a calamitous event.

"It's gone beyond me, Harry," repeated Commander Gregson in the course of a mournful confabulation some days later.

"The only hope now is for you to go and see Prout yourself. You see," he added, "your name still carries a kind of feudal influence in the Vale."

"H'm," grunted St. Merryion, "you'd scarcely think so if you heard the Labour fellows going for me on the County Council. Well, I suppose I must have a try—though I'm not hopeful. If Prout says a thing, he sticks to it."

Maurice John, as became his position, received the Earl with perfect courtesy. From a cupboard over his gun in a corner of the parlour, he took down bottles and glasses, pressing the visitor to hospitality. He listened with patient attention to his lordship's version of the affair; to the apology which was offered; to the assurance that the most rigorous measures would be taken to prevent any repetition of the offence. At the end, he shook his stubborn square head.

"I telled 'ee, m'lord, a many year ago, as I wouldn't not never shoot no foxes wi'out givin' 'ee a fair warnin'. I give the Commander that warnin' a two weeks back when some young ladies and gen'lemen poached up me seeds. The hunt heven't not took the warnin'—they done it agin. Now I keeps to me word."

For an hour and more St. Merryion continued to plead the case, but without avail. At last, with a heavy sigh, he got up and held out his hand.

"Well, good-bye, Maurice. I can only say again that I am sorry."

"I take it kindly you're comin', m'lord."

Maurice John escorted his visitor to the door.

It chanced that as St. Merryion was crossing the yard to his car, a lad appeared leading a fat heifer. Falling on this

animal, his lordship's heavy eye suddenly lightened; he signalled the lad to halt.

Ten minutes later Maurice John, glancing out of the window, observed a group of still life.

St. Merryion was one of those impassioned souls who would gaze for hours in rapt, unwinking contemplation, profound as a Hindu *yogi's*, at a cattle, a pig, or a hound.

Maurice John turned sharply away, switched on the wireless, digested the weather and market reports, slowly filled and lit his pipe, fidgetted awhile in his chair, then got up and looked out of the window again. No change in the poise and posture of the group.

With an iron effort of will Maurice John forced himself back into his chair with the local paper. He read it, as his custom was, from cover to cover, including every advertisement, however foreign to his needs. An invisible force then drew him once more to the window. Beyond the fact that his lordship had shifted from the near to the off side of the animal, the balance and beauty of the picture remained unchanged. After a few moments of intense conflict, the artist in Maurice John conquered; he reached for his hat; he trudged out into the yard and took up his stand beside the devotee.

Five, ten, twenty minutes passed in unbroken silence. Then, as though from far away regions of purest ether, his lordship sighed:

"That's a grand beast, Maurice."

Maurice John nodded.

Ten minutes passed.

St. Merryion spoke:

"Are you entering her for the Morchestershire Show?"

Maurice John nodded.

Ten minutes passed.

St. Merryion spoke:

"By God, she'll beat mine!"

Maurice John nodded.

Ten minutes passed.

St. Merryion enquired:

"What do you feed her?"

Maurice John told him; mainly home-grown, home-ground cereals. He added, as one who had made a deep study of the subject, "I doesn't hold wi' givin' the cattle a big lot o' consecrated cake."

St. Merryion nodded.

Ten minutes passed.

Maurice John spoke:

"I don't know whether you be at all wrapped up in ship? I got some very pretty ewes in the paddock back up yonder. Maybe you might like to throw an eye across 'em?"

Dusk had fallen before the two tramped back to the car. As the visitor turned the door handle, Maurice John rumbled:

"About they seeds—maybe I were a bit hasty. You're welcome, as you allus hev bin, to ride over my ground, m'lord."

"Oh, yes, the seeds—thanks," St. Merryion muttered absently. "Look here, Maurice, will you come over and pass your opinion on my beast for the show?"

Maurice John said he would.



MODERN CAVALRY HEAD-DRESSES.

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL J. E. N. RYAN, T.D.

PART III. LANCERS.

POLAND was the cradle of lancers. The lance, the weapon of the medieval knight, vanished almost completely from European armies after the introduction of fire-arms except in Poland and Russia; regiments of Polish lancers in armour existing at the end of the sixteenth century were the forerunners of the lancers of modern European armies.

Two articles of dress are particularly associated with lancers, the lance cap or "czapka" and the double-breasted tunic or "ulanka." The original Polish "czapka" was a cylindrical cap with a fur edge and a square top fitting loosely inside the upper part, which could be pushed up and down like a concertina. This gradually became altered into a stiff cap with a front peak, the square top being separated from the body by a constricted neck. The new Polish army preserves the tradition of this national head-dress, the forage cap having a square top with lines of braid across the crown.

The cap as introduced with lancers into the cavalry of the Western Powers at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century after the partition of Poland, was much larger than the later models, the trencher top attaining nearly a square foot in area. Following the Napoleonic Wars and especially during the period of sartorial rivalry between George IV and Charles X, was the epoch of elaborate, rapidly changing uniforms when the British, French, Austrian and Prussian armies copied each other's shakos, bearskins and helmets as

well as the uniforms of Hungarian and Polish origin, producing a complexity so bewildering that it would not have been surprising if inexperienced general officers had not on occasions to command their troops to speak before they could be certain of their nationality!

The lancer uniform was introduced into the British army in 1816 by the conversion of four regiments of light dragoons into lancers copied from those of the Napoleonic cavalry. The lance cap had a skull portion with straight sides covered with gold lace for officers, the upper part being of ribbed cloth of the colour of the facings. The plume was of cock's tail for officers, and in addition to a front peak was a false one turned up and sewn on the back. The cap was kept on the head by a scale chin-strap. After the Crimean War it was reduced in size and the false peak abolished, the present model being evolved in the late fifties. Before the introduction of service dress the cap was covered in marching order with a black waterproof cover, officers wearing a plain black leather one. Since 1831 the cap of the 9th Lancers has differed from that of other lancer regiments, having metal bands instead of braid round the waist and on the peak and angles, and a metal rosette at the side instead of a gold or worsted one.

The modern cap (see Illustration No. IX, 1, 2, 3) has the skull part of black patent leather, the crown which is little more than half the size of the original model, being for officers of cloth of the colour of the facings (except the 9th Lancers' black leather), and of leather for the troops—white instead of black in the 17th Lancers. The under part of the crown is of ribbed cloth for all ranks of the colour of the facings, except again in the 9th Lancers which have blue instead of red. On the left side in front is a gold or red or blue and yellow worsted rosette, and behind this a drooping plume of swan feather or horsehair for officers or other ranks. The green plume of the now amalgamated Royal Irish Lancers was the most unusual, the shade having been at one time lighter. The peak of the cap is braided for officers, and the curb chin-chain is attached at the sides by lions' heads. A cap line of gold or yellow cord encircles the cap and, passing round the body, is looped on the left breast.

The radiated cap plate bears the Royal Arms in silver on a gilt ground. In addition each regiment has a special design : this being for the 5th Lancers the Harp, the 9th Queen Adelaide's Cypher, the 12th the Sphinx superscribed " Egypt " and above the Prince of Wales Plume, the 16th their title, the 17th the Death's Head and " Or Glory " with the letters D.C.O., and for the 21st Lancers the Imperial Cypher. Crossed lances form the foundation of the design in the 9th, 16th and 21st Lancers, and the sprays supporting the battle honours are of shamrock, laurel, oak or palm in the different regiments. The head-dress worn by the mounted bands of the amalgamated regiments is that of the senior one. The forage cap for lancers is characterized by the welts down the quarter seams.

The seven Yeomanry regiments designated lancers—now reduced to one, the Lanarkshire Yeomanry—had mostly blue uniforms, the lance cap for officers of the City of London Yeomanry (Rough Riders) being blue-grey with the City Arms replacing the Royal Arms on the cap plate, and with a light blue plume (see illustration No. IX, 2). The " plastron " and facings of the tunic were purple. The Lincolnshire Yeomanry wore green, and the East Riding of Yorkshire regiment a maroon uniform. The head-dress for Colonial lancers is, of course, the slouch hat, and for Indian regiments the turban.

France has had no lancer regiments so-called, since the war of 1870, one of the first military reforms of the Third Republic being to abolish this branch of the Cavalry, the existing regiments being transformed into dragoons. Later the lance was re-introduced for dragoons and light cavalry, so that in 1914 the whole of the cavalry, with the exception of the cuirassiers, was so armed. The lancer regiments of the " Grande Armée " which took a prominent part in the Napoleonic campaigns, were composed of Polish auxiliaries wearing their national uniform, the cap having an upright plume. During the Second Empire the cap was smaller with a cock's-tail plume, and the chin-chain was worn hooked up to an angle of the crown.

The German Uhlans which were medium cavalry, and derive their name from a Tartar word meaning " belonging to the hoof," were introduced on the Polish model into the Prussian

army at the beginning of the last century. One of the first acts of the ex-Kaiser at the commencement of his reign was to arm the whole of the German cavalry with the lance, so that the popular idea of all German cavalry as Uhlans was not so far out.

The head-dress at the beginning of the last century was the shako as for all Prussian cavalry except cuirassiers, the high "czapka" with false back-peak not coming till the year of Waterloo. In 1843 during the period of general dress reform in the Prussian army a smaller cap was introduced, which was altered before the Franco-Prussian War and in 1889 to the last model. This is smaller than the British cap with a narrow neck and rounded skull portion. It is made entirely of black patent leather, the coloured cloth upper part being separate and worn with the plume in review order only. The regimental distinctions followed a definite scheme, each group of four of the sixteen Prussian line regiments having white, scarlet, yellow and light blue "czapkas," the badges and fittings being alternately of brass or white metal for each group; the colours for the three Guard regiments were white, red and yellow.

The plume was of white horsehair for both officers and men (see illustrations Nos. XI, 2, 3, and XII, 3), for N.C.O.'s black and white (XII, 1), and for trumpeters red (XI, 1). The oval cockade in front of the plume shows the colours of the State—Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony or Württemberg—in which the regiment was recruited. The cap lines of silver or white cord were worn in all orders of dress as a hat guard, being attached to the top of the cap, passing round the neck, and ending in tassels looped on the left breast. On manœuvres and during the War a field grey cover was worn over the cap; during the War a grey felt "czapka" was also worn by officers.

The badge for the three Guard Uhlán regiments (see illustration No. XI, 1) and for the 13th Hanoverian Uhlans was the Guard flying eagle with star, for the first three line regiments the Prussian heraldic spread eagle with the Royal Cypher F.W.R. in an oval shield (XII, 3), and for the other Prussian Uhlans the same eagle with the letters F.R. on the breast (XI, 2); the two Hanoverian regiments had the inscription, "Peninsula, Waterloo, Garzia, Hernandez" (XI, 3). The badge for the

Saxon Uhlans was their Star device (XII, 2) and for the remaining Bavarian and Württemberg regiments the badges were the same as worn by the dragoons of these States.


The Uhlan tunic or "Ulanka" (see illustration No. IV, 3)* resembled the British lancer tunic, being double-breasted and worn with a coloured girdle, but instead of shoulder cords or straps were epaulettes with crescentic margins. Like the tunic of dragoons it developed in both armies from the long-tailed coatee, and was not introduced till much later than the lance cap, superseding the coatee in the fifties of the last century. The colour was dark blue for the Prussians and Württembergers, sky blue for the Saxons, and green for the Bavarian Uhlans. The front or "plastron" of the colour of the facings developed from what were originally lapels on the coatee, which enlarged till they covered both sides of the breast and joined in the middle. On the British tunic the "plastron" is sewn down to one side, but with the Germans it was separate† and was worn in review order only. The name "plastron" is derived from what was known as a "plastron de fer," which was a metal plate similarly shaped worn by knights in armour over the quilted buckskin gambeson. The forage cap for German lancers was of the same colour as the "ulanka" with a band of the regimental facings, except for the Saxons who had white caps like cuirassiers. Illustrations No. V, 1 and 2‡ show an Uhlan sabre with folding hilt, and an officer's shabracque with rounded corners and the Imperial Cypher in the hind corner.

The evolution of the lance cap in the Austrian cavalry commenced with the fur-edged Polish cap worn by the first Uhlan regiments raised by the Emperor Joseph II, son of Maria Theresa, in the latter part of the eighteenth century. In 1798 the fur edge disappeared and a peak was added as on the shako of hussars to be referred to later. During the succeeding forty years the "czapka" became higher and rigid with the addition of a chin-strap and cap lines on the body. In 1840 the feather hackle previously worn was replaced by a horsehair

* CAVALRY JOURNAL, October, 1933, page 587.

† This was the case with the British Lancer tunic as formerly used also in marching order, the breast piece then having a reverse side of the same colour as the tunic, worn in this order.

‡ CAVALRY JOURNAL, October, 1933, page 587.



1

2
IX.

3

Gt. Britain—

1—17th Lancers.

**2—City of London Yeo.
(Rough Riders).**

**3—5th (Royal Irish)
Lancers.**



1

2
X.


3

Austria-Hungary—

**1—6th K.u.K. Uhlans
Officers.**

**2—Forage Cap
Officers.**

**3—1st K.u.K. Uhlans
Men.**



1

2

3

XI.

Germany—

1—Guard Uhlands.

2—9th (Pomeranian) Uhlands.

3—14th (Hanoverian) Uhlands.



1

2

3

XII.

Germany—

1—5th Prussian Uhlands.

2—Saxon Uhlands (Field Service Cap).

3—3rd Prussian Uhlands.

plume looped back along the side of the cap, and this became a peculiarity also of the Austrian artillery and train shako, as well as that of Saxon Rifles. After a short reversion to the Polish cap, the striking model worn by the Austrian Uhlans before and during the Great War, was evolved.

This modern cap (see illustrations No. X, 1 and 3) has three outstanding features—a small crown, extremely narrow neck, and a black horsehair plume fastened by a small chain and lions heads to one side of the cap. Reflecting the difference in character of the people, it is lighter and more graceful than the German model. The upper part is covered with cloth (for the troops with a black leather crown) similarly to the British cap, the most remarkable colours being the Imperial sulphur yellow of the 1st and 6th, and the cherry red of the 11th Uhlan “czapka.” The gilt scale chin-strap of the officers’ cap is engraved with a laurel leaf design, and is attached at the sides by lions’ heads. The badge for all regiments was the Austrian double eagle embodying the thousand-year old tradition of the Holy Roman Empire. On the breast is a shield with the regimental number. The cap for officers is, like the British cap, braided on the crown and sides and round the waist and peak. There are no cap lines. Instead of the “ulanka” was worn a light blue frock with patch pockets, and carried on the left shoulder a double-breasted pelisse of the same colour lined with fur, which in winter was worn over the frock. The Austrian (as distinct from Hungarian) cavalry reserve (Landwehr) consisted of Uhlans distinguished from the “active” Uhlans by a plain red leather “czapka,” and also of Tyrolean and Dalmatian Mounted Rifles whose head-dress was a green felt hat (Jägerhut) with a plume of cock’s feathers. In complete contrast to the Germans, the lance was abolished in 1884 for the Austrian Uhlans shortly before it was adopted by their neighbours for the whole of their cavalry. The well known high cap formerly worn by Austrian officers in undress uniform is shown in illustration No. X, 2; the cap of the present Bundesheer resembles the German model.

As previously indicated in connection with the Russian dragoons, the only regular lancer regiments in the Russian army after 1882 and before the reorganization of 1907, were the two

Guard Uhlan regiments, but in the latter year seventeen line Uhlan regiments were reformed from dragoons. Their head-dresses and uniforms were similar to those of German Uhlans. The "czapka" badge was the Russian double eagle. The regiments were also uniformed in groups after the German fashion, but the "czapka" was worn on ceremonial occasions only and never in the field, the coloured forage cap (see illustration No. VIII, 1)* characterized by its large top, being the ordinary head-dress. The more famous irregular lancers or Cossacks ("Kasaki") wore with the long caftan or "tcherkesska" the well known lamb-skin cap or "papacha" (see illustration No. VIII, 3)* varying in form in the different Cossack armies, which comprised as well as cavalry, infantry and artillery Cossack formations. For full dress the cap was of black fur with a coloured crown, the Kuban and Terek Cossacks of the Caucasus wearing in the field a natural lamb-skin "papacha," while the Don, Ural and Astrakhan Cossacks used only the forage cap. The Siberian, Transbaikal and Amur Cossacks had sheep-skin caps. The head-dress of the three regiments of Life Guard Cossacks was more elaborate, consisting of an astrakhan busby with a red or blue cloth bag on the right side and a white plume on the left.

Until the reorganization of the Italian cavalry after the War there existed therein eight regiments of lancers ("Lancieri") armed with the lance and wearing a dark blue uniform. The full dress head-dress for these regiments was a black fur busby similar to that of the hussars or "Cavalleggeri" to be described later, but the white metal ornament in front consisted of crossed lances surmounted by a crown, with a plaque showing the regimental number.

The remaining European armies with regiments of cavalry styled or dressed as lancers are those of Belgium, Spain, Bulgaria and Turkey. The four regiments of Belgian lancers had till the War a lance cap of French design as worn by the lancers of the Second Empire, with a radiated cap plate and a plume of feathers or horsehair for officers and men, white for the first two regiments, and red for the others. The upper part of the cap

* CAVALRY JOURNAL, January, 1934, page 90.

was red, yellow, white or blue for the different regiments, but it was usually worn with a black waterproof cover. The chin-chain was hooked up. Cap lines from an angle of the crown of the cap were fastened round the neck of a short blue-braided jacket. The present folding cap for the troops has in front a tassel. The head-dress for Spanish lancers ("Lanceros") is, or was till recently, a steel helmet as for the dragoons but with white metal ornaments, and having a white plume when worn with the light blue uniform. Bulgaria had four line cavalry regiments dressed in dark blue or green German Uhlan uniforms, but instead of the "czapka" a low cylindrical astrakhan cap or "kalpak" with a white metal coat of arms and red cloth crown, was worn. The two existing line regiments wear a brown service uniform with a peaked forage cap ("furazka").

Lastly, the Sultans personal bodyguard, the Life Guard Squadron or "Ertogrul," and the Turkish Guard Uhlans, wore in full dress a double-breasted lancer tunic of German cut, the head-dress being a conical lambskin "kalpak" with a cross on the cloth top, black for parade and of natural colour when worn in the field with khaki. This head-dress which was also worn by the thirty-nine regiments of Turkish lancers ("Suwari") has with the traditional Islamic fez worn by the infantry, been proscribed by the Republic, the universal headgear in review order being now a steel helmet of French pattern, and for officers a khaki cap.

(To be continued.)



*CAVALRY IN THE GREAT WAR**A Brief Retrospect.*

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL A. G. MARTIN,
formerly 6th Dragoons, German Army.

PART III. Battle of the Marne.

AFTER the escape of the left wing of the Vth French Army, from Richthofen's Cavalry on the Aisne, the Allied retreat flowed on four more days without further serious obstruction.

Then came the dramatic moment, when Joffre saw his chance, and took it.

The Allied Armies faced about. Manoury (VIth Army), emerging *deus ex machina* from Paris, sprang his surprise attack on von Kluck's vulnerable flank, and presently, the entire front from Paris to the Swiss frontier was ablaze.

Von Kluck's lightning change of front, which strove not merely to parry the thrust, but incidentally to finish off Manoury once and for all, can be counted as one of the boldest manœuvres in the history of war. He could never have risked it, but for the conviction, that the enemy on whom he had thus apparently rashly turned his back, would be too cautious at first to take due advantage of the situation.

The German right wing no longer possessed that weight of numbers, which the Schlieffen plan demanded.

Since the Battles of the Frontiers, Joffre had been concentrating in the direction of Paris all the forces he could safely disengage from the Lorraine front. The Germans meanwhile pressed on in pursuit, unreinforced, and with no reserves following in second line. Apart from their losses on the battle-

field, the armies of the right wing had suffered further depletion by the ill-advised dispatch of a couple of Army Corps to the Eastern front.

No changes in the distribution of the German cavalry, to allow for probable future contingencies, were made during the race to the Marne. The four corps remained in their original allocations: von Richthofen and von der Marwitz with the Ist and IIInd Armies, von Hollen with the IVth and Vth, and finally von Frommels three divisions, with the Crown Prince of Bavaria's Army stranded before the French permanent fortifications in Lorraine.

Among the forces moved up post haste by Joffre to support his left wing, were the 8th and 10th Cavalry Division. These were formed into a corps under General Conneau, and given the task of covering the left flank Vth Army, which had been exposed by the retirement of the British.

The measure came too late to be of any use during the critical passage of the Marne (Sept. 2nd/3rd), but was in time to serve another important purpose. For when, on September 5th the retreat came to an end, and Joffre issued his celebrated order for a general offensive, Conneau's Corps was at hand to link up the B.E.F. and the Vth Army, incidentally closing the interval that still existed between the two.

The relative strengths of the opposing forces of strategic cavalry on the Marne-Ourcq front were as follows:—

<i>Germans</i>				<i>Allies</i>			
Richthofen Guards and				Conneau 4th, 8th, 10th			
5th Divs.	2	Divs.	3
Marwitz 2nd, 4th, 9th				British Cav. Div.			
Divs.	3	Sordet 1st, 3rd, 5th			
				Divs.	3
—				—			
Total Divs. 5				Total Divs. 7			
—				—			

The British Cavalry Division figures here among the units available for strategical employment, though not actually used in such capacity. Working in close liaison with the infantry divisions of the B.E.F., its activities had more the limited

character of divisional cavalry. As such it had no part in the rôle Conneau was expected to play with his corps, and consequently does not share the blame attaching to the latter for its inactivity.

The French strategical cavalry opposing the German Ist and IInd Armies was divided into two groups.

(1) General Conneau, with three divisions opposite the eastern part of the gap, facing north; (2) General Sordet (later Bridoux) with three divisions, on the left (northern) flank of the French VIth Army, facing east.

From these points of departure, both corps were offered exceptional opportunities of proving that cavalry can still exercise decisive influence on the issue of a great battle.

It was up to Conneau to advance boldly, rend the thin veil with which Richthofen was screening the gap before his front, and make straight for von Kluck's exposed lines of communications. Sordet's chance was just as promising, if not more so, could he but get round von Kluck's northern flank and co-operate with Conneau from the opposite direction. Between them, they might have involved the German Ist Army in a fatal dilemma, forcing it to disengage from Manoury, and barring its retreat by blowing up the Aisne bridges between Soissons and Compiègne.

Military critics might do well to harp less on the error of judgment von Kluck committed by marching blindly past the fortified camp of Paris, and show some appreciation for the indomitable generalship and exemplary staff work by means of which he extricated himself from the toils of a miscarried operation. Considering the chaotic state into which von Kluck's transport had been thrown by his precipitous change of front, it was a great feat to get it all back safely across the Aisne, ahead of the combatant troops, when the retreat was decided upon.


The fate likely to have befallen the Ist Army, had Conneau and Bridoux raided both its flanks at this critical stage, can be imagined. However, von Kluck took his risks with open eyes, relying on the slowness of the enemy, and subsequent events justified his optimism.

It was "a close shave" for all that.

There is little or nothing to say on the subject of General Conneau's advance except to notice the astonishing lack of push. It took two days (Sept. 6th and 7th) before he even got in touch with the enemy, and on September 8th, finding the Germans holding the Petit Morin, he crossed the river at Bellot, *behind* the British Infantry.

When eventually (Sept. 10th) the Corps arrived on the north bank of the Marne, von Kluck was already in full retreat and his flank out of danger.

*Approx. distribution of strategical cavalry
on Western Wing of Battle of the Marne, Sept. 8th.*



The other cavalry corps, Sordet's, was ordered to cover the open left flank of the VIth Army. Assembled on the morning of September 7th N.E. of Paris, it advanced by Nanteuil le Haudouin on Betz. Betz was found to be occupied by entrenched German forces, likewise Cuvergnon, and the day passed in fruitless attempts to expel the enemy from these villages. The defenders were units of the German 4th Cav. Div., later reinforced by infantry.

At nightfall Sordet withdrew to Nanteuil to bivouac; men and horses completely exhausted, having (according to Palat) covered 120 kilometres within the last 36 hours.

The 5th Cav. Div. had meanwhile been trying to get round the enemy flank to La Ferté Milon, but was beaten back at Autheuil by other parts of the German 4th Cav. Div. (to be exact: 2 squadrons 15th Hussars, 1 squadron 17th Dragoons; the M.G. Detachment of the Cav. Div. and M.G. Coy. 7th Jägers). Among the losses suffered by the French 5th Cav. Div. on this occasion were one gun and 6 ammunition waggons abandoned on the field.

Next morning—*September 8th*—Sordet advanced again from Nanteuil and attacked Betz with the 3rd Division, while the main body of the corps (1st and 5th Divisions) were held in readiness south of Lévignen.

About this time, Marshal Joffre, evidently dissatisfied with the corps achievements, deposed General Sordet, and appointed in his place as Corps Commander, General Bridoux, up to date G.O.C. 5th Cav. Div.

The C.-in-C. pointed out in his orders, that the fall of Maubeuge would enable the Germans to bring up reinforcements. Here was the cavalry corps' opportunity! It was not to stick to the Army flank, but launch divisions and mixed detachments against the German lines of communication. It was essential to destroy the railway at Soissons—most important to the enemy—and at Compiègne.

In spite of this stimulus from high quarters, only one division—the 5th again—was dispatched on the required undertaking, which shows that the marching powers of the corps must have been at a very low ebb.

General Bridoux, on taking over the Cavalry Corps, nominated General de Cornulier-Lucinière (Provisional Cav. Div.) to succeed him in command of the 5th Cav. Div. The instructions the latter received with regard to the raid were: "to cross the River Ourcq at La Ferté Milon and harass the enemy retreat by means of gunfire" or words to that effect.

The 5th Cav. Div. started at midday (Sept. 8th), and, by making a wide circuit past Crépy, through the woods, where numerous enemy posts were encountered (Schulenburgs detachment), finally reached the Ourcq at Troësnes.

Here a German aerodrome was discovered, and columns of infantry and artillery were observed marching on the other side of the river.

It was decided to destroy the aerodrome, but an attack delivered by the 5th Light Brigade was beaten off, whereupon the division withdrew north into the woods again, and went into bivouac for the night at Faverolles—some four miles S.E. of Villers Cotterets.

The French raiders little guessed how near they came to making an important capture. General von Kluck with his staff was on his way to the new Army H.Q. La Ferté Milon, when he suddenly encountered enemy cavalry and found himself within an ace of being captured. He and his officers seized pistols and carbines, and kept the enemy at bay until infantry arrived to rescue them from their perilous situation.

Had the brain and directing agency of the German Ist Army been placed *hors de combat* with one sudden coup at this most critical stage of the battle, it is difficult to see how a débacle could have been avoided.

While General de Cornulier had thus succeeded in getting round the German flank, the two other divisions of the corps were engaged with enemy forces (4th Cavalry Division) at Ormoy-le-Davien, with little or no success. Later in the afternoon a renewed attempt was made to approach Cuvergnon, but when it was reported that the enemy had occupied Bargny, Bridoux withdrew to Crépy for the night.

A dragoon squadron left behind, found that the enemy had evacuated Betz, and promptly occupied it.


On the morning of September 9th, General Manoury, instead of outflanking the enemy, found that he was outflanked himself. His left wing, crumbling away under the German assault, concentrated on Nanteuil from N.E., north, and even N.W.

What particularly perplexed the French Army Commander, at the same time rendering Bridoux's duty of covering the left army flank problematical, was the appearance of enemy forces in the north.

A strong column approaching the battlefield from Compiègne via Verberie seemed to be about to take Manoury in the rear.

side!" remarked General Boëlle, the Corps Commander to his chief of staff. But so it was.

Bridoux's Corps (1st and 3rd Cav. Div.) left its bivouac on the morning of the 9th, to take up a position near Bargny. The Corps Commander hoped to cover the army flank from here, but soon masses of German infantry emerging from the woods N.E. of Bargny (the IXth Corps, advancing to attack Nanteuil), forced him to withdraw to Crépy, and from there, in a south-westerly direction, followed, part of the way, by the German 4th Cav. Div.



At 7 p.m. the Corps (now reduced to four brigades) observed a column of enemy infantry marching north, on the Nanteuil-Verberie road. It was Lepels Brigade, or parts of it, retreating. Bridoux attacked the German force with his horse batteries and dismounted troopers, but was presently so heavily shelled himself, that he had to break off the action and retire with all possible speed. Finally his tired regiments found rest in bivouac north of Dammartin, where the left wing VIth Army was now believed to be.

While Bridoux was thus being hustled about all day, his subordinate division commander, General de Cornulier, raiding the enemy flank with the 5th Cav. Div., was having a far more satisfactory time.

Leaving bivouacs at Faverolles early in the morning, the 5th Cav. Div. advanced to the Ourcq again. At Chouy the 2nd echelon H.Q. Staff IXth German Corps was raided, and a number of officers captured. Enemy transport columns, visible at Neuilly St. Front, across the river, were shelled.

After these minor successes, the division turned north to Villers Hélon, from where it could command the roads leading from Soissons to Chateau Thierry and Villers Cotterets.

Two squadrons 22nd Dragoons, pushing out eastwards to the Soissons-Chateau-Thierry road, attacked enemy transport at Oulchy, but were beaten off. The commanding officer, Major Jouillé, was wounded and taken prisoner.

A reconnoitring squadron, 16th Dragoons, had even worse luck. Trying to approach Soissons, they found their progress barred on every side. The squadron took cover in Vauberon Fe, a mile or so east of Mortefontaine, and hearing from civilians that there was an enemy aerodrome nearby, resolved to attack it.

The gallant squadron leader, Lieutenant de Gironde, another officer and 25 troopers were killed in this scrap, and the surviving 30 men captured later.

Meanwhile the Division scored a success on the Soissons-Villers Cotterets road, where a squadron, 22nd Dragoons, succeeded in ambushing and destroying an enemy motor supply column.

The raid now having run its course, General Cornulier turned west, and giving Crépy, which was reported occupied by the enemy, a wide berth, finally reached the neighbourhood of Néry, where the exhausted regiments went into bivouac.

The 5th Cav. Div.'s exploit provides interesting study. It establishes the truth of the lesson learnt at Néry, namely that cavalry penetrating behind the enemy front generally fails in its object, if met with by a determined spirit of resistance.

On turning to the part acted by the two German Cavalry Corps—von der Marwitz and von Richthofen—in the Battle of

the Marne, it will be seen how widely the nature of their task differed from that of their opponents, Generals Conneau and Sordet (Bridoux).

The strategic situation demanded offensive on the French, defensive on the German side.

The Germans may take it for a compliment that their defence of the gap seems to interest military writers more than do the still-born French attempts at strategical pursuit.

Colonel Pugens, in a series of articles published in the "*Revue de Cavalerie*," leaves it to be inferred that the performance of von der Marwitz's and von Richthofen's Corps in the gap was negligible and that much more might have been achieved.

Undoubtedly a great many errors were committed, and omissions made, but these far more for reason of the magnitude of the task than from any slackness or want of self-confidence.

Four tired cavalry divisions could not be expected to hold up an advancing army of nine infantry (five of the British) and four (one British) cavalry divisions. It was merely a question of delaying that advance in order to gain time for von Kluck either to beat Manoury, or safely effect his own retreat.

This object was achieved in the end, thanks in no small measure also, to the cautious tactics of the Allies.

During the first three days of the battle—September 5th to 7th—the German cavalry were actively engaged screening the withdrawal of the four Army Corps of the Ist Army which von Kluck was swinging round to engage Manoury on the Ourcq.

This task successfully accomplished, von der Marwitz was ordered to cover the left flank of the Ist Army; von Richthofen to cover right flank of the IIInd Army. Incidentally, both corps were to join hands across the gap and block it.

Von der Marwitz, who retired on the 7th from the Grand Morin to defensive positions on the north bank of the Marne at La Ferté Sous Jouarre, was greatly embarrassed in his dispositions by a crisis which had arisen on the left wing of the Ourcq front. However, the danger passed over, and on the 8th he had his two divisions guarding the river west and east of La Ferté. Next day (9th), the timely arrival of reinforcements,

in the shape of an infantry brigade under General Kraewel, enabled him to hold up the British IInd Corps, which had crossed the Marne during the night.

While on the morning of September 8th, the British IIIrd Corps was cautiously approaching La Ferté Sous Jouarre, where von de Marwitz lay in wait for it, the Ist and IInd Corps, B.E.F., came up against determined resistance on the Petit Morin.

Here Richthofen's two divisions were spread out in a long thin line; the 5th Cav. Div. from St. Cyr to Orly; the Guards Cav. Div. extending from there to Sablonnières. The few German horse batteries had a poor time against the weight of shell-fire the British Artillery concentrated on them, but down at the water's edge the crossing was fiercely contested by stout-hearted riflemen and machine-gunners.

Soon after midday von Richthofen learnt that the detachment at Viels Maison belonging to the VIIth A.C. (2nd Army) had been withdrawn, so that his left flank was now in danger of being turned. He decided to retire to new positions behind the Dollau stream, but his orders issued to this effect only reached the Guards Cav. Div.

The 5th Cav. Div., for some inexplicable reason, had retired on its own responsibility, without reporting this intention to the Corps Commander, and also without notifying the Garde Schützen Battalion and certain units of the 11th Cavalry Brigade who were defending St. Cyr. The latter stuck gamely to their posts against overwhelming odds, till, between 4 and 5 p.m., the last survivors retired north.

The attitude of the 5th Cav. Div., in abandoning the line of the Marne, is incomprehensible. The division retired that evening (8th) to Marigny, several miles north of the river, leaving certain bridges intact, by means of which the enemy could cross soon afterwards.

Shortly before that ill-omened plenipotentiary from G.H.Q., Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch, appeared upon the scene and ordered the battle to be broken off, von Kluck had already taken effective measures against the threat from the gap, by directing the left

wing of his front on the Ourcq to swing back on a pivot and face south.

The movement however was rendered superfluous by the immediate retirement of the whole Ist Army to the Aisne.


The German 4th Cav. Div., though belonging to Marwitz's Corps, was separately employed during the Battle of the Marne. It served the purpose of covering the right flank of the Ourcq front, rendering invaluable services to the Ist Army in that capacity, as the French Cavalry Commanders, Sordet and Bridoux, should be able to testify.

When the retreat became inevitable, von Kluck ordered the 4th Cavalry Division to march at once to the Aisne, and occupy the bridges from Soissons downstream to the village of Attichy. How wise this precaution was became apparent, when shortly afterwards the Inspector of Communications reported that the presence of enemy cavalry south of Soissons and in the woods of Villers Cotterets made it impossible to forward supplies.

What a chance for Bridoux, if he could have been on the spot; but he was far away, trying to keep level with Manoury's retreating left wing as it fell back towards Paris.

The 5th Cavalry Division, which had succeeded in making all this stir on Kluck's lines of communications, was seeking safety too, and had turned its back on the woods of Villers Cotterets, and any further chance of interfering with the German retreat.

No communication—either by telegraph, wireless or messenger, could be established between the raiding 5th Cavalry Division and H.Q. VIth Army so that the former remained in ignorance of the general situation. It is hardly to be supposed that General de Cornulier would have retired his division in the afternoon of the 9th had he had but an inkling that the tide had turned, and the German Ist Army was moving back eastwards to the Aisne.



THE CAREER OF AN INSUBORDINATE OFFICER.

BY CAPTAIN E. W. SHEPPARD, O.B.E., M.C., R.T.C.

“ Full many a flower is born to blush unseen,
Full many a crime the world does not discuss,
Full many a villain lives to reach a green,
Serene old age, and so it was with us.”

—*Elegy written in Spoon River Churchyard.*

IN the above words—which are quoted from memory only—Mr. J. C. Squire has celebrated the sad fate of the “poor bucolic Borgias” and “hayseed Herods,” who in the obscurity of their village homes, proved themselves worthy to rank with the first criminals of recorded time—“and all for naught, since no one ever knew.” The subject of the following story resembles these unfortunates, not indeed in the lowliness of his birth or the obscurity of his life, but certainly in the oblivion which, contrary to all desert, has overtaken him and his deeds. And yet the career of Sir Robert Fletcher, sometime Brigadier-General in the Army of the United Company of Merchants of England Trading to the East Indies, and member of his Britannic Majesty’s Parliament, is perhaps worth a biography, if only for the fact that it is quite without parallel in our history. Perhaps this is as well, for it can hardly be held up as a model for aspiring youth, nor indeed would anyone who in these strenuous and efficient times endeavoured to model himself on our hero, live except to regret it. However, to our story.

The circumstances of Sir Robert Fletcher’s early years are lost in obscurity, a fate which has been that of greater men than he, including, if our memory serves us right,

Napoleon. We first hear of him in the middle of the eighteenth century, as a lieutenant in one of the regiments serving in the Presidency of Madras, and the action which brings him to our notice is typical of his whole career.

There were at this time, for lieutenants in the Madras Army, many and varied ways of earning distinction, as was proved, to the great glory of themselves and their country, by Clive and others; but Robert Fletcher's way was none of these; he chose to separate himself from among the congregation of his brother officers by sitting down at his desk and penning an insolent letter to the Government. The matter of it was highly technical and indeed trifling; but the manner rendered it notable and the young man's superiors appear to have thought it worthy of immediate recognition. Robert Fletcher therefore, found himself in receipt, some days later, of an order dismissing him from the Company's service. This was more than he either desired or expected, for he was, it seems, as yet ignorant of the world and of affairs and but a prentice hand in the gentle art of insubordination; and he found himself reduced to seek a friend in high place who should have influence enough to get his lost commission restored to him. Such a one was found in no less a person than Eyre Coote, the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army: and at the price of an apology—how the necessity for it must have wrung our hero's high soul!—he was duly reinstated.

This untoward incident, which all but wrote a premature "finis" to a promising career, appears to have had long lasting effects on the demeanour and actions of the young soldier. Upon the tale of these dull halcyon days when for him to hear was to obey; when Robert Fletcher was barely to be distinguished from the rest of the zealous, efficient and daring young officers who laid, at Wandewash and Pondicherry, the first firm foundations of the British Empire in India, we do not propose to embark. We find him during this period employed on a special mission to reconnoitre the French Islands of Bourbon and Mauritius; taking a creditable part in the expedition to Manilla; and as *locum tenens* for Major Hector Munro in command of the Bengal Army, reaping with energy and success the fruits of the decisive

victory of Buxar. But all this is nothing to our present purpose. Our Indian military annals display a plethora of competent and efficient leaders; nor were Robert Fletcher's military qualities so unusual to make him on their account alone a fitting subject for the notice of posterity. It is with his relations to his superiors that we are here concerned, and to these we must now return.

Early in May, 1765, Lord Clive arrived in Calcutta from England to take up his second Governship of Bengal. He had instructions from the Court of Directors to reform the whole military and civil system in that province and a free hand as to men and methods. The scandalous corruption rampant in every department of the administration, and the shameless manner in which all officials from the highest to the lowest had feathered their own nests, rendered drastic measures necessary, and Clive was not the man to shrink from them; but his stern methods of reformation made him in a few weeks the best hated man in Bengal, and one of his measures was calculated to add the officers of the army to the number of his enemies.

This measure was the abolition of the double *batta* or field allowance which had been granted by Meer Jaffier, the Nawab of Bengal, as a thankoffering for his enthronement by the British after the battle of Plassey in 1757, and had been continued ever since. The officers of the Army were induced, largely by the machinations of disgruntled civil officials, to join issue with the Governor on this point and to resign their commissions *en masse* rather than continue to serve without the *batta*. This they did on May 1, 1766; but the movement was not unanimous even among the lower ranks, and the higher officers took no part in it. Clive refused to be intimidated, and by a judicious mixture of cajolery and firmness succeeded, after a period of serious crisis, in bringing the officers back to a sense of duty and restoring discipline; but it must have astonished him, though it would hardly have astonished anyone who knew Sir Robert Fletcher—as he had now become—to learn that that officer, who at the time commanded the 1st Brigade, and was thus one of the senior men in the army, was deeply implicated in the mutiny.

It was not for some weeks after the end of the disturbance that Clive had occasion to suspect his complicity. How little he did so at first is shown by the fact of his having appointed Sir Robert to sit on the Court Martial for the trial of the offenders; but before the Court could assemble the Governor had received an anonymous letter making such specific and damning charges against our hero that the latter found himself, on arrival at Patna, ordered into arrest.

Briefly, the charges were that the commander of the 1st brigade had himself been a prime mover in the mutiny; and that he had publicly recommended the wholesale resignation of commissions at a dinner at which a dozen of his officers were present, stating that his own staff would set the example. The letter concluded with a finely indignant peroration that his "duplicity, hypocrisy, injustice and rapaciousness would make a man of common honesty blush to see human nature as degraded as in this individual."

Even if there had not been certain other facts known to Clive, predisposing him to believe that these accusations were not without solid foundation, Sir Robert's own behaviour must have seemed to him suspicious; in fact he was in this juncture a somewhat inadequate and unsatisfactory villain. His first act on being placed in arrest was to request that he might be allowed to present his case, not before a Court Martial, but before no less a body than the Governor and Council in Calcutta. No doubt such a court might have proved more susceptible to influence—pecuniary or other—and less likely to take an extreme view of Fletcher's case than one composed of military officers; but whatever hopes the accused may have placed in this chance of escape were doomed to disappointment, for his request was politely but firmly refused.

Accordingly the Court Martial was convened and our hero brought before it. Four officers gave evidence that, four months before the mutiny actually took place, Sir Robert was not only aware of what was toward, but had at a dinner given by one of them, Captain Goddard, himself suggested the form which the mutiny actually took and in particular had taunted his host with being backward in a movement so much for the

common good, for the sake of which his (Sir Robert's) own personal staff were ready to sacrifice their lucrative appointments. Furthermore, two witnesses affirmed that a fortnight before the actual sending in of the officers' papers, Sir Robert was well aware that all preliminary arrangements had been made; and that he not only took no steps to deal with the crisis, but neglected to inform his superiors for a whole week, and even then reported the matter only because one of his fellow brigadiers, having got wind of the affair, had already done so.

Under the circumstances, it must be admitted, our hero must have been hard put to it an effective defence; but it is disappointing to learn that he could think of no better device than that outlined in the old maxim for those who have no case. Goddard, whose subsequent career sufficiently gave the lie to the defendant's strictures on his personal and professional character, was the chief target for abuse; and the rest of the plea was a poor attempt to show that the policy of darkness and composure adopted veiled an astute and Machiavellian scheme to gain the full confidence of the disaffected officers and acquire complete knowledge of their designs, by a pretence of sympathy with them. Unfortunately this plea was unsupported by any evidence beyond the defendant's bare word; and the main gravamen of the charge, Sir Robert's failure to report to the Government, as soon as he heard of it, the existence of so serious a peril to the discipline of the army and the public safety, remained unmet.

Accordingly the verdict went against him; the Court decided that Sir Robert was "guilty of mutiny, having incited sedition, and after coming to the knowledge of a mutiny, having delayed to give information to his Commanding Officer," and adjudged him to be cashiered—a sentence which was duly confirmed by the President and Council.

Without making any pretence to be connoisseurs in the matter of villainy, we cannot but feel that, from a purely artistic point of view, our hero's handling of this affair left something to be desired. Success or failure are not infallible criterions for the judgment of any enterprise; but after all the sad fact remains that he not only failed in the matter he undertook, but

involved himself in the ruins of his schemes. He appears not only to have committed himself too deeply at the start, but to have failed to seize the opportune moment for withdrawal; or it may be, he let "I dare not" wait upon "I would" and relaxed his energy and persistence just where it might best have served his cause. Or was it perchance—for after all even the most complete of rascals is not immune from the common weaknesses of mankind—a twinge of conscience, a striving of the better self, not yet altogether subdued, some lingering ghost of these outworn shibboleths, duty and loyalty, that at the critical moment made Sir Robert fumble and falter in his nefarious design?

Anyway, be the cause what it may, the engineer had been hoist with his own petard, and our hero's public career seemed at an end. But his powers of recovery were as extensive as his wealth and influence; and holding, like Browning that "we fall to rise, are baffled to fight better," he set to work, after the lapse of a decent interval of time to allow of convenient oblivion veiling his past, to get himself once more re-instated. No doubt his position as a Member of Parliament, in which he took his seat about this time, made his task considerably easier; and in 1771 he was once more back in India, this time as a Colonel in the service of the Madras Presidency. This was a real triumph; not only did he get back his rank, but his seniority also, and that it would seem with interest; for less than a year later we find him, the rejected of Bengal, Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army.

The appetite grows with eating, and practice makes perfect; and Sir Robert Fletcher soon showed that if he was now no more subordinate than he had been heretofore, he was at least more skilled in his methods of insubordination. Before many months he and his civil superiors were at daggers drawn; and the obstructive tactics pursued by the Commander-in-Chief were so vigorous and effective that the Governor at length resolved to cut the Gordian knot with one trenchant stroke. Accordingly one morning our hero found himself relieved of his post and relegated to the command of Trichinopoly, a dull and insignificant place in the southern confines of the Presidency.

Such an appointment was the equivalent to the despatch of a German officer in pre-war days to a small garrison town on the western or worse still on the eastern frontier. But German and other officers have to obey orders, and no such necessity was laid on Sir Robert Fletcher. His excuse for disobedience, however, had at least the merit of novelty; he pleaded that, as a Member of Parliament it was not only his privilege but his duty to return home to attend to the interests of his constituents. Such a plea, which would be surprising enough to-day, must at that time have been simply astounding, and the Governor and his Council seem to have been so stupified by it that they let him go.

It was, had they but known it, merely a case of *reculer pour mieux sauter*. In less than three years he was back in Madras again as Commander-in-Chief, this time for good.

We now come to Sir Robert's final essay in the gentle art of insubordination—a most finished production which deservedly met with a full measure of success. It must be admitted that in reappointing to a position of trust an officer with his past record, the Honourable Company were, to use a vulgar expression, “asking for trouble”; but as we know, he had a considerable measure of influence and had no doubt made use of his previous tenure of high command to feather his own nest in the manner customary in the India of those days. When even so great a man as Clive showed little scruple in amassing a private fortune while in a public position and by means which were, to say the least, of decidedly doubtful morality, we may be sure that lesser men would not be slow to follow his bad example; and no doubt the money which we may fairly presume Fletcher to have acquired played an even larger part than before in his re-instatement.

At this time there was considerable friction between the Madras Government and the Court of Directors of the East India Company at home. The latter had just held an enquiry into the origin and conduct of the military operations which had led to the deposition of the Rajah of Tanjore, and the handing over of his treasure to Mohammed Ali, Nawab of the Carnatic, a tributary of the British. Mohammed Ali averred that with-

out the hoards of Tanjore he could not pay a large debt owed by him to the Madras Government; but the Court of Directors refused to believe this, pronounced the war to have been undertaken on a frivolous pretext, and the conduct of the Government "wholly unjustifiable"; and as a means of signifying their highest displeasure, they then proceeded to relieve the Governor of his office and send out a "new broom" to replace him.

The "new broom" was Lord Pigot, who as plain Mister, had been Governor of Madras during the later years of the Seven Years War.

He arrived at Madras some two months after Fletcher, in December, 1775. His was a difficult task calling for considerable qualities of tact and statesmanship, in which his lordship appears to have been somewhat deficient, though one historian gives him credit not only for honesty—"then much more rare" than in these present enlightened days—but for ability also.

A few weeks after his arrival he found that his lot was not to be an easy one. Mohamed Ali, desirous of proving his contention that if he were deprived of the revenues of Tanjore he could not pay his debts to the Madras Government, put up a certain Mr. Paul Benfield, now a civilian but formerly an officer of engineers and contractor for works on fortifications to the Madras Government, to send in a somewhat surprising claim against himself for 23 lakhs (about £250,000). Mr. Benfield's previous financial record was not a particularly good one, and his books at the time of his retirement from the service of the East India Company showed him to have expended several thousand pounds of the Company's money without being able to account for it in any way. Consequently the Governor, after a cursory examination of the claim, had no hesitation in pronouncing it fraudulent. But if he believed that by so doing he had rid himself of Mr. Benfield or of his little bill, he was mistaken. That astute gentleman at once set to work to make friends of the mammon of unrighteousness; several of the members of the Council were induced, from motives and by means which it would perhaps be indelicate to specify, to suggest the re-opening of the question; and when the matter was put to the

vote, the honest men found themselves in minority of five to seven.

This was an annoying start for a high minded reformer, but worse was to come. Lord Pigot had decided, in accordance with his instructions, to send Colonel James Stuart, the officer next in seniority to Fletcher, to restore the Rajah of Tanjore, and asked that the Commander-in-Chief should give him instructions for his guidance. These instructions the Council decided they would like to see—a reasonable request enough, one would think, in ordinary conditions; but Pigot considered that the conditions were not ordinary and refused to assent. In this he was probably wise; but his next action was not wise. Fearing lest he should be outvoted on the point—as he no doubt would have been if and when the matter were raised—he decided to ensure for himself a favourable decision, and for no particular reason given, suspended Stretham and Brooke, the two senior members of the Council.

This suspension he published in the Military Orders of the Garrison and then adjourned the Council, satisfied that he had got his own way. He had also incidentally placed himself where most of his colleagues were—on the wrong side of the law.

Probably, however, the two suspended Councillors might have passed from the scene without the proverbial dog barking at their going, had not the deluded Governor at the same time made the serious blunder of adding the name of Sir Robert Fletcher to theirs. On August 22nd, 1776, that officer was “ordered in arrest, for being concerned in circulating letters tending to incite and cause mutiny and sedition among the troops in this garrison”; Stuart being placed in command in his stead. Perhaps Pigot thought that as this indomitable rebel was safely sick in bed, he could treat him as he liked. Little he knew the mettle of the man.

Sir Robert lost no time in assuming the counter-offensive. Summoning to his couch three officers of kindred spirit to himself, his Adjutant-General, Lieutenant-Colonel Edington, Major Horne, commanding at St. Thomas' Mount, and Captain Lysaght, of his Staff, he concocted with them his plan of operations. Colonel Stuart, his appointed successor, also appears to have

been something rather more than privy to it, to judge by his subsequent conduct.

The next night, that of August 24th, Pigot and Stuart were returning home from the Council—which, purged of the recalcitrant ring-leaders, had now recommended its sittings—when the carriage was stopped some two or three hundred yards from the fort. Here two of Fletcher's bravoës, Edington and Lysaght, were awaiting their victim. Stuart alighted from the coach, Lysaght took his place; and Lord Pigot was quickly and quietly driven out of the city, arriving at St. Thomas' Mount at 9 p.m.

The Governor now realized that he had been trapped, and the artillery guard at Horne's house had the satisfaction of listening to an impassioned harangue from him, in which he adjured them to rescue him on the grounds that he also had helped to serve the guns, long years ago in the French Wars.

This appears to have moved them about as much as the war-time adventures of, say, Mr. Bottomley, amused our troops in France in 1917; and the unhappy prisoner was shortly afterwards removed by Horne to close custody. It would seem indeed that he was not in high favour in the army; for a similar attempt by one of his adherents on the previous afternoon to induce the men on the main guard of the Fort to arrest the two Councillors opposed to the Governor had encountered only a blank refusal.

The successful rebels at once took steps to consolidate their position. The civil rebels, Stretham and Brooke, together with Fletcher and the other members of the Council who had sided with them, issued a manifesto the next day, in which they denounced the illegal, violent and unconstitutional conduct of Lord Pigot in breaking through the positive orders of the Company, stated that they had been compelled "for the future welfare and preservation of the affairs of the Company, to order Lord Pigot into arrest"—the very words their victim had used of Fletcher himself—and ordered "all officers and soldiers to pay due obedience to our orders signed by ourselves and our secretary, we, the majority of the Council, being the only legal representatives of the Company."

On the following day one of the chief actors in the conspiracy, Lysaght, received his thirty pieces of silver in the shape of an

appointment as Town Major of Fort St. George; while an order to the troops praised them for their conduct in the recent crisis and held out to them hopes of pecuniary reward, to be paid in the near future. Curiously enough, public opinion, which had looked with kindly indulgence, not to say sympathy, on the well-meant and successful efforts of Mr. Benfield and his cronies to secure the sums of money to which they were not entitled, was scandalized at the idea of soldiers turning a few dishonest pence; and five months later the three Commanding Officers in the fort—of whom Edington was one—thought it incumbent on them to publish a manifesto explaining the blameless purity of the motives of their inaction. The document seems to have served a double purpose; for its authors also took occasion gently to remind the Council that in actual fact the promised money had not materialized. Sad to say, it apparently never did so.

To return to the unhappy Pigot, he was informed on August 28th that he might, on condition that he gave a sort of parole to remain in quietness, select his own place of residence—the best house in the settlement, if he wished; and that every necessary should be furnished him at the Company's expense, and every respect and attention paid to his person. Or he might, if he chose, embark on one of the Company's ships for Europe, when the new Council would order him every accommodation in their power. But he refused all these splendid offers—which be it noted were to cost nothing to those who made them, since the Company would pay the bill—and remained an unwilling and unwanted guest of Major Horne for eight months. No doubt it seemed to his gaolers that he had little cause for complaint; his family were permitted to reside with him; he was doled out table money at the rate of seventy rupees a day; he was allowed to take the air in his carriage; he was occasionally even sent for a few days' jaunt into the country. What more could any man want? There seems to have been something lacking; perhaps the Council pardonably enough failed entirely to understand the nature of that *rara avis* in those days—a man who was not only able but honest. Anyway, the captive fumed, and fretted, and lashed himself into rages,


and sank into fits of melancholia, and finally died on May 10th, 1777, less than a fortnight after he had, on medical advice, been removed for a change of air to Government House in Madras, where in the great days of old he had held supreme power, and from which he had such a short time since walked forth for the last time in freedom.

His bitterness of soul was, it may be supposed, hardly alleviated by the fact that Warren Hastings, the Governor-General, on hearing the news of his downfall, had accepted the *fait accompli* and recognized the new Government; but he was happily spared the most unkindest cut of all. When the Court of Directors in England received the full reports of what had taken place, they indeed reinstated him in his office, but added the proviso that he should lay it down within seven days and return to England, together with the other members of the Council. Perhaps death for this proud soul would have been in the end preferable to this final humiliation.

The fate of the Councillors is lost in obscurity; but that of the soldiers, whose hands had done the deed, was not an unduly hard one. Stuart, after holding his command for five months, was suspended and sent for trial by Court Martial. This, however, was postponed for three years, and then the plea that he had acted throughout under the legitimate orders of the majority of the Council, which constituted the *de facto* Government, procured him an acquittal; in view of this verdict the other members of the conspiracy, Horne, Edington, and Lysaght, were not brought to book. Three years later, in the midst of the second Mysore War, Stuart, now a Major-General, once more succeeded to the chief command at Madras, on the death of Sir Eyre Coote. In the field he displayed a quite unusual degree of incompetence, but his energy and ability in the conflict with the civil power were meritorious to a degree. He was recalled to Madras at the end of the war and dismissed the Company's service. Then there appears to have come back to him the memory of former days, and he began to hatch a new plot against the Government, relying on the fact that the royal troops in Madras were still under his command. Alas! before he could arrest a second Governor, he was himself

arrested, confined in the fort, and later conveyed on board a homeward-bound ship. It was three years before he had the chance of taking his revenge on the Governor, which in this case took the form of a duel and a bullet in the shoulder.

But what of Fletcher? Unhappily there is little more to tell. This, his finest achievement in the gentle art of insubordination, was also his last. He lived but for four months after it, and passed peacefully away in December, 1776, in the kindly air of Mauritius, even before the order for his second trial by Court Martial could gladden his dying eyes. But who can doubt that his end was a pleasant and peaceful one? "*Finis coronat opus*" might well be written over his bones, for not even if Sir Robert Fletcher had lived to thrice men's allotted span, could he have hoped to surpass this his last *chef d'œuvre*—as consummate a piece of insubordination as is to be found in our military records.



SWORD TRAINING.

BY CAPTAIN G. T. WHEELER,
P.A.V.O. Cavalry, F.F.

IN the majority of cavalry regiments to-day sword training reaches its zenith in "Dummy Thrusting" on the normal Dummy Thrusting Course. Before this stage is reached, the man is taught the correct use of his sword, first dismounted, then mounted. He is, throughout, taught to regard the sword as a weapon with which drill is performed, rather than as an effective fighting weapon. This is unquestionably correct for elementary training, because it leads to an instinctive use of the sword on lines that have been proved to be best for killing the enemy without damaging the man's wrist, or causing to him being disarmed in battle.

I consider that it is not sufficient for war, that is, for the fully trained soldier, who, in a long service army, is supposed always to be ready for war. Though in this I appear to disagree with some eminent authorities, General Von Bernhardt, in his book "Cavalry in War and Peace" dismisses the sword with the following remark: "The training in the use of the sword must be limited to the few exercises that are prescribed for it, but must not be wholly neglected. In a *mêlée* the man will often have to rely upon this weapon." If the words "for his life" are added to the last sentence, which is presumably what the General meant, the whole sentence appears rather flippant.

Major-General Rimington ("Our Cavalry") in his chapter on Training the Man, recommends "a great deal of work at the dummies," and goes on to say that he would have these dummies in fixed places and readily visible, which is not a very great advance on normal Dummy Thrusting.

Dummy Thrusting, whether it is on the normal course, over a fixed Village Course, or, as General Rimington suggests, over an acre of ground in which are a score or more of self-adjusting dummies of varying heights, has definite limitations.

The normal course becomes purely drill after a very short time. It serves to teach the man to handle his sword correctly, and the horse to go through a certain unvaried procedure. It does not teach the man to *fight* with his sword; he knows beforehand where each dummy is, and he has been rigidly taught the only correct way of dealing with each. Any variation from the normal owing to unforeseen circumstances, such as the loss of a stirrup, leads to loss of marks in a competition. It is argued that the Dummy Thrusting Course makes the horse handy, and with this I strongly disagree. To support my argument with anyone who holds otherwise, I would ask them to choose the best Dummy Thrusting horse in a squadron and ride it round the course leaving out the second and fourth jumps. If they can persuade the horse to vary his habits to this extent without injuring his mouth they must have good hands indeed. The course is purely drill to the old horse; he may go round perfectly though he has a mouth of iron and sides of wood.

The Village Course is a stage forward. The man is surprised by unexpected enemy, but, to keep this up, the course must be changed frequently and often radically, which is expensive. In most places it is not an easy course to make without big expense, both initially and in maintenance. However, as it is only a variation of the Village Course that I am recommending, I will leave it till later.

The "dummy-strewn acre" has the big advantage that there is no standard method laid down, so the man has practice in fighting with his sword, not just drilling with it. It is, however, an elementary lesson in fighting, and it contains nothing to make the man forget the correctness of his positions. He is neither excited nor surprised.

I consider that when all these exercises are completed, the man and horse (as a single weapon) is still not fully fit for war.

The man lacks three essentials :—

(a) A real desire to get at the enemy, born of complete confidence in himself, his horse and his swordsmanship.

(b) Experience. The ability to keep his head, and use it to make quick decisions, when confronted with noise, excitement and the unforeseen.

(c) The desire really to gallop down an enemy, and forget for once which leg his horse is on, or, if the desire is there, the ability to see and take an opportunity to do so.

The first is, of course, largely a product of the other two, and is by far the most important. I have heard it affirmed that at the charge at El Mughar not a single Turk was killed by the sword. My informant was an eye-witness. If this is so it might be thought that extreme efficiency with the sword was unnecessary, but the fallacy is obvious when the question of confidence is considered. The charge at El Mughar was a colossal success, and whether the Turks were killed with the sword or by machine gun fire is of no account tactically. The charge, like every other charge, had to be made at speed and with determination. It is for this determination that supreme confidence in the sword is required.

In order to produce this confidence I believe that something more than Dummy Thrusting is required, and it is this that I will describe.

The general idea is to choose any available bit of ground, imagine what type of enemy might be found there, and how they would behave if they were there. If a wood is available, one would expect either infantry or African natives of no discipline. The former would get behind the tree trunks, the latter up them. If walls are available the enemy will probably try to keep the other side of them and shoot over the top, whether they be European or Pathan, and so on. Then consider how the action of the enemy can be represented by dummies.

When this is decided one must make out a special idea. This is the story that is told to the men before they start. If the course approximates to a village (like the walled manêges of India) it can be said that a gang of dacoits are in sole occupation of the village, and they are to be hunted to death. If


open country is being used, the swordsman may be considered as a scout that has been cut off and has to fight his way to safety, either killing or avoiding the enemy he meets, and so on. The fewer the rules the better. It can be done singly, when the man has only to decide and act, or it can be done in pairs, when the senior has to control, as an old hand might control a pig-sticking heat.

The accompanying photographs give an idea of some of the ways in which dummies can be arranged.

Nos. 1 to 7 deal with a village.

No. 1 shows one of the villagers firing at the swordsman. It is necessary to have a man with blank ammunition at each of the dummies. He serves, firstly, to attract the attention of the swordsman to that dummy; secondly, to accustom the horse to fire; and thirdly, to make the noise which makes for excitement and reality. He fires once when it is desired to attract the swordsman's attention, i.e., normally when he has dealt with the dummy before, and as many times after that as seems fit, usually once or twice. The three dummies in the photograph show alternative positions in which it can be put. The rifleman fires until he is seen and then as he is approached he dodges back and gets behind whichever dummy is being used, the others are removed. The swordsman should not know where the dummy is going to be until he arrives on the spot.

No. 2 shows the same villager using the middle dummy of those in No.1. He is firing his last round just before the dummy is stuck. No. 3 shows a sack tied to the branch of a high tree, like a child's swing. As the swordsman comes round from behind the tree, shown just to the left of the "sack-thrower's" shoulder, the thrower lets the sack go straight at him (very little practice is required). The sack is intended to represent a man attacking mounted, or from slightly higher ground, and is filled partly with earth and partly with hay, so as to weigh about 112 lbs. This is sufficient to disarm a man who adopts the "fountain pen" grip. The next dummy is also visible in this photograph. The firer on the right of the "piano" jump (San Sebastian) fires and then runs across the horse's front to squat below the dummy shown on the left, in the foreground.



No. 1.




No. 2.



No. 3.




No. 4.



No. 5.




No. 6.



No. 7.



No. 8.




No. 9.



No. 10.



No. 11.



No. 12.



No. 13.

The swordsman has to change his sword quickly from right to left front, as the firer nips across.

No. 4 shows the view that the swordsman sees as he crosses some higher ground. Some villagers are lying up for him behind the wall.

No. 5 shows what happens as he rides along that wall ready for them. At intervals they pop their heads (dummies on the end of a stick) over the wall and fire at him. The head shown seems to have come rather far over, so he is able to use his hilt.

No. 6 shows a villager, who has been caught in the open, making a get-away through a gap in a wall. He is dragging a sack behind him on the end of a wire.

No. 7. The villager has run into a walled field for safety, and knelt down just inside to wait for the swordsman. Actually the swordsman did not know whether he had gone right or left after he entered. But the photograph has been taken just after he had stopped in the entrance and seen where he was. Again he was dragging a sack after him.

Nos. 8 to 11 show an open course.

No. 8 shows an enemy behind a tree. The path of the horse round the tree is shown by the dust. This is because the swordsman had tried to get at the dummy from this side, failed to reach it so had to continue round and get it from the other. The rifleman is not visible, though one was there.

No. 9 shows the swordsman galloping all out to catch a man before he gets up a tree. One man fires from below (as shown) to attract attention, but goes as soon as the attack gets close. The sack is on a cord held by a man up the tree (just visible) who pulls it up as the swordsman approaches. It is a difficult nearside point because of the over-hanging branches. The horse is jumping an irrigation ditch.

No. 10 shows an enemy, dragging a sack, running away through the trees. He is making for a walled field (*manège*), which he enters through a gate, then passes straight through and leaps over the wall at the far side into—

No. 11, Undignified safety!

Nos. 12 and 13 show two incidents in a Pair Competition.

No. 12. They have "bought it." Both have chased a man down

the side of some rails, and now both are on the same side whilst the enemy has nipped through the rails into safety and is firing at his leisure. One of them is going back to get the other side and drive him out.

No. 13 shows a double pursuit. The pursued have jinked different ways in search of safety.

All the above incidents are from actual courses laid out for competitions or training, and all are thoroughly workable. Laying out a course is a bit of a business, as all incidents have to be rehearsed, and, to get full value, no incident can be used more than once, though very small variations are sufficient. Having seen the amazing difference in dash and confidence that it produces in swordsmen, I am convinced that the trouble is more than justified. If it was done twice a week for a month each training season, both as training and competitions, the time would be well spent.



*THE RAMLE VALE HOUNDS IN
ALLENBY'S COUNTRY*

By R. G. B. SPICER, M.C., Joint Master.

THE real facts of hunting in this country since the Occupation are a little shrouded in mystery and even controversy, but the following is a short history of those early days compiled from the memories of those who were present and interested.

The first "pack" consisted of a few dogs who were kept and hunted by an officer of the London Yeomanry at Deir El Belah in the spring of 1918. In March, 1919, at Aleppo, Victor Findlay of the R.H.A. and Waddington of the Sherwood Rangers started a bobbery pack consisting of one couple given them by Prince Yusef Kamal, two so-called "Chiens de Chasse" and two or three other odd dogs. They hunted them around Aleppo and once "by invitation" (what a delightful scene this conjures—almost reminiscent of Somerville) with the R.A.F. at Musline. Further, about this time, Flight-Lieut. Bulteel was sharing his one and only bell tent with his beloved dogs, giving them a large proportion of his own rations and cadging what further food he could for them from his friends. He is said to have hunted them where and when he could.

At Haifa, "Pick" Armitage had meanwhile started a pack with long dogs and on Findlay's transfer there, he joined forces, having got through General Angus McNeill 5½-couple from Egypt and 3-couple of Fell hounds from a major in the New Zealand forces.

The Vale of Acre Hounds was then formed with Major Armitage as Master, Findlay First Whipper-in and A. J. M. Bonar of the Herts Yeomanry as Second Whipper-in. They

were kennelled on Mount Carmel and flourished. About then, Selby Lowndes appeared. Just before that the Commanding Officer of a brigade of R.H.A. had received a telegram reading : " Selby Lowndes reporting for duty with two couple fox hounds one beagle bitch send transport." Selby Lowndes was at that time a very junior subaltern and as a horse and horse holders had already been despatched to the station for him and as transport, as it was in those days, was generally regarded in the light of a sacred institution, the Commanding Officer's first impression was to send a reply more pithy than polite but fortunately whilst the Adjutant worried over the wording of the message the magic words " fox hounds " had time to work its effect.

We are told that three days later, hounds met on Beyrout Race Course and drew blank, and then came the trek to Homs. A brigade of cavalry moved with the artillery; the sun was hot, water scarce and the scarcity of G.S. wagons increased a hundredfold, but hounds arrived in good fettle.

The first meeting at Homs resulted in the killing of a wolf. Hounds put him up and coursed him in the open but perhaps it is fortunate that none of them were in at the death.

Brig.-General Byron was also connected with hunting hounds in these early days. The pack which he controlled could be described as a very homely one and with a desire to produce uniformity the type most favoured was said to be the " German pointer."

Few of these were purchased; the majority are said to have been cajoled from reluctant owners and a few even retained status of house dogs while being produced at the meets twice weekly.

There was actually another pack in those early days at Sarona and it is thought that the H.L.I. got from them the hounds which started a bobbery pack with which the Forest of Bir Salem was hunted.

The doings of this hunt are obscure but there is still a story, well founded, concerning a fox's brush being paraded at crack of dawn by members of the Sergeants' Mess before a still somnolent officers' quarters.



The Pack at Wadi Kefr Ana, showing typical cactus.



The Joint Master, Mr. Spicer, with the Secretary, Mr. Worsley, and the Pack.



The Field at the Opening Meet.



Moving off from Ramle to draw Bir Salem.

General McNeill was the first, however, to organise a hunt in this country on the usual lines and as he himself has described at length the activities of his hunt in a letter to the "Horse and Hound" I will not reiterate it. Sufficient is it to say in this article, that, starting with a conglomeration of hounds and dogs, he hunted the pack from 1922 to 1926 and in 217 days accounted for 112 jackal. He had, of course, in the early days of his mastership eliminated the dogs and retained hounds only.

When General McNeill left the Gendarmerie for the Government Stud Farm, nobody managed to keep hounds going and the country remained unhunted. The orange groves spread and with them the wire; more land was brought under close cultivation and the local farmers, both Arab and Jew, were said to be thoroughly hostile towards any resuscitation. In fact, when I was transferred from Kenya to Palestine in 1931 I was definitely and authoritatively, I may say, informed that hunting was impossible in the Ramle Vale for a hundred and one reasons.

Enthusiasm, however, and a grim determination not to be beaten has resulted in the Ramle Vale Hounds of to-day. This hunt brings joy to many of us out of the Polo Season when, for a horse and hound lover, there is no recreation worth calling one.

Captain Geoffrey Warden serving with the Trans-Jordan Frontier Force on secondment from the "Loyals" had imported on his own initiative about five couple of hounds from home with the intention of hunting them in Trans-Jordan. Having found, however, insufficient support and the difficulties insuperable, he asked me to take his hounds over and to start hunting again in Palestine, which has been done.

We raised money, built kennels, imported further drafts all very generously given to us. Colonel Elwes of Colesbourne has given us some of his best, and a wonderful pack his must be. Sir Julian Cahn, Lord Melchett, Mr. H. Higginson and Lord Cobham have all, with that generous sporting spirit of masters of hounds, enabled us to bring our pack up to 14½-couple, and last but not least a real hunt terrier.

We hunt two days a week with an occasional bye and although the country is difficult, and becoming increasingly so,

we show great sport even if we do not kill a plethora of jack.

General McNeill was right when he said that this must be the worst scenting country in the world.

Our kennels are at Ramle where surely at night the jack's staccato bark is accompanied by a ghost-like "coo-ee" from the soul of an Australian Light Horseman and lover of Banjo Paterson. We meet in the region of Bir Salem where G.H.Q. once were. We draw the Wadi Surar from Junction Station—shades of Neil Primrose and the Bucks & Dorset Yeomanry surround us, and more so when our jack makes his point for Abu Shushed and the Jaffa-Ramle road.

From Naane we ran the other day exactly the same line as the East Riding Yorkshire Yeomanry rode when they charged a machine-gun nest held by the Turks. It must have been a thrill to Tesseyman of The Palestine Police, who was out with us that day to be going "full split" over the same ground where he won his D.C.M. in that charge with *arme blanche*. I am afraid that he was as badly held up that day by wire as he was when his squadron was similarly held up and where his troop officer was killed.

We draw around Katra and El Mughar, the memory of which must ever be a thrill to those of the cavalry who were in Palestine, and particularly to the Berkshire Yeomanry.

The hunt staff wear pink, and our olive green collar gives us a local quiff of which we are as proud as The Pytchley of the white or as the Scots Greys were of the black piping in their caps.

We ride Arabs; they are as clever as cats, go all day, and never seemingly put a foot wrong over cactus or wadi.

His Excellency Sir Arthur Wauchope, G.C.M.G., has been our most generous supporter and in fact presented us with our Hunt Ball at Government House last year. We held a successful Point to Point that afternoon of five races which all filled and which was a great success from every point of view including the financial one.

Our only hound ailment so far has been anthrax from which we have lost a couple. They contract this foul disease by

eating, when drawing the wadis, dead camels already half-eaten by jack.

The following is an account of one of our days :—

A GOOD HUNT.

On Wednesday hounds were at Aqir Village—a small field of persistent supporters were well rewarded by one of the best hunts we have had. A jack found in some tall wheat near Aqir Village was coursed at a great rate for half an hour. He made a large semi-circle southwards and eventually gained temporary refuge in the Wadi Surar. Hounds overran the line and being cast back they were picking it up again when an Arab said he had seen our hunted jack—they ran on in the bed of the Wadi with some nice music, and in less than five minutes ran into view and killed him in a pool in the Wadi. Hounds made a point of about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles and 5 as they ran. The time was forty-five minutes.

Mr. Rudyard Kipling will not mind, I am sure, if the Ramle Jack soliloquises as follows :—

When Samson set my brush on fire
To spoil the Timnites' barley
I made my point away from Tyre
And left Philistia early.
By Gath to Ramle's Vale I fled
And took the Joppa Road, sir!
And was a Gentleman in Red
When all the Quorn wore woad, sir!



*PRINCIPLES FOR THE EMPLOYMENT AND COM-
MAND OF INDEPENDENT CAVALRY FORMATIONS*

By permission of "Militar-Wochenblatt."

BY COUNT SCHACK (Retired Colonel).

IN his book "Moltke ein Vorbild" General von Seeckt writes: "The ability to employ cavalry effectively is, even to-day, an important test for generals." He then goes on to say: "Napoleon had this ability." It would have been equally true had he included Frederick the Great and the elder Moltke in the same category. The common characteristic of all three is that they assigned to Cavalry a very definite and strictly limited field of action, such as the wars of their time demanded. Frederick the Great, especially after the disastrous experiences of the first Silesian war, trained his cavalry for pitched battle (Schlachtentätigkeit) with the result, that the military exploits of his cavalry achieved immortal, and world-wide fame. Napoleon, when his armies were divided up into corps and divisions marching independently, realized the necessity for obtaining accurate information with regard to enemy positions and allotted to his cavalry the task of long-distance reconnaissance, which was so admirably carried out by Murat.

In the war of 1866, after the failure of the Prussian Cavalry, Moltke allotted similar tasks to the cavalry divisions, and in the Franco-Prussian War, the results of this reconnaissance formed the basis for the operations of his Army.

Even before the Great War, the German Army had in Count Schlieffen a commander who, for carrying out his masterly plan of operations aiming at ruthless annihilation of the enemy forces, had no idea of refusing the decisive co-operation of the

strong German Cavalry. By recognising clearly and in good time that long-distance reconnaissance will become more and more the task of the air service, he again assigned to the independent cavalry the rôle of a fighting force operating with its fire effect in the flank and rear of the enemy.* The warning of the great strategist passed unheeded. Faithful to the tradition that at the beginning of every new war, the army can act only on the experience of bygone days,† it was considered, that as before, the main task of the cavalry was long-distance reconnaissance and the training of the troops and their commanders was, accordingly, based on this principle.

Now, however, that we have before us the experience gained in the Great War, which fully corroborates Count Schlieffen's views, it seems strange that in the new German Service Regulations long-distance reconnaissance is still, as formerly, assigned as the main task of the cavalry. (No. 132 Training Manual for Combined Arms (F.u.G.132)). This may perhaps be explained by the fact that during the Great War, repeated attempts were made to employ independent cavalry in the flank and rear of the enemy, without, however, resulting in any really decisive engagement. The reasons for this failure are to be sought, first of all, in the fact that the command responsible for the employment of the cavalry units sometimes put them in too late, or in insufficient numbers, while at other times, the command of the cavalry was rendered very difficult, by the manner in which its tasks were assigned. After the Battle of the Marne, the Higher Command, when it determined to outflank the left wing of the French by a renewed offensive, brought the cavalry into action too late. Six German Cavalry Divisions could have been held in readiness on the right wing of the army, in the region of Noyon—Roy—Montdidier, whereas actually only the first two cavalry divisions advanced there on the 18th September. The results of this delay on the part of the command made themselves felt for days and weeks later; the German Cavalry being continually forced to launch renewed and useless attacks for the possession of ground, which had it

* Count Schlieffen. "Der Krieg der Gegenwart" (Present-day Warfare).

† Von Seeckt. "Moltke ein Vorbild."

been brought into action in good time, it would have occupied without striking a blow.

The Army Command provided wholly inadequate cavalry support for both the great outflanking operations in the East which led to the Battles of Lods and Vilna.

An example of how cavalry command may be unfavourably influenced by the manner in which tasks are allotted, was proved by the engagement of the 4th Independent Cavalry Corps under Hollen, on the right wing of the German Army at Lille. The "Struggle on the Flanks" ("Ringens um die Flanke") was then at its height. By bringing into action this cavalry corps under Hollen, the German Supreme Command intended to make a last attempt to turn the enemy flank and, by a series of attacks, to drive him back from the north to the south. The order issued to the cavalry corps under Hollen, which had detrained to the east of Lille, was as follows: "The task of the 4th Independent Cavalry Corps is to advance independently of the 6th Army, although always keeping in touch with it, by a wide enveloping movement against the flank and rear of the enemy facing the right wing of the army; all lines of communication, especially the railway lines leading from the coast and from the south to the region west of the line Amiens-Lille, are to be completely destroyed, and the fight is to be continued to the last man and the last horse for the purpose of preventing by every possible means any enemy attack on our right wing."

It was impossible for the cavalry corps commanded by Hollen to maintain the required uninterrupted liaison with the 6th Army, if it was to carry out, at the same time, its other task of launching an effective attack on the flank and more especially on the rear of the enemy. The uncertain advance of Hollens cavalry corps during the days between the 5th and 8th October, as well as the continuous struggle to keep open communication with the rear by employing the division for the offensive, can be very easily explained by the allotment of the double task to the cavalry corps. In addition to this, a third order for the defence of the flanks of the 6th Army was given, which excluded the possibility of any further operations against the rear of the French Army, for the fighting strength of the

cavalry corps was insufficient to enable it to act simultaneously at two points so far distant from each other. If from among these conflicting orders the 4th Independent Cavalry Corps chose the two which could be more or less combined, and were at the same time, the easier, namely, flank defence and the maintenance of uninterrupted liaison with the 6th Army, while for a time refraining from advancing on the rear of the enemy, this was certainly not the intention of the Supreme Command, but was the outcome of the manner of allotting the two tasks.

If in the work published on the Great War by the Historical Records Department, the reasons for the failure of flank movements is frequently attributed to the lack of mobility and attacking force of the cavalry; this explanation only leads us back to the general principles of command. It is true that the marches carried out by the independent cavalry were often remarkably short and very slow. A day's march of barely 30 km. under circumstances demanding the utmost mobility of the cavalry, was by no means uncommon. On 6th October, the cavalry corps under Hollen undertook a march of this kind from Lille to the north. Without ever coming into contact with the enemy, it only reached the Deule Canal near Deulemont, in the evening, and halted there for the night. This very inadequate marching performance was often attributable to the particular cavalry formation having been previously overtired.

In the work of the Historical Records Department, reference is made to this question, and it is stated that in August, 1914, during the decisive operations of the 8th Army in East Prussia, the mobility of the 1st Cavalry Division suffered very greatly from the after-effects of overstrain during the preceding period, when it was guarding the Frontiers, from which it may be concluded that the strength of the independent cavalry should, under all circumstances, be reserved for their employment in decisive battle, as recommended by v. Schlieffen and never be previously wasted, on subordinate tasks such as guarding the frontiers. Long distance reconnaissance and screening operations also, in a way, belong to the category of subordinate tasks allotted to independent cavalry, and which should never be allowed to lead to its premature overstrain.

They can, however, very effectively prepare the way for later cavalry fighting. If during long distance reconnaissance and masking operations, the enemy independent cavalry can be engaged and put out of action, this decisive success would deal a crushing defeat on the enemy who, during the course of the Great War, only too often hampered the freedom of action of the German independent cavalry and crippled its ability to counter-attack.

No. 83 of the Training Manual for Combined Arms (F.u.G.) does not, however, uphold this view and demands that the enemy independent cavalry should be repulsed. In the Great War, it has frequently been proved that cavalry, which has been repulsed, can again advance as quickly as it retired as soon as the pressure of the stronger cavalry force opposing it is removed. Unless a decisive deadly blow is dealt to the cavalry and, in present-day warfare, to the motorised and mechanised forces of the enemy, the struggle will be endless and its inevitable outcome will be mutual hampering of each other's movements and complete paralysis of all mobile troops. The Great War has provided us with many such examples. We should, therefore, welcome the fact that the German Service Regulations insist on the cavalry following the only possible course in order to avoid a repetition of the indecisive cavalry duels of the Great War. If the necessary order for "mobility in operations" (*bewegliche Gefechtsführung*) demanded by the service regulations is systematically carried out in all cavalry formations, up to the cavalry corps, the desired result will be successfully attained. Speed and mobility in action certainly require very high standards of leadership and training of the troops, and as proved by the Great War, this is not to be found in every army.

If the independent cavalry is to reach a certain point where it is to come in contact with the enemy with the required speed, it should not, on its way, waste time in unnecessary fighting. Whenever possible, it will, therefore, avoid engaging enemy cavalry. The advance will be carried out on a narrow front, because, the wider the front, the more probable it is that one or several columns will encounter the enemy. No. 97 of the

Training Manual for Combined Arms recommends that cavalry divisions should march like brigades; this, however, does not apply to the cavalry division in the corps. In this case, the cavalry division will not generally consist of more than one column. Nevertheless, on principle, the division of the cavalry corps is always a supporting column which encounters the least resistance.

If, on 12th November, 1914, the day of the Battle of Wlozlawek, the Schmettow Cavalry Corps, employed in the flank and rear of the V. Siberian Army Corps, had applied both these guiding principles for command, namely, avoidance of cavalry duels and keeping in touch with the column, encountering the least resistance, it would have been forced to bring up its right column (9th Cavalry Division) which during the advance, had encountered the Cossack Guards Division, to the left column (6th Cavalry Division) which had reached its objective. What actually happened was that during the whole day of the battle, the 9th Cavalry Division allowed itself to be harassed by enemy cavalry, while the 6th Cavalry Division was too weak to launch a decisive counter-attack unsupported.

During the advance to the battlefield no attacks should be made on occupied villages. To my certain knowledge, Count Schlieffen once said in a discussion on the Battle of Jena, that fighting for villages was characteristic of the fighting methods of the time. The very latest military history teaches us, however, that the predilection shown for such attacks has by no means disappeared, even in the cavalry, the arm of the service least fitted for such employment.

Very often, both during the Great War and after it, has the amazing fact been proved, that independent cavalry has worn itself out and entailed the loss of valuable time and heavy casualties in attacking villages. The Cavalry Corps commanded by Hollen lost a whole day (4th October) in futile attacks on Lille, which was occupied by the enemy. In the Palestine Expedition of September, 1918, the British independent cavalry, after the Battles of Charon and Nablus, had very successfully carried out a rapid advance into the rear of the defeated Turks, but were then led to waste their time by making prolonged

attacks on the two coast towns (Haifa and Acre) situated on their left wing, thereby forfeiting the chance already within their grasp of annihilating the whole Turkish Army, by quickly following up in pursuit to Damascus.

In 1922, during the Turkish War of Independence, the brilliant Turkish Cavalry Commander, Fakher ed Din, while relentlessly pursuing the defeated Greeks as far as Smyrna, suffered his only really important set-back, by prematurely attacking a village occupied by a Greek column, instead of waiting until the vanguards of the Turkish Army, advancing in hot pursuit, drove this enemy surely into his arms.

If the publication of the Historical Record Department stresses the fact that in the Great War the cavalry evinced insufficient push and mobility, all armies—having the right to arm—have been busily engaged in remedying this evil, by increasing the fire efficiency of their independent cavalry formations. This increased fire efficiency in the attack will, however, be partially compensated by the resistance of the defence which has been greatly increased since the war. On the strength of this, the French General Armengaud attributes only a very modest degree of attacking power to the present French Cavalry Division with its 500 M.Gs. and 36 guns. Whether this is true or not, only the future can show. Nevertheless, the modern cavalry commander should always remember to take full advantage of the defence thus placing the onus of the attack on the enemy, while, at the same time, making use of the mobility of his troops for the purpose of engaging targets and occupying and holding important sectors of ground. It is quite easy to quote numerous examples of this from the Great War, which prove that the greater speed and mobility of independent cavalry has often made it possible for it to reach and occupy—before the enemy could do so—important points the capture of which, at a later time, would have entailed much time and trouble.

It is surely an unnecessary platitude to state that speed and mobility greatly increase the prospects for successful cavalry action and yet such platitudes are not always obvious to the troops. For instance, after the Battle of the Marne, a German

reconnoitring squadron which had been left behind at the river, on their own initiative, abandoned their horses thereby depriving themselves of their greatest strength, and endeavoured to rejoin their division on foot (they were naturally all taken prisoners). For this reason, therefore, it is expedient to put into the hands of commanders of all ranks, particularly those with little military experience, very definite principles and rules for their guidance. The fear that, by this means, their initiative and commanding instinct may be destroyed, seems completely unfounded. In war, every order must be carried out as required. The decisions of a commander will, however, be better and above all more rapidly understood, if certain military principles and rules are so impressed on his mind that he will carry them out almost involuntarily.



THE HAIG STATUE.

A YEAR ago an article was submitted for publication in this journal by Captain F. C. Hitchcock, criticising very severely the first two efforts of the sculptor, Mr. Hardiman. The article was shown to the First Commissioner of Works, who made the following request. "In view of the fact that neither of the first two models will be erected, it is hoped that you will not publish an article in the CAVALRY JOURNAL until you have seen the new model which is under construction."

A whole year has passed during which several attempts have been made to see the model without success, the model not being sufficiently advanced. I therefore wrote to the Commissioner of Works to ascertain the situation and received the following reply.

7th March, 1934.

H.M. Office of Works,
Storey's Gate,
Westminster, S.W.1.

DEAR GENERAL PITMAN,

I am afraid I cannot have made the position in regard to the Haig memorial quite clear to you. There has never been any intention of asking Mr. Hardiman to submit a third model to the assessors for approval. The committee of assessors approved his second model, subject to one or two modifications which are being made, and what the sculptor is now engaged on is the full sized figure in clay. When this is completed, I propose to see it myself and to invite the Secretary of State for War and some military members of his Council to look at it from the point of view of accuracy of detail in uniform and equipment. Among these Generals will, no doubt, be some well qualified to judge the horse from the standpoint of the Cavalry Officer.

In these circumstances I am afraid I cannot agree to set up a committee composed as you suggest. I see no reason,



**THE LATE FIELD MARSHAL EARL HAIG
on his charger during the Victory March, 1919**

Another charger belonging to Earl Haig which he rode in France, was purchased by H.M. The King after the Field Marshal's death, and it was ridden in all the Royal Processions until 1929. It was named "Haig" by the King. This photograph should be of valuable assistance to a sculptor in every possible detail.

*Block kindly lent by the National Horse Show Association.
Reproduced by kind permission of the "Central Press Photos Ltd."*



Mr. A. F. HARDIMAN'S FIRST TWO EFFORTS

Blocks kindly lent by the British Legion.

however, why you should not make it known through the CAVALRY JOURNAL just how the matter stands. The foregoing information has, in fact, been announced both in the House and in the Press during recent months.

Yours sincerely,

W. ORMSBY GORE.

My suggestion, to which Mr. Ormsby Gore refers, was to the effect that there should be a competent cavalry officer on the committee and that one could not find a better representative than Lord Baden-Powell, who not only has a great eye for a horse but is also an artist. It would appear from the above reply that if the First Commissioner of Works approves of the Clay Model when completed, and the Secretary of State for War and the Military members of his council pass the details of the kit as accurate, then a statue will be erected on the lines of the model.

I am in full agreement with the Commissioner that it would be most unfair to criticise Mr. Hardiman's work before we have seen the finished model now being altered and I am therefore holding up Captain Hitchcock's article until our July number, by which time we hope the model will be ready for inspection and a guarantee given that a statue will not be erected until such time as a satisfactory model has been produced. I would like to quote an extract from a letter I received from the late Field Marshal in reply to one telling him that the Cavalry War Memorial was now ready.

"I hope Adrian Jones has produced a real live horse and not an ancient symbolic charger, such as we see H.R.H. The Duke of Cambridge and King Edward riding.

Yours very sincerely,

HAIG."

We reproduce as a frontispiece and overleaf two illustrations of Earl Haig as we all remember him and also Mr. Hardiman's first two efforts.—MANAGING EDITOR.

NOTES

WE have been asked by the Army Vocational Training Centre, Aldershot, to publish the following Notes on Vocational Training :—

VOCATIONAL TRAINING COMPARED WITH APPRENTICESHIP.

We all know that comparisons are odious, but there is a tendency to compare Vocational Training with Apprenticeship. In trades where the apprenticeship is well established, little thought is given to systematic training and advancement.

The apprentice is generally an irresponsible youth who acquires his knowledge of the trade by watching and waiting on a craftsman, with just an occasional word of instruction. Little instruction is given on the job, and practically nothing is done to teach him how to use his tools or to perform the manipulative operations of the trade. The first thing he learns is to push trucks, and the second to make tea!

The only training he gets is one or two hours a week during the winter should he attend a Technical School.

Compare this with the definite training received by the students in a Vocational Training Centre. First, the use and manipulation of tools, followed by simple exercises and preliminary instruction, then gradually being taken on from the simple to the more difficult work, the student the whole time actually using the tools himself and working under the supervision of a skilled Instructor who directs the work and checks it for faults. During the whole period of his training the vocational student is learning by "doing."

We agree that the ability to perform in a skilled manner the normal operations of the trade is not a sufficient basis for classifying a man as a skilled mechanic; he must have experience in the practice of his trade and we know there is some talk of our

students lacking experience. But do they? During the latter part of their training, they carry out jobs without the aid of the Instructor, and in this way gain experience and confidence in tackling jobs under different circumstances. We realise that our students in six months cannot hope to gain the experience that some men gather in sixty years, but the experience of some of these is not worth twopence a ton. Many men only just manage to hold down their jobs by the skin of their teeth, and make a botch of many of the jobs they do. That's the kind of experience we prefer our students not to have.

Go to the employer of apprentices and try to get from him some detail of the skill or knowledge of the trade which he expects the apprentices to have at the end of his term of apprenticeship; try to get from him a definite list of the things he expects to teach the apprentice during the first month or the first three months, and so on through the entire period of apprenticeship. In only the most exceptional cases, can the employer afford to study the particular things which should be taught, or have any organised plan for teaching them.

This is very different from the definite training given in a Vocational Training Centre with its progressive course of instruction.

Some say that a Vocational Centre cannot create work conditions similar to those in industry. This is a mistaken idea, the Centre can and does. The students spend most of their time training under conditions similar to those in which they will work in civil life.

Whilst it is not suggested that we consider Vocational Training to be perfect, we are convinced that given normal brains, physical ability and common sense, a vocationally-trained student compares very favourably with the apprentice.



HOME AND DOMINION MAGAZINES.

The "Army Quarterly," for January is much concerned with the history of the Great War, which forms the subject of several articles and book reviews. Major Wardle pleads for a more varied syllabus of training for the young officer, whose early enthusiasm is apt to run to waste in the humdrum routine of ordinary duties; and Lieut.-Colonel Hutchinson also advocates a greater stress being laid on the romantic and glamorous phase of the soldiers' calling in the training of the new style regular army. Lieut.-Colonel Downes puts forward yet another scheme of infantry reorganisation.

The December "Fighting Forces" contains as its chief items two articles on the International Police Force, one by Lord Davies, the chief British advocate of the scheme, pointing out the necessity for a new strategy to make its use effective, and another by Lieutenant Martin, showing how well fitted to be the nucleus of such a force is the French Foreign Legion, in the ranks of which he has served. There is a trenchant criticism of Mr. Lloyd George's war memoirs by Lieut.-Colonel Baird Smith, and a plea by Mr. Horsfeld Carter for reason and moderation in the recent campaign against the "absurd" League of Nations.


Two numbers of the "R. E. Journal" are before us. That for September has two interesting articles on the Austrian crossing of the Piave in June, 1918, and the demolitions on the Fifth Army front during the March, 1918, retreat. The December issue includes an interesting diary of an R.E. subaltern, Major Young, during the first phase of 1914, and a narrative of a recent staff exercise in Belgium, based on the projected operations of the "hush hush" force which was to land on the Belgian coast in rear of the German lines in conjunction with the Passchendaele offensive in 1917.

The " R.A.M.C. Journal " contains a useful analysis of the recently issued report on the state of public health in Great Britain.

The " R.A.F. Quarterly " presents a discussion on the laws of war designed somewhat to simplify the present confusing array of principles and maxims; an informal discussion on the policing of tribal areas by aircraft, and an amusing account of a leisurely voyage home on leave from Iraq by way of India, Japan, the Pacific and Canada.

The " Canadian Defence Quarterly's " chief feature is a commended essay by Lieut.-Colonel Letson in the recent prize essay competition, on the application of mechanization to Canadian conditions; two excellent articles on Nazi Germany; and a long paper, translated from the French, on the attack from an infantry point of view.

E. W. S.



FOREIGN MAGAZINES.

The French "*Revue de Cavalerie*" for November-December and January-February contains much that is of interest. In the latter number General Boucherie studies Sherman's operations in Georgia in December, 1864. He clearly shows the important part that Thomas and Wilson, Sherman's subordinate commanders, played by keeping Hood's Confederate army busy round Nashville while Sherman was marching through Georgia. Still further does he make clear the importance of Wilson's pursuit of the beaten Confederates from the battlefield of Nashville. Wilson with 10,000 mounted troops drove the beaten Confederates, from the 16th to the 22nd December, as far south as the R. Tennessee, where the fugitives were abandoned. An army of 60,000 had been irretrievably beaten and dispersed.

These two numbers contain the two concluding parts (Nos. 10 and 11) of Lieut.-Colonel Pugens' study of the defence of the gap between the German First and Second Army by the Ist and IInd Cavalry Corps at the battle of the Marne (6th-9th September, 1914). The 9th September was the critical day of the battle for the Allies, states the writer. Why, then, was not the success far greater than happened in actual fact? The real reason was the slowness of the Allied pursuit at the Marne itself on the 9th, in particular the astounding hesitation displayed by the French IInd Cavalry Corps under General Conneau. The 10th Cavalry Division hesitated far too long at Château-Thierry where it waited until some of the infantry of the XVIIIth Army Corps was among it: it is idle to blame the British for having delayed their Allies as Pugens tries to do. Even after having crossed the river the author makes it abundantly clear that the French cavalry was culpably dilatory. Conneau's 4th Cavalry Division only crossed the Marne at 2 p.m., behind Allenby's mounted troops after having wasted the

whole morning on the southern bank. The 8th Cavalry Division followed the 4th later in the afternoon. The IInd Cavalry Corps "had covered the right flank of the British that no enemy threatened"; it had secured the crossing of the Marne by the French XVIIIth Army Corps which "no German unit had made a show of opposing." The German 5th Cavalry Division wandered aimlessly on the north bank of the Marne where only a single French cavalry patrol came to disturb it! The British Army, states Pugins, was also too slow. It spent the greater part of the morning of the 9th before the crossing of the Marne awaiting the results of the action of a single one of its divisions.

On the German side it cannot be said that Richthofen's Ist Cavalry (Guard) Corps showed any understanding of the situation. Its movements were slow, while the action of its 5th Cavalry Division seems devoid of all reason. In spite of these faults the right of the German Second Army withdrew in broad daylight utterly unmolested.

Pugins concludes that the two German Cavalry Corps (Ist and IInd) succeeded in their mission. They deluded the Allies not by the merits of their action but mainly because of the slow advance of the Allies and of their delays in crossing the Marne. In three days the Allies failed to grasp the nature of the gap which was yawning ever wider between the two German armies. Their Cavalry saved the Germans from an overwhelming disaster. The fault, on both sides, may be ascribed to the higher leading which failed to direct the cavalry headquarters; these in turn, particularly that of the German Ist Cavalry Corps, did not know how to animate their command with the spirit or knowledge requisite to the performance of their tasks.

This lengthy series of articles dealing with the entire episode is full of interest, though somewhat long and slightly involved in some of the middle articles.

In the November-December number Captain Labouchère has an interesting commentary concerning the performance of an American cavalry brigade at Fort Riley, U.S.A. This formation in May, 1932, marched just 100 miles in 23 hours. The horses, carrying nearly $17\frac{1}{2}$ stone per head, numbered 687; only six failed to complete the march. But, says the writer, this

was a peace-time performance. It has been many times rivalled in war by marches, which, if not so long, are probably more meritorious. He then quotes from the Napoleonic campaign of 1806 in which, after the battle of Jena, the cavalry pursuit lasted from 14th October until 11th November; during this time distances of 30-45 miles were being covered by the French horsemen for days on end. Again, during August, 1914, Sordet's cavalry covered immense distances; certain units marched nearly 50 miles per day. On 31st August, the German 4th Cavalry Division had covered 76 miles before encountering the British at Néry. In April, 1918, the French IInd Cavalry Corps, marching to the support of the British, marched in two days over 130 miles of which 90 miles were covered in 25 hours. Finally, there are the marches of the Desert Corps in Palestine during the final phase of that campaign. The 5th Cavalry Division covered 550 miles in 38 days whilst fighting frequently and the whole time being troubled by heat and lack of water. These latter facts render these performances yet more noteworthy; thus the Lincolnshire Yeomanry were on the move for 84 hours, while the Dorset Yeomanry rode over 60 miles in 54 hours without touching water!

In the "Revue Militaire Française" for November General Boucherie discusses "Modern Cavalry." In so doing he describes the evolution of the arm in France from 1914 to the present day, and divides that growth into three periods—i. 1914 to 1925; ii. 1925 to 1930; iii. 1930 onwards. In the first period every attempt was made, he writes, to endow cavalry units with greater fire power by an immense increase in machine guns and other automatic weapons. The second period was marked by a large introduction of mechanical vehicles into cavalry; as a result the division was reduced to horsed regiments with one regiment of *dragons portés*, i.e., dismounted cavalry carried in lorries. The armoured vehicle, already designed to work with mounted troops, was now supplemented by the armoured car suited for cross-country travel. The cavalry division finally possessed 500 automatic weapons; but the armoured vehicle was still tied to the road. Otherwise it had gained in mobility, but

was still very weak in artillery, although possessing one brigade of 4-inch guns and two brigades of 75mm. guns. The formation was at any rate more powerful, if more difficult to manœuvre and more delicate in the field.

Since 1930 three currents of thought have modified the use of cavalry; (a) it was urged that aircraft had superseded mounted troops for reconnaissance; (b) it was argued that motorized infantry, owing to its mobility, could no longer be protected by cavalry, and that the latter would become merely a mobile fire-reserve; (c) the conservative standpoint was urged that mechanical vehicles cannot act without the help of mounted troops, and that the true basis of the cavalry division remains the horse. The result is, the author argues in detail, that the horse and the motor must be made complementary to each other. This view was, in fact, accepted in France in 1931 with the result that the "mixed" cavalry division was evolved, that is :

(1) a complete combination of horses and machines in the greater number of cavalry formations, i.e., cavalry divisions and army corps and divisional reconnaissance units;

(2) the creation of a number of wholly mechanized cavalry formations, i.e., reconnaissance groups and other elements kept in general reserve or designed for use with wholly motorized infantry.

By these means :—

- (a) the characteristic of mobility is enhanced;
- (b) the speed of manœuvre is improved.

But machines and horses are mixed and the art of command is complicated.

The new organization needed modification; so in 1932 the motor vehicles were separated into two classes :—

- (i) Unarmoured vehicles designed to increase mobility (troop-carriers for cross-country work, motor cyclist units);
- (ii) Armoured vehicles suitable for reconnaissance.

The latter were then sub-divided into :—

- (1) the fast, well armed, vehicle, possessing great radius of action designed for distant patrol work;

- (2) a slower vehicle, sufficiently armed to overcome rifle-fire and designed to precede or act with cavalry reconnoitring bodies.

It also became clear that a heavier machine was needed to break through the main crust of enemy resistance, and so the true fighting vehicle was introduced. This would work in conjunction with motor cyclists.

The result was the organization of motor-borne units, motor cyclists, distant patrol cars, reconnaissance cars and fighting vehicles into "Mechanized Brigades," and this led to the separation within the Cavalry Division of mechanized and non-mechanized units. Experience has shown the value of this plan; but it is not to be regarded as more than a distinct stage of an evolution that is daily growing more marked.

The complete motorization of cavalry which this organization foreshadows might thus be possible, even to-day, but it would meet with formidable obstacles, chiefly :—

- (1) the strain on army expenditure;
- (2) the risk of the vehicles now adopted growing rapidly obsolete.

Even so, it should be considered how far such a step would now be justifiable, since it may be assumed that the conversion of cavalry to a motor basis must be proportionate to that of the whole forces concerned. For the moment, there are needed :—

- (a) armoured vehicles capable of searching for information at a long distance;
- (b) unarmoured vehicles designed to supply a heavy volume of fire (machine guns and artillery) for tasks of security and protection;
- (c) heavily armed and armoured vehicles for close fighting purposes.

At the present day it is only possible to transform a portion of the French cavalry. But the horsed cavalry must look to the time when all its reconnaissances will be carried out with the help of machines, and where it must call upon armoured vehicles to supply its fighting power.

Throughout the process it is necessary to remember that :—

(1) Those long range duties which, of old, required “ cavalry ” for their performance, will remain;

(2) In order to preserve its superior mobility and greater fighting power cavalry must necessarily yield to the inevitable progress which will not stand still;

(3) Fire has abolished mounted action, but it cannot immobilize a cavalry which will recover in the new machines a defensive capacity and an offensive value such as it has never known in the past.

The “ Cavalry Journal ” of the United States contains a historical study by Colonel E. Davis, Chief of Staff, 65th Cavalry Division, of the work of the German Cavalry in the Rumanian campaign of 1916. The German Cavalry Corps had to be improvised, and, during the first period of the campaign, styled by the author the “ Transylvania Manœuvre,” consisted of the German 3rd Cavalry Division and the Austrian 1st Cavalry Division; for the “ Wallachia Manœuvre ” these formations were replaced by the German 6th and 7th Cavalry Divisions, since the former were quite exhausted. During the Transylvania Manœuvre (19th September to 30th October) the cavalry participated, first in the covering operations then in the main battle, fighting on foot practically all the time. There is little doubt that the original plan, which was to break into Rumania by the eastern passes of the Transylvanian Alps was strategically the best, since it offered the Germans the chance of falling on Bucarest from the north and thus surrounding a large part of the Rumanian forces. But their forces proved inadequate to the task and the Cavalry Corps alone succeeded in reaching the objectives set before it. The “ Wallachia Manœuvre ” (11th November to 6th December) was therefore set going and was successful, the Cavalry Corps again having a hard task. Falkenhayn, the German commander, decided to force the eastern Transylvanian passes, mainly the Vulcan and Szurduk. Having accomplished this task, he advanced on Bucarest with the Cavalry Corps on his extreme right. After forcing the various tributaries of the Danube he entered Bucarest on 6th December. The author thinks well of the work

of the Cavalry Corps; he considers it displayed superior tenacity, fortitude and resourcefulness in dismounted action; the horsemanship, though not completely tested, seems to have been excellent. The break-through at Targu Jiu in Wallachia resembled closely Allenby's operation in Palestine two years later, but the circumstances differed—the Balkan terrain being more difficult with many rivers to force. Falkenhayn's operation was loose in plan and lacked precision in timing; Allenby's operation was a classic in its precision and clear-cut distinction between "the break-through" and the "exploitation."

From the Notes at the end of the number can be gleaned some interesting data on the transport of cavalry units by motor. The 1st Squadron, 7th Cavalry, was conveyed in 24 trucks each towing an eight-horse trailer; in addition, there were cooks and other cars, also a troop of an Armoured Car Squadron, seemingly as escort. Few details are given, but it seems that the squadron did a move of 27 hours on end. The horse-trailers were well spoken of. The convoy carried rations for 200 men and 180 horses for 10 days. The whole column was controlled by radio. The total distance covered was 310 miles in 3 days over a very bad road. The return journey from Terlingua (Texas) to Fort Bliss was also covered in 3 days.

A similar experiment was tried with Troop B, 110th Cavalry, Massachusetts National Guard, which was conveyed some 42 miles in 2 hours and 17 minutes from the command to begin embussing. The move was done in 7 horse buses and 2 passenger buses carrying 52 men and 52 horses.

In the Austrian "Militärwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen" for December, Major-General Kerchnawe tries to show that cavalry can still inspire such fear in shaken infantry, that, given favourable conditions, it may still be reckoned with as a close-combat arm. He gives two instances from such Austrian cavalry actions in Galicia during 1914: he compares the effects of the attacks to those secured by the British tanks at Cambrai. But his chief argument is taken from the action at Schaschintzi on 6th September, 1914. On this occasion the Austrian cavalry occasioned, even without any actual attack, such disorder in the Timok Division of the Serbian army, that this formation virtu-

ally ceased to exist. The Serbian troops were staunch and war-tried, yet such was the anxiety engendered in them by the Austrian cavalry that it sufficed for an Austrian infantry night attack to stampede the Serbians.

In the January number, Lieut.-Colonel von Dragoni, whilst endorsing much that Dr. Leppa has had to say concerning the use and leading of the cavalry on outbreak of war in 1914,* maintains that under the actual prevalent conditions Dr. Leppa seems to expect too much. He admits that, on the Western Front, the German cavalry could have been massed on the extreme right wing and have been employed as Dr. Leppa suggests. There should, however, have been some special arming and equipment of the squadrons so used. But on the Eastern Front such a policy was scarcely possible in view of what had been decided. Such had been the fear of a large scale Russian cavalry invasion on outbreak of war that the Austrian cavalry divisions had been allotted to the front more in the nature of a frontier-guard; moreover, Rumania on the right and the R. Vistula on the left left little space for any such large scale manœuvre. He further asks whether, if the German cavalry should have been given the rôle of sweeping round the German right wing in Flanders, why was no allowance made for a like Russian cavalry movement westwards from Poland? Lastly, he states that those commanders, whom Dr. Leppa desires, were indeed in existence, but that they were not allowed to lead; moreover, the cavalry itself, at that period, was not equipped nor armed for the rôle now outlined for it by Dr. Leppa.

Swiss military opinion is much exercised by the unofficial disclosure of the long-expected plan of army reorganization. This points to the abolition of army (strategic) cavalry, that is to say, the reduction of that arm by not less than 30% of its establishment. Such a step will be compensated to some extent by a considerable increase of divisional cavalry, of aircraft, as well as by the creation of "cyclist regiments"; the latter, it is rumoured, will consist of:—

* See CAVALRY JOURNAL, Oct., 1932, p. 518 and Jan., 1933, p. 111, for translation of this article.

Headquarters;
2 battalions, each of 3 companies;
1 motor machine-gun company;
1 platoon "infantry-supporting" artillery;
1 motorized artillery group of 2 batteries.

The whole question is discussed at length in several short articles and letters published in "Der Schweizer Kavallerist." It is admitted in several letters that difficulty is being found in the recruitment of cavalymen in certain districts and that, even if army cavalry be retained, some reforms in the composition of army cavalry are badly needed. At present that cavalry consists of 3 large brigades, which, on manœuvres, are constantly reinforced by artillery, by motorized and other units, until their command and employment becomes somewhat complicated.

The "Schweizerische Monatschrift" for November has a good account of a reconnaissance carried out by a squadron of the Russian 3rd Hussars in East Prussia between 9th and 16th September, 1914, from which it would appear that all Russian cavalry units were very far from being incompetent. The study of Mr. Lloyd George's memoirs continues throughout the three numbers of this magazine of this quarter.



RECENT PUBLICATIONS

“History of The Poona Horse (17th Q.V.O. Cavalry).” Two Volumes. (Royal United Service Institution, London.) One Guinea. Size, Crown 4to.

Volume I contains the histories of the 33rd (Queen Victoria's Own) Light Cavalry and the 34th (Prince Albert Victor's Own) Poona Horse during the period 1817-1913, whilst Volume II continues the narrative until the year 1931.

After having read the records of both corps in the Great War, 1914-1918, when active service was seen in France, Mesopotamia and Palestine, one is lost in admiration of the devotion to duty and heroism displayed under most trying circumstances, the achievements of the Indian ranks being all the more remarkable because many of them could have hardly fully realized exactly what they were fighting for. Although frequently employed as infantry the true cavalry spirit was never lost, the uppermost thought and desire of all officers and men always being to mount their horses and use the points of their swords against the foe; but when the opportunity did present itself dashing charges were made and carried right home which proved that the keenness and spirit of the Indian Cavalry are alive to-day as ever and the moral effect of cavalry, led by determined officers, even in these days of high explosives and automatics, is a factor to be depended upon.

When in 1921, on the re-organization of the Indian Cavalry, these two regiments were amalgamated under the title, The Poona Horse (17th Queen Victoria's Own Cavalry), it was a happy selection, for they had served together earlier on many a hard-fought battlefield, notably Hyderabad, Khooshab and Kandahar, and had long been friendly rivals in work and play; to a certain extent they were similar in constitution and system

and moreover it was not uncommon for an officer to have served in both units.

The Regiment remains one of the few which still carry a Standard on parade.

The work concludes with a detailed list of officers and their war services. (1817-1931.)

Both volumes are well arranged and attractively produced, containing a number of illustrations and useful maps.

“Four Score Years and Ten.” By General Sir Bindon Blood. (Bell.) 16s.

General Blood's active career extended from 1860, when he was first commissioned in the Royal Engineers, to 1906, when he vacated the Punjab command. Here ends his volume of reminiscences—because, as he tells us, “I should have no pleasure in recording, and I fear they would have no pleasure in reading, what I might write about the time that has since elapsed.” The book opens with a brief sketch of the history of the author's family, much more exciting than usual; but then few can boast of having had as ancestors a man who succeeded in stealing the Regalia of England from the Tower, or as many elopements and runaway matches as are here described. Then follows the narrative of Sir Bindon Blood's early career, most of which was spent in India; he is at pains to vindicate his generation from charges of idleness and lack of interest in their profession, but it is clear that it found much time for sport, and for many readers—if not for the reviewer—the chief attraction of the volume will lie in its tales of achievements with hog-spear, rifles and rods. In these, as in many other respects, the author soon found distinction, and for many years held the Indian record for a bag of fifty-seven tigers. Strangely enough, however, he saw no active work in the field until his eighteenth year of service, and then only in a minor frontier campaign. Thenceforward, however, he had fighting in plenty—in Zululand, in Afghanistan, in Egypt, on the North-West Frontier on several occasions, and in the Boer War, and in all of these theatres achieved distinction and promotion until he finally ended as General of a Command, and as Representa-

tive Colonel Commander of his old corps. His autobiography, told with an attractive blend of humour and modesty, is one of the best books of military reminiscence we have read for some time, and cannot fail to have a wide appeal.

“The Gallant Company.” By H. R. Williams. (Angus & Robertson, Australia.) 6s.

The tide of war books, now on the ebb in this country, appears to be in full flood still in Australia and this is an excellent specimen of its kind. The author, whose reminiscences are based on a war time diary, served with the 56th Battalion, 5th Australian Division, first as an N.C.O., then as a commissioned officer; he first went to Egypt, whence he was transferred in the spring of 1916 to the Western Front, and fought there for over two years, being invalided home wounded after the battle of Mont St. Quentin. There are no purple patches in the book—no insistence on real or fancied horrors of war—just a plain, sober, convincing tale told in a minor key throughout, but ending in a stirring call to the youth of Australia to live worthily of the great deeds of their sires, which shows the depth of the author’s patriotism and pride in his comrades and his country.

“Black Mastiff.” By M. Coryn. (Barker.) 9s.

This is an admirable life of the great French mediæval warrior, Bertrand du Guesclin, Constable of France and of Castile, to whom more than to any other one man is due the fact that the English victories of Crecy and Poitiers had no strategic results, and France in the second half of the 14th century was saved from becoming a vassal state of Britain. This great leader has been somewhat neglected by historians, perhaps because his methods were the reverse of spectacular, and in no way influenced by the considerations of false chivalry to which most of his contemporaries were enslaved. Learning his trade in the Succession Wars of Brittany, he won by sheer merit promotion to the highest military office in France, and though all his life he had only one victory in a pitched battle to his credit, and more than one defeat, he finally succeeded, by

Fabian strategy and guerilla tactics in a prolonged war of posts and surprises, in nibbling away practically all the spectacularly won British gains in France. Become legendary in his own land, he won the esteem of his foes to such an extent that when he was at death's door, the commander of the castle he was unsuccessfully besieging came to lay the keys of the place in his dying hands, out of sheer honour and respect felt for a gallant foe. This book tells the story well; the author has made full use of all the usual authorities, even the dialogue passages being verifiable from reference. A map or two, however, would have made the tale easier to understand.

“ Tank Warfare.” By Captain F. Mitchell, M.C. (Nelson.) 3s. 6d.

This is a most excellent book intended primarily for boys, it is true—but it is one of those boys books which the unfortunate owner will get a chance of reading only after it has been well perused by his elders. Captain Mitchell, who commanded the first British tank to engage in a tank v. tank battle with a German machine, describes the whole history of the Royal Tank Corps from its first appearance on the battlefield in France; he gives plenty of plans, illustrations, aeroplane photos and trench maps to give point to his story, and carries it right down to the present day, even dealing with the German Halger Ultra bullet and the new armour devised to defeat it. He has an admirable style and makes the most of the many heroic deeds with which the history of this, the youngest combatant corps of the British Army, is so plentifully besprinkled. One can imagine no better book for presentation to the young officer or soldier about to join the Royal Tank Corps; it can be best summed up in the words of the reviewer's eldest son, who has perused it from cover to cover, as “ jolly good! ”—a really marvellous three and sixpence worth.

“ Behind the Smoke Screen.” By Brig.-General P. R. C. Groves. (Faber & Faber.) 15s.

General Groves, a whole-hearted adherent of the Air arm, puts forward in this admirably forceful book a plea for the

urgent consideration of the problem of air defence of these islands and the Imperial sea routes, on the security of which its existence depends. He accuses successive Governments and Air Ministers, particularly Mr. Churchill and Sir Samuel Hoare and their Chiefs of Staff, in especial Lord Trenchard, of having been systematically blind to our needs in this respect and of having thrown out the " smoke screen " of his title to blind the public. He then discusses the rôle of the Air arm in a future war, with special reference to its use against cities and towns, and in naval warfare, and concludes that even the last war, when its powers on a small scale were so clearly shown, can give but a faint forecast of its enormous potentialities under present, still more under future, conditions. By its use a war can be rapidly and inevitably decided in the very earliest stages, nor can any defence, either aerial or ground, really avail to neutralise it. The only defence, indeed, is counter-attack in the shape of reprisals, but for this our geographical position and the deplorable state of our Air arm has rendered us completely incompetent. And this in a world situation full of peril and inflammability, without any possible hope of fettering the use of this terrible weapon by international agreement or disarmament measures! General Groves' tone is anything but that of an alarmist, and his book is a weighty and formidable indictment of our whole defence policy, which no thinking soldier or intelligent citizen should neglect to read and ponder. We heartily commend it to the careful study of our readers.

" Napoleon and His Marshals." By A. G. Macdonnell. (Macmillan.) 7s. 6d.

Mr. Macdonnell, recently risen to fame as a novel writer, has now turned his talents to history, and essayed to tell the story of the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, with special reference to the part played in them by the men who afterwards became the marshals of Napoleon. Unfortunately, his gifts for fiction have not served him well enough for the more exacting task he has here undertaken, and his spirited and lively book is therefore marred with numerous errors of detail. He gives no list of authorities, and it would be interesting to know how he

has been misled, for instance, on the personal antipathy alleged to have been felt by Napoleon for Davout, and how he came to make the statement that the Grand Army of 1805, which the Official History shows to have been singularly ill-trained, armed and equipped for a campaign in Europe, was the most superb in the world. Among many other detailed errors we have noted such as these:—Brueys, not Bruix, commanded the French fleet at the Nile; General Jellacic was an Austrian, not a Russian; the gibe about the million men who died to do away with the religion the First Consul restored was made by Delmas, not by Augereau; it is quite wrong to say that Napoleon, once he realised the truth, failed to appreciate the merit of Davout's victory at Auerstadt; the battle of Heilsberg in 1807 followed those of Pultusk and Eylau, and Lutzen preceded Bautzen, instead of, as Mr. Macdonnell puts them, the other way about. Mr. Macdonnell, in fact, has taken on a task for which he was not qualified, and has not known where to look for the expert advice which would have saved him from these and other pitfalls. He has even failed to give some of the best of the anecdotes about his heroes, which are to be found in plenty in quite well-known authorities. A perusal of this book fills the reader with the more regret that the studies of Colonel Phipps on the same topic—the work of a brilliant writer and a master of the subject with which he dealt—are now unlikely to be completed as its author had projected them.

E.W.S.

“An Outline of the Principles of War.” By R. A. E. Voysey.
(Diss Publishing Company.)

Any book which will assist in the analytical study of military history, as applied to war, is of value. Here, the author produces the principles of war and proceeds to give detailed historical illustrations for them from a very limited list of campaigns.

In a foreword, Lieut.-General Macmunn recommends it as “a high grade ‘cram book,’ in the good sense of that slang word. It is what the military side of this busy world so much needs, a short cut to general knowledge of this vast subject.”

Unfortunately, it is just as this that the book fails. Of the illustrations, of which the whole book really consists, only Beersheba and Megiddo from Palestine, and the cavalry action at Nery are taken from the last war; one comes from the Russo-Japanese war, and the rest from Napoleon and the American Civil and Franco-Prussian wars. The production of a "cram book," based only on campaigns long past, will not help the military student. As the author says in his own preface, "Strategy is emphatically not a subject for cramming."

The author, also in his preface, considers that, in most text books, maps are inferior and inadequate. To get over this difficulty, he produces a method by which the reader draws his own map, on squared paper, from reference points given at the end of the text. The average reader, it is feared, will find this somewhat irritating and the results rather unsatisfactory.

"The Russian Campaign of 1914." Golovine. (Hugh Rees, Ltd.) 20s.

Study of the Russian campaign in 1914 has suffered severely from the lack of any authoritative account from the Russian point of view; this book goes far to fill that gap. General Golovine had attended the "Ecole supérieure de guerre" in Paris, in 1908-9, when the college was under Foch; he held many important staff appointments during the war: and in 1917 was elected to the post of Director of the Russian General Staff College.

In many ways the early part of this book is the most interesting. The 1914 Russian campaign was really lost during the years between 1908 and the outbreak of the war, and Paris was as much responsible as St. Petersburg. Officers were in power in Russia who had not even experience of the Manchurian war and who were living in bygone realms of thought. The perfect example of this was provided by Sukhomlinov, the War Minister, who had the most disruptive effect on the few modern thinkers. 'He could not even hear the words "modern war,"' he told the Staff College professors, "without a feeling of annoyance. As war was, so it has remained; all these things are vicious innovations; look at me, for instance; for the last

twenty-five years I have not read a single military manual." The Grand Duke Nikolai managed to effect improvements in the training of the troops themselves in spite of Sukhomlinov, but the latter's paralysing influence on all staff training and re-organisation remained complete.

It is very interesting to note that, in April, 1914, Sukhomlinov held a war game to study the actual campaign on the Eastern front, and the officers playing this game were almost identical with those who put the plans into operation later. All the mistakes made in August and September were made in April, and Sukhomlinov would not even allow the administrative aspect of the problem to be discussed or considered.

French pressure on Russia, prior to the war, was also responsible for much of the subsequent trouble. In 1912, Jilinsky and Joffre reached an agreement as to the Russian offensive, but the obligations were utterly at variance with the actual possibilities. They forced Russia to begin operations at a time when only one-third of the armed forces could be deployed, "which constituted a strategic error of the first magnitude."

General Golovine considers that East Prussia, and Berlin in particular, were never the correct strategic objective at the beginning of the war; and he gives a very clear analysis of the case for General Obruchev's earlier plan of striking Austria first. He shows how the untrained higher staffs before the war were led blindly at the heels of the Grandmaison school, with the disastrous results of operating when only partially mobilised at the urgent, almost imperative request of the French. The worst position was that of the Grand Duke, forced to put into operation a plan, in the making of which he had no hand, and of which he thoroughly disapproved.

The actual accounts of the battles are very clearly written, with fairly adequate maps, and the author brings out most forcibly the disastrous results of the lack of staff training of Jilinsky and his Staff of the Group of Armies. The war plan laid the train for the disaster; Jilinsky's staff fired it, and their complete lack of contact and comprehension of the situation would be laughable if the results had not been so tragic. It was the Army Group H.Q. who were the evil genii of the piece, in

General Golovine's views, and he publishes many new documents, diaries, etc., which go far to prove his contention.

The author throws a new light on Rennenkampff's advance after Gumbinnen. The charge of "criminal immobility," levied by Ludendorff at Rennenkampff, was untrue and produced merely for the greater glorification of Ludendorff. Rennenkampff was a man of real energy, but the condition of his troops, the lack of transport and supply, and the chaos of communications, due to the faulty war plan, absolutely forbade more rapid movement. Moreover, the accepted comparison of strengths between Russian and German forces is, says Golovine, completely wrong; the size of the Russian armies has been much exaggerated, and if the relative power in artillery, which he considers the most important factor, be studied, it will be found that the Russians were heavily outweighed. At any rate, he produces a fairly convincing apologia for Rennenkampff.

Samsonov, he states, was an exceptionally courageous and vigorous man, whose brain and training were inadequate for the task, which was rendered almost impossible by the incredible inefficiency of the Army Group H.Q. staff. The picture painted of the state of chaos, so far as orders and control were concerned, makes one realise the condition of mind into which Samsonov must have been driven when he finally committed suicide.

This is an exceptionally interesting book, which certainly presents a different aspect of the campaign and adds important material for historical study.

H. G. E.

"Ordered East by 'Ship's Adjutant.' " (Gale and Polden, Ltd.) 2s. 6d.

This little book will be found invaluable not only by those who are faced with a tour in the "Shiny" for the first time, but also to refresh the memories of those who have to return thither after a spell of duty at home. Its purchase will save time, trouble, and worry, and in all probability much useless expenditure.

The book is divided into two parts. The first under the heading of general information, deals with pre-embarkation arrangements, the voyage, and the journey up-country.

The second deals in a very comprehensive way with the question of the selection and packing of kit. Appendices give a list of kit for purchase in the East, and provide a summary of the various Indian Customs Regulations. Throughout many useful hints are given, and nothing of importance is omitted.

The book at present caters only for the officer himself; it might well be enlarged to include assistance for his wife.

W. P.

“Extracts from the Diary of a Huntsman.” By Thomas Smith.

“Hunting Songs and Verses.” By G. J. Whyte-Melville.
(Country Life.) 6s. each.

Thomas Smith scarcely needs any introduction to foxhunters, as his name will be for ever coupled with his famous cast immortalized by Jorrocks as “the all-round-me-at cast.” Yet he has often been confused with his contemporary, Thomas Assheton Smith of the Tedworth and Quorn, who was a great thruster and who was described by Napoleon as “le premier chasseur de l’Angleterre.” The author of the Diary, nicknamed “Craven” Smith, hunted the Hambledon, Craven and Pytchley, and was, and is still, well known for the science and skill he displayed. In his Diary he lays down the duties of the Hunt Staff, relying on principles, which he had proved by his own personal experience to be sound and not, on unproven theories. He claims two remarkable records—one that he had killed 90 foxes in 91 hunting days in a bad scenting country like the Craven—and the other, that on an average he had had not more than three blank days in any four years during which he had hunted hounds. It is of special interest to compare his words, written in the golden age of fox-hunting, with the advice given to-day, for instance, on “scent.” Frederick Watson has written a most entertaining introduction, which states “Craven” Smith’s case clearly and concisely.

Country Life, Ltd., is responsible for the publication which belongs to the well-known series of the “Tavistock Library” of sporting books. No sportsman should be without this excellent volume on the science of fox-hunting.

"Hunting Songs and Verses" also belongs to the Tavistock Library. Whyte-Melville is best known by his novels "Kate Coventry," "Katerfelto," etc., and few realise that he wrote several popular hunting songs and ballads, which are, alas, far from being widely known in these days. He hits many a modern nail on its head—for example, "Ware Wire":—

"But remember, fair sportsman fair usage require,
So Up with the timber and Down with the Wire!"

O. J. F. F.

"Horse-Sense and Horsemastership of To-day." By Lieut.-Colonel Geoffrey Brooke, D.S.O., M.C. (Constable & Co., Ltd.) 15s.

This book, the work of an expert, was first published in July, 1924, and reviewed in the CAVALRY JOURNAL in April, 1925. Since then it has been reprinted nine times and after revision and enlargement this new edition has been published.

It is undoubtedly one of the best books which have been written on this subject and should be possessed by every aspiring horseman.

The author tells us about seat and hands, jumping, hunting, show jumping, ailments, a day's hunting, problems of purchase, early training, training of polo ponies and showing, to mention only a few of the many features.

The numerous illustrations are excellent.

"First Aid Hints for the Horse Owner." By Major W. E. Lyon. (Constable & Co., Ltd.) 8s. 6d.

This book as the author states is a veterinary note-book but written in such an easy style that the veriest tyro can understand it. The work is well arranged and there are very clear notes on diagnosis and cure.

The diagrams in the text, printed in two colours, show clearly the various ailments that are likely to occur. This book makes no claim to depute for the veterinary surgeon but will prove not only extremely interesting and instructive but also valuable where professional aid is not urgently required.

*SPORTING NEWS—INDIA*RESULTS OF THE LAHORE HUNT HORSE SHOW, HELD AT LAHORE
CANTONMENT ON THE 23RD AND 24TH DECEMBER, 1933

CLASS No. 1—E. AND C. HORSES.

1st Sir Henry Craik's Aust. b. g. Night-Light.

2nd Major H. Henrotin's Aust. b. g. Ace of Hearts.

Judge's remarks : A fair class.

CLASS No. 2—E. AND C. PONIES.

1st Lieut.-Col. D. Pott's Aust. b. m. Madam Satan.

2nd Capt. J. H. Wilkinson's Irish b. g. Robin Hood.

Judge's remarks : Winner outstanding in average class.

CLASS No. 3—INDIAN HORSES.

1st Capt. E. G. Audland's Ind. b. g. Consequence.

2nd Mrs. D. Vanrenen's Ind. bl. m. Norway.

Judge's remarks : A good average class.

CLASS No. 4—ARAB AND INDIAN PONIES.

1st Lieut.-Col. H. Macdonald's Ind. b. g. Starlight.

Judge's remarks : Consider that three-year-olds should not be allowed in this class as they are eligible for breeding classes. Suggest a minimum age of four years. Small but fair class.

CLASS No. 5—STABLE OF THREE.

1st Major D. Vanrenen's Ind. bl. m. Norway ; Ind. b. m. Rhona ; Ind. br. m. Teal.

2nd Lieut.-Col. D. Pott's Stable. Selected.

Judge's remarks : Fair class.

CLASS No. 6 (a)—INDIAN FILLIES, 36–48 MONTHS.

1st Mohd. s/o Shujawal's Ind. b. f. Roebuck.

2nd Lal s/o Mohammed's Ind. br. f. Trenchant.

Judge's remarks : Two fillies with plenty of substance.

CLASS No. 6 (b)—INDIAN COLTS (OPEN), 24–36 MONTHS.

1st Major D. Vanrenen's Ind. b. c. Fashionable.

Judge's remarks : A very nice quality colt.

CLASS No. 6 (c)—INDIAN FILLIES (OPEN), 24–48 MONTHS.

1st Sir Henry Craik's and Capt. Saulez's Ind. br. f. Jenny Lind.

Judge's remarks : Four entries only.

CLASS No. 7 (a)—HACKS—HORSES (OPEN).

1st Major H. Henrotin's Aust. b. g. Ace of Hearts.

2nd Mr. N. J. Wilson's Aust. b. m. Jemima.

Judge's remarks : Very good class.

CLASS No. 7 (b)—HACKS, PONIES (OPEN).

1st Capt. Mohd. Akbar Khan's Ind. b. g. Karmo.

2nd Capt. J. H. Wilkinson's Irish b. g. Robin Hood.

Judge's remarks : A well-behaved class.

CLASS No. 8 (a)—HACKS, INDIAN HORSES.

1st Mrs. Nadin's Ind. ch. m. Queen High.

2nd Capt. E. G. Audland's Ind. b. g. Consequence.

Judge's remarks : A fair class.

CLASS No. 8 (b)—HACKS, INDIAN PONIES.

1st Capt. Mohd. Akbar Khan's Ind. b. g. Karmo.

2nd Mrs. P. L. Orde's Ind. b. g. Scout.

Judge's remarks : A poor class.

CLASS 9 (a)—LADIES' HACKS (SIDE SADDLE).

1st Sir Henry Craik's Aust. b. g. Night-Light.

2nd Mrs. Nadin's Ind. ch. m. Queen High.

Judge's remarks : A small but good class.

CLASS 9 (b)—HACKS PAIRS. Cancelled.

CLASS No. 10 (a)—OFFICERS' CHARGERS (MOUNTED BRANCHES).

1st Major D. Whitworth's Eng. b. g. Tantalus.

2nd Capt. Mohd. Akbar Khan's Ind. ch. g. Qes.

Judge's remarks : Training good. Class of charger shown fair ; winner outstanding ; next three good.

CLASS No. 10 (b)—OFFICERS' CHARGERS (DISMOUNTED BRANCHES).

1st Capt. A. B. Miller's Aust. ch. m. Ruby.

2nd Capt. K. Lawton's Aust. b. m. Earmark.

Judge's remarks : A fair class ; first and second well ahead of the rest.

CLASS No. 11 (a)—POLO PONIES (HEAVY WEIGHT).

1st Capt. A. E. C. Poole's Ind. ch. g. Robin.

2nd Capt. Mohd. Akbar Khan's Ind. b. g. Karmo.

Judge's remarks : A very good class.

CLASS No. 11 (b)—POLO PONIES (LIGHT WEIGHT).

1st Mr. T. T. Todd's Ind. ch. g. Oakwood.

2nd Capt. P. R. Tatham's Aust. br. g. Cotton Tail.

Judge's remarks : Very good class.

CLASS No. 12—POLO PONIES (LIKELY TO MAKE).

1st Mrs. R. H. Wordsworth's Ind. br. g. Marmion.

2nd Mr. T. T. Todd's Ind. ch. g. Oakwood.

Judge's remarks : First three outstanding ; remainder poor.

CLASS No. 13 (a)—HUNTERS (HEAVY WEIGHT).

1st Major D. Whitworth's Eng. b. g. Tantalus.

2nd Lieut.-Col. R. E. Harenc's Aust. br. g. Shadow.

Judge's remarks : First two outstanding ; winner very nice horse.

CLASS No. 13 (b)—HUNTERS (LIGHT WEIGHT).

1st Capt. E. G. Audland's Ind. b. g. Consequence.

2nd Mr. N. J. Wilson's Aust. b. m. Jemima.

Judge's remarks : A good class. Placed horses excellent hunters.

CLASS No. 14 (a)—OPEN JUMPING.

1st and 2nd 13/18th Hussars. Nomination.

Judge's remarks : Good performance.

CLASS No. 14 (b)—B.O.Rs. JUMPING.

1st and 2nd 13/18th Hussars. Nomination.

Judge's remarks : An average class.

CLASS No. 14 (c)—I.O.Rs. JUMPING.

1st 6th D.C.O. Lancers. 1st Nomination.

2nd 6th D.C.O. Lancers. 2nd Nomination.

Judge's remarks : Below the average.

CLASS No. 15—TEAM JUMPING.

1st 13/18th Hussars. One Team.

2nd Punjab Light Horse. Team.

Judge's remarks : Two teams competed. Average.

CLASS No. 16 (a)—GUN TEAMS.

1st 3rd Field Battery, R.A. Second Team.

2nd 3rd Field Battery, R.A. Third Team.

Judge's remarks : A very good class.

CLASS No. 16 (b)—BEST PAIR LIGHT DRAUGHT HORSES.

1st 5th Field Battery, R.A. First Pair.

2nd 57th Field Battery, R.A. Second Pair.

Judge's remarks : A good class.

CLASS No. 17 (a)—TROOP HORSES (BRITISH).

1st 5th Field Battery, R.A.'s Ind. ch. g. No. 149.

2nd 5th Field Battery, R.A.'s Aust. b. m. No. 68.

Judge's remarks : A fair class only. Training not of a high order. Winner a good Indian bred.

CLASS No. 17 (b)—TROOP HORSE (INDIAN).

1st 6th D.C.O. Lancers. Nomination.

2nd 6th D.C.O. Lancers. Nomination.

Judge's remarks : A moderate class. Winner a well-trained nicely balanced troop horse.

CLASS No. 18—HANDY HUNTER'S COMPETITION.

1st Major C. T. Beckett's Aust. bl. g. Braunston.

2nd 5th Field Battery, R.A.'s Aust. br. g. No. 137.

Mr. J. M. McNeill's Aust. b. m. Gulab.

Best Lady Rider : Mrs. Wordsworth.

Judge's remarks : High standard. Good entry.

CLASS No. 19—CHILDREN'S PONIES.

1st Miss Cooper's Ind. b. m. Helen.

Best Turned-Out Rider : Master Landale.

Judge's remarks : A very fair class.

CLASS No. 20—TONGA PONIES.

1st Tonga No. 290.

2nd Tonga No. 285.

Judge's remarks : Better class than last year. Best Ponies turned out for bad condition.

CLASS No. 21 (a)—PACK MULES.

1st 1st Battn., The East Surrey Regiment's No. 2 Team.

Judge's remarks : Fair class.

CLASS No. 21 (b)—PAIR DRAUGHT MULES.

1st 1st Battn., The East Surrey Regiment's Second Pair.

Judge's remarks : Very good turn-out.

CLASS No. 22—BEST HORSE.

Sir Henry Craik's Aust. b. g. Night-Light.

Judge's remarks : Useful lot. Winner outstanding.

CLASS No. 23—BEST PONY.

Lieut.-Col. D. Pott's Aust. b. m. Madam Satan.

Judge's remarks : Winner outstanding in an average class.

Two Medals presented by the National Horse-Breeding and Show Society of India, awarded to :—

BEST INDIAN HORSE :

Capt. E. G. Audland's Ind. b. g. Consequence.

BEST INDIAN PONY :

Major R. H. Wordsworth's Ind. b. g. Marmion.

THE INTER-REGIMENTAL POLO TOURNAMENT, 1934.

PLAYED AT MEERUT ON FEBRUARY 23RD, 24TH, 26TH, 28TH, AND MARCH 2ND, 1934.

		The Royals			
P.A.V.O. Cavalry	}	P.A.V.O. Cavalry 6—0	}	P.A.V.O. Cavalry	}
Probyn's Horse				7—4	
3rd Cavalry	}	19th K.G.O. Lcra. 8—4	}	19th K.G.O. Lcra.	}
19th K.G.O. Lcra.					
8th K.G.O. Lcra.	}	15th Lancers 9—1	}		
15th Lancers					
Poona Horse	}	13/18th Hussars 9—8	}	13/18th Hussars	}
13/18th Hussars					
Skinner's Horse	}	Skinner's Horse 8—7	}		}
10th Hussars					
		Central India Horse		Central India Horse	
		Guides Cavalry		8—2	Central India Horse 9—2

WINNERS—P.A.V.O. Cavalry 5—4

P.A.V.O. Cavalry

No. 1. Capt. C. P. Bayer
 No. 2. { Capt. P. R. Tatham
 { Lt.-Col. G. de la P. Beresford
 No. 3. Capt. P. B. Sanger
 Back Capt. R. G. Hammer

Central India Horse

No. 1. Capt. M. Cox
 No. 2. Capt. R. George
 No. 3. Capt. B. Dalrymple-Hay
 Back Capt. A. J. S. Alexander

The Inter-Regimental Tournament this year attracted an entry of 13 Teams and it was generally admitted that there was every prospect of its being a very open tournament.

Of the games in the first round, those between the 13/18th Hussars and the Poona Horse and the 10th Hussars, and Skinner's Horse, each went to extra time with widened goals. With the Poona Horse leading 8—6 when the sixth chukker opened, it looked as if they were in a fairly secure position, but the 13/18th made a great recovery and pulled the game out of the fire. Skinner's Horse had a terrific struggle with the 10th Hussars, whose team has been much weakened by Gairdner's departure to the Staff College. This was a good galloping game.

Considerable interest centred round the match between Probyn's Horse and the P.A.V.O. Cavalry, the two teams having met in the final of the Indian Cavalry Tournament, in which game Beresford of the P.A.V.O. had broken a bone in his hand. His place was now taken by Bayer, who proved an efficient substitute. The P.A.V.O. won a convincing victory, Sanger playing brilliantly. The score does not really represent the game, because Probyn's put up a great fight. Two of the P.A.V.O. goals came from 40 yard hits and one a 60 yard

hit. The remaining games in this round are fairly accurately described by the score.


Of the second round matches, the issue of that between the C.I.H. and the Guides Cavalry was never in doubt, though the Guides worked hard and played a good team game. The P.A.V.O. always looked to be the winners against the Royals, and the 19th Lancers beat the 15th Lancers by a small margin, a result which was perhaps not generally expected. There was a great battle between the 13/18th and Skinner's Horse, the former winning in the second of two extra periods.

In the Semi-Final round the C.I.H. again had an easy passage, but the match between the 19th Lancers and the P.A.V.O. provided some very fine polo. The game was kept going at a great pace throughout and the hitting was hard and clean. There was very little to choose between the two teams.

It was hard to compare the form of the two teams left in the final, because the C.I.H. had not yet been extended. Tatham of the P.A.V.O. had hurt his hand in their game against the 19th Lancers and had to retire after the first chukker, his place being taken by Beresford, whose injury had mended sufficiently to enable him to play. The game started off with some rather sticky polo, but soon opened up, and the two teams got going at a great pace. Dalrymple-Hay opened the score for the C.I.H. in the first chukker, but the P.A.V.O. equalised in the second, and gained the lead in the third, each time through Sanger. The fourth chukker ended with the score 2 all. Dalrymple-Hay having scored again. This player now put his side ahead early in the fifth chukker and Cox increased the lead to 4—2. On resuming for the last period, a cross by George gave the P.A.V.O. a 40 yard hit which Sanger drove hard and true through the middle of the goal (4—3). Thus encouraged, the P.A.V.O. attacked and scored again through Beresford (4—4). The game now became a desperate struggle until Sanger, coming through the game at a great pace, scored the winning goal just as the bugle went. This was a fighting finish, for Sanger was undoubtedly the dominating personality in the Tournament, having played magnificently throughout.



2000



OFFICER OF HUSSARS IN THE SERVICE OF THE ELECTOR
OF BAVARIA, 1688.

From "Das Heer des Blauen Königs."

THE

CAVALRY JOURNAL

JULY, 1934

EDITORIAL

It is unfortunate that the drought will prevent the 1st Cavalry Brigade from carrying out their brigade training in Norfolk and Norfolkshire, as was the original intention. These troops have had the benefit of training on new ground. It is hoped to be able to arrange to go to the south coast to work with the 1st Cavalry Division at the time of going to the south coast when has been no rain.

* * * * *

We are glad to be able to report the use of wireless sets being developed in Cavalry Regiments. The sets, which are carried in a small car and capable of being used both for speech and telegraphy are just what the Cavalry want. There are to be three sets in each regiment, though this year only the 1st Cavalry Brigade is to be equipped with them.

* * * * *

On July 16th the Royal Scots Greys will begin a tour of 100 miles, reaching on August 7th. The route will be Glasgow, Carlisle and Fairford to London, then Oxford and then to Marlborough to Abernethy, then to London and Aldershot, then to Laversham and then to London through Perth and Dunblane to Edinburgh. A road ride and Track Ride display will be given at Aldershot, Laversham and Perth.

* * * * *

We regret to announce the death, on May 31st, of Major General the Hon. Sir Cecil Bingham, C.B., K.C.M.G., G.C.V.O. He was gazetted to the 3rd Hussars as a lieutenant and to the 2nd Life Guards in 1886. On the outbreak of the South African War he went to the Cape as a General Officer Commanding and served throughout the campaign.



OFFICER OF HUSSARS IN THE SERVICE OF THE ELECTOR
OF BAVARIA, 1688.

From "Das Heer des Bayer-Königs."

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

JULY, 1934

EDITORIAL.

It is unfortunate that the drought will prevent the 1st Cavalry Brigade from carrying out their brigade training in North Hertfordshire, which was the original intention. There they would have had the benefit of entirely new ground. It is hoped to be able to arrange for this brigade to go to North Wiltshire, but at the time of going to Press, no decision has been reached.

* * * * *

We are glad to be able to say that the use of wireless is being developed in Cavalry Regiments. The sets, which are carried in a small car and capable of being used both for speech and telegraphy are just what the Cavalry want. There are to be three sets in each regiment, though this year only the 1st Cavalry Brigade is to be equipped with them.

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On July 16th the Royal Scots Greys will begin a tour of 450 miles, concluding on August 7th. The route will be through Crieff and Blair Atholl to Mar Lodge up the Glen Tilt and from Mar Lodge to Abernethy *via* the Derry Burn and Allt Dearg, thence to Inverness and by the coast to Aberdeen through Perth and Dunblane to Edinburgh. Musical ride and Trick Ride displays will be given at Aberdeen, Inverness and Perth.

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We regret to announce the death, on May 31st, of Major-General the Hon. Sir Cecil Bingham, C.B., K.C.M.G., G.C.V.O. He was gazetted to the 3rd Hussars in 1882 and transferred to the 2nd Life Guards in 1886. On the outbreak of the South African War he went to the Cape as A.D.C. to General French, and served throughout the campaign. In

December, 1906, he was promoted to command the 1st Life Guards, and in November, 1910, he was given the 2nd Cavalry Brigade in the Eastern Command, and when the Great War broke out he had been commanding the 4th Cavalry Brigade for two and a-half years. He led his brigade throughout the retreat from Mons, the advance to the Aisne and during the 1st battle of Ypres. In February, 1915, he was promoted to Major-General and succeeded General de Lisle in command of the 1st Cavalry Division, and in October he was appointed to command the Cavalry Corps. The Corps was broken up in 1916 and later in the year General Bingham was appointed to the command of the 73rd Division at home, and from April, 1917, to June, 1919, was G.O.C. 67th Division.

* * * * *

We offer our congratulations to the following on whom His Majesty conferred honours on his 69th birthday :—

G.C.V.O.

Field-Marshal E. H. H. Viscount Allenby, G.C.B.,
G.C.M.G.

G.C.S.I.

Field-Marshal Sir Philip Chetwode, Bt., G.C.B.,
K.C.M.G., D.S.O., C-in-C. in India.

K.C.B.

Lieut.-General G. A. Weir, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
G.O.C. the British Troops in Egypt.

Lieut.-General A. E. W. Harman, C.B., D.S.O., late
G.O.C. 1st Division.

C.B.

Major-General A. J. McCulloch, D.S.O., D.C.M.,
G.O.C. 52nd (Lowland) Division.

Lieut.-General Sir A. E. W. Harman has had 41 years' service, embracing duty in the Militia, the Cavalry and the R.A.S.C., and is Colonel of the Queen's Bays. He was a distinguished Cavalry Commander in France with the 6th Cavalry Brigade and the 3rd Cavalry Division. He had a brigade in Germany, has been Commandant of the Cavalry School twice, Commander of the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Aldershot, and Inspector of

Cavalry. From 1930 to April, 1934, he commanded the 1st Division.

Also we congratulate Major-General B. D. Fisher, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., on his appointment as Commandant of the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, with effect from about the end of August, 1934; Brigadier E. F. Norton, D.S.O., M.C., on his appointment as Brigadier-General Staff, Aldershot Command; and Colonel S. Howes, D.S.O., M.C., on his appointment as Commander 6th Cavalry Brigade, T.A., with effect from September next.

* * * * *

The following changes in commanding officers have been announced :—

Royal Horse Guards. Lieut.-Colonel F. B. de Klée to be Lieut.-Colonel.

15th/19th Royal Hussars. Lieut.-Colonel M. O'M. Creagh, M.C., to be Lieut.-Colonel.

* * * * *

The Managing Editor has received one or two letters from subscribers, deploring the discontinuance of the coloured frontispieces. This action was the result of our adverse balance last year and it is hoped to restart producing them again at an early date, especially if it is the wish of subscribers.

* * * * *

We have been asked to publish the following letter addressed to the Editor of "The Times." As most of our readers are aware, there has been in existence for some time a scheme to extend and beautify the Chapel of the Royal Military College as a Memorial to the Sandhurst Cadets who fell in the Great War, but unfortunately the scheme has not yet come to full fruition owing to lack of funds. In consequence the building is in an unfinished state and does not do credit to the great institution of which it is a part.

"Sir,—May I beg the assistance of 'The Times' to bring to notice the unfinished state of the memorial to Sandhurst cadets who fell in the Great War, and to appeal for funds to complete it?

The form which it was decided to give to the memorial was the enlargement of the College Chapel, together with, as the chief feature of the interior decoration, the recording upon marble panels by regiments of the names of the fallen officers. It had become a tradition at Sandhurst before the War that the names of all cadets who fell on active service should be inscribed upon the Chapel walls, but the walls were already so covered that the inscription of the names of the 4,000 cadets who fell in the Great War would have been impossible. It was a question, therefore, of either building a new memorial chapel or enlarging the old one, and the latter alternative was chosen in order that there should be no break with the associations which the old chapel holds for so many generations of Army officers.

The method of enlargement adopted after much consideration was to place the new chapel across the original building, which would then become the centre of the whole structure, changing the orientation from south-east to north-east. The plans were those of Mr. A. C. Martin, F.R.I.B.A., who was on the staff of the College during the War.

The scheme of construction and interior decoration was an ambitious one, and although I hope that time will prove that it was not too ambitious for the great services to the Army and the nation which it is designed to commemorate, it could not be expected that the money to carry it out would be immediately subscribed. It has been necessary to proceed by stages as funds have become available.

The foundations were laid in the autumn of 1918; the new east end was completed in 1921 and in 1922 the central portion of the old chapel was reconstructed to conform to the new design. In 1924 a new organ was installed in the gallery of the old west end, the old organ being nearly worn out and its position unsuitable. There the work stopped. There remains the building of the west end, and it is to enable this final stage to be completed that this appeal is made.

Towards the £50,000 for which an appeal was made in 1916 the subscriptions received have amounted to £33,750, but of this nearly £19,000 was earmarked for memorial panels, etc., and

in spite of a large contribution from College funds it has never been possible to complete the superstructure. The result is that this noble memorial remains unfinished, and not only is the beauty of the design seriously obscured, but the acoustic properties of the chapel are affected, and, further, a large number of regimental memorials cannot be erected in suitable positions until the wall space and pillars of the west end are available.

The estimated cost of completing the fabric of the west end is £14,000, towards which there is in hand a sum of about £4,000, leaving £10,000 to be provided. I cannot think that this great nation will be so forgetful of the part played by Sandhurst in the War as to allow the memorial to her sons to go unfinished for want of this sum.

Field-Marshal His Royal Highness the Duke of Connaught, as senior Field-Marshal, is entirely in sympathy with this appeal, which he trusts may meet with a generous response. Subscriptions may be sent to me or to the Secretary of the Memorial Fund at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst, Camberley. For intending subscribers who would like fuller information about the progress of the memorial work which has been so unfortunately suspended there is a booklet, prepared in 1922 and revised in 1924, which I shall be happy to send on application.

I am, Sir, your obedient Servant,
R. S. MAY, Major-General,
Commandant, Royal Military College, Sandhurst,
Camberley.

* * * * *

The undermentioned have become subscribers for 1934 :—

Captain R. M. Fanshawe, 16th/5th Lancers; Major H. F. B. Stephenson, Yorkshire Dragoons; The President Mess Committee, 11th P.A.V.O. Cavalry F.F., I.A.; Captain W. W. A. Loring, 15th Lancers, I.A.; Lieut.-Colonel Rajvi Sohan Singh, Dungar Lancers, Rajputana, India; Gerald P. Martyn, Esq., B.C., Canada; Major Stevenson Easby, United States Cavalry.

THE FIRST HUSSARS

By MAJOR H. FITZM. STACKE, M.C.

HUSSARS, as most soldiers know, originated in Hungary ; but their picturesque uniform, derived from the national dress of that country, has been copied in so many other armies that it has become perhaps the most widespread form of military costume—at any rate the most widespread of the many forms of full-dress uniform worn before the last war. Since that war there has been a general standardization of uniforms, and now-a-days some shade of khaki with a peaked cap and a brown leather belt is the recognised kit of a soldier in most countries, literally from China to Peru. Many of those uniforms are modelled on that of the British Army—for the first time in history this country is setting the military fashion. Before 1914, however, other armies supplied the models for soldiers' dress ; and Hussar uniforms were then as widespread as are variants on the British Service dress to-day.

Some other characteristic national uniforms have in the same way spread to several countries. The distinctive square-topped cap (*schapska*) of the Polish Uhlans has been adopted by cavalry regiments in many other armies—Prussian, Russian, Austrian, French, Saxon, Bavarian, Belgian, Portuguese and even Mexican, besides our own Lancers. The costume of the Algerian Zouaves was copied, curiously enough, by an American regiment raised during their Civil War, by an Irish corps which fought for the Pope in 1870, and by our own West India Regiment. The dark-green jacket of the German *Jägers* has served as a model for the Rifle Corps of our own and of several other armies. No uniform, however, has been so widely, so universally copied as that of the Hungarian Hussars.



Locatelli-Hussar 1702-1705

HUSSAR OF LOCATELLI'S REGIMENT IN THE SERVICE OF THE ELECTOR OF BAVARIA, 1702-5.

In 1705 this regiment was transferred to the service of the King of France, and an offshoot from this corps, the Hussars of Berchény, eventually became the existing French 1st Hussars.

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In the vanished days of bright uniforms before 1914, Hussar regiments so called, dressed in variants on the characteristic Hungarian costume, were conspicuous not only in the Austro-Hungarian Army but also in the German, Russian, French, Spanish, Dutch, Danish, Swedish, Serbian and Rumanian armies as well as our own, whilst the Hussar uniform had been copied by yet further regiments in other countries, by the Belgian Guides, by the Greek Royal Escort, and by several units in South America. Even the Italian Light Cavalry regiments displayed the characteristic Hussar busby. That sincerest form of flattery was a deserved tribute to the renown (and to the taste in dress) of the Magyar horsemen.

Much of that pre-war splendour has vanished now, but it may be of interest to trace the manner in which that widespread imitation of the Hungarian dress came to pass ; also to note the oldest Hussar regiments still in existence to-day.

Apparently Hussars were first so termed in Hungary towards the end of the sixteenth century. At that time Hungary was a frontier State with nebulous boundaries, maintaining a precarious existence between the Germanic States of the Empire and the aggressive power of the Ottoman Sultans. The continuous fighting against the Turkish invaders made it necessary to organize a force of picked mobile troops ready to turn out at short notice. It was arranged that these mobile fighting men should be furnished by the various districts on a basis of one trooper, armed and mounted, for each twenty of the population ; and from the Hungarian word for twenty—"husz"—developed the term "huszar."

That is the most usual explanation of the term ; but at least two other meanings have been suggested. One suggestion is that "hus'ar" in Hungarian means "twenty ha'pence"—then the daily pay of a mounted soldier. Another is that the term is not Hungarian in origin but Polish, a corruption of the Polish word "Towarzycz" (equivalent to the well known Russian "Tovarish"—"Comrade")—and that the term originated with the picked body of noble-born Polish horsemen whom Sobieski led to the Relief of Vienna.

Whatever its origin, there is no doubt that the term came to be applied to the light horsemen of Hungary before the year 1600, and remained associated with them exclusively during the century that ensued. At that period in Western Europe all cavalry were heavily equipped, still perpetuating the tradition of the armoured men-at-arms of the Middle Ages ; light well-bred horses were rare ; and horsemastership also seems to have been rudimentary. In such circumstances the Hungarian troopers soon became famous not only for their fighting powers but also for their riding and for their care of their horses. A Hungarian writer has described the upbringing which led to this renown :—

“To form the Hungarian Hussar requires the training of a life, and to understand the formidable strength of this class of warriors their education must be traced from the beginning. From his earliest youth the future Hussar is familiar with horses, they are his friends and his playmates ; he eats with them and sleeps with them ; he knows the meaning of every sound they make, and every movement and attitude of their frames ; he has an intuitive and unerring knowledge of their habits, their likings and dislikings. The Hussar loves his horse, and speaks to it as if it were an intelligent creature ; he tells it of his griefs, his fears, his hopes, and the sagacious animal replies with affectionate whinnys and nuzzlings in the bosom of his master. The Hussar, whatever his fatigues or privations, will never dream of rest or refreshment for himself until he has first provided for the wants of his four-footed friend ; even his own wounds remain uncared for until those of his faithful companion are attended ; in this manner a singular attachment is formed between the Hussar and his horse. Let him be turned out into the plain with a thousand other animals, he will answer the whistle of his master, and gallop to him with the docility of a spaniel.

“Before the candidate for the Hussar uniform is permitted to assume it, he is carefully disciplined in the use of arms. The weapons are as familiar to him as his own limbs ; he knows their properties and capabilities with the nicest accuracy.

When first enlisted, therefore, he is a perfect soldier, without further drill or exercise. The weapons of the Hussar are pistols, a sabre, and carabine. When a troop or regiment of this force is brought up to battle, they are, like all cavalry soldiers, impatient of a distant engagement, and eager for the charge. Nothing can exceed their enthusiasm when the word is given to advance at full speed ; the bridle is thrown upon the neck of the charger, who is animated with the same fiery ardour, and equally well disciplined, as his master. The Hussar grasps a pistol in each hand, and the whole body rush like lightning upon the enemy. When within a few yards distance the pistols are discharged and returned to the holsters and the carabine is slung round, fired, and allowed to fall back with the speed of thought. By the time the horse has, in a few bounds, brought his rider up to the foe, the formidable sabre is bared and ready to do fearful execution on those who wait for the attack.

“The skill of the Hussars in the management of the sabre is astonishing. There is nothing more terrible than the approach of a body of Hussars, brandishing their broad, bright blades and shouting with eagerness for the attack.

“Like the soldiers of Cæsar at Pharsalia, the Hussars always struck at the face, and seldom missed their blow. It was mostly fatal, and those who survived an encounter with them generally carried with them deep and disfiguring wounds . . . Hence also, in part, the terror which they inspired.”

A French writer of the eighteenth century* recorded that:—

“Leur manière la plus ordinaire de combattre est d’envelopper un escadron ennemi, de l’effraier par leurs cris et par différents mouvements. Comme ils sont fort adroits à manier leurs chevaux, qui sont de petite taille, qu’ils ont les étriers fort courts et les éperons près des flancs du cheval, ils les forcent à courir plus vite que la grosse cavalerie ; ils se lèvent au dessus de leurs selles, et sont dangereux surtout contre les fuyards. Ils se rallient très-facilement et passent un défilé avec beaucoup de vitesse. Ce qui rend encore leurs chevaux

*Abrégé du Dictionnaire Militaire (1759).

plus vifs, c'est que n'ayant que des bridons, ils en ont la respiration plus libre, et pâturent à la moindre halte sans débrider. Quand ils font halte, après quelque vive course, ils tirent les oreilles et la queue à leurs chevaux pour les délasser.

"Leurs selles sont d'un bois fort léger et courtes, avec des arçons également relevés devant et derrière. Au lieu de panneaux, ce sont des tresses de grosse ficelle. Elles sont posées sur de bonnes couvertures en plusieurs doubles, qui leur servent pour se coucher et couvrir leurs chevaux. Les dessus des selles sont des peaux avec leur poil, qui couvrent leurs pistolets aussi bien que leurs housses. Ces peaux vont depuis le poitrail du cheval jusqu'à la queue et aux jarrets, et tombent en pointe sur les cuisses."

At first only temporary levies, on the lines of the Sheriff's Posse of the Wild West, these "huszars" were presently formed into definite units; and it is recorded that the Hussar regiments of Berczenyi (or Berchenyi) and of Kohazy did good service in the Turkish Wars of 1663 and 1684.



Hussar in the Austrian Service, 1680

From thence forward Hussar regiments formed a permanent feature of the Imperial Army. In 1685 a distinguished Hungarian cavalry leader, Count Adam Czobor, raised for the Emperor's service a Hussar corps of 3,000 men, from which four years later he formed a regiment organized on the same footing as the other regular cavalry regiments of the Imperial Army but with the special dress and equipment of the Hussars. This regiment thenceforward remained in continuous existence, although changing its name with each successive Colonel in the old fashion, which the Austrian Army was the last to retain, until the last war. When, however, the Austrian cavalry were given permanent numbers on the reorganization after the war of 1866, this regiment was, for some reason, numbered not the 1st but the 9th Hussars, and remained so designated until its disbandment in 1918.

The numerical designations of the Austro-Hungarian cavalry regiments before the last war bore, in fact, as little relation to the actual antiquity of the corps as do the numbers borne by the Indian cavalry regiments to-day, as may be seen from the following list, arranged in the actual order of seniority :—

The 9th Hussars were formed in 1685.

„ 8th	„	„	1696.
„ 3rd	„	„	1702.
„ 4th	„	„	1734.
„ 6th	„	„	1734.
„ 10th	„	„	1741.
„ 2nd	„	„	1743.
„ 1st	„	„	1756.
„ 11th	„	„	1762.
„ 5th	„	„	1798.
„ 7th	„	„	1798.
„ 12th	„	„	1800.
„ 13th	„	„	1859.
„ 14th	„	„	1859.

To which must be added the 15th and 16th, originally Dragoon regiments, but converted into Hussars in 1873.

The Austrian service, however, was not long to retain a monopoly of the Hussars. Under the menace of conquest by the Turks the Hungarians had accepted first the alliance and then the suzerainty of the Hapsburgs ; but as soon as the Moslems had been expelled the autocratic rule of the Emperor Leopold I aroused first resentment and then active revolt among the proud Magyar. Actuated by hostility to Austria as well as by the spirit of adventure, the Hungarian horsemen began to enlist as mercenaries in the armies of Austria's enemies. As early as 1688 a corps of Hussars, led by one Lidl von Borbula, joined the army of



Hussar in the Bavarian Service
1688

the Elector of Bavaria, then at war with the Austrian power. That corps was disbanded when peace was made, but four years later, in 1692, a corps of Hungarian Hussars entered the service of the King of France ; for the French were then at war with Austria, and the armies of Louis XIV were facing the armies of the Coalition—Dutch, British and Austrian—in the Low Countries. This corps of Hussars was organized by an adventurous gentleman with the title (apparently spurious*) of Baron de Corneberg, who turned the French Army's need of light cavalry to good account, since he received a capitation grant of 230 *livres* for each of his 500 Hussars. Money, however, was to be his downfall. The next year he gambled away the whole of the regimental funds, and was thereupon dismissed, being replaced by an officer of Bavarian extraction, Jacques-Andre de Mortani.

The Flanders campaign of 1692–6 established the reputation of these Hungarian soldiers of fortune, so far as the French Army was concerned, for they did brilliant service as scouts.† In the year 1694 they astonished both the opposing armies by an exploit of singular daring. On the 30th October a force of the Imperial cavalry, thirty squadrons under the Count von Tilly, was encamped around Hal. Tilly himself had taken up quarters in the chateau, guarded by a regiment of Dragoons. Mortani, with 200 of his Hussars, rode out from Mons after dark, covered the intervening twenty miles during the night, surprised the chateau, seized Tilly in his bed, and returned with their prisoner and the standard of his guard. Recklessly gallant in the field, the Hungarian mercenaries were nevertheless difficult to control, and after the Peace of Ryswick in December, 1697, Mortani's Hussars were disbanded.

That peace lasted only four years. The War of the Spanish Succession began in 1702, and again a corps of Hungarian Hussars joined the army of the Elector of Bavaria, then opposed

* “. . . un certain Corneberg, qui se donnait comme baron à la cour de Louis XIV ” (Mouillard).

“. . . le baron de Corneberg, bitard d'une grande maison d'Allemagne . . . buveur insatiable, joueur acharné.” (Choppin).

† “Luxembourg les réunit en compagnies et s'en servit comme éclaireurs. Il en fut si satisfait, qu'il écrivit au roi que ces grotesques cavaliers, au langage étranger, entendaient merveilleusement le parti et la grand'garde, et faisaient fureur dans son camp.”

to Austria as an ally of France. This corps, the Hussars of Locatelli, served for three years with the Bavarian forces ; but after the battle of Blenheim in 1704 the Bavarian Elector and his shattered army had to evacuate their own country and retreat with their defeated French allies, first to the Rhine and then to the Low Countries. There the upkeep of the Hungarian mercenaries proved too much for the impoverished Elector, and in 1705 the Hussars of Locatelli were transferred to the service of France. The colonelcy was soon afterwards conferred on the Marquis de St. Genies, who however was replaced within the year by a Hungarian nobleman, the Baron de Rattsky.

Throughout the rest of that war the Hussars of Rattsky performed notable services in the French armies, taking part in the battles of Oudenarde, Malplaquet and Denain, and in numerous minor engagements. They were not the only Hussars in the French service during this period, for two similar corps of Hungarian horsemen had been formed in 1705, called after their respective Colonels, Poldeack (subsequently Filtz, then Monteil) and Verseilles ; but the former was transferred in 1709 to the service of Spain, and the latter seven years later was incorporated in the Rattsky regiment.

In 1711 the Hussars of Rattsky took part in a great cavalry raid carried out against a detached mounted force of the Allies near Douai—a raid carried out by two distinguished French cavalry leaders, de Gassion and de Coigny, with 37 squadrons of horse (including the Hussars) and 14 of Dragoons. The enterprise was completely successful ; the Allied cavalry was surprised and dispersed, while the captures are stated to have included 2,200 horses and many standards ; but the latter trophies could not be counted, because . . . “ *parce que ce sont les hussards qui s'en sont saisis et de qui on ne peut les arracher, s'en servant pour fondre la dorure et pour leur usage particulier.*” (Letter of M. de Gassion, quoted by Choppin).

For a few years after the Peace of Utrecht, Rattsky's was the only Hussar corps retained in the French service, but in 1720 their Second-in-Command, Lieut.-Colonel Count Ladislas de Berchény, obtained permission to raise an additional regi-

ment. Accompanied by a few selected officers he proceeded to Hungary and thence through the Balkans so far as Constantinople, returning six months later by sea to the south of France with a shipload of wild recruits. These, when trained and disciplined, made a fine regiment; but at this period the Hussars were still quite apart from the regular army of France. They remained a self-contained corps of mercenaries, regarded as curiosities by their hosts. In 1732 a French dictionary* described them as "habillés bizarrement . . . bons pour les courses et les partis mais nullement propres aux actions de pied ferme." Nevertheless, the fame of their exploits constantly increased, while their peculiar tactics and equipment became celebrated.†

At the time of the War of the Austrian Succession (1743-8), additional regiments of Hussars were raised for the French Army, their number eventually rising to nine; but the recruits forthcoming during the short peace which followed were not sufficient to keep so many corps up to strength, and in 1756 they were reduced, four regiments only being retained, which absorbed the other five. In this reorganization the Hussars of Berchény absorbed their parent regiment, the old corps of Rattsky (known, however, since 1743 by the name of a new Colonel, Lynden). Thenceforward the Hussars of Berchény remained the oldest regiment of Hussars in the French service, their Colonelcy remaining vested in the Counts of Berchény until the Revolution, when the old family title was abolished and the Regiment was entitled the 1st Hussars.



Officer of Hussars in the French Service, 1743

* Dictionnaire de Moreri.

† The "Abrégé du Dictionnaire Militaire" (1759) notes that :—" Leur discipline est exacte, la subordination grande et les châtimens rudes ; le plus ordinaire est la bastonnade sur le dos et sur le derrière, d'un nombre de coups marqué."

Choppin adds : " Cet usage de la bastonnade resta longtemps en vigueur dans quelques-uns des régiments qui furent levés plus tard ; le hussard qui arrivait le dernier, soit à l'exercice, soit au pansement, soit à un appel, recevait toujours un coup de canne, et quoiqu'ils eussent contracté l'habitude de se précipiter tous ensemble pour qu'aucun d'eux ne fût en arrière, le coup de canne n'en était que plus généreusement donné, car il frappait plusieurs dos à la fois."

Another writer of the period recorded that : " le supplice dont ils punissaient les deserteurs est épouvantable ; ils les embrochent tout vifs et les rôtissent devant le feu."

During the years immediately preceding the Revolution a scarcity of Hungarian recruits had led to Germans, Alsatians and finally Frenchmen being admitted to the ranks of the Hussars, where it is recorded that they were taught to swear, at any rate, in the Magyar tongue.* Casualties during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars gradually eliminated all the old soldiers of Berchény, and thenceforward the regiment remained entirely French.

The other old regiments of Hussars in the French service underwent a similar process of naturalisation, and by the beginning of the nineteenth century Hussar regiments were accepted as a normal branch of the French cavalry.

Other countries, however, had by then incorporated Hussar regiments in much the same fashion. In the Prussian Army two troops of Hussars were received as mercenaries in 1721. These were expanded subsequently to form a complete regiment the Hussars of Prince Eugene. Three squadrons of this corps were detached in 1730, and were organized into a separate unit of Bodyguard Hussars stationed in Berlin; which, eleven years later, was increased to a complete regiment, the ancestors of the famous Zieten Hussars of later years. In that same year (1741) another detachment from the regiment of Prince Eugene was combined with a newly-raised corps to form a regiment of "Black Hussars," with a black uniform trimmed with silver and a death's head badge, from which descended the 1st and 2nd (Bodyguard) Hussars of the Prussian Army before 1914. This was not, however, the only striking Hussar uniform in the army of Frederick William I. At that same period (1740-45) the Prussian Army could also display a regiment of "Brown Hussars" (von Hoditz), of "Red Hussars" (von Gersdorff), and of "Yellow Hussars" (von Dieury). The first



Prussian Black Hussar
(von Ruesch) 1741

* "A la fin du dix-huitième siècle, quantité de François servaient dans les hussards; mais on leur apprenait à jurer en langue hongroise, ce dont ils s'acquittaient fort bien."

named survived, retaining its distinctive uniform, to become the 4th Hussars of the pre-war Prussian Army. The other two were soon disbanded, though the precedence and the red uniform of Gersdorff's corps were transferred in 1759 to a new regiment, which subsequently became the Blücher Hussars (No. 5). Dieury's Yellow Hussars also were perpetuated, in a sense, by a regiment of Russian Hussars who copied their uniform; for in the eighteenth century the uniforms of the Russian Army were close copies of the Prussian model, and in 1762 there appeared Russian regiments of Black and Yellow Hussars. It does not appear, however, that these units contained any Hungarian personnel, and the Prussian Hussar regiments also had by that time lost their original element of Magyar mercenaries.

A similar process had instituted Hussar regiments in several other Central European states. Wurtemberg had enlisted one squadron of Hungarian troopers in 1735; in 1758 these were expanded to a complete regiment, and five years later a second regiment was raised. These, however, were soon recruited from German—not Hungarian—personnel, and before the end of the eighteenth century they had been amalgamated into the other cavalry regiments of the State. Saxony added an irregular Hussar corps to its cavalry during the Seven Years' War, but this afterwards disappeared, and when in 1791 a regular Hussar regiment was formed in the Saxon Army it was by the simple process of selecting likely light cavalymen from the other existing Saxon regiments of horse. By that date evidently the Hussar tradition had ceased to be the national monopoly of Hungary.

That tradition had, indeed, spread so far as Britain. So early as the days of Marlborough British officers were describing their charging squadrons as "breaking in *à la hussarde*, sword in hand and at a gallop" (Cranstoun, describing the



Prussian Hussar
1760

Greys at Oudenarde), and when in 1757 a light troop was added to each of our regiments of Heavy Dragoons it was noted that these new troops were "intended to act as Hussars." Two years later complete regiments of Light Dragoons were formed; in 1783-4 these units were re-dressed and gave up the red coat, adopting instead a blue jacket braided in obvious imitation of the Hussar regiments abroad. After the Flanders campaign of 1793-5 and 1799 the British Army's admiration for the Hussar spirit (and uniform) still further increased, and in 1806-7 the final step was taken. Three British Light Dragoon regiments, the 7th, 10th and 15th, were formally entitled Hussars, receiving the characteristic fur cap (generally termed "colpack" abroad, but destined to be known here as a "busby") and the slung jacket (or "pelisse") in addition to the braided jacket they already wore.

Thus by the period of the Napoleonic Wars, Hussar regiments were to be found in all the principal armies of Europe, with every variation of colour and braiding that art could provide. The four oldest Hussar regiments of the French service had traditional distinctive costumes, respectively sky blue and silver (Berchény), maroon and silver (Chamborant), silver grey and crimson (Esterhazy), green and gold (Saxe-Conflans). The corresponding older regiments of the Prussian Army displayed uniforms of black, scarlet, brown, crimson and green. The Austrian Imperial Army had a similar range of colours, while the Russians could show pink and yellow, orange and black. A black Hussar regiment also appeared in the British service in September, 1809, when a corps of Brunswick cavalry formed in the April of that year, were compelled by the French conquest of their country to emigrate to England and, like their Hanoverian comrades of the King's German Legion, to come into British pay. The "Black



Field Officer of the Prussian
Zieten-Hussars 1775

Brunswickers," however, returned to their country at the end of the Napoleonic War, and eventually became the 17th (Brunswick) Hussars of the pre-war German Army.

The actual British Hussar regiments of Hussars, however, both at that time and ever since till the present day, have not varied from uniforms of dark blue—at least so far as the Regular cavalry have been concerned for several of our Yeomanry regiments have worn Hussar costumes of scarlet or green. Abroad, the German Army preserved the varied uniforms noted above until 1914, and the Spanish Army added to the galaxy a Hussar uniform of white and gold. This, however, was a comparatively modern creation, the "Husares de la Princesa," dating only from 1836. The varied splendour of the old Austrian uniforms was retained until the unfortunate war of 1849; but in the reorganization which followed that campaign the Hussar uniforms of the Imperial Army were simplified into two patterns, dark blue and light blue, with in each case red breeches. A corresponding simplification took place in the uniforms of the French Hussars after the ensuing war of 1870. On grounds of economy the varying uniforms of the individual regiments were swept away; the historic colours of the old 2nd and 3rd Hussars of the French Army—the maroon of Chamborant and the silver grey with crimson braid of Esterhazy—at last disappeared; and all the French Hussar regiments were clothed alike in the colours they still retain for their full dress to-day, the sky blue and silver, with red trousers, worn from the beginning by their 1st Hussars, the ancient regiment of Berchény.

It is perhaps appropriate that the uniform of that old regiment should thus be preserved, for the disbandment of the former regiments of the Austro-Hungarian and the German armies after the last war has left the French 1st Hussars as incontestably the oldest Hussar regiment in existence to-day.* As we have shown, they trace their descent directly from the corps raised by Count Ladislav de Berchény in 1720, and through

* That is, as *Hussars*. The British 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th, 10th, 13th, and 14th Hussars are all older regiments, the first two dating from 1685 and the last two from 1715; but all of them were raised as Dragoons and were not converted into Hussars until the nineteenth century.

that corps, by virtue both of original descent and of subsequent amalgamation, from the Hussars of Rattsky, the descendants of that regiment of wild Hungarian mercenaries which entered the service of the Elector of Bavaria in the days before the British Army marched out from Flanders, up the Rhine and "over the hills and far away" to the battlefield of Blenheim under the Duke of Marlborough.



THE CAVALRY IN FRANCE, AUGUST–NOVEMBER, 1918

By LIEUT.-COLONEL T. PRESTON, M.C., T.D., Yorkshire Hussars

PART II.

THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION ON 8TH AUGUST

8th August
Sketch 1

So far as the ground was concerned, the task which faced Major-General Mullens, G.O.C. 1st Cavalry Division, was easier than that of the 3rd Cavalry Division on his right, for he had no river to cross and could move forward on a two-brigade front from the outset. Moreover, the Amiens–Chaulnes double-line railway ran practically parallel to his intended line of advance, and would be a great help to the troops in keeping their direction.¹

General Mullens's plan, therefore, was as follows:—

The 9th Cavalry Brigade (Brigadier-General d'Arcy Legard) to pass through the 2nd Canadian Division and operate south of the railway;

The 1st Cavalry Brigade (Brigadier-General H. S. Sewell) to pass through the 5th Australian Division and operate north of the railway;

The 2nd Cavalry Brigade (Brigadier-General A. Lawson) to be in divisional reserve and, with divisional headquarters, to follow on behind the 9th Cavalry Brigade.

The two leading brigades were to push on as quickly as possible to the Amiens Outer Defence Line—some six miles beyond our then front line—and hold it until the infantry came up.

¹ The idea was that the cavalry, after handing over the Amiens Defence line to the infantry should press on to the general line Roye–Chaulnes. (See first article).

As mentioned in the previous article, zero hour was at 4.20 a.m., the whole of the Cavalry Corps being assembled by then in the fork between the Amiens-Villers-Bretonneux and Amiens-Roye roads (see Sketch 1). By 5.20 a.m. the 1st and 9th Cavalry Brigades had moved forward until their heads were about a mile north-east of Cachy and the same distance behind the British front line, whilst divisional headquarters were just north of Cachy village.

Though the infantry attack made rapid progress, it was not until 7.30 a.m. that the leading cavalry units were able to cross the front-line trenches. The movement over the actual trenches in the thick fog, with the necessity of clearing away wire in some places, all took time, and moreover the fog made it difficult at first for officers to see exactly where they were.

The 9th Cavalry Brigade rode south of Monument Wood and then advanced towards Marcelcave with the 19th Hussars on the right, the 15th Hussars on the left (with their left on the railway) and the 8th Hussars in reserve, each regiment having with it four Vickers guns of the 9th Machine Gun Squadron. The infantry of the 2nd Canadian Division had got on as far as Guillaucourt—some four miles from our front line—by the time the cavalymen passed through them.

About 11.15 a.m. the 19th Hussars (Lieut.-Colonel G. D. Franks) rode through Guillaucourt village and advanced towards the crucifix outside the south-eastern exit. Here the leading squadron came under heavy machine-gun fire; but by wheeling first north and then east, the troops got into a valley and suffered comparatively few losses. On their left were the 15th Hussars under Lieut.-Colonel H. Combe, who sent forward Captain H. F. Brace's squadron immediately south of the railway: this squadron advanced in line of troop columns, preceded by three patrols which were directed on to certain tactical points—a dovecote, a clump of trees on a ridge, and a railway bridge. Touch was gained with the Bays (1st Cavalry Brigade) north of the railway.

The second 15th Hussar squadron (under Captain F. A. Nicolson) was also in line of troop columns, and was echeloned

8th August
Sketch 1

8th August
Sketch 1

back on the right of the first. This squadron on emerging from the north-eastern exit of Guillaucourt came under machine-gun fire from its right, was compelled to dismount, and pushed forward on foot to the final objective. The attached Vickers guns of the 9th M.G. Squadron (Major J. A. Moncreiffe) rendered valuable help in this movement, taking on enemy machine guns and keeping down their fire very considerably ; whilst another section attached to the 15th Hussars had the satisfaction of knocking out a German motor-car on the Harbonnières-Rosières road. The car was seen to stop and burst into flames, the two occupants only just escaping.

From about 11.30 a.m. General Legard's headquarters had been located at the eastern end of Wiencourt, and here about midday an aeroplane landed, its pilot having been wounded : he reported that the enemy was on the run as far east as Rosières. The 9th Brigade was established on its objective (part of the Amiens Outer Defence line) by 1 p.m., having advanced two miles since passing through the infantry, and six miles as the crow flies since crossing the original British front line in the early morning.

In the meantime, Brigadier-General Sewell's 1st Cavalry Brigade had been advancing north of the railway, which they had crossed south-east of Villers-Bretonneux. Passing over the front-line trenches with the Queen's Bays (Lieut.-Colonel G. H. A. Ing) as advanced guard, the Brigade pushed on behind the infantry of the 5th Australian Division, through which the leading squadrons passed at about 9.15 a.m., just after the Australians had reached their second objective west of Harbonnières.

The Bays immediately came into action, taking 30 prisoners with two trench mortars. Captain Barnard's squadron was then fired at from a point south of Harbonnières, but two troops were ordered to charge, killing about 20 Germans and capturing 26 with two machine guns, as well as a field gun in a tunnel under the railway : the squadron then rallied in the low ground between Harbonnières and the railway. Another attempted advance by the squadron at 9.30 a.m. was stopped by heavy

hostile machine-gun fire from south and south-east of the village. 8th August
Sketch 1

Some whippet tanks then having come up, they and the squadron tried another advance towards the Harbonnières-Rosières road, but this also was held up, two tanks being knocked out and a third breaking down. Captain Barnard, Lieutenant Solaini and Lieutenant Tomlinson having been wounded, Lieutenant Hannon took command of the squadron and held a line along the railway, facing south, with a patrol pushed forward to a bridge further down the railway. From this position the squadron killed large numbers of Germans with Hotchkiss and rifle fire, also capturing two wagons which came up a road, evidently unaware that our cavalry had got so far forward.

At 9.40 a.m. Colonel Ing sent up the Bays' reserve squadron with four machine guns from the 1st M.G. Squadron, to the same position in the valley south of Harbonnières, and shortly afterwards the regiment captured a lorry loaded with German officers' kits coming out of the village. At 10.30 some Australian infantry came up, and one squadron of the Bays was withdrawn to its horses with the idea of resuming the advance mounted; but a tank officer having reported that the enemy were massing in large numbers for a counter-attack, and the Australians being as yet rather weak in numbers, Colonel Ing thought it best to keep his men in position and send the horses back under cover. Actually, no counter-attack materialised, but any of our patrols who tried to advance were instantly shot at. These two squadrons of the Bays, therefore, stayed where they were for the time being, touch being obtained with the 15th Hussars south of the railway as already mentioned.

The left-hand squadron of the Bays (Captain Sir C. Magnay) had meanwhile advanced round the northern side of Bayonvillers, its leading troop under Lieutenant Carabine sustaining several casualties from hostile machine-gun fire. Later on, this squadron took up a position dismounted and drove off a local counter-attack whilst the Australian infantry were digging themselves in behind.

8th August
Sketch 2

ACTION OF THE 5TH DRAGOON GUARDS.¹

(See Sketch 2).

At about 9.45 a.m. Brigadier-General Sewell ordered the 5th Dragoon Guards (Lieut.-Colonel C. R. Terrot) to pass through the Australian infantry, advance north of Harbonnières, and push on to the final objective; and if the hostile resistance was not too strong, to the line Vauvillers-Framerville just beyond it. Accordingly the regiment moved off at 10 a.m. in double echelon of squadrons at a trot, led by "A" Squadron (Captain A. D. Winterbottom) in the centre, with "B" Squadron (Captain L. F. Mitchell) slightly in rear on the left and "C" Squadron (Captain H. O. Wiley)² on the right. Regimental headquarters followed "C" Squadron. The regiment passed through the leading infantry 1,000 yards west of the second objective (about a mile north-west of Harbonnières) and rode on without opposition to a point 1,000 yards past the second objective.

From this point the operations of the squadrons were as follows. "A" Squadron, which was leading, was fired at by machine guns from Harbonnières, but pushed straight on to the Amiens Outer Defence line, which it found unoccupied. After crossing the trenches, the squadron was shot at from a train on the light railway east of Harbonnières: the train was trying to steam away, but was struck and set on fire by a bomb from one of our aeroplanes. Continuing its advance, the squadron overran the train; its occupants (most of whom had just returned from leave) tried to get away towards Framerville, but were all killed or captured, some by "A" and some by "B" Squadron.³

Still advancing, "A" Squadron was enfiladed by machine-gun fire from the cemetery on the western outskirts of Vauvillers, but it managed to reach its objective, the Vauvillers-Framerville road, where it came into dismounted action against the retreating enemy.

¹ From an account kindly supplied by Lieut.-Colonel H. O. Wiley, M.C., who took part in the action.

² One troop of "C" Squadron was away on liaison duty with the 9th Cavalry Brigade.


³ A Bays' patrol under Lieutenant Cockerill also assisted.



THE CHARGE OF 5TH DRAGOON GUARDS AT HARBONNIERES, AUGUST 8th, 1918

From the painting by Fortunino Matania, in possession of the 5th Dragoon Guards.

Exhibited in the Royal Academy.



Various parties of Germans were captured at this point, including infantry, transport, two motor lorries, two anti-aircraft guns, two field guns and a 5.9-in. howitzer, as well as the staff and patients of a casualty clearing station at the Moulin de Vauvillers.

Shortly afterwards "B" Squadron joined up with "A," after which both squadrons, being much depleted owing to casualties and sending men back as escort to prisoners, withdrew to the Amiens Outer Defence line north-east of Harbonnières.

"B" Squadron had, as already mentioned, followed on the left rear of "A" when the advance started. Having helped to round up the Germans escaping from the train, "B" Squadron advanced over the Vauvillers-Framerville road and then swung south towards the small wood 1,300 yards S.S.E. of Vauvillers, killing many of the retiring enemy and capturing some transport. However, the wood was wired and full of machine guns, its defence being—so it was said—organised by a divisional general who was thought to be an Austrian. The squadron, therefore, being far from its objective, wheeled round and joined "A" Squadron on the Vauvillers-Framerville road as noted above.

Turning now to "C" Squadron—which moved on the right flank with regimental headquarters—they captured a light engine and some trucks before reaching the Amiens Outer Defence line which they crossed. Heavy enfilade machine-gun and rifle fire was now turned upon them from the right flank, and they were thereupon ordered to swing left-handed and occupy the trench line. This proved to be a difficult operation owing to the heavy fire, under which the led horses had to recross the trench; and a number of men and horses were hit. One of the latter was Lieut.-Colonel Terrot's charger, and he was in consequence unable to go on with the other two squadrons.

The defence of the trench was then organized, some more Germans found in it being captured, whilst a message was sent back to 1st Cavalry Brigade headquarters asking for reinforcements; meanwhile a heavy machine-gun fire was kept up on

8th August
Sketch 2

the trench on the right. Several small parties of the enemy just in front of the trench were attacked and taken prisoner.

Just about an hour had now elapsed since the regiment had passed through the infantry. At 11 a.m. the Australians came up and took over the trench from "C" Squadron which withdrew, joining up with the other two squadrons and concentrating north-west of Harbonnières.

Besides killing a large number of Germans, the 5th Dragoon Guards captured and brought back 20 officers, 740 other ranks, 50 horses and 5 transport wagons.

The regiment suffered the following casualties:—Officers, one killed (Lieutenant J. Jordan); one wounded and remained at duty (Captain H. O. Wiley). Other ranks: 6 killed, 42 wounded (one remained at duty), 5 accidentally hurt, 8 missing. Horses: 122 killed, wounded and missing.

* * * *

This little affair is a very good example of what damage can be inflicted by a well-handled cavalry regiment when used to exploit an infantry success. The following lessons were learnt from it:—

- (1) Owing to the noise and excitement of battle, verbal orders were misunderstood, even though the regiment was in a drill formation. It was found much better to send a man with a message to each squadron leader.
- (2) Until squadrons were finally committed it was best for their leaders to ride with the C.O., leaving their seconds-in-command in charge of the squadrons.
- (3) No unit smaller than a regiment could undertake an operation of this kind.
- (4) Practice in forming up prisoners and detailing escorts to take them to the rear was greatly lacking. It had never been practised and should be.
- (5) The horses were big in condition at the commencement. They stood the action very well and proved that big condition was best before any large-scale cavalry operation.

- (6) A great deal of ceremonial drill had been done during the summer of 1918 and there is no doubt that this contributed largely to the steadiness of squadrons in the action.

THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION GAINS ITS OBJECTIVE.

During the first part of the foregoing operations, the G.O.C. 1st Cavalry Division had fixed his headquarters at Marcelcave station, whence he moved forward to the north-east of Guillaucourt at 11.45 a.m. A quarter of an hour later the Bays (1st Cavalry Brigade) attacked southwards from Harbonnières station so as to help the 9th Brigade and other troops south of the railway, one squadron of the 5th Dragoon Guards and four more machine guns being sent to assist. The 11th Hussars (Lieut.-Colonel R. J. P. Anderson) were then ordered to advance southwards from the east end of Harbonnières, covered by machine guns placed at the southern edge of the village, whilst "I" Battery, R.H.A., also came into action.

8th August
Sketch 1

It was found impossible to advance owing to hostile machine-gun fire, but as we have already seen, the 9th Cavalry Brigade south of the railway was able to push on to its objective by 1 p.m.

At 12.15 p.m. General Mullens conferred with General Sewell, who reported that his brigade was firmly established on the Amiens Outer Defence line, but that there was strong resistance east and south of Vauvillers. General Mullens then decided to use the 2nd Cavalry Brigade—which had so far been held in divisional reserve—to prolong the right of the 9th Cavalry Brigade and get in touch with the left of the 3rd Cavalry Division south of the Luce. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade accordingly rode southwards from Guillaucourt to a point north of Caix, where it turned east, crossed the Amiens Outer Defence line and (at about 1.45 p.m.) pushed out patrols towards Vrély and Rosières. These patrols were, however, met by heavy bursts of machine-gun fire, showing that both villages were strongly held; and on the left, patrols of the 9th Cavalry Brigade were similarly held up. The 1st Cavalry Brigade was now brought

back into reserve at Guillaucourt, moving at 4 p.m. to an area near Caix, where General Mullens also fixed his divisional headquarters for the night.

At 7.30 p.m. the 6th Canadian Infantry Brigade took over the line from the 1st Cavalry Division ; the 2nd and 9th Cavalry Brigades spent the night in support behind the right and left, respectively, of the infantry, except for one squadron of the 9th Lancers, which remained in the line.

THE 2ND CAVALRY DIVISION ON 8TH AUGUST.

8th August
Sketch 1

As we saw in the first article of this series, Major-General Pitman's 2nd Cavalry Division was held back in Cavalry Corps reserve at the outset ; and, owing to the rapid progress made during the morning by the other two divisions, its help was not needed for some hours.

When about midday the Corps Commander learnt of the resistance encountered by the 3rd Cavalry Division in Beaucourt Wood, he ordered General Pitman to assist by moving north of the Luce with the 3rd and 4th Cavalry Brigades, the 5th Cavalry Brigade being retained in Corps reserve and sent at 1 p.m. to a spot half-a-mile south-west of Aubercourt. Soon afterwards, however, news came in that the 3rd Cavalry Division was pushing on to its objective and needed no help on the left, so the order to General Pitman was cancelled.

At 2.15 p.m., Sir Charles Kavanagh gave verbal instructions to Brigadier-General Rankin of the 4th Cavalry Brigade to seize the high ground beyond Caix. The 4th Cavalry Brigade, therefore, moved off along the north bank of the Luce, closely followed by the 3rd. Major-General Pitman, accompanied by his G.S.O.1 (Lieut.-Colonel Malise Graham) accompanied the column and, on a ridge south of Caix, met the G.O.C. 6th Cavalry Brigade and arranged that that brigade should co-operate on the right of the 4th in its advance. Shortly before 6 p.m. the 3rd Hussars (Lieut.-Colonel W. T. Willcox) attempted to get forward towards Vrély and Rosières ; but as we have seen already, these villages were strongly held and no further progress could be made.

When darkness fell at 8.30, the 2nd Cavalry Division (less the 5th Cavalry Brigade in Cavalry Corps reserve) concentrated in the valley south of Guillaucourt. The 4th Machine Gun Squadron spent the night with the Canadian infantry and rejoined its brigade next morning. At 8 p.m., Sir Charles Kavanagh moved his advanced Corps headquarters to Cayeux-en-Santerre, and an hour later one of his staff saw the G.O.C. 11th Canadian Infantry Brigade, who arranged for the relief of the 3rd Cavalry Division in the line. This was done during the night, and the 3rd Cavalry Division came into Corps reserve just east of Cayeux, the 2nd Cavalry Division relieving it behind the infantry.

SITUATION ON THE EVENING OF 8TH AUGUST.

The situation at the close of the first day of the battle was most satisfactory. The Fourth Army's surprise attack had succeeded almost beyond the highest hopes. The Germans had been driven back from six to seven miles with a loss of over 13,000 prisoners and between three and four hundred guns. The cavalry had performed invaluable service, having passed through the leading infantry about 10 o'clock in the morning, and gained the Amiens Outer Defence line—save at one point on the right opposite Le Quesnel—early in the afternoon. Owing to hostile machine-gun fire from the villages, it had not been possible to push on in any strength east of the Outer Defence line; but it was confidently hoped that the morrow would see a further advance. Of the nine brigades in the Cavalry Corps, only four¹ had so far been seriously engaged.

8th August
Sketch 1

Throughout the day's operations, the rapid advance of the cavalry had made it extremely difficult to maintain communications. The two leading divisions, and even the Corps headquarters, went far too fast for the cable wagons to keep up with them, and too fast for the supply of available cable to be maintained. Wireless was constantly used and was a great help; indeed, after Cavalry Corps headquarters was established at Cayeux, wireless and telegraph were the only means of com-

¹ Canadian and 7th Cavalry Brigades (3rd Cavalry Division); 9th and 1st Cavalry Brigades (1st Cavalry Division).

munication—other than D.Rs. or officers in cars—back to the Army and Canadian and Australian Corps. The limit of speaking on the cable had been reached and passed.

THE SECOND DAY: PLANS FOR 9TH AUGUST.

Sir Henry Rawlinson's overnight orders were for the advance to be continued towards the general line Roye-Chaulnes-Bray-sur-Somme-Dernancourt, some five miles ahead of the line held on the night of 8th August. The Canadian Corps was to operate on the right, assisted by the Cavalry Corps: as regards the latter, the 2nd Cavalry Division on the right and the 1st on the left were to pass through the infantry as soon as they could and advance in the direction of Roye and Chaulnes respectively. The 3rd Cavalry Division, in Corps reserve, was to come back to the Caix-Cayeux area for the present and water its horses on the south side of the Luce.

The hour of attack was left to the Canadian Corps, who fixed zero at 10 a.m. The Cavalry Corps commander, therefore, held a conference at Cayeux at 7 a.m., attended by his three divisional commanders and General Hardress Lloyd, 3rd Tank Brigade. Cavalry Corps operation orders were issued at 9 a.m., by which hour the 2nd and 1st Cavalry Divisions were formed up in positions of readiness south and north of Caix.

THE FIGHTING ON 9TH AUGUST: THE 2ND CAVALRY DIVISION.

9th August
Sketch 3

It will be remembered that Le Quesnel village had defied capture on the first day—in fact it was the one point where our troops had not reached their final objective. In the early morning of the 9th, after a heavy bombardment, it was attacked and taken by a Canadian battalion, and all was now ready for a general advance by the Canadian Corps. It was originally intended to commence this at 10 a.m., but owing to communication difficulties and other causes, the general forward movement did not begin until 11 a.m., and in the case of some infantry brigades not till 1 p.m. As a result, the fighting throughout the day was of a very disjointed nature, the attacks of the various divisions and brigades starting at different times ;

in some of them the infantry were supported by artillery or tanks, and in others with no outside help.

In the 2nd Cavalry Division, General Pitman had the 3rd Cavalry Brigade in front, the 4th close behind, and the 5th in divisional reserve (the latter brigade had been in corps reserve the day before and had now been returned). In the 3rd Cavalry Brigade, the 4th Hussars (Lieut.-Colonel N. O. Laing) sent out mounted patrols at an early hour ; these reported that at 6.50 a.m. the line Le Quesnel-Beaufort-Warvillers-Vrély was strongly held by the enemy, and that a cavalry advance was impossible at present.

For various reasons the infantry did not attack on the right until after midday, and at 1.25 p.m. the 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade was reported to be held up by machine-gun fire from Beaufort Wood. A company of whippet tanks lent by the Cavalry Corps, however, enabled the Canadians to capture the wood, and at 2.45 p.m. it was found possible to move part of the 2nd Cavalry Division forward : the 5th Cavalry Brigade (Brigadier-General N. W. Haig) sent the Royal Scots Greys (Lieut.-Colonel W. F. Collins) towards Le Quesnel, with whippet tanks to work down the Roye main road, and the 20th Hussars (Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Little) towards Beaufort with four whippets and two Vickers machine guns. At the same time the 3rd Cavalry Brigade (Brigadier-General J. A. Bell-Smyth) moved on Vrély with the 4th Hussars leading. About half-an-hour later large numbers of Germans were reported to be retiring from Beaufort Wood towards Warvillers ; they were engaged by R.H.A. guns, and at 3.15 p.m. an attempt was made by a squadron of the 16th Lancers to charge them ; this was unfortunately foiled by a belt of old wire. It certainly looked at this moment as if the enemy was on the run, and orders were sent to the 3rd Cavalry Division (in corps reserve) to saddle up and be ready to move.

During the next two hours the 5th Cavalry Brigade managed to get about a mile and a half further forward, and reached Folies ; here, however, they were held up by machine-gun and shell fire, whilst on the left the 3rd Cavalry Brigade were simi-

larly stopped after working round Warvillers ; the trouble here seemed to be machine-gun fire from the north and north-east, in the 1st Cavalry Division sector. Shortly before 7 p.m. the Scots Greys pressed on to Bouchoir and the 20th Hussars to a point south of Rouvroy-en-Santerre, whilst at 7.15 p.m. the 3rd Brigade succeeded in making another short advance, the 5th Lancers (Lieut.-Colonel B. W. Robinson)¹ getting into the western end of Rouvroy-en-Santerre although the 4th Hussars, coming round on the left flank, were unable to enter the east end of the village. The remainder of the 2nd Cavalry Division was at the cross roads 1,500 yards west of Warvillers, and no more progress had been made by the time darkness fell—but it is important to note that not only the cavalry, but the infantry and tanks as well, were unable to gain any more ground here. By about 9 p.m. the 2nd Cavalry Division had been relieved by Canadian infantry and withdrawn into bivouac, where the horses were watered—many of them for the first time that day.

ACTION OF THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION.

9th August
Sketch 3

As already mentioned, the objective of the 1st Cavalry Division for 9th August was Chaulnes, an advance of some five miles ; and the divisional boundaries were: on the right, the line Vrély-Fouquescourt-Hattencourt, and on the left, the railway. This meant that the division would be operating on a frontage of two to three miles, and Major-General Mullens proposed to advance with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade on the right, the 9th on the left and the 1st in reserve.

The original idea was for the cavalry to move forward ahead of the infantry, but—as in the case of the 2nd Cavalry Division—mounted patrols sent out in the early morning found Vrély and Rosières strongly held, whilst other patrols² which rode north-east across the railway had no better luck. It was, therefore, decided at 8 a.m. that the infantry should attack

¹ One squadron under Captain Heath was attached to Cavalry Corps H.Q. as escort squadron from August 8–12.

² One of these, very gallantly led by Corporal Graham, 8th Hussars, got as far as the outskirts of Vauvillers, being under fire all the time it was out.

first, the cavalry to pass through as soon as they got the opportunity.

The 2nd Canadian Division launched its attack on Vrély at 11 a.m. and met with strong resistance. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade sent the 9th Lancers (Major R. H. R. Brocklebank) towards Vrély in front of the infantry, but this gallant attempt to get forward was soon stopped by machine-gun fire. Rosières was attacked about 1 p.m., but for some time no definite news came to hand. At 3.45 p.m. the 1st Cavalry Brigade moved towards Vrély, this village and Rosières having been reported clear of the enemy: half-an-hour later, however, Germans were found to be still holding part of Rosières. Tanks were sent to clear up the situation, and at 5 p.m. the 9th Cavalry Brigade was able to advance south of Rosières: the 8th Hussars (Lieut.-Colonel G. M. Mort) galloped on to Meharicourt and found it clear of the enemy, but patrols¹ which pushed on to Maucourt and the railway found they could get no further owing to wire, broken ground and machine-gun fire. Immediately to the right, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade had galloped for Fouquescourt, but had been prevented, by the same causes, from entering the village.

By 5.30 p.m. the 1st Cavalry Division had reached the limit of its advance for the day. The 2nd and 9th Cavalry Brigades held the line: cross-roads N.E. of Rouvroy—east of Meharicourt—sugar factory S.E. of Rosières, whilst the 1st Cavalry Brigade in reserve had come up to Vrély. The division had advanced to a maximum depth of about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from what had been the front line that morning. At 9 p.m. the cavalrymen—except those holding advanced posts—were relieved by Canadian infantry.

SITUATION ON EVENING OF 9TH AUGUST AND ORDERS FOR 10TH.

The result of the fighting on 9th August was a further big advance all along the Fourth Army front, namely about five miles on the right and rather less on the left. Many more prisoners and guns had been taken, but all commanders realized

9/19th Aug.
Sketch 3

¹ Lieutenant Wall's patrol galloped over a party of Germans in a trench, all of whom—2 officers and 60 other ranks—surrendered.

that the enemy's resistance was stiffening. The initial surprise effect had worn off and—a most important factor—we had now to fight over very difficult ground. Our troops had reached the edge of a wide stretch of country over which the French had fought in the 1916 Somme battles: the ground was completely covered by old trenches, shell-holes and belts of wire, all partly hidden by long grass. This, of course, favoured enormously the enemy's delaying tactics and lavish use of machine guns in the defence; the country was well-nigh impossible for our tanks and cavalry and exceedingly difficult even for infantry.

On the other hand, our losses—except in a few infantry battalions—had not been severe, and a fresh division (the 32nd) had been allotted to the Canadian Corps. Sir Henry Rawlinson felt that if we continued to press the Germans as we had done during the past two days, their resistance might be definitely broken down. He therefore gave orders for a further advance on 10th August, the objective being the same as the day before, namely the line Roye-Chaulnes-Bray-Dernancourt.

The Cavalry Corps' orders, issued at 11.55 p.m., were to the following effect:—

The 3rd Cavalry Division to send out patrols at 5 a.m. along the whole front of the Canadian Corps between the Roye main road and the Amiens-Chaulnes railway. The main body of the division to move at 5.30 to a position of readiness between Le Quesnel and Caix. As soon as the above-mentioned patrols were out, the advanced posts, patrols, etc., of the 1st Cavalry Division to withdraw to the area north of the Luce between Caix and Cayeux (where the main body of that division was already bivouacked). The 2nd Cavalry Division likewise to withdraw all patrols, etc., to the Caix-Cayeux area south of the Luce.

The 3rd Tank Brigade to send all available whippet tanks to co-operate with the 3rd Cavalry Division.

Cavalry Corps H.Q. to remain for the time being at Cayeux.

* * * *

The night of the 9th/10th was quiet except for aerial bombing by the Germans along the main roads and the Luce valley,

and several cavalry units suffered casualties in men and horses from this cause.

THE CAVALRY ON 10TH AUGUST.

By 5.30 a.m. Major-General Harman's 3rd Cavalry Division was formed up about a mile south of Caix. He proposed to advance with the 6th Cavalry Brigade on the right, the 7th on the left, and the Canadian in reserve. The 6th Cavalry Brigade was ready to move with its patrols in close touch with the infantry on the front (both inclusive) Bouchoir-Rouvroy, whilst the 7th was similarly behind the line (exclusive) Rouvroy-Meharicourt-(inclusive) Rosières.¹ The infantry attack made little progress until 8 a.m., and although at 10.30 the 6th Cavalry Brigade moved further forward, there seemed to be no immediate prospect of passing through the infantry. At about 11.30 a.m. an optimistic report (which proved later to be quite inaccurate) came in from the 32nd Division to the effect that the enemy was falling back rapidly and that Parvillers, La Chavatte and Fransart were in our hands. On this, the 6th and 7th Cavalry Brigades sent out special patrols to report on the suitability of the ground for a rapid mounted advance (they reported at 12.40 that it was quite unsuitable); the Canadian Cavalry Brigade was moved to a point half a mile west of Parvillers; the 2nd Cavalry Division was ordered to saddle up and be ready to move; and the 1st Cavalry Division was placed on one hour's notice but without saddling up.

By 1.30 p.m., Sir Charles Kavanagh had moved his advanced report centre to a point just S.E. of Caix. At that hour the 3rd Cavalry Division was moving through Warvillers towards Rouvroy, its advanced troops being in touch with the infantry near Damery and Parvillers.² The 2nd Cavalry Division was moving up behind the 3rd west of Warvillers.

¹ The 7th Brigade patrols were found by a squadron of the 7th D.Gs. under Captain Malone, and a squadron of the 17th Lancers under Captain Parbury.

² About this time, a company of whippets under Major West arrived at 6th Cavalry Brigade H.Q. on the Folies-Warvillers road, to discuss an attack on Parvillers by the tanks in conjunction with the Royals and 3rd D.Gs.; the ground, however, proved to be totally unsuitable.

Major R. A. West, D.S.O., M.C., who was formerly in the North Somerset Yeomanry, was killed a few days later, and was awarded a posthumous V.C. for magnificent work with his tanks.

An hour later the G.O.C. Cavalry Corps, still believing that the Germans were on the run, ordered :—

The 3rd Cavalry Division to push on to the high ground north of Roye ; the 2nd Cavalry Division to push on and occupy Nesle that night ; and the 1st Cavalry Division to saddle up and move to the low ground 1,000 yards N.W. of Warvillers.

General Harman decided to send the Canadian Cavalry Brigade (Brigadier-General Paterson) on towards Roye, closely supported by the 6th Brigade. The divisional commander, after conferring with the two brigadiers, decided that the only possible line of advance was along and south of the main Roye road. The Canadians, therefore, rode off via Bouchoir to carry out their mission, the 7th Brigade being now withdrawn into divisional reserve.

At 4 o'clock the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, in touch with the French infantry on their right, captured Andechy, securing 41 prisoners and a quantity of rolling stock, with supplies, on the railway. A line was taken up half-a-mile east of Andechy, but machine-gun fire was coming from woods north-east of Damery and from Hill 100 on the Roye road, and further advance was checked. Three troops of the Fort Garry Horse now made a daring attempt to take Hill 100 by a mounted charge straight down the Roye road—the ground on either side being impassable—but this was stopped by machine-gun fire, the losses in horses being heavy but, luckily, comparatively light in men.¹ An infantry attack on Equerre Wood, launched at the same time by the 32nd Division, equally failed to make any progress.

No better fortune attended the 2nd Cavalry Division which, with the 4th Cavalry Brigade leading, tried to advance via Maucourt on Fouquescourt. This marked the end of the battle so far as the cavalry were concerned.

At 6 p.m. Cavalry Corps received a warning order from Fourth Army stating that G.H.Q. had ordered the Army to push on to the River Somme—some eight miles away—and establish

¹ Several of the wounded were brought in by a M.O. and bearers from the 6th C.F.A. (Lieut.-Colonel C. H. Stringer), which throughout the day was the furthest advanced medical unit on the Roye road. It evacuated many infantry casualties as well as cavalry.

bridgeheads from Ham to Péronne. The Cavalry Corps was to advance on the morning of the 11th, with a view to securing the river line from Offoy to St. Christ, followed by the Canadian Corps; one cavalry brigade being lent to the Australian Corps.

The B.G.G.S. Cavalry Corps (Brigadier-General A. F. Home) immediately motored to Fourth Army headquarters and pointed out that, apart from the increased enemy resistance, the ground was quite impassable for large bodies of cavalry: the order was, therefore, cancelled.

At 7 p.m., cavalry patrols reported that the infantry had not got on as far as had been reported, and that the Germans still held the line Bois Z-Damery-Parvillers-Fouquescourt-Maucourt. General Kavanagh thereupon ordered the withdrawal of all the cavalry for the night as follows:—

- 1st Cavalry Division to bivouacs N.W. of Caix;
- 2nd Cavalry Division to area Beaufort-Warvillers-Vrély;
- 3rd Cavalry Division to area Le Quesnel-Folies-Bouchoir.

WITHDRAWAL OF THE CAVALRY: CLOSE OF THE BATTLE OF AMIENS.

At 7 a.m. on 11th August, Cavalry Corps issued the following orders to the three divisions, the gist of which had already been telephoned to them during the night:— 11th August
Sketch 3

- (1) *1st Cavalry Division* to send out patrols to keep touch with the infantry and to be ready to move at short notice.
- (2) *2nd Cavalry Division* (less 3rd Cavalry Brigade operating with Australian Corps) to be ready to move at one hour's notice.
- (3) *3rd Cavalry Division* to remain in bivouacs at one hour's notice.
- (4) *6th Squadron, R.A.F.*, to provide contact patrols with the infantry and report progress every two hours.
- (5) *3rd Tank Brigade* to be ready to co-operate with the cavalry if required.

By 12.30 p.m. the infantry had not advanced, and no attack seemed to be probable. The M.G.G.S. Fourth Army (Major-General A. A. Montgomery) then rang up on the telephone to say that the Army Commander wished to withdraw the cavalry as soon as possible: any cavalry not engaged could be sent back when the Cavalry Corps Commander thought fit, and the rest when that day's operations were over. General Kavanagh attended a conference at 3 p.m. at Villers Bretonneux, where the 2nd Australian Divisional headquarters were located, and during the evening the cavalry were withdrawn as follows:—

The 2nd Cavalry Division moved at 5 p.m. to the Cayeux-Ignacourt area, leaving the 3rd Cavalry Brigade between Cayeux and Caix ready to operate with the Australian Corps.

The 1st Cavalry Division moved at 6 p.m. to the Vecquemont-Rivery area, with its H.Q. at Lamotte-Brebiere (2½ miles east of Amiens).

The 3rd Cavalry Division moved at 7.30 p.m. to the Boves-Ailly-sur-Noye area, with its H.Q. in Boves Wood.

On the march back, the 1st Cavalry Division was bombed from the air near Domart, the 18th Hussars and 9th Cavalry Field Ambulance, unfortunately, suffering several casualties.

* * * *

It was estimated that during the 8th, 9th and 10th August the Cavalry Corps captured some 3,000 prisoners, together with two trains and a large quantity of supplies and transport. The 1st Cavalry Division alone had obtained receipts for 1,361 prisoners (11 being officers) on August 8th and 9th; but, as already pointed out, the rapid advance of the regiments made it quite impossible to keep an accurate list of all the prisoners, guns and other booty that were taken or ridden over. Large numbers of the enemy were also known to have been killed.

The Cavalry Corps casualties—including several from aerial bombing at night—totalled 1,052, of whom 117 were killed: a very light list under the circumstances.¹

¹ Appendices 1 and 2.

These three days' operations showed the great value of mounted troops in exploiting the success of a surprise infantry attack, *so long as the ground was such as to permit rapid movement*. It was not so much the actual enemy machine guns that held up the cavalymen in the later stages, as the fact that the broken ground prevented manœuvres to avoid and outflank these machine guns. And it cannot be too strongly emphasized that the infantry and tanks were equally unable to cope with these conditions. The whole Fourth Army was virtually held up, and by 13th August the Commander-in-Chief, after a personal visit, had decided to strike his next blow on another part of the line where the Germans were less fully prepared.

(To be continued)



APPENDIX 1.

CAVALRY CORPS CASUALTIES, AUGUST 8th-12th, 1918

					Officers.			Other Ranks.		
					K.	W.	M.	K.	W.	M.
1st Cavalry Division :										
1st Cavalry Brigade	2	6	—	8	98	13
2nd Cavalry Brigade	1	4	1	3	90	—
9th Cavalry Brigade	1	7	—	11	99	—
Divisional Troops	4	6	—	17	34	1
Total					8	23	1	39	321	14
2nd Cavalry Division :										
3rd Cavalry Brigade	1	9	—	9	49	12
4th Cavalry Brigade	—	5	—	6	61	7
5th Cavalry Brigade	—	1	—	—	12	—
Divisional Troops	—	6	—	—	26	1
Total					1	21	—	15	148	20
3rd Cavalry Division :										
6th Cavalry Brigade	1	1	—	3	28	2
7th Cavalry Brigade	1	14	—	15	102	23
Canadian Cavalry Brigade	4	6	1	21	126	38
Divisional Troops	1	1	—	8	41	4
Total					7	22	1	47	297	67
Grand Total					16	66	2	101	766	101


APPENDIX 2.

CASUALTIES OF 7TH AND 9TH CAVALRY BRIGADES, AUGUST 8th-10th, 1918

				Officers.			Other Ranks.			Horse Casualties.
				K.	W.	M.	K.	W.	M.	
7th Cavalry Brigade :										
Brigade Headquarters	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
7th Dragoon Guards	—	9	—	5	36	3	120
Inniskillings	—	3	—	4	37	16	117
17th Lancers	1	1	—	4	22	5	62
7th M.G. Squadron	1	—	—	—	1	—	4
“ K ” Battery, R.H.A.	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Total				2	13	—	13	96	26	303
9th Cavalry Brigade :										
8th Hussars	—	1	—	2	34	—	66
15th Hussars	1	3	—	6	24	2	50
19th Hussars	—	2	—	3	37	—	75
9th M.G. Squadron	—	—	—	2	4	—	15
9th Cavalry Field Ambulance	—	2	—	1	6	1	8
“ Y ” Battery, R.H.A.	—	—	—	—	2	—	4
Total				1	8	—	14	107	3	218

Note.—The above totals do not quite agree with the figures given by the divisions and shown Appendix 1. It is not known which are correct.

SKETCH 1



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THE PLANT

BY JOHN BARRACK.

I.

THE Intelligence Officer gazed thoughtfully at the swiftly changing traffic in the Nanking Road. To use his own phraseology, Tony Wilson was feeling a little peeved. This trouble in China was a nuisance. Already it had stopped his leave; and he had half-intended to get married, but a curt forty-eight hours' notice had put an end to that. Ah well, perhaps he would be able to save some money whilst in China. He settled still more comfortably in the car. As the motor swung down this main thoroughfare of the central and western districts of Shanghai, Tony idly turned over in his mind how his lack of knowledge of either the Chinese language or the people would help him to carry out his job. But his brain refused to concentrate. His thoughts wandered to the scenes around him.

He was thrilled by the glamour of the streets. The electric lights were on and the sky was that very dark blue that is sometimes seen in early night, with a few stars shining. The trees in bud and beginning to blossom. The mixture of Chinese and Western architecture. The ubiquitous rickshaw coolies with their varying loads. In the streets were all nationalities—"all that is produceable," as it has sometimes been rather crudely put. Truly cosmopolitan. Picturesque French sailors, hard-bitten U.S. Marines, a hoity-toity damsel claiming a doubtful English nationality, a pert American miss, the real ladies of both countries, here two Chinese women driving in their motor car, there two sing-song girls crowded into one rickshaw, a

partially naked yellow-brown child with strangely red cheeks sprawling on the pavement, its flat-breasted mother smiling at it, a Russian woman carrying a basket of purchases, Frenchwomen, Jewesses, Italian marines, Annamites from the French Concession, Sikh policemen on duty in the International Settlement, Irishmen, Scotsmen, Englishmen, Welshmen, Germans, Belgians, Swedes, Swiss—in fact a medley. The inhabitants of that huge port of the Far East, Shanghai. Shanghai, which has been built up on what was a mud flat!

The car sped on past the Race Club and into the Bubblingwell Road—that poetical name born from the desire of a princess—and still his problem troubled him.

Why the language—damn it, the language was one of tones, differing in practically every part of the country. No, he would never . . . suddenly he sat bolt upright in the car and slapped his thigh. He had got it—his problem was solved! His little knowledge was going to be a dangerous thing—but a dangerous thing to the wily Chink and not to himself. What was it the American had said the evening before when they were discussing a show in the other's country? A ruse . . . a plant . . . well, the Chinese should have a plant all right.

He would learn Chinese!

II.

“Well, Fung, how are we progressing?”

The Chinaman smiled in a nervous, half-deprecatory way. “Master is getting on—famous,” he said, and then closed his books.

“That's good,” said Tony, “because I have a job of work on hand which requires that at least I should know the correct pronunciations of places on the map. But we will go into that to-morrow. I have some writing to do now, Fung, so you can go.”

Tony seated himself at his table, pulled an attaché case towards him and snapped back the fastenings. The Chinaman's eyes seemed to glow for a moment as they rested on the contents of the small case. Sheets of closely typed foolscap, with the corner of a sketch showing under a turned-back leaf. What

would not his masters give for that case complete. Fung conjured up the many thousand taels that would be his, the house he would buy, the wife he would wed, if only he could communicate to his Red patrons all the information contained in those closely written sheets. Already he had done pretty well, for the Englishman was so careless. How frightened he had been the other day when he had seen Fung looking at one of the papers on the table, and how easily he had accepted the explanation that Fung was interested in all things English, especially written English, and the expression of regret and the many apologies. What fools these English were. Ah well, whether the Kuominchun or Ankuochun ultimately succeeded, Fung would feather his own nest whilst he could. Having gathered a sufficiency of money he would then seek safety, either inside the International Settlement at Shanghai, or with whichever was the successful party.

Fungs' dreams were abruptly shattered by Tony suddenly rising to his feet and gazing in consternation at his precious leather case. Then with a smile he turned to the Chinaman. "It's all right, Fung," he said, "I thought I had lost a map, but I see it under those papers on the table." The Chinaman smiled in answer, and with a good-bye, bowed himself out.

* * * * *

The Englishman worked late that evening. He added to his file of "dud" summaries, over which he exercised conspicuously elaborate precautions whenever Fung was present.

The time was ripe. All the misleading information it was necessary to pass on to the Chinese revolutionists was contained in the files and sketch maps, locked in the I.O.'s attaché case. The summaries were works of art. Just enough truth to make them seem genuine. Sufficient spurious information to give a totally inaccurate idea of the likely action of the Powers. Somehow he must get the Chinaman to realize fully what a prize the case was. He was sure Fung had a pretty shrewd idea at the moment, but his appetite must be whetted. He must be given an opportunity to have a good look at the papers; he would then probably arrange to have them stolen. When that happened Tony registered a mental vow that he would not be too near.

He did not trust Fung; and a knife is a handy and silent weapon.

The next day's lessons were very successful. Towards the end Tony unlocked his attaché case and produced a map, showing the distributions of the various Chinese Armies and the names of their Generals.

"Look here, Fung," he said, "these names are so much alike and so confusing, I want you just to go through them with me, and the names of the various provinces." This was done. At the end Tony got to his feet, apparently with the intention of putting the map back in its place, when he suddenly gave a low moan and collapsed over the table. For a few moments he lay still, then, apparently with much effort, managed to murmur, "Help me—bed—next room."

Half-lifting, half-carrying, the Chinaman got the I.O. to his room and called for his servant.

Meanwhile the Oriental's quick eyes were taking in the details of the room. He noted a mosquito net hanging in one corner, the situation of the French-window, the setting of the Englishman's iron bedstead with a second mosquito net suspended above it, and that the floor was covered with a carpet sufficiently thick to deaden footsteps. Then the boy having arrived, Fung Shen Fu prepared to leave. But the Englishman suddenly stirred and opening his eyes, turned to Fung and murmured, "Before you go, please lock away—my case—the map we were looking at—bring me key." Fung Shen Fu nodded. He returned to the next room, and taking up the map, folded it and placed it in the attaché case. He was too cute a criminal to attempt a minute examination of the contents of the case, but a rapid glance at one or two files was sufficient to assure him of their worth. He closed and locked the case and returned to the bedroom with the key.

The Englishman appeared to have practically recovered. He was lying back on the pillows, but his voice was much stronger and firmer when he thanked Fung Shen Fu for his trouble.

The Chinaman, having bowed himself out, pursued his inconspicuous way to a certain low-down tea shop in the heart

of the native city, where, safe from the eyes of the police, and imagining himself immune from the attentions of the police watchers, he had a long and earnest conversation with one of the most unholy looking specimens of humanity it is possible to imagine. Most of the talk seemed to be a wrangle about terms, but eventually the business appeared to be settled, and with the laconic remark, "to-night," accompanied by a horrible sign, the teacher of Chinese hailed a rickshaw and was carried away to the more savoury neighbourhood of his own abode.

III.

At ten o'clock that night Tony might have been seen making elaborate preparation for bed. He was clad in a suit of white silk pyjamas for coolness, but it was noticeable that he was still wearing white socks and a pair of white rubber-soled tennis shoes.

The night was hot, with no breeze to relieve the sultriness. Mosquitos were buzzing and the protection of a net was essential. From force of habit the I.O. examined the net spread over the iron bedstead, set slightly out from the centre of one of the walls of the room. He then produced a couple of boxing gloves, skilfully tied them together, palm to palm, and spread a pinky-brown handkerchief over one and round the wrist-guard of the other. A few streaks of grease paint and the result was a not too unlikely looking face and head, which he fastened to a body of bound-up, suitably-hardened pillows, clad in sky-blue silk pyjamas. It was the old, old trick of a dummy in the bed. But the I.O. was sorry for the dummy, and more sorry for his blue silk pyjamas, which, although they might be a bit faded, were still fairly new.

The result of his labours was a most presentable body, apparently in deep and easy slumber, whilst the boxing glove head rested most naturally on the pillows.

Having assured himself that all was in order, the I.O. readjusted the mosquito net and tucked it in carefully all round the bed; he believed in thoroughness. Through the mosquito net the life-like appearance of the dummy was truly remarkable. Stepping into the next room the I.O. secured the attaché case,

and returning, placed it on a chair by the bed. He then padded softly to the far corner of the room where an old mosquito net was hanging from the ceiling. The net was so disposed that anyone standing by it could see himself in a long looking glass on the opposite side of the room. The I.O. produced some white grease paint and powder; he covered first his face, then his hands, with the mixture; then tied a white handkerchief over his hair. The effect was amazing. In the reflected moonlight, which showed up objects with fair distinctness, he appeared suddenly to merge into the mosquito net by which he was standing. But being a thoughtful individual the I.O. had no idea of standing vigil for possibly several hours. He had carefully provided a chair—but a chair that had been painted all white. After all, he had said to himself, a chair sitting out all by itself under an old mosquito net looks rather odd, unless you colour it to fit in with the general tone of the picture. The chair and the mosquito net were both essentials to enable the long wait to be carried out in comfort and in peace.

With a last look round the I.O. dived under the folds of the net and from then on apparently faded into the greyness of the room. It was to some purpose that he had attended lectures on camouflage during the War.

Slowly the time dragged on. Under his net, safe from the mosquitos and with the slumbrous hotness of the night around him, Tony was drowsing in his chair. Suddenly he was broad awake. Apparently, however, nothing was stirring; and then he saw a naked foot as it rested for a second on a patch of carpet illumined by a direct ray from the moon. Just that brief glimpse and then it was gone.

He was now fully conscious. He must act swiftly. One mistake and the plot would fail. Watching with the utmost care he saw a faint grey shadow near the bed in the centre of the room. He strained his ears to catch the smallest sound. Ah, yes, there it was. A faint scraping as the thief lifted the attaché case from the chair. Now, if his reasoning had been correct, would come the knife thrust. Suddenly there was a soft tearing noise. Tony simulated a half-moan, half-grunt, for the benefit of the murderer, and then, fearing lest the wretch

should examine the body, gave a shout and fired his automatic, which all the time he had been carefully nursing on his knee. There was a rush of naked feet and a mis-shapen figure, clutching something in its hand, dashed through the French-window, which the I.O. for the first time, now noticed was open.

Ten minutes later Tony was ringing up his Chief on the telephone.

"Yes, it's all right. I've planted the stuff—Oh, yes, one shot was sufficient to scare the bird. Now I think you had better come and fetch me.—Yes—and start the police looking for the pleasant looking johnny who is supposed to have done me in.—What?—yes—anyway, I must get away before the Chinese boys are round to smell a rat. Remember to give the Press some nice snappy paragraphs about me—Yes, I think my body here will do for the corpse. Bring a box or something to put it in. Righto. Good bye."

IV.

Next morning the I.O. made his report to his Chief. He explained in detail the events which led up to the incident of his supposed murder. "As you have often remarked, sir, the test of a scheme, concocted for the benefit of one's enemies, is whether or not they are going to be influenced by it in the way you wish—whether they are going to take the bait. We know, so far, that they consider the papers of sufficient importance to have me killed, as they thought, so that I might not be able to report my loss. If they accept the contents as gospel, then we have gone a long way towards establishing——" At that moment there was a knock at the door, and an officer, carrying a sheet of foolscap, came into the room. Having apologized for his intrusion, he handed the paper to the Chief Intelligence Officer.

"This has just been translated, sir; I thought you would like it at once."

The Chief read the document through in silence, except for a quiet "Ah!" as he laid it in front of him on the desk. As soon as the bearer had left the room the Chief read the paper aloud. It was worded as follows:—

Translation of a document, being the report of a meeting at which one Fung Shen Fu addressed the crowd.

5th June, 1927.

My Brothers, I, Fung Shen Fu, greet you. I have just now been trying to teach one of those lick-spittle running-dog officers our blessed language. I will not tell you how dull, and slow, and stupid he was, how his brain was always clogged as is that of the smoker when the pleasure of the opium has gone. Enough! I say he was a fool, as fools they all are, but he, this one, this man, he more fool than they all. He have books, he have papers, all these he pretend to be much use, much important. But I know. I, Fung Shen Fu, who speak and read the language of the running-dogs, I know. And because I know these papers they are no good, this man he die. He deserve so because he more fool than they all, and he try to make one big fool of me, but he also die because his master, the big Brass hats, the great running-dogs, think we not know what they play, their game.

It is so, my Brothers. . . .

"Well, I'm damned, sir," said Tony. "I bought a raspberry that time. Cunning old fox. Anyway, even if he does not think what we wanted him to, he at least believes I am dead, and——"

"I am sorry, Tony," said the Chief, and the I.O. knew from the tone and the name that he was expressing his sympathy. "I know Fung is not thinking what you hoped he would, but he is thinking and doing what I hoped he would. It is quite plain that he believes that we think he is deceived, and thinking that it will be the more easy actually to put our real plans into effect. Tortuous, you say? Well, so is the Oriental mind. I am building on your ground work. I did not undeceive you before because I wanted of your best. I believe in thoroughness of detail. Now the ground is prepared. We can go ahead. Of course . . ."

But the I.O. was not listening. He was thinking of a pair of blue silk pyjamas, not too badly faded, with two knife cuts clean through the jacket.

CONCERNING A TIGRESS

BY "RISALA."

To the guests who come to one's house the skin of a tiger on the wall is merely a handsome trophy. Some accord unqualified admiration, some view with ill-concealed criticism a skin which compares, unfavourably perhaps, with some of their own fine specimens, while others even display the bad taste to raise their eyebrows when the subject of measurement is mentioned. Such is the diversity of human nature, but to the proud owner, each skin possesses a sentimentality and an individuality peculiarly its own. Therein lies the infinite charm of a trophy. More so than every picture, each head and skin tells a story, and recalls a scene, in the words of a great sportsman and soldier, "As vivid with me now as then." Each one conjures up the vision of some forest setting, perhaps of a cautious stalk in the bitter cold of a winter's morning, perhaps of a sweltering perch in a tree during a beat in the middle of the hot weather, or it may be of a patient wait in a machan, culminating in the arrival of the quarry on to the kill in the late evening, when the sun has sunk below the horizon and the night life is beginning to appear—the last perhaps the most fascinating of all.

To turn however, from the general to the particular, I have in mind the skin of a certain tigress—a fine tigress, measuring eight feet six and a half inches between pegs, which adorns, not my house, but that of my brother-in-law. It was thus:—

One hot weather some years ago, I was shooting with my brother-in-law (henceforward alluded to, by way of abbreviation as P) in the South Mandla District of the Central Provinces. We had actually two blocks at our disposal, but the southern, and most accessible one had been shot in for the

previous two months, and although it was one of the best blocks in the district, we decided that in the circumstances, better chances of sport lay in the northern forest, which had only been visited by one sportsman during the past year. We therefore decided to work our way up, putting in a few days at each camp, partly in order to become familiar with a greater range of country, and partly in the hope of a quick success *en route* with tiger or barasingha. We passed through some magnificent country, consisting mostly of hills covered with thick sal jungle, separated by grassy valleys, interspersed with occasional small areas of cultivation, which betokened the existence of tiny villages. The latter seem somewhat incongruous in their surroundings, for there is a stately grandeur attaching to the sal jungle country, which is not dissimilar to English park land, seen on a vast scale. Also, the rich verdure of the sal reacts on the eye in pleasant contrast to the parched and arid aspect of most other parts of the country at this season of the year. We moved leisurely, halting for three or four days at each stage, tying up baits for tiger each night, and stalking in the jungle morning and evening. Tiger there were, for we saw several tracks of them, while we frequently sighted herds of bison, barasingha, and sambar (though the latter had mostly shed their horns), but no entry had been registered in the game book by the time we reached the camp in the northern block for which we were making. Arrived here, we pitched our tents in the middle of a grove of sal trees, whose ample foliage afforded us the advantage of shade throughout the day. It was a wonderfully pleasant camp, the sole drawback being the fact that the only available water was obtained from a small tank, into which the dwellers of the local hamlet used to drive their cattle to drink. Thanks however, to reliable servants, who carried out with meticulous care our instructions as regards boiling all water, we survived with no ill effects, though our drinks were, to say the least of it—muddy!

One morning about a week after our arrival in this camp, having returned from our respective early stalks, we had just sat down to a late breakfast, when a messenger arrived from X, the Divisional Forest Officer, who was touring his district, to

say that he had had a kill by a tiger and would be delighted if we would go over and join in the beat. He wrote, from the last camp in which we had stayed on our way up, and being a considerate man, had also sent over a couple of ponies, to save us six weary miles on our flat feet. Needless to say, we lost no time in demolishing the remainder of our breakfast, and mounting our temporary "chargers," duly reported ourselves to X shortly before midday. He, of course, was delighted to see us, for the Forest Officer on tour is a lonely soul, and the companionship of two fellow sportsmen, even though it be only for a short while, is as meat and drink to him. X is a remarkable man. Eighteen years before this—I have this story from his own lips—he had an encounter with a wounded tiger while following up in high grass, which resulted in him being pulled off his elephant with the tiger's teeth firmly embedded in his thigh. The ordinary mortal would have been somewhat shaken by such an occurrence, but not so X. Realising, like the infantry soldier, that his rifle was his best friend, he clung tenaciously to it, and as the two of them, man and beast, landed in a tangled mass on the ground, he pressed the muzzle against the tiger's throat and pulled both triggers. As may well be imagined, the tiger's head was literally blown to pieces, while X was picked up very much the worse for wear. He lingered for many wearisome weeks in hospital, but eventually emerged, thanks to an iron constitution and an adequate supply of what is vulgarly known as "guts," a fit man, but minus a leg. This handicap did not, however, prevent him from continuing to take his part, on an elephant, in following up wounded tigers and panthers, while he has been known to deal with one of the latter animals on foot, or perhaps it would be more correct to say on one foot! To the great loss of his service he has since retired and taken up his abode in "fresh fields and pastures new" in another continent.

The beaters had all been assembled, and the preliminary arrangements for the beat made, before our arrival; we therefore wasted the minimum amount of time before making a start, for the day was well advanced, and we had fully three miles to go to get to our positions for the beat. Part of this distance

we covered mounted on elephant and pony, but for the last mile or so we had to proceed on foot, and here I was astounded at X's agility and his pace on crutches over rough ground. The beat was a typical tiger beat, and therefore needs little description. There being no shikari in these parts, it was run by one Bhaggu, a cheery scoundrel with whom we had made friends during the few days we were camped here on the way up to our block. Our machans were on the hither side of a dry nullah, and afforded an unusually long average field of view, which in places was as much as one hundred and twenty yards, though here and there small patches of cover obscured the vision. The draw for position placed X on the left, myself in the centre and P on the right. As we dispersed to our trees X cautioned us—"No long shots please, we don't want to get let in for a follow up if it can possibly be avoided."

As frequently happens on these occasions, the beat was extraordinarily void of other animal life, and all we saw in the early stages was a solitary chital fawn that frisked out of the thick jungle and made off away to our right. When the beat was about half-way through however, a tigress came trotting out at a smart pace straight towards me, coming into first view at about a hundred yards rise. As she approached she moved off to her right, and was temporarily lost to sight behind a clump of bushes; finally she checked at the edge of the cover about forty yards to my left front, showing me just a head and neck. This was obviously only a very temporary halt, so I put up my rifle, and taking a hasty aim at her head, fired. Did I wish to excuse myself I could say that the week before I had taken a heavy toss and broken a rib, which made any turning movement of my body extremely painful. I could further say that when taking that toss I had cracked the stock of my rifle, and I might even add that my machan was the most unsteady of any I have ever sat in. All these statements are strictly true, but it would be idle to offer them as excuses for I know in my heart of hearts that I missed that tigress through over-eagerness and consequent bad shooting and for no other reason. At my shot the tigress turned sharp left-handed and passed at a gallop under my machan. Having only a

magazine rifle I was unable to get in another shot, but as she turned again, this time right-handed, and leaped the nullah behind the line of guns, P fired, and quite excusably missed her. He got in a second shot, however as she was breasting the far bank, this time hitting her hard and causing her to slow down considerably. By this time I had turned about in my machan and was able to get in a couple of snap-shots as she was dodging in and out of some young sal trees, though I fear I did little damage. As far as I could make out she appeared to stop in a patch of cover about one hundred and twenty yards behind us, for the ground beyond this was fairly open and I felt sure that had she crossed it, I must have seen her.

No warning signal having been given, Bhaggu brought the beat on after a short interval, and in due course the coolies emerged from the thick jungle opposite our machans. We now learned that the beat had also contained a tiger, which had broken back at our shots, fortunately without mauling anybody. X now mounted his elephant, while P and I got down from our respective trees. Having heard our information regarding the movements of the tigress after she had been hit by P's second shot, X suggested that I should climb up a tree and fire a few rounds into the bushes where I thought the animal had lain up. This left us no wiser than we were before, for there was no answer from the tigress, though I felt sure that she had not moved on. X now proposed that he should go round by the right on his elephant to see if he could spot her, while P and I advanced dismounted. Now, it is a fairly widely recognised principle that it is a sound plan to allow a wounded animal of the dangerous kind at least an hour, if not more, in which to stiffen, or possibly to die, before following up. But X was in command; he had been at the death of over a hundred tigers, and who were we to gainsay him? He had not gone more than about a hundred yards when he stopped his elephant and announced to us that he could see the tigress, as he thought dead, lying under a bush. Now came a protest from the mahout—"No, Sahib, she is not dead, I can see her breathing." Then there ensued an argument between X and the mahout as to whether her ladyship was dead or alive—all this within

about twenty yards of the subject under discussion! X clinched the matter by saying, "All right, I won't spoil her skin, I'll just put a shot into the white part of her tummy." P and I advised making a job of it with a fatal shot. Unfortunately however, X knew that P had never seen a tiger before this, much less shot one, and was therefore most anxious that the skin should not be further damaged. We murmured something to the effect that we considered our own skins far more valuable; X, however, was adamant—"It's all right," said he, "I'll just tickle her up." So saying he put up his rifle and fired. This was the signal for a display of fireworks of the first magnitude; the exact sequence of events is rather difficult to record, for it all happened with such amazing rapidity that the impression is somewhat confused. The tigress accepted the challenge, and despite a badly shattered hind leg, sprang at the elephant with a roar that seemed to shake the very foundations of the forest. The elephant, a small female, and not staunch to tiger, turned abruptly about, trumpeting loudly, and bolted, but not before she had been mauled behind by the tigress. Sometime while this was happening X discharged his second barrel, at which he maintains, the tigress sheered off. The Almighty alone knows where that bullet went, still the fact remains that the tigress, having launched her attack, turned and made off into some fairly thick jungle about a hundred yards away.

By dint of foul abuse and a vigorous use of the "ankus" by the mahout, the elephant was brought to a standstill in about a hundred yards. Fortunately the country was fairly open, for had there been many trees about X would undoubtedly have been scraped off, as he was only on a pad. It is not a pleasant thing to be bolted with on an elephant; I experienced it when a very small boy, having been taken out shooting by an uncle of mine, and I have no wish to repeat the performance. X, however, arrived grinning all over his cheery face—"That was a near thing," said he, "I don't think I've had as close a shave since I lost my leg eighteen years ago". And I think he was probably quite right, for the tigress had been as near on top of the elephant as makes no matter, and had she got there X's position would have been precarious indeed.

We had marked the direction taken by the tigress, and were preparing for further pursuit; X, however, was anxious regarding his elephant, and wanted to get her wounds dressed, for having only one leg he relied very largely for his sport, to say nothing of his work, on her. Moreover, the day was far advanced, for we had started the beat late in the afternoon, so we decided to leave matters as they were for the night and to follow up in the morning with a herd of buffaloes. We therefore returned to our various camps, and that night we slept sleeps which are all the sweeter for a full day's exercise with some excitement added.

Next morning we arrived at the scene of the previous evening's encounter before the buffaloes, having passed the herd on the way out. A minor incident was provided by the buffaloes making as if to charge the elephant, but fortunately they were completely under the control of a quite naked small boy, aged about eight years, so nothing untoward occurred. X, whose elephant was actually none the worse for her mauling, suggested that by way of a preliminary reconnaissance he should take a turn round the edge of the cover into which the tigress had been seen to go, in case he could spot her, for we reckoned that if she was still in the neighbourhood, she must either be dead, or else very sick indeed. He very soon announced to us that she was dead, for he was down wind of her and his nose told him so! It was not long before we were able to confirm his statement. As I have mentioned, the season was the middle of the hot weather; the tigress, who must have died very soon after we had left her the evening before, had been raked from behind and her stomach was badly shattered, the bullet having passed first through her thigh. There had been some rain in the night and the grubs had got at her. Have I not said enough? "We must measure her," said I. "Yes, we ought to measure her," said P, moving further up wind of her. "Come on," I said. "We've got to get it over, so let's get down to it." And down to it we got, holding our noses firmly.

Now came the question as to whether we should remove the carcase or skin it on the spot. Here X's mahout stepped in.

"I will skin her," said he. "What do I care for a slight smell?" So saying he divested himself of his coat, rolled up his shirt sleeves, and drawing his knife, proceeded to work, the carcase being held in position for him by three or four men who had by this time turned up. Only an oriental could tackle such a task, but before very long it began to tell even on him. "Five tigers have I skinned," said he as he plied his knife, "seven panthers and ten bears, but never have I smelt anything like this." For half an hour more he worked in silence on the carcase, then—"Fifteen tigers have I skinned, twenty panthers and twenty-five bears, but none has had a smell like this." For another hour he worked, by which time each of his assistants had been relieved; then he took a stroll into the jungle to clear his nostrils. Returning to his Herculean task he remarked, "Thirty tigers have I skinned, forty panthers and fifty bears, but this smells worse than any." And so it went on, the tale of fictitious trophies skinned increasing with every stroke of the knife. With a face the colour of an unripe green pea that mahout announced that the skin was ready for removal. Even then the elephant protested loudly when it was loaded on to her. We had kept carefully up wind during the process of skinning, but once on the elephant there was no escape, though we had left the worst of it to the "sanitary squad" of the jungle—namely the jackals and vultures. One may abandon the carcase of a tiger at dusk, but by breakfast time the next morning there will be little but bones to be seen.

This had not been a very strenuous day, nevertheless we were extremely grateful for a most excellent cup of tea with which X provided us on arrival at his camp. Over this very welcome beverage he regaled us with stories of tigers, his own and others, of maulings and measurements, until we realised of a sudden that the sun was sinking low in the sky, and we had best be on our way to our camp. And so, having made our thanks to X we set off, with our odoriferous trophy on the head of a long-suffering coolie, always keenly conscious of its presence. X told us afterwards that his mahout was unable to face food for the next two days, while we, on our part, were not rid of the nauseating stench in our nostrils for a full week.

Perhaps we may be pardoned if we felt a certain pride in saving that skin. That we did so, let it be said, was largely due to the efforts of P's cook, a gentleman of Goa, who could turn his hand with equal dexterity to any of the multifarious duties required in a camp. Whether it was relieving the driver of a bullock cart on his perch behind the team during a march, pitching a tent, skinning a trophy, dishing up an appetising meal out of nothing in particular, or in more civilised surroundings, cooking a soufflé, he invariably "produced the goods" with a quiet efficiency which always gained our unqualified admiration.

At the time I cursed myself for a lost opportunity, for that tigress should have been mine. But I did not grudge her to my brother-in-law, for I had plenty of time, whereas this was almost his last shoot in India. For twenty years he had devoted all his leave to sport, and had never even seen a tiger, yet within a week he shot this tigress, and another, which he met during a morning's stalk, an opportunity the like of which comes to but few of us. But I never enter his home and see the skin of this gallant tigress without living again the scene of her demise, which provided us with some valuable experience and not a little excitement.



THE SILLADAR CAVALRY OF INDIA

BY THISTLE.

THIS unique system of raising cavalry disappeared in the aftermath of the Great War, not so much because the regiments raised in this way had proved inefficient, but because the system was not regular. Silladar regiments were permitted too much independence to please the inventors of the modern standardization.

The Silladar cavalry of India was inexpensive and extremely mobile. The regiments could march anywhere in Asia without any assistance from the military supply departments, or without any expense to government except (and that only in latter years) for the cost of the provision of free grass at camping places. The system attracted a superior class of men into the ranks, it was a true survival of the old light cavalry of the East, and held many of its traditions and customs.

In reality, what subsequently became known as the Silladar system, was not originally a system at all. Even in its final form it was merely the standardization of certain customs which in the course of time had been adopted.

Although sometimes loosely referred to as a relic of feudal customs, this description is inaccurate, because service was not connected with land tenure. In its original form, men of substance made bargains for their services on the condition of supplying their own military equipment and animals. Such a bargain might be that of a single horseman in relation to his own services, or that of a leader for followers whom he mounted, equipped and maintained at his own expense.

India has always been a part of the world which has maintained great numbers of cavalry. The continuous fighting and

the open nature of the country, has made this arm a necessity, and in India it has always played an important part in the fighting.

Prior to the arrival of the British, cavalry was termed *Pai-gah* (or mercenary) if the personnel was mounted and equipped by an employer, or *Khudaspa*, if each man owned his own horse and equipment. Anybody of cavalry might be partly *Paigah* and partly *Khudaspa*. The owner of the horses and equipment of a *Paigah* was termed a *Silladar*, and his followers were called *Baghirs*. *Khudaspas* were those *Silladars* who were only able to equip and mount themselves. The origin of the name *Silladar* is stated by some to have come from the Persian words *sillah*, a weapon, and *dar*, the bearer thereof. Others give different derivations, but the point is immaterial. In ancient days every independent ruler, for his own safety, maintained as large a *Paigah* as he could afford to equip, horse and maintain. Such forces received fairly regular pay. In an emergency extra cavalry was obtained by hiring mercenary *Paigahs* or *Khudaspas*. There were always bodies of these, who, like the Free Companies of Mediaeval Europe, were ready to serve wherever they could obtain the best terms.

It will at once be realized that under these conditions there could be no hard and fast organization. Any man, with several followers whom he armed and mounted, was in reality the *Silladar* of a miniature *Paigah*. A *Khudaspa risalah* (cavalry regiment) would be made of a number of such groups and also of individuals who mounted themselves. While it is most improbable that there was any universal rate of cavalry pay, it was an accepted custom that those who did not own their own horses received less pay than those who mounted and equipped themselves. The owner, of the horse and equipment of a *baghir*, made his profit out of the difference between these two rates of pay. A *baghir* could become a *Khudaspa* by acquiring a horse, but if a *Khudaspa's* horse were killed, he did not necessarily become a *baghir*. He first had to find a *Silladar* to mount him. This was a great weakness, as the personnel were unwilling to expose their horses to risk of being injured.

When the British first began to take part in the local Indian wars, their armies were small, ill-organized and inefficient. It was the French who first demonstrated that the Indians by proper training could be made into disciplined soldiers. No cavalry was included in the original "army" raised by the East India Company; light-horse, when required, was raised by hiring *Khudaspas*. These men proved quite useless for any sort of regular operations. They had in mind only two main objects; one, to collect as much loot as possible, the other to avoid any serious fighting, in which their lives or the lives of their horses might be endangered. Any mercenary, hired to fight without being regularly enlisted in a recognized unit, is inclined to be very prudent about exposing himself to danger. A serious wound may prevent his continuing to earn his livelihood as a soldier. In the case of the *Khudaspas* there was another great risk which influenced their actions. The loss of a horse turned a *Khudaspas* into a foot soldier, a follower, or at best a *baghir*.

The East India Company therefore abandoned the *Khudaspas* system, and raised a number of regiments of Indian cavalry on the regular system. Two regiments of Madras cavalry, raised on this system, still remain on the establishment. The policy of maintaining regular cavalry was adopted, and at one time the East India Company had a large mounted force of this nature.

About the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, it was decided to make another experiment with the *Khudaspas*, and Colonel James Skinner was allowed to raise two regiments taken over almost *en bloc* from the defeated Mahratta army, on a new plan termed the irregular or *Silladar* system.

Skinner's men were still *Khudaspas*; they mounted and equipped themselves. But, with the object of overcoming the worst faults of the *Khudaspas* system, his new *Silladar* system introduced an innovation by a system of insurance, called a *Chanda* Fund (literally a subscription fund). This would provide the *Khudaspas* with a new horse, should his own be killed in the service. This made a definite break with the past, and Skinner's regiments, under strict discipline, soon became highly efficient light cavalry. Their mobility was assured by retaining the old system of pack pony transport. This was the method of

carrying kit that had been customary in the light cavalry of the East since time immemorial.

The new Silladar system proved so satisfactory that it was extended and improved upon. A Colonel Gardner was allowed to follow Skinner's example, and within the next fifty years the *Silladar* irregular cavalry in the Company's service grew into a large force.

A further development was now made by the introduction of what were designated "*assamis*." The term *assami* designated all the property that a *Silladar* was obliged to maintain to be an efficient soldier; a man wishing to join a *silladar* regiment purchased the *assami* of a man wishing to leave, provided the latter wished to sell. Of course, at first, there was nothing which forced the man who was leaving, to sell. He could take his horse and other property home if he so desired. In that case the recruit had to outfit himself elsewhere. At the beginning, sales of *assamis* were arranged by private treaty or auction; but later a fixed price for an *assami* was laid down, and sales were made compulsory on leaving, with the exception of the Aden Troop where *assamis* were auctioned up to the end. In the modified system there were still *baghirs*, and one *Silladar* could own several *assamis*.

The outbreak of the mutiny gave a great fillip to the *Silladar* or irregular system. The regular units nearly all mutinied, and the irregular units showed a much higher degree of loyalty. New cavalry regiments were necessary and these were raised on the irregular system. This, combined with the fact that the *Silladar* system attracted a better class of men, caused the government at the end of the mutiny to disband all the regular Indian cavalry regiments, except those of the Army of Madras Presidency.

The extension of the system was followed by many gradual modifications in the direction of regularizing it. When the auctioning of *assamis* became a thing of the past, conventional values, called "*prices*," were standardized for horses, irrespective of their real value. Renewals and replacements became the responsibility of the regiments instead of individuals. *Baghirs* were gradually reduced in numbers, and finally only Indian

officers were allowed to maintain such men, and they were restricted to one or two each. In certain regiments *baghirs* were abolished altogether.

Men on enlistment were no longer allowed to bring with them their own horses, arms, or equipment, nor were they permitted to take these away on discharge. Baggage ponies were gradually replaced by mules, and mule *Chandas* modelled on the horse *chanda* were organized for the provision and maintenance of pack animals. Saddlery and equipment being purchased regimentally became gradually standardized. The purchase of horse and mule rations was taken away from the individual *Silladar* and arranged regimentally. At first this was done through the regimental shopkeepers, but finally these, in most cases, were also eliminated.

Although horses and mules in the end became practically, if not theoretically, the property of the regimental *Chandas*, the equipment, etc., still continued to be the personal property of the *Silladars*. In view of the success of the *Chanda* system, many regiments began to extend this to cover equipment. Where this was done, the articles for which the *Chanda* was responsible for keeping up, also changed hands at a fixed "price." The actual value of such articles ceased to be a matter of personal interest to the recruit when their maintenance and replacement became the responsibility of a *Chanda*.

The natural result in the end was that the *Silladars* really owned only their personal uniforms and such sums of money as they had deposited in the regimental funds. The horse *Chanda* owned the horses, the mule *Chanda* the mules, saddle and equipment *Chandas* where these existed, owned much of the other property.

As conditions in India changed, recruits began to be accepted who were unable to pay in cash the full price of an *assami*. On joining they paid down a proportion, varying according to regimental rules and the means of the classes enlisted.

As it was necessary that the retiring owner of the *assami* should be paid in full, the balance of the purchase price was lent to the recruit at interest by the regiment, and this loan was deducted from his pay by instalments. On discharge a man

received back the actual value of the *assami* less any sums that he owed the regiment. During the Great War recruits who could not pay down any portion of their *assami* on enlistment, were taken, and such men were entirely financed by the regiment.

In the final development of the *Silladar* system the regiments themselves were beginning to be the real *Silladars*, and the sowars were well on their way to becoming *baghirs*. The profits gradually accumulated from sale of the various articles of uniform, equipment, etc., from store together with the interest accumulated from loans for the purchase of *assamis*, formed the capital which enabled the regiments to finance the system when the cash investments of the men enlisted, grew less and less. Thus each regiment became a kind of *Paigah* enlisting *baghirs* who were made into *Khudaspas* on the Hire Purchase System.

However, up to the end due deference was paid to rights of the personnel in all questions of administration. No decisions affecting the rights or pockets of the men were ever taken except in open *darbar*. Here it is true, no one below the rank of Indian Officer could speak, and all decisions were those of the Commanding Officer, but all ranks were at liberty to hear the questions discussed and the reasons for orders, which affected them financially, explained.

The government paid the officers and men their monthly pay, and provided the rifles and a couple of machine guns; there their responsibility ended. The whole of the tentage, equipment and rationing was arranged regimentally. Scattered throughout India were sets of cavalry barracks or "lines" which were the private property of "cavalry combines."

These "combines" collected subscriptions from all the *Silladar* regiments to maintain these lines. If regular units used the lines the government paid rent to the combines. If a *Silladar* regiment was quartered in government lines it paid rent to government. The pay was not excessive, a *sowar* or trooper received an inclusive rate of about two pounds ten shillings per month and the total cost of a regiment was about £24,000 per annum.

Gradually regiments had started all sorts of subsidiary activities; many had large grants of land on horse breeding terms in the Punjab Canal colonies. Here they were landlords on a big scale, using part of the land in paddock areas and letting the remainder out to tenants. The income received from the tenants helped to pay the expenses of the horse breeding. In certain cases the grain from these properties was taken to the regiment and used in feeding the personnel.

The Indian cavalry is now regular, it is better fitted out with technical equipment than was ever the case formerly, and its personnel are better trained in technical duties. The regiments have become very creditable copies of British cavalry, but the social status of both the Indian officers and men has decreased, the cost of maintaining the regiments is vastly greater, and the units are no longer particularly mobile. They have lost many of the merits of the light cavalry of the East, and have acquired many of the defects of the cavalry of the West.

The old irregular cavalry-man had a monetary stake in his regiment; he could not afford to be disloyal. The experience of the Mutiny proved that the regular was not equally reliable. There is nothing to indicate that any new factor affects this historic experience in a time of emergency.

One of the reasons advanced for the abolition of the *Silladar* system, was that the administration occupied much time that should be devoted to training. Had the change to the regular system remedied this, it would really have been justified on this ground alone. But military office work and book-keeping has increased, not decreased. Every activity is now controlled and supervised, and the Commanding Officer instead of being an autocrat, is now the servant of the countless masters of the Services and Departments. The old self-reliant and improvising mind of the *Silladar* officer has disappeared. Officers and animals have become spoon-fed. Letter writing has too often replaced action; examination qualifications have been substituted for personality.

" THE FALL OF BHURTPORE, 1826 "

BY " ZARIF."

ANY reverse, however temporary, suffered by the British Army, has always fanned the flame of discontent in India. The hopeful, patient, Indian mind welcomes such mishaps as the certain symptoms of the instant dissolution of the British Empire.

The muddled campaign of the Burmese War (1824-1826) was no exception to the rule, and feelings of unrest were rife in India, but nowhere more than in the Courts of the Rajputana States, where intrigue was the breath of life to designing ministers.

One such Court, in particular, was quick to take advantage of the Government's embarrassment, and for some months there had been many secret meetings in the house of Durjan Sal, the cousin of the child Rajah of Bhurtpore. The young Rajah had been installed on the " gaddi " with the approval of the Resident at Delhi (Sir David Ochterlony), and was recognised by the Supreme Government as the lawful ruler of Bhurtpore.

Durjan Sal, however, had different views, thinking it much more desirable that he himself should sit on that well-padded " gaddi " than his miserable brat of a cousin. He was a fat and comfortable man, but he was also a great commander of men, and it was with considerable shrewdness that he appreciated the situation, and weighed up his chances of a successful " coup d'etat."

He did not anticipate any vigorous opposition from Sir David Ochterlony, who was ill and very old; the Government, with Lord Amherst as Governor-General, was fully occupied in salving something from the wreck of the Burmese War; and, what was more, Bhurtpore Fort had successfully resisted the

terrific onslaught of the gallant and victorious General Lake himself in 1805—and surely, if General Lake could not batter down its walls, the Fort must be impregnable.

From a practical point of view everything appeared to favour Durjan Sal as he sat scheming in his private apartments; but he was wise enough to realise the importance of the goodwill of both priests and people; so he summoned the “pundits” to a secret “durbar.”

Their considered opinion was most encouraging. When the fortress of Bhurtpore was built, they said, the oracles had pronounced that the kingdom should never fall until a crocodile ascended the ramparts. As there was no river of any consequence for miles, and the Fort was not within walking distance of even the most athletic crocodile, the prophecy was confidently interpreted as the perfect security of the Fort for ever. And well it might be, for it would not have been one whit more impossible for a crocodile to trot up the dome of St. Paul's Cathedral. Moreover, they argued, had not the prophecy withstood the acid test of the siege by General Lake?

That was a point which always swayed their counsels: they had defeated Lake!

When he considered the moment ripe for action, Durjan Sal seized the “gaddi,” and announced that the child Rajah was deposed. Let the Governor-General and all his Agents fume and rage: he Durjan Sal, was henceforth the ruler of Bhurtpore!

In due time a dusty runner brought the news to Sir David Ochterlony who arose in his wrath at such impudence, and immediately sent troops to enforce the orders of the Agent to the Supreme Government.

Durjan Sal listened to the reports of his spies, and smiled. He made no effort to strengthen the defences of his fort, but folded complacent hands over a vast stomach, and waited for the inevitable result of Sir David's action. It was not long delayed. The Governor-General, anxious and worried by the ill-success in Burma, had no inclination for disturbances in Central India, and considered Sir David's action to be both provoking and premature. So sharp was the rebuke which he administered, that Sir David had no course but to cancel his

arrangements and send in his resignation. He died a few months later.

Sir Charles Metcalfe, who succeeded him, soon convinced the Governor-General that to allow a petty princeling to flout the Government's authority was to court disaster, and he obtained sanction to despatch an expedition against the State. Lord Combermere, the Commander-in-Chief, was appointed to command the force in person, and the column was adequately supplied with heavy artillery; for it was realised that the lack of a suitable siege-train was the principal cause of Lord Lake's failure to reduce the fortress twenty years before.

The column arrived at the village of Agapore, six miles south of Bhurtpore, and, after several insignificant skirmishes with the enemy's outlying picquets, pitched camp on the 10th of December, 1825.

The next morning, before dawn, the Cavalry Brigade was sent out on a special mission, with orders to capture the "bund" of a lake which supplied the water for the fortress moat. A small party of enemy cavalry, who were met and routed, were discovered to be reinforcements for Durjan Sal, brought by a neighbouring Rajah, who was himself killed in the mêlée. Durjan Sal had not attempted to defend the bund of the lake, which our cavalry quickly captured and occupied without opposition, though some of the 16th Lancers were fired upon by the artillery on the walls of the Fort.

At midday on December the 12th, the column moved from Agapore and encamped not far from the Fort, on the same spot that General Lake had selected for his army, and here everyone settled down with the utmost deliberation. Three days later, the Cavalry Brigade was sent out to demonstrate on the western side of the Fort, drawing heavy fire from the enemy, while the Engineer officers made a complete reconnaissance of the other three sides, unmolested.

Although the walls of the Fort were only built of mud, the Artillery and Engineer officers made the most elaborate plans for breaching the walls and laying land-mines, and their preparations for the final assault were *not ready for over a month*.

The operations appear to have been conducted in a very leisurely manner, as though time were no object. Parties of officers would go off pig-sticking, shooting, or sight-seeing; while those who preferred to loaf about the camp caused such a congestion "coffee-housing" in the batteries and earth-works, that the Sappers had to persuade the Commander-in-Chief to issue a General Order forbidding anyone not on business to loiter near the mine emplacements. Nevertheless, such a pastime must have been accompanied by considerable risk, for the enemy plentifully bespattered the diggings with round shot and musket fire. Individual officers were free to come and go as they pleased to any part of the camp, and one Gurkha soldier acquired much praise by the brave but foolhardy act of scaling the walls of the Fort, on his own initiative, and returning with a glove and a leather jerkin filched from one of the unsuspecting enemy.

Training and discipline were poor, and many were the midnight alarms when all the troops were turned out to drive off an entirely imaginary enemy.

An eye-witness in the 16th Lancers gives a good account of one such occasion. On the night of December the 27th, 1825, the 1st Extra Light Cavalry were dining with the 16th Lancers in their Mess tent. "After dinner there was some good singing, and the party had the appearance of being a jovial one. At about 11 o'clock, whilst P—— was singing a very good song, McC—— in his mincing brogue asked me 'Do you think now, there'll be anything to do to-night?' 'No,' I answered. 'Well, then, faith,' said McC——, 'I believe I'll take another glass of claret.' The words were scarcely uttered, when a sergeant came into the tent to inform us that we were to turn out instantly. In a moment the Mess tent was deserted, and everyone was quickly on horseback. Firing was now distinctly heard in different directions. There was a good deal of confusion, and from the darkness of the night nobody appeared to know where we had best go to. At last the firing was heard to increase on our right; when we got to the spot, we found the 1st Extras blazing away like furies, and no enemy in sight. It was soon discovered by us that we were in far greater danger

from our friends than from our foes, as the balls from the Cavalry's pistols were whirling in all directions among our men. When we got up, it was all over, or nearly so. Out of the party who had been sitting so jovially at the Mess a few minutes before, three were wounded, all belonging to the 1st Extras. Captain C—— had his forefinger cut off, and another nearly severed from his hand; Captain P—— had a deep sabre wound in his thigh, and another severe wound in his arm; B—— was slightly touched on the wrist, and his horse shot in two places. We had three men wounded. We returned to our camp (this had taken place immediately in front of it) at about 1 o'clock.

"As we were dismounting, a horseman was seen galloping towards our guard with two native troopers after him. The sergeant of our guard with the greatest coolness took up his lance, and, as the fellow was passing, ran him through; the man fell; besides the lance wound he had two or three cruel sabre cuts. I got up to him two or three minutes after he fell, but in that short space of time the syces and grass-cutters of the guard had contrived to strip the unfortunate wretch to the skin, leaving him nothing. I abused them with all my heart and soul, and made some of them run to the hospital for a 'dhoolie,' in which I had the wounded man placed and carried to the doctors."

Meanwhile the work of breaching and mining was going on. The guns had little effect on the walls of the Fort, for the cannon balls just buried themselves in the mud, and nothing but a little earth crumpled away from the spot where they struck. The mining trenches, however, had slowly come right up to the edge of the moat, and it would not be long before a charge could be laid. Lord Combermere tried to hurry on the zero hour, but a deputation of Engineers came to him, and explained so clearly that the breach was not big enough to admit of more than one man crawling through at a time, that he eventually gave way, and decided to wait until the mines had done their work.

All this delay and ineffectual activity reminds one of the occasion when Alice, in Wonderland, was imprisoned in the White Rabbit's house, and listened to the plots to remove her.

This effect is heightened by the consternation and panic which prevailed on the night of January 9th, when one of the enemy's round shot hit an ammunition tumbril, exploded it, and caused a terrific fire in the lines, so that the whole camp was illuminated in the glare. Eighty bullock "hackeries" were destroyed, and several ammunition tumbrils exploded.

This delayed matters still further, and it was not until January the 18th, 1826, that the final successful assault took place.

Let us watch the battle through the eyes of an officer who was with the 16th Lancers. "A squadron of the 3rd Cavalry and three squadrons of Skinner's Horse were on our left. The 10th Cavalry were posted on our right, so as to prevent the possibility of escape between us and Malaye, a village on rising ground to the southward of the Fort. At this village a battery had been erected under the command of Colonel C——, supported by the 11th Dragoons.

The face of the Fort, where we were posted, was so closely invested as to render any attempt at escape hopeless. We knew that the blowing up of the grand mine (the largest ever charged) was to be the signal of attack, and it was believed that the explosion would take place at eight o'clock. The explosion was anxiously expected, but it could not be heard from our side. At about half-past eight a heavy discharge of artillery was heard, and shortly afterwards a brisk fire of musketry, rapidly increasing until it became unremitting. Our guns were now silent, and as we were five or six miles from the breaches, and could know nothing of what was going on, nothing could exceed our anxiety as to the cause. Presently the fire of the musketry became slacker, until it was only heard at intervals, and we fancied we could distinguish its approach to us as each succeeding bastion was carried. Soon after ten o'clock, Corporal Derbyshire and a trooper who had been sent to patrol a short way into the jungle in our front, galloped back to us, and said that they had seen a party of horse, who had come close up to them in the wood. P—— imagined that possibly these men might have mistaken Skinner's Irregular Horse for the enemy, so I told the Major that I would return with the men and ascer-

tain who they were. When I had gone a short distance into the jungle, I saw a few straggling horsemen, who retired on seeing us; not knowing their numbers, I did not think it would be safe with only two men to follow them far into the wood, so contented myself with being able to report that some of the Rajah's horse were in front. I was now about a quarter of a mile in front of our two squadrons. I thought I heard a murmur from the Fort, which was concealed from me by the wood. I stopped my horse and listened. I could distinctly hear the buzz of voices.

I went on a little further, and after a volley of musketry, I distinctly heard the British ‘ Hurrah! ’—another, and another, and yet another followed. I was confident of the sound, and returned in high spirits to our squadrons, convinced that the Fort was ours.

About midday, some of the enemy's horse appeared on the plain, and endeavoured to make their point good, but were stopped by the 8th Cavalry. Our Brigadier ordered the artillery to pour grape shot into them from our two six-pound guns, and our squadron, which was sent in pursuit of them, went at such a pace to cut them off before they could recover the wood, that we almost felt the effects of the grape. We did not succeed in preventing the Rajah's troops from reaching the jungle, but had gone so fast that by the time we got into the wood, we formed a perfectly irregular body of horse.

I, with six men, went headlong in pursuit, and soon found myself with this detachment completely separated from the squadron. As the enemy were scattered through the jungle, I found it impossible to keep even the six men together, and everyone acted for himself.

I got on the near side of a horseman, and, being within the parry of his spear, tumbled him off his horse; another passed and had the speed of me, and as he appeared to be preparing his matchlock for a shot at me, I thought it as well to be beforehand with him.

I fired my pistol at him, and missed him; he instantly threw away his matchlock, and finding that I was now gaining on him, he threw himself from his horse on the off side, put up his hands,

and asked for mercy. I told him to give up his sword to McCaw, an old servant of mine, who now came up; the man did so immediately.

McCaw was not satisfied with this, so, suiting the action to the word, brought his lance down, saying, 'Sure, Sir, wouldn't it be better just to give him a poke?' I would not allow this, and the horse was led away and the man made prisoner.

I could not, even at the time, help laughing at seeing Griffiths riding after a fellow, whose shield was slung at his back so as completely to defend it. Whenever Griffiths got into position to give a point, his lance rattled off the shield without doing the man any injury, and poor Griffiths was quite in despair. I galloped up to the man and foolishly got on his right side. He made a cut at me, which I parried, but the point, glancing off, slightly grazed my left arm. I changed my position to his near side, and then had him at my command. His turban fell off, and the rolls of linen which fasten it by being rolled over the head and underneath the chin, being now unloosened, I cut him across the neck; he fell but was not killed. I was now very near the Fort, and being out of the jungle, I had a distinct view of it. On the bastion the British flag was waving, but underneath the walls, and close to the ditch, I saw a not quite so agreeable sight—to wit, a whole troop of the Rajah's horse drawn up, who, I fancied, on seeing us, showed a disposition to cut off our retreat. However, E—— and his squadron coming up, we charged them, completely routing them, killing a great portion and making prisoners of the rest. The 59th, who were on the ramparts, cheered our men. We returned to our former position, and it was imagined that all was over, and that never was a fort, supposed to be impregnable, taken so very easily. Cold meat, wine and water, and cigars were produced, and we all made a very good hearty meal. We were now ordered to scour the jungle, but we saw nothing. Passing the Fort on our way back to camp, some of us went inside, passing through numbers of the dead and dying. On the ramparts we found the 59th in high spirits, looking like so many devils, their faces were so blackened with powder, the officers as bad as the men. I could not remain here long, and rode with my squadron

across the salt-pits on the way to camp. When we had nearly arrived, I saw a detachment of Native Cavalry who were guarding a native. I rode up to it, and found that Durjan Sal was the prisoner. The Rajah rode a large bay Persian horse, overloaded with flesh, on which he sat well, considering his weight, which must be eighteen stone (all fat); he looked dejected, as well he might, but still dignified and important; he had even now the appearance of a man used to command. He had endeavoured to make his escape over the ground on which we had been posted all the morning, and was taken after little resistance by an out-piquet of the 8th Cavalry, commanded by Lieutenant B——, who now rode in advance of the prisoner with the splendid sword he had taken from the Rajah, stuck in his girdle.

The piquet had in the most shameful manner plundered and stripped Durjan Sal, whose dress now consisted of the slightest ‘dhoti,’ a pink ‘cummerbund’ which was thrown over his shoulders and could only partially cover his naked body, and a dirty pink turban on his head, such as only the lowest caste menials wear.

In this plight he was conducted to the tent of Lord Combermere, Major B—— riding on one side of him, Captain F—— on the other, so that escape was impossible. His favourite wife followed him, sitting behind her brother on a beautiful horse: the poor boy had been shot through the hand, but bore his wound bravely.

With regard to the prophecy that Bhurtpore Fort would never fall until a crocodile scaled its walls, the men of wisdom were regarded as little better than humbugs; but they were in no way dismayed; they pronounced Lord Combermere’s name ‘Kom-beer,’ which, in these parts, is the vernacular for crocodile!”

And so the matter ended. Durjan Sal was made a prisoner; the child Rajah was restored to the “gaddi”; and the column returned to its respective cantonments, Lord Combermere taking a large quantity of loot with him—an act for which he was afterwards severely censured.

Viewed from a purely military angle, there are several tactical points of interest. Lord Combermere made good use of his cavalry by sending them off on a special mission, at the outset,

to capture the bund of the lake; and later using them to round up any of the enemy who tried to escape from the Fort. He was thus able to concentrate his force at the breach in the walls, instead of having to surround the circumference of the fortress with troops. He economised his force by bringing a suitably powerful siege train to accomplish his object, obviating the possibility of several costly and ineffectual assaults. Surprise he obtained by distracting the enemy's attention from his engineering operations by cavalry demonstrations on the opposite side of the town, and by using an underground mine rather than artillery fire to effect the breach.

Altogether he performed the operation very successfully, with remarkably few casualties to his own troops. His victory had considerable strategical results, too, for it caused a much better tone among the Rajputana States, and many of the Rajahs came to Delhi to reassure the Resident of their allegiance to the Government; and the canker of Lord Lake's failure twenty years before was cut out of the native mind before it could do further damage.



Translated by Major A. J. R. Lamb, D.S.O., The Queen's Bays, from the article written by Captain de Labouchere in the September-October 1933 number of the "Revue de Cavalerie."

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**THE MENACE TO PARIS
AND
THE CAVALRY ACTION OF NÉRY
(1st September, 1914).***

AN EYE-WITNESS'S ACCOUNT.

I.

1. *The Allied retreat and the movements of the German Wing.*

At the end of August, 1914, the British Army was in a critical situation. It formed part of the Allied left wing, and was flanked on the right by General Lanrezac's Vth Army, and on the left by General d'Amade's Territorial Divisions, and up to August 29th by Sordet's Cavalry Corps. After August 29th this corps had been replaced by available units of the VIth French Army. The British Army had been retreating since August 24th, followed by General von Kluck's Ist German Army.

Von Kluck had five army corps and von der Marwitz's cavalry corps of three divisions.

Sir John French had the 1st and 2nd Army Corps (each of two divisions), the 4th Division and the 19th Infantry Brigade (belonging to the 3rd Army Corps in process of formation), General Allenby's Cavalry Division of three brigades and two other independent cavalry brigades.

* See "Revue de Cavalerie," Nov.-Dec., 1921, "The 1st Cavalry Brigade at Néry," by Le Commandant Henri Couannier.

After fighting on the 22nd at Mons, the British Army, fearing it might be outflanked owing to the reverse to the Vth Army at Charleroi, had retired, covered by its cavalry. On August 26th, after the battle of Le Cateau, in spite of the heroic resistance of Smith-Dorrien's 2nd Corps, the British Army continued its retreat towards Paris, and it seemed as if nothing could prevent the execution of the Schlieffen plan. The manœuvre of the German Wing looked like succeeding and the pursuit continued without respite.

On the evening of August 28th, Moltke issued the general instruction prescribing a rapid march on Paris, General von Kluck to direct himself on the lower Seine and General von Bulow on the capital.

Fortunately, on August 29th the staggering blow inflicted on Bulow's Army by Lanrezac's Army at Guise, broke the cohesion of the German Right Wing. On the other hand Joffre was trying to form on his left the VIth Army under the command of General Maunoury, and the 11th German Corps at Proyart had just come up against the 7th French Corps whose resistance must have made Kluck uneasy and revealed to him the appearance of new enemy forces on his right flank.

In accordance with the instructions issued by German G.Q.G., Kluck should have marched to the west of the Oise in the direction of the Lower Seine, but after the Battle of Guise, Bulow sent him a wire to come nearer to him. Believing the English to be out of action, Kluck decided to set off in pursuit of the Vth French Army.

The "side-slipping" of Kluck towards the south-east was observed on August 31st between mid-day and 4 p.m. by the English Flying Corps whose information was transmitted the same day to French G.Q.G.

On August 31st Field-Marshal French, who wanted to fall back on September 1st behind the Seine, to the west of Paris, finally gave way to the requests of Lord Kitchener and General Joffre and decided to hold the line Nanteuil-le-Haudoin—Betz and to conform to the movements of the Vth and VIth French Armies.

2. Orders given by General von Kluck on August 31st and movements of the 1st German Army on that day.

On the German side, General von Kluck was unable to accede completely to General von Bulow's wish to pursue in the direction of La Fere and Laon and was only able to push on in the Oise valley by Noyon and Compiègne. He had telegraphed his intention to Supreme Command on the evening of the 31st.

On the morning of the 31st he received the following wireless message: "The movement contemplated by the 1st Army has the approval of the Supreme Command."

At this time the 1st German Army, by means of forced marches, was pursuing the enemy who were falling back by Verberie, Vic and Soissons, and it had reached the line Maignelay (12 kilometres south of Montdidier), Mareuil (15 kilometres north of Compiègne), Berneuville-sur-Aisne and Epagny (10 kilometres south of Coucy-le-Chateau).

General von Kluck told the 1st Cavalry Corps (General von Richtofen) of the IIInd Army to gain Soissons via Ribecourt, to ensure liaison with the IIInd Army and to cover the left flank of his army. He ordered the 2nd Cavalry Corps (von der Marwitz) to cover the right flank of the army and to continue the pursuit by Thourotte in the direction of Villers-Cotterets.

Consequently, on August 31st, General von der Marwitz moved the 2nd Cavalry Corps via Lassigny to Thourotte. He moved in the order: 4th, 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions. All the chasseur battalions of the Cavalry Corps were being used to ensure protection and cover the right flank of the column in its advance. The itinerary of the 2nd Cavalry Corps was via Gury and Margny.

Covered at Longueuil by a cyclist detachment, the 4th Cavalry Division (General von Garnier) which specially interests us, passed over the Oise at Thourotte, crossed the Forêt de Laigue and at 4 p.m. reached the south-east corner of the wood, near Offemont where it halted for two hours.

During this time the 2nd Cavalry Division crossed the bridge at Montmacq, and likewise passed through the Forêt de Laigue as far as Tracy-le-Mont, debouching on a line facing Soissons—Coucy-le-Chateau. The 9th Cavalry Division reached Choisy-au-Bac north-east of Compiègne at 6 p.m.

That afternoon a German aviator had dropped a German flag on "Les Halles de Paris,"* bearing the inscription: "The Germans will be in Paris in three days."

3. *Orders given by Field-Marshal French on August 31st and movements of the British Army on that day.*

Operation Orders No. 13 of the B.E.F. issued from Dam-martin-en-Goele at 8.50 p.m. on August 31st made it known that "The enemy seemed to have finished his westerly movement, and appeared to be wheeling southwards. Heavy columns of cavalry were advancing in a general south or south-easterly direction towards Noyon and Compiègne, covered by at least two cavalry divisions which had reached the Oise in the afternoon."†

The order instructed the higher formations to move the following day—"The 1st Corps into the area La Ferté-Milon—Betz. The 2nd Corps into the area Betz-Nanteuil. The 3rd Corps (composed of the 4th Division, the 19th Brigade and some new units) into the area Nanteuil—Baron and the Cavalry Division into the area Baron—Mont l'Eveque."

"The rearguard of the 3rd Corps had to reach an east and west line through Néry by 6 o'clock on September 1st.‡

On the evening of August 31st the British Army was extended on a front of about 35 kilometres between Missy-au-Bois and Verberie.

The 1st Corps (Douglas Haig) had one division at Missy and the other at Laversine, north-east of the Forest of Villers-Cotterets in close liaison with the Vth French Army (Lanrezac). It had the 3rd Cavalry Brigade at Dommiers, and the 5th Cavalry Brigade which covered its left flank, at Mortefontaine.

The 2nd Corps (Smith-Dorrien) having suffered heavily at Le Cateau, was in retreat about 12 kilometres further south in the area Coyolles—Crépy-en-Valois. It was out of touch with both the 1st Corps on its right and the 3rd Corps on its left.

The 3rd Corps (General Snow) was in the area around Verberie.

Allenby's Cavalry Division was split up. The 2nd Cavalry Brigade, north of the Oise at Chevrières, covered the left flank

* The Covent Garden of Paris.

† Official History of the War, Vol. I, page 236.

‡ Official History of the War, Vol. I, page 236.

of the British Army. The 4th Brigade near Verberie ensured liaison with the VIth French Army (Maunoury), and finally the 1st Cavalry Brigade was in cavalry divisional reserve behind the infantry of the 3rd Corps, at Néry.

Between Néry and Crépy-en-Valois there was a gap of 10 kilometres south of the Forest of Compiègne. Its tall trees hid enemy movements from aerial observation.

This, in general terms was the situation of the British troops and the Germans opposed to them on the evening of August 31st.

II.

1. *Von de Marwitz Cavalry Corps passes through the Forest of Compiègne, and von Garnier's division arrives at Bethisy Saint Martin.*

About 5 p.m. on August 31st General von der Marwitz was with the 4th Cavalry Division near Offémont. Being warned by a telephone message that strong enemy columns coming from Soissons and Vic and passing through Crépy-en-Valois, were moving southwards, he gave the order to take up a relentless pursuit again, and too keep pushing on during the night to the south of Crépy-en-Valois in the direction of Nanteuil-le-Haudouin.

Carrying out this order the 9th Cavalry Division went through the Forest of Compiègne and marched on Verberie. They found it strongly held and put off their attack till the next day.

The 2nd Cavalry Division went ahead by the Foret de Laigue and Choisy-au-Bac* and halted in the Forest of Compiègne at La Croix St. Ouen. During the dark wet night the two divisions halted on the road in column of route. Leaving Offémont and the Foret de Laigue, the 4th Cavalry Division pursued its march across the Forest of Compiègne via St. Jean au Bois and debouched from the Forest at Gilocourt towards midnight.

At 11 p.m. the 1st Army made it known by a telephone message that it intended to reach the line Verberie—Villers-Cotterets—Longpont by 8 p.m. on September 1st and ordered the 2nd Cavalry Corps to move on ahead to the south of Villers-

* Where The Queen's Bays stayed on the night Aug. 30th/31st. (Translator.)

Cotterets against the French left wing which was falling back to south of Soissons.

The 9th Division failed to get on at Verberie and remained near La Croix St. Ouen. The 2nd tried to outflank the enemy via Saint Sauveur and was held up on the Authonne. Touch was lost with the 4th Division.

The 4th Division commanded by von Garnier had marched without halting. After passing through Gilocourt it had arrived at 1.20 a.m. on September 1st at Bethisy-Saint-Martin where it captured three English transport wagons. It reconnoitred Bethisy as well as it could in the darkness, and then took up a position in a dense fog, on the heights south of Bethisy and waited for daylight.

2. Allenby's Cavalry Division moves to the south-west of the Forest of Compiègne.

On August 29th and 30th Allenby's Cavalry Division had marched as a flank guard covering the left of the British Army moving via Compiègne and the right bank of the Oise.

On August 31st Marshal French's order No. 13 instructed him to continue to cover the 3rd Corps on September 1st.

Twenty kilometres further east, the 3rd Cavalry Brigade was put under the orders of the 1st Corps which already had the 5th Cavalry Brigade under its command.

The 3rd Cavalry Brigade crossed the Aisne at Fontenoy pursued by Uhlans, and found itself on the evening of August 31st at Montefontaine.

On the left of Allenby's Cavalry Division the provisional cavalry division of the VIth Army was holding the eastern edge of the Forêt d'Hallatte and watching Pont-St. Maxence on the Oise.

The cavalry division under General Allenby's command consisted of the 4th, 2nd and 1st Brigades. The 3rd Hussars (4th Cavalry Brigade) were opposed to the 3rd German Hussars who were the Divisional Regiment of the 3rd German Corps. They retired from before these latter about mid-day after fierce fighting. The 4th Cavalry Brigade halted with the 3rd Corps at Verberie.

The 2nd Brigade maintained liaison with the VIth Army and halted at Chevrières.

3. *Detailed dispositions of the 1st Cavalry Brigade (British) on the evening of August 31st.*

At Choisy-au-Bac that morning the 1st Cavalry Brigade had received the order to move to the north-west of Venettes, to watch the roads running into Compiègne and guard the crossings of the Oise till mid-day, at which hour the bridges were going to be blown up. Unfortunately, the orders to destroy them could not all be carried out, especially at Bailly, north of the Forêt de Laigue, where enemy intervention had prevented the detachment sent by the 4th British Division from carrying out its task. Furthermore, they had not succeeded in demolishing the bridge at Compiègne, it being too solid.

The 1st Cavalry Brigade patrolled to the west of Venettes and saw no signs of the enemy. Having completed its mission it received orders to go into billets at Néry. It recrossed the Oise at Verberie, passed through various billets of the 4th Division (British) and went on to Néry, south of the Forest of Compiègne.

Operation order No. 13 and the information of the enemy which it contained, in particular that which concerned the movements of German Cavalry was still unknown to the troops. The officers of the brigade knew little of the general situation. They had the impression that the enemy's pursuit had slackened because during the day no enemy at all had been seen or reported south of the Oise, and the forest.

Furthermore, the officers who had to arrange the billets at Néry went ahead of the brigade along the road from Venettes to Néry without any apprehension whatever. Major Cawley (the Brigade Major), Captain Bradbury (second in command of "L" Battery) and Lieutenant Labouchere of the 6th French Dragoons (Liaison Officer of The Queen's Bays) all went together. It never entered into the head of the last-mentioned that both his companions of the road would be killed the next day in the course of a severe engagement.

The brigade arrived at Néry at nightfall and settled in as best it could to enjoy a restful night at last. It believed itself to be covered by the infantry units whose billets it had passed through. Now, at this very same time, the German Cavalry, profiting by the cover of the forest was arriving at Bethisy Saint

Martin and were quite unsuspecting of the fact that they were less than 3 kilometres from the 1st Cavalry Brigade at Néry!

4. *The forces opposing each other.*

The 1st British Cavalry Brigade was commanded by General Briggs, a real cavalry leader. He had fought in the Transvaal, knew the effects of firearms, and knew how to use ground.

His brigade was composed of three cavalry regiments each formed of three squadrons (of four troops) and a section of two machine-guns. The 11th Hussars (Colonel Pitman), the 5th Dragoon Guards (Colonel Ansell), the 2nd Dragoon Guards (Queen's Bays) (Colonel Wilberforce) and a battery of Royal Horse Artillery of three guns (13-pdr.) commanded by Major Sclater Booth.

Total strength estimated at 1,468 officers and men and 1,873 horses.

Having disembarked at Havre on August 17th, the brigade was moved by rail to Maubeuge. It received its baptism of fire at Obourg on the Mons canal during the battles of Mons and Charleroi. Since then it had fought daily with the rear-guard, marching night and day without rest or repose. It was at Le Cateau on the 26th, Remicourt on the 27th and St. Quentin on the 28th. It had suffered some losses but its morale was intact.

The 4th German Cavalry Division was commanded by Lieut.-General von Garnier.

The division was composed of three cavalry brigades of two regiments of four squadrons, a detachment of six machine-guns and a "group" (brigade) of three horse batteries each of four guns. These cavalry brigades were: The 3rd Cuirassier Brigade (2nd Cuirassiers and 9th Uhlans) under Colonel Count von der Goltz, the 17th Cavalry Brigade (17th and 18th Dragoons) under General Count von Schimmelmarmann, the 18th Cavalry Brigade (15th and 16th Hussars) under Colonel von Prinz. The Horse Artillery "group" belonged to the 3rd Field Artillery Regiment.

Total strength about 5,200 officers and men, 5,600 horses, 12 guns and 6 machine-guns.

The 4th Cavalry Division must have been very tired when it arrived at Bethisy for, according to prisoners' statements it

had made a forced march of twenty-six hours to get there, following upon other equally rapid marches.

III.

THE BATTLE OF NÉRY.

1. *The Battlefield.*

Néry, a village of 600 inhabitants, lies on top of the plateau situated on the south side of the Authonne valley, a defile which separates the "massif" of the Forest of Compiègne from the heights of Valois. It is built on the western slope of a deep ravine which drops from Mont Cormont and the Néry sugar factory down to the Authonne valley. The village stands at an altitude of about 90 metres. It is dominated on the west by the plateau denoted by Longmont, .123 and .118; on the east by Feu farm and Sainte Luce farm, both on the 110 contour. The Néry ravine drops from the 87 contour near the sugar factory, to the 56 contour east of Néry steeple, and forms a very serious obstacle east of the village.

The Chaussée Brunehaut, an old Roman Road and several highways and other roads meet at Néry, of especial importance being those coming from Villeneuve, Saint Vaast, Verberie and Bethisy-Saint-Pierre. The road from Bethisy-Saint-Martin ends at the Néry sugar factory on the plateau to the east of Néry.

2. *Protective arrangements of the British Troops.*

The units of the 1st Cavalry Brigade were billeted in Néry. The 5th Dragoon Guards occupied the northern end of the village with their horses outside. The 11th Hussars were in the middle of the village with their horses under cover in farms and sheds. The battery with its guns, wagons and teams was in a field south of the village and east of the road from Néry to the sugar factory. The battery headquarters and some of its horses were at the sugar factory. The 2nd Dragoon Guards (Queen's Bays) were divided up as follows: The 1st and 2nd Squadrons west of the main road to the south of the village and immediately west of where the battery were bivouacked. The 11th Hussars who had acted as advanced guard to the brigade that

day, assumed responsibility for its protection whilst it was getting into billets and put out picquets. Each unit took over the protection of its own sector for the night August 31st/September 1st, liaison posts being fixed by mutual arrangement between commanding officers. Regiments received orders to send out patrols, each in its own sector, at daylight the next day with orders to be back in time to move off at the appointed time, 4.30 a.m.

The night passed calmly and quietly without the usual alarms.

The brigade believed itself to be covered by infantry of the 4th Division and nobody, at least no one amongst the troops, was aware of the gap which existed between the 4th Division and the 2nd and 1st Army Corps, the gap through which the German Cavalry had passed.


Acting on the orders received, each regiment sent out patrols in the morning before daybreak; those of the Queen's Bays and 5th Dragoon Guards returned a little before 5 a.m. and reported that they had met nothing on their front. The patrol of the 11th Hussars commanded by Lieutenant Tailby had orders to reconnoitre the plateau east and south-east of Néry. By 5 a.m. there was no news from him, and in the meantime nobody knew anything about the enemy.

3. *The British surprised.*

At daybreak on September 1st, the fog was so thick that the brigade which should have left at 4.30 a.m. got orders not to move until receipt of further orders. Consequently, about 5 a.m. the men were watering their horses and getting their breakfasts ready.


Colonel Wilberforce and several officers of The Queen's Bays, amongst whom were Major J. A. Browning, second-in-command,* Captain E. S. Chance, adjutant, and Captain H. W. Hall, signal officer, were eating their breakfast of tea and omelettes all together in the principal room of a farm. All of a sudden the noise of several explosions and of tiles crashing into bits in the yard caused them to jump up and rush outside. Shells were falling in the village. One could hear the bursts simul-

* Killed at Messines, near Ypres, on October 31st, 1914.



THE BATTLEFIELD OF NÉRY, LOOKING EAST

Twelve German Guns were aligned along the horizon. Bays M.Gs. were in the foreground about 600 yards from the German Guns.



taneously with the sound of the guns going off. There was a deafening din of breaking windows and things being flung about. The crackling of machine-guns and whining of bullets added to the noise of the guns. It must have been about 5.30 a.m. Stampeded horses, some of them wounded and covered in blood galloped off northwards up the main road through the village. They were the horses of the Bays which had been pegged down in the lines that night. Terrified by the bombardment they had broken their headropes. The men ran to their horses or to their arms.

Lieutenant Labouchere went towards "L" Battery at the south-western exit of Néry to the road junction of the Saintines, Rully, Villeneuve, Verrine roads and the Chaussee Brunehaut. The battery was less than 100 metres to the south of it, right in the open. He could not see where the firing was coming from owing to the fog which was still very thick. However, after a few moments he could see the flashes of the German guns to the south-south-east. He told Lieutenant Lamb, the officer commanding the Bays' machine-guns, who collected some of his men and managed to get his two machine-guns into action at the above-mentioned cross roads against the bank of the road, which protected them excellently. The flashes of discharge from the German guns were now easily seen between Feu Farm and Mont Cormont, and served as a target at a range of 800 metres.* Neither the guns nor the enemy were yet visible. The German 77 mm. shells fell close by on the Bay's billets and on "L" Battery. The battery was in bivouac with its horses fastened up and the guns in column of sections in a field belonging to M. Nicolas, immediately south of the cross roads.†

The battery commander, Major Sclater Booth, was at the battery headquarters. He ran off to rejoin his guns but was wounded and put out of action by a shell at the moment he left the village. He fell in a beet-root field where he was not found till several hours afterwards. In his absence Captain Bradbury took command of the battery and endeavoured to get his guns into action.

* The author and translator have agreed together that this distance was considerably shorter than 800 metres. Probably about 500 metres.

† M. Nicolas' son-in-law, M. Paul Hazard, a Néry farmer, was not called up till 1915 and witnessed the action.

On the left of the Bays' machine guns the men of the 11th Hussars spread out under cover of houses and garden walls did good work with their rifles and machine-guns.

A short time before the first guns opened the 11th Hussars patrol had returned at full speed. Lieutenant Tailby sent with a corporal and five men, by Colonel Pitman, the C.O., to reconnoitre the plateau east and south-east of Néry, had come out of the village at dawn, and to get along quicker had cut across country. The side of the plateau was so steep that he had to zig-zag up it. When he got to the top he could see nothing owing to the fog, so he went on round the plateau and at about one mile from Néry the fog being less thick, he saw a dismounted column of German Cavalry. A scout opened fire and the German Cavalry started in pursuit. He managed to get away and returned to warn the brigade. Major Anderson went to warn the 11th Hussars and Colonel Pitman went to brigade headquarters to warn General Briggs.

General Briggs had already had his warning because a shell had just burst above the house in which he was with Major Cawley, Major Sclater Booth, and the French Liaison Officer of the brigade, Lieutenant Raoul Johnston.* A piece of shell went through the roof; General Briggs picked up the fuse and saw that it was "set" for a range of 800 metres. General Briggs at once sent to warn General Allenby, commanding the cavalry division at Verberie and General Snow commanding the 3rd Army Corps at Saintines, that the 1st Cavalry Brigade was being attacked by enemy cavalry of unknown strength.

He then organised the defence.

Why had the brigade been surprised? What was going on on the German side?

4. Arrangements made by General von Garnier. Plan of attack of the 4th Cavalry Division and its brigades and the artillery plan.

We left von Garnier's division on the heights south of Bethisy-Saint-Martin waiting for dawn. General von Garnier had doubtless a good reason for deploying his division and it is probable that information had revealed to him the presence of

* Killed at Zillebecke, near Ypres, in May, 1915.

British troops at Néry. On arrival on the plateau the General learnt that there actually was, near Néry, a big British bivouac and he decided to fall upon the enemy.*

At first General von Garnier would have given the order to deploy and charge, but finding the ground unsuitable, he changed his mind and decided to attack dismounted.

It does not appear that the General had thought of having reconnaissances made before joining battle.

"At 6 a.m. (German time—that would be 5 a.m. French time) the division was deployed for the attack to the east of Néry in the following order from north to south: 3rd Cavalry Brigade (2nd Cuirassiers, 9th Uhlans) the men being dismounted, with the 2nd Machine-gun Detachment on its left. This attack was supported by a battery of the 3rd Field Artillery Regiment on the heights east of Néry. The 17th Cavalry Brigade (17th and 18th Dragoons) also with its men dismounted, supported by two batteries of artillery on the heights south of Néry. The 18th Cavalry Brigade (15th and 16th Hussars) was placed behind the centre in column of squadrons, as a mounted reserve in dead ground.

The protective measures of the English, who seemed to be dead with fatigue after their long retreat, were completely lacking. With a range of only 600 to 800 metres the batteries and the machine-gun detachment opened a destructive fire on the enemy's artillery bivouac and on the village of Néry which was occupied by the enemy cavalry. The surprise was complete and the enemy suffered astonishing losses.†"

5. *Dispositions made by General Briggs and his manœuvre to the north and south of Néry.*

General Briggs had warned General Allenby and General Snow that he was being attacked but it took at least two hours for reinforcements to arrive.

He did not believe the enemy were in great strength and he decided to hold and beat back the German attack by manœuvring round both his flanks. Consequently General Briggs ordered Colonel Wilberforce to reinforce his right with the Bays, to the south of Néry, and Colonel Pitman to extend the front of the

* Statement of an officer of the 18th German Dragoons.

† General von Poseck, *Die Deutsche Kavallerie in Belgien und Frankreich*.

11th Hussars so as to relieve the 5th Dragoon Guards to the north of Néry, and to leave one squadron in brigade reserve. He then ordered Colonel Ansell to take two squadrons of the 5th Dragoon Guards mounted to the north of Néry in the direction of Sainte-Luce Farm and to act on the enemy's right flank.

Unfortunately many of the horses of the 5th Dragoon Guards had got away and were not caught again till much later. However, they succeeded in getting together two almost complete squadrons, moved mounted to the north of Néry along the Bethisy road making use of the ground, and engaged in dismounted action. "A" Squadron prolonged the front of the 11th Hussars to the north.

"B" Squadron manœuvred by the Rue de Néry valley towards Sainte-Luce Farm, later turning off towards the south-east to bring fire to bear on the right flank of the enemy. This manœuvre took place just in time to oppose the movements which the 9th Uhlans and 2nd German Cuirassiers were attempting to the north of Néry. They got forward dismounted to within 500 metres of the village of Néry but were held up after suffering heavy casualties.

On the British side, Colonel Ansell was mortally wounded. The two squadrons of his regiment bravely continued the fight in spite of their numerical inferiority which was hidden from the enemy by the still dense mist. Their deliberate attitude deceived the two regiments of the 3rd German Cavalry Brigade as to their real strength.

During this time, Major Ing commanding "B" Squadron of The Queen's Bays went to occupy the road from Néry to the sugar factory, thus covering the right of the 1st Cavalry Brigade. The enemy who had succeeded in getting into the buildings of the sugar factory, tried to debouch from them but were unsuccessful.

Lieutenants de Crespigny and Misa with about fifteen men of The Queen's Bays tried to bring off a counter-attack. Lieutenant Norman Champion de Crespigny (of French descent) stuck to the ground that he had succeeded in recapturing, and was killed in doing so. All his men were killed or wounded with the ex-

ception of Lieutenant Misa and two troopers who got back unscathed. The heroic resistance of the Bays at this point stopped the attack of the hussars of the 17th German Cavalry Brigade who were unable either to get beyond the Néry sugar factory or to pass across the road running from Néry to Rully.

6. *The action of "L" Battery and the British Machine-Guns.*

Throughout the whole period of the battle the machine-guns of The Queen's Bays fired on the targets presented by the German batteries and the columns which tried to advance to the attack. The two Vickers Guns fired off thousands of rounds. They got very hot. The water, although frequently renewed, boiled in the water jackets whence the steam escaped. It was frequently necessary to change the white-hot barrels, but each time fire was resumed with even greater intensity.

Lieutenant Lamb and the gun-numbers took turns at filling the machine-gun belts. Fortunately, the ammunition boxes were full when the action began.

After giving his orders, General Briggs accompanied by Major Cawley came to see the machine-guns. He joked with the French officer, assuring him that amongst all the khaki uniforms, his French Dragoon uniform consisting of a plumed helmet, black tunic with white collar and cuffs, and red breeches, was attracting fire. Then, as he had surprised him in the act of firing some belts of machine-gun ammunition he asked him laughingly if he thought he was killing many Germans. The answer was, needless to say, strictly in the affirmative!

Continuing his inspection, General Briggs went to see the gunners at "L" Battery, 100 metres away.

Only 400 metres away from three German batteries, the unfortunate battery was being subjected to an infernal shelling. Captain Bradbury, aided by the men who were not busy with the horses, had unlimbered and manhandled his three guns round into position to reply to the Germans.

Before 6 a.m. one gun was put out of action by a direct hit from a shell. The two others opened fire. Scarcely had they begun to shoot when Lieutenant Giffard's gun was silenced. Giffard and all the men of his section had been killed or wounded.

Two remaining N.C.O.'s rejoined Captain Bradbury and the third gun. Immediately afterwards Lieutenant Campbell was killed.

The sole remaining gun was kept in action by Captain Bradbury, Lieutenant Munday, Sergeant-Major Dorrel, another sergeant who was killed, Gunner Derbyshire and Driver Osborne.*

A shell took off both Captain Bradbury's legs. In spite of his terrible wounds he continued to direct the fire of his only gun, but a further projectile inflicted yet another wound. He lost so much blood that he had to be carried away dying. Carried on a stretcher, he passed close by the Bays' machine-guns. He still had enough strength left to say to Colonel Wilberforce who happened to be near the machine-guns at the moment: "Hullo! Colonel, they've given it us hot, haven't they?"† He died a short while after.

A little later on, the last officer, Lieutenant Munday, was killed, but the three survivors continued to serve their gun, the only remaining gun in the battery, which continued to fire till it had expended all its ammunition. In vain did the enemy concentrate all their fire on it; they could not silence it. The survivors kept up the fire till they had used the very last shell. It was only then that "L" Battery was silent.

From the Queen's Bays machine-gun positions, the spectacle presented by the battery was horrifying. But those with the machine-guns were so busy that they hadn't time to look for long at the pathetic sight of its ripped-up horses, the wounded crawling along to get away under cover of the straw stacks which had caught fire, and the wrecked guns and limbers. Among many other wounded, Major Cawley was to be seen being taken away on a stretcher, completely scalped by a shell and covered in blood. He was only destined to survive his fearful wound for a few moments.

A little to the north of the Queen's Bays machine-guns, the men of the 11th Hussars under shelter of the garden walls, continued to bring fire to bear on the enemy. Some Hussars under Lieutenant Arkwright, who had himself got hold of a rifle, were

* Dorrel, Derbyshire and Osborne were awarded the V.C.

† History of The Queen's Bays (2nd Dragoon Guards) by F. Whyte and A. Hilliard Atteridge from documents in possession of Major H. W. Hall, M.C.

busy shooting. Further off, the 11th Hussars machine-guns under Lieutenant Kavanagh were also firing on the German batteries.

Close to "L" Battery the two straw stacks were now completely enveloped in flames.

7. *The last German attack.*

The sun began to break through. The fog dispersed and made it possible to see the bottom of the valley distinctly, and the plateau of Sainte-Luce, the German batteries, and the regiments of German Cavalry, who thanks to the fog had been able to get so close to Néry. Then everyone was thunderstruck to see a column of Germans preceded by civilians advancing from the south and trying to come out from Néry sugar factory. Wasn't it perhaps only a stratagem? However, the civilians were avoided and fire continued on the Germans who followed them.

It has since been learnt that the Germans seized M. Level, manager of the factory and Mayor of Néry, his family and factory personnel, 25 people all-told, amongst them M. Vasseur at present manager of the beet-crushing plant at Néry, M. Henri Meignen, who now lives at Verberie, Mme. Jeanselme, wife of a brazier at the sugar factory, etc., and they made these unfortunate people walk in front of them hoping to protect themselves from the British fire. One man was wounded and a woman killed.*

According to German narratives these troops must have belonged to the 18th Cavalry Brigade (Colonel von Prinz) composed of the 15th Hussars (Colonel von Zieten) and the 16th Hussars (Lieut.-Colonel von Ludendorff), which was engaged against the British right and later carried out a dismounted action to cover the left wing of von Garnier's division.

Soon the Germans filtered back in disorder and disappeared behind the crest.

IV.

THE END OF THE BATTLE OF NÉRY.

1. *The Germans abandon eleven guns.*

The battle was drawing near an end. The gun fire on the

* Information given by the Mayor and inhabitants of Néry.

German as well as on the British side had stopped. The guns of the German batteries could be seen very distinctly now. Each time that the Germans came up to them, machine-guns and rifles riddled them with bullets and they gave up trying to get them away. The personnel of the batteries had to fall back behind the skirmishing lines whilst carrying away their wounded.

The German losses must have been considerable because in spite of their crushing numerical superiority they began to beat a retreat. "Before the reserves, who had been sent for by the English, could intervene, the 4th Cavalry Division disengaged from the enemy."*

It was now about 8 a.m.

2. *Arrival of British Reinforcements.*

Replying to General Brigg's appeal, the 4th Cavalry Brigade and "I" Battery arrived on the scene of the action, coming from Saint-Vaast (4 kilometres north-west of Néry) followed by a mixed battalion of the Warwickshire and Dublins,† of the 10th Infantry Brigade, coming from Verberie, and a battalion of the Middlesex Regiment coming from Saintines.

"I" Battery opened fire about 8 a.m. The Germans expedited their retreat.

"More and more reinforcements reached the enemy; the division found itself exposed to artillery fire coming from the south, and when it received information pointing to the arrival of enemy troops at Bethisy and Crépy-en-Valois, and even in rear of the division, Lieutenant General von Garnier gave orders to break off the fight and beat a retreat in an easterly direction."‡

Eleven German guns remained on the ground as trophies of a dearly bought success. Unfortunately, the British could not think of taking them away, since the losses of horses had been very serious, and there was a shortage of teams. It had to suffice to break the gun-laying gear and gun sights with hammers.

The battle now dying away got more and more distant until about 9.30 a.m. At 9.45 a.m. one heard the last shots fired by

* Narrative of Colonel von Zieten, commanding the 15th German Hussars.

† 1st Royal Warwick Regiment and 2nd Battalion The Royal Dublin Fusiliers were both in the 10th Infantry Brigade. (Translator).

‡ General von Poseck, Deutsche Kavallerie. . .

the German rearguards who covered the retirement of the 4th Division.

3. *The Pursuit.*

The Germans retired eastwards by the farm and hamlet of Plessis-Châtelain. General Briggs sent "C" Squadron of the 11th Hussars in pursuit of them; they had been in brigade reserve up to then. Carrying out Colonel Pitman's orders, Major Lockett's squadron pushed on to, and seized Plessis-Châtelain. They took 78 German prisoners belonging to the following units:—

18th Mecklenbourg Dragoons.

16th Mecklenbourg Dragoons.

16th Schleswig Hussars.

15th Brunswick Hussars.

2nd Cuirassiers.

5th Hussars.

17th Dragoons.

7th Uhlans.

3rd Regiment of Horse Artillery.*

Patrols sent out by Colonel Pitman reported Verrines clear, and three or four squadrons moving away towards the east. It was out of the question to follow up the enemy for losses had been heavy and the situation was too uncertain.

4. *The German Retreat.*

The 4th Division rallied south-east of Plessis-Châtelain, and here news arrived that British troops were in rear of them near Glaignes. So the division marched off southwards via Roquemont and Trumilly, towards Rosieres where it arrived at 4 p.m., having been attacked several times *en route* by enemy detachments.

"Hopes of at last gaining touch with the 2nd and 9th Cavalry Divisions, which were also moving in the direction of Nanteuil-le-Haudoin were not realised. The divisions were still to the north of the Authonne defile.†

The three brigades of the division, each acting on its own, took refuge in the Forests of Ermenonville and Bois-le-Roi, where they passed the night without supplies.

* Information brought in to French G.Q.G. by a captain returning from British G.H.Q.—*Les Armées françaises dans la Grande Guerre*. T.I. 2e. vol., annexe 2007.

† Von Poseck-Deutsche Kavallerie.

The British columns passed quite close to them along the Senlis, Borest and Baron roads without being aware of it. In any case there was no question of attacking them owing to shortage of ammunition and wastage of men and horses after a march of 120 kilometres* accomplished in twenty-four hours.

5. *The departure of the British from Néry.*

About 11 a.m. the 1st Cavalry Brigade mounted and moved off to go into billets that night at Borest. Next day, September 2nd, which was a lovely hot day, it went through the Forest of Ermenonville. Whilst doing so several German horses equipped with cavalry saddlery were captured. The fugitives were not far off, but no contact was made, and no excuse for a further encounter was sought for.

6. *The Losses.*

The 1st Cavalry Brigade had relatively few losses; 135 officers and men killed and wounded, of whom 5 officers and 49 men belonged to "L" Battery.†

The losses of The Queen's Bays were 1 officer and 4 men and 1 French sergeant of the 6th Dragoons, the interpreter Bonvallet, killed; 8 officers, amongst whom were Captain E. S. Chance the adjutant, and 2 squadron leaders, Major G. H. A. Ing and Major A. E. W. Harman,‡ and 35 men wounded. About 80 horses were killed and a large number got away and were temporarily or permanently lost.§

Without doubt the Germans had a large number of killed and wounded.

Besides the guns of their three batteries they had lost several machine-guns, more than 100 prisoners and as many horses.

V.

RESULTS OF THE BATTLE OF NÉRY.

This battle was a British victory. Although surprised they rose to the occasion and obliged the enemy to retreat; they remained masters of the battlefield.

* 75 miles. (Translator.)

† Official History of the War, Vol. I, Ch. XII.

‡ Lieut.-General Sir A. E. W. Harman, K.C.B., D.S.O., who commanded the 1st Division at Aldershot up till April, 1934.

§ History of The Queen's Bays.

General von Kluck had appreciated that von der Marwitz's Corps failed to reach its objective, Nanteuil-le-Haudoin, during September 1st, his 4th Division having luckily surprised an enemy bivouac near Néry, was driven back with serious losses by superior forces (sic) in the vicinity of Rosières, north of Nanteuil-le-Haudouin.*

Von Kluck wrote that "the 4th Division suffered so heavily that by September 3rd it had not yet collected together, and was unable to continue the march before September 4th with the rest of the cavalry corps."†

Actually, the 4th Cavalry Division remained on the Ourcq, with the 4th Reserve Corps. Thus von der Marwitz's Corps, held up by the British army, and in particular by the 1st Cavalry Brigade, was unable to carry out its mission of reconnaissance in the direction of Paris and so the menace to the capital was staved off. Even more serious, Kluck, deprived of part of his cavalry and of his means of reconnaissance, was not aware that Maunoury's troops were massing on his flank, and that the manœuvre which was about to give the Allies the victory of the Marne was already in course of preparation.

From a tactical point of view the battle shows the superiority of the British Cavalry over the German Cavalry. General von Garnier lacked imagination and appreciation of "ground." He was obstinately bent on making a frontal attack against a village defended by machine-guns which formed a difficult obstacle, and against an insurpassable slope from the Sainte-Luce plateau and Feu Farm. To ensure success the Germans should have combined wide mounted outflanking movements to north and south with their frontal fire attacks.

General Briggs at once realised that it was necessary to act on the flanks, and his manœuvre with the 5th Dragoon Guards and The Queen's Bays succeeded in stopping the German attacks.

It must be added that success was due in large measure to the resistance put up in the centre by the 11th Hussars, The Queen's Bays and "L" Battery who held out without wavering and most tenaciously against repeated and murderous attacks.

* Von Kluck, "Der Marsch auf Paris," page 80.


† "Marne," von Kuhl; page 121.

General von Garnier marched entirely on his own and never ensured liaison with the 2nd and 9th Divisions. He ought to have been able to warn them and use them as his support.


In contrast General Briggs' liaison arrangements worked very well and scarcely two hours from the beginning of the battle, British reinforcements intervened and lent their assistance to the 1st Cavalry Brigade.

But one of the most striking things, from a cavalry point of view was the complete absence of German reconnoitring patrols. A well conducted reconnaissance should have endeavoured to find and estimate the enemy's frontage and the weak points in his position; it would have found a gap of 10 kilometres between Néry and Crépy-en-Valois, and rather than persist with insufficient means in delivering sterile frontal attacks, General von Garnier, had he been informed, would have been able to break down his enemy's opposition by outflanking him.

In short, on the 1st of September, 1914, in spite of the advantage of a crushing numerical superiority, the 4th German Cavalry Division (more than 5,000 Germans) was defeated by the 1st English Cavalry Brigade (less than 1,500 English).



Y TUESDAY, 1ST SEPT 1914



DARFUR

By MAJOR H. C. MAYDON

It was February, 1916, that the eagles began to gather in the Western Desert.

For a thousand miles north to south the long blue streak of the Nile cut across desert and linked up Europeanized Egypt with the fringe of Central Africa. North, south, east and west, all the world was at war ; only amid these desert wastes, where life and soul are the possession of water, did the nomadic tribes hold aloof.

At Khartoum rumours eddied, rose and fell, took shape or vanished like elusive curls of smoke. There, above a score of races commingled, ever with an invisible, curious eye fixed on their British masters. Masters whose ranks were thinned by the lucky dispensables, who had gone to join the dog fight or had been filled by the inexperienced ; yet masters who tried to hide their irritability and unrest and still to play the game. The British game of " carry on." Local native wars and unrest were flatter than usual. Single white men still patrolled the land, a jest on lips and their hearts elsewhere with their brothers across the water.

And then a tiny cloud loomed up from the west and the hearts of men were lighter.

Ali Dinar was Sultan of Darfur, a despotic kingdom, twice the size of France, a desert land whose destiny was, is, and maybe for ever will be, contained by the one word " water."

The eastern boundary of Ali Dinar's kingdom lay 400 miles to the west of the Nile ; his northern confines were swallowed in the Libyan desert. On the west he marched with French Wadai, and on the south he reached the Bahr El Arab, the Dinka country, where the bush and swamps commence. No mean spot on the map of Africa for a despotic Arab.

Thirty years before, the intrepid Gordon had set his mark in Darfur, since when, in the Mahdist storm, the Darfuris had swept across to help their brothers of Islam, just too late to share in the débâcle at Omdurman. They then retired to their desert fastness and stood aloof. The Sultan had paid his annual tribute to the British Hakuma, and in an offhand, feudal way had made allegiance, but otherwise his independence had remained intact. No representative of our Government had crossed his frontier, and no enterprising sportsman-explorer had passed beyond the veil of the unknown and returned to tell the tale.

In early 1916 our furthest westward post was Nahud, station of a British inspector and a handful of Arab police, and he was cut off by 200 miles of almost waterless desert from the nearest military stations of El Obeid and Bara.

Beyond Nahud, westward, it was roughly 50 miles to the Darfur boundary and 50 more to Gebel El Hilla, the first reliable spot where water might be obtained in sufficient quantity for a small force. Beyond, further westward, by the direct caravan route, it was 60 miles to the wells of El Abiad and thence 80 miles to El Fasher, capital of Darfur.

And now there were rumours of war in the air. The actual reasons were an abrupt cessation of the yearly tribute from the Sultan and various insolent and threatening messages to the British Government. Also raids across our border and the consequent feeling of fear and unrest among the friendly inhabitants. A certain knowledge of an understanding between the Senussi and Ali Dinar.

Our retort could be nothing less than an invasion of Darfur and the occupation of El Fasher, its capital.

El Obeid, 300 miles south-west of Khartoum, was railhead and the first base of the adventure, and here, in due course, some 1,500 troops of the Egyptian Army detrained, shook themselves, cast off all unnecessary impedimenta and marched off to take their place on the chessboard.

The setting of the board required no mean staff work, sifting of information, pre-arrangement and forethought. For,

when you come to bedrock, it is the victualling of your army which is the chief difficulty. Every soul in that army is keen enough to fight, but he expects the staff to feed him.

In the ordinary scallywag patrols of the Southern Sudan most of us, even the very junior, had learnt to fend for ourselves, especially we of the Arab Irregulars. The old M.I., hunting terriers of nearly every patrol, carried ten days' home-made bread ration in their girbah across the peak of their saddles, three days' grain for their mounts in the nosebags, a canvas water bottle, and, at a pinch, a water skin. Officers and men had learned to work by jumps, and each jump must land you on water. Water was the only thing that mattered. Where was water would probably be villages to reinforce rations of durra (millet) for man and mount, grazing for the animals and game for the pot. The animals were trained to water once a day, but the end of your jump must land on water.

Our force had many desert experts. The Camel Corps of El Obeid and Bara lived, recruited, and constantly worked in desert country 200 miles from the Nile or nearest river. Their camels were watered every fifth day in winter, and on his makloofa the rider carried enough to make him self-contained for as long. Their jumps could be longer. The 40 miles of the pony and mule was extended to 100 miles, but the jump must land on water.

So much for the irregular mounted troops. Five companies of Camel Corps and two companies of M.I. Each company was independent with its own first line pack transport for a limited number of days.

What of the infantry, the guns and their first line transport? Forget if you will the second line, the supplies of everything, the forward moving of the base from railhead to first kicking-off place of Nahud. Forget it, or, if you will, lump it, unregretted, on the already groaning shoulders of the Staff and S. and T. The infantry and gun units were each complete with their first line transport of camels or mules. Their jumps were shorter—they needed more nursing.

I intend to follow the fortunes of one of the M.I. companies. Both these companies were lucky to find themselves here at all, in this waterless desert. Happily our G.O.C. was a cavalryman and he, above all, recognized the paramount importance of quick and far-reaching reconnaissance.

The camel is the most perfect mount of the desert for carrying its rider long distances at a fair uniform pace, and complete with supplies and equipment for five days. What is better, the camel rider reaches his destination fresh and unfatigued and ready for a long day's foot work on top of his long ride.

But the camelry can never compete with cavalry or M.I. for fast reconnaissance, for striking a quick blow and making away, for seizing a near but vital position at the gallop, or in the pursuit. The camel lacks the quick spurt at the vital moment. He is big and unwieldy and very conspicuous.

Both M.I. companies were mule companies, and a word or two is necessary to explain their composition. They turned out for field service a hundred strong, all Arabs, in four sections under four native officers, Egyptian, Arab or Sudani, with one British officer in command. The men were armed in those days with S.L. .303 carbines and a bayonet and 140 rounds on mount and man. The men carried machetes for cutting scrub for Zareebas. Each company also had a hamla or transport of 40 mules under a native N.C.O. Each mule carried up to 160 lbs. weight. The hamla could not trot save in sudden short emergencies. All the officers, sergeants and centre and flank guides of sections were mounted on ponies.

The 40 hamla mules carried up to five days' durra grain for the animals, five days' biscuits for the men, officers' kit, reserve ammunition and entrenching tools, and canvas troughs for watering animals.

There were no machine guns or Hotchkiss rifles attached to M.I. Each company had efficient signallers by flag or helio. Each company turned out with the pick of its men and more than its proportion of ponies for scouting purposes.

Each unit had orders to march individually from El Obeid to Nahud by a selected route, to lessen the strain on the water supply.

In the Sudan it is the custom to make two marches per day. An early morning one, followed by a long midday rest, and an evening one to reach camp before dark. Animals are watered once, at midday, and then, if conditions permit, driven out to grazing.

Slowly the whole striking force concentrated at Nahud. So far we were still inside our own borders. It was further on westward that the fur would begin to fly.

* * * *

For a month we sat and possessed our souls in patience, while the Staff and Intelligence prepared the way. Bazaar rumours puffed and eddied, but actually, ahead of us, lay a blank wall of silence, the brooding mystery of the desert.

Extensive training was carried out. We prepared ourselves for desert and thin bush warfare, with the protection of a mighty square on the move as our vital objective.

The reason for the square formation is that the Sudan is an open country, innocent of roads and boundaries, hedgerows and cross-country obstacles. Your opponents are experts in guerilla warfare and unhampered by baggage trains. You have no flanks and your L. of C. is thin air, a vague elusive trail behind you, which must possess the resiliency of the fabled mammal, whose legs and tail, as quickly as you cut them, spring together again. You must expect attack from anywhere, you must move in battle formation, and above all, your baggage train must be protected more zealously than your life. For famine and thirst are your worst enemies, and in this campaign thirst would overloom everything. You must picture the square as a huge, slow-moving fortress, pressing relentlessly forward—a steam roller. It was the protection of this square from surprise that was the chief rôle of the M.I.

What did we expect? What would be the enemies' tactics? A hidden mass of Dervishes, surprise, a sudden rush of spearmen? The old game; predominantly surprise. Only be forewarned and stop them far enough away and all would be well. Above all don't let them get into you. Don't straggle, don't open out. Nurse your baggage train. That nightmare train

that was to fill our human walls to bursting point. The pace of the square is the pace of your slowest-moving pack animal. One slipped load means halting the whole square.

Has the enemy any cavalry, and how is he armed? Has he plenty of rifles? What about guns? Rumour has it that he is bringing out old brass muzzle-loaders of Gordon's time and is well equipped with M.G.s from the Senussi.

Does he favour night attacks? There may not be enough thorn bush to cut for zareebas. Shall we carry barbed wire?

Be careful when grazing your animals. Do not forget the French disaster in Wadai, when the Arabs in ambush waited till midday halt and then drove in the grazing camels on top of the resting square and swamped them.

Thus and thus. But ever the recurring question—water. Anxious the head of the Intelligence in those early days, and need to be. For besides his other problems, the actual steadfastness of our own troops was in question.

Besides the sprinkling of British officers, there were three other elements in our ranks—Arabs, Sudanese and Egyptians. Of these the Arabs and Sudanese formed nine-tenths of our rank and file and provided a few commissioned officers. To my belief they were loyal to the bone.

But the "Gyppies" were another question. Beyond the personnel of two Camel Batteries and a few M.G.s, we had few of them in our ranks, but they formed the nucleus of our officers. Now "Gyppies" are a queer race and personally I do not pretend to understand them. Some of them are of the best in the world, but with others there is a feeling of intrigue and a lack of that sense of "backing up." In any case it was soon obvious to all of us that there was sedition at work. Its outward signs were the black and disquieting rumours which were daily afloat. There was even a rumour that the troops were being tampered with. Gradually suspects were weeded out and sent back, Khartoum-wards. One solitary Egyptian officer, forewarned, played the traitor's game and deserted to the enemy. Then good feeling was restored.

One galling burden had slipped from Intelligence's over-weighted shoulders.

Then came the news and orders, 15th March.

There were to be two striking columns. The advanced force and the main body, and they were to move separately. The main body was not to leave Nahud until the advanced force had made its first bound and established itself at Gebel El Hilla, 40 miles over the border. Thus the enemy's dispositions would be exposed and the first wells would have been made good.

The chosen day came and the advanced force moved off to break the ice. They consisted of five companies of Camel Corps, two Camel sections of M.G.s, one section Camel guns, and one Transport company, and were accompanied by the G.O.C. and forty picked M.I.

We had a wing of the R.A.F. attached to us for message-carrying, reconnaissance and bombing. In one short hour's flight they could reveal to us a secret which would take two days to send by messenger. Through them we heard of the occupation of Gebel El Hilla, a skirmish and the retreat of the Darfuri screen.

On 19th March came orders for the advance of the main body. As the same water difficulties still faced us, and as the country ahead had been cleared of the enemy, units still moved forward independently.

Imagine then our M.I. company on the march during the long hours of each night, following a vague meandering camel track, which linked each distant village or water hole, led by an Arab guide who somehow never played us false, and thus set another feather in the cap of our indefatigable Intelligence. Although the country was reported free of the enemy, all precautions had to be taken. Scouts and patrols scoured the country at head and flanks. For such work commend me to the desert Arab, from whom most of the M.I. were recruited. It is their natural craft.

Night marching to the Arab is also second nature. Nor is the custom unpleasant, once the habit has been achieved.

Although the pace must needs be slow, there is a pleasant coolness in the air, and a great stillness enwraps the world. Let there be a moon for choice, but failing that the planets and the great stars give light enough. Where in the harsh sunlight everything is stark, fierce and inimical, at night the same countryside is all friendly. The burning, thirsty sands of mid-day, cruel with mirage and endless vista, have become cool and tempting.

The dust is laid ; the glare is gone ; there is no thirst. Imagination and the zest of life strengthen tenfold. Shadows flicker and pass. A flock of guinea fowl, busy a'grubbing on the track, scurry wildly for refuge from our very feet. The jingle of bits, the whinny of a mule, the subdued voices of the men yarning of their womenfolk or the last patrol ; the far hoot of an owl, or strident call of nightjar, all play their tiny rôle in the setting of the scene.

Flitting shadows begin to take shape. Where are we ? Our guide is questioned and soon after the vestiges of life are apparent. A criss-cross of footpaths, cattle trails, a few stark, sun-dried durra fields, a group of lop-sided grass-roofed tukls, a sun-baked hoof-pocked bed of a pond, a peeping, half-scared herdsman, and dotted nearby a grove or two of Tebeldi trees. Here is our rest place for the day. Here is our water supply.

For during these marches all our water was obtained from Tebeldi (Baobab) trees. In the most waterless parts of the Sudan there is a strange custom, to wit, the hollowing out of the trunks of living trees and using them as water reservoirs. Each hollowed trunk will hold up to 400 gallons of water, which keeps wonderfully clean and pure. The mouth is cut in the trunk some 10 feet above ground and is big enough to admit a small boy. The boy then hacks and burrows his way into the trunk and down to the ground. The result is a 10 feet deep reservoir as wide as the trunk allows. These tanks are filled by hand during the rains and the aperture sealed with clay.

These tree reservoirs are the property of the head man of each village, and during the dry season—nine or ten months of each year—the villagers depend on them for their water or

sell water to wayfarers for as much as 5 piastres per bucketful.

On the third day out from Nahud the main body had concentrated at Wad Banda, just short of the Darfuri boundary. Here we awaited orders to proceed, and here the vitalness of the water question was brought home to us. The infantry had finished their water tanks and the whole force was now dependent on Tebeldi trees. If orders to advance did not come quickly we might not have enough water to take us back to Nahud. And we were still in our own territory; what was this water nightmare to become in a hostile country with an ever-lengthening L. of C.?

Happily, on the evening of 22nd March, came a message from the advanced force, saying: "Gebel El Hilla occupied without difficulty. Continue your advance."

Fantasses (water tanks) were filled, and the whole main force moved forward to Genana, on the border, and thence on Gebel El Hilla, after relieving a Camel company, who had been left by the advanced force as a guard at the only (poor) wells at Sherif Kabashi.

The main force reached Gebel El Hilla on 26th March and joined up with the advanced force.

This was our first sight of Darfur, and was intensely interesting to our long pent-up curiosity.

From the high ground and rather dense bush west of Genana the land gradually slopes down and opens out as you approach Gebel El Hilla. The village was built on the slope of the Gebel itself—quite a large hill and visible from miles away. Four miles distant to the north is the village of Lugud, lying in the centre of a clump of small hills, which form the head of a range running due west. These were remarkable for their strange shapes and sizes, and from a distance resemble an ancient walled city of ruined towers and battlements.

Between the hills and ridges stretched an endless rolling plain of dry "heskineet" grass and low forest of thorn scrub. Dry khors or water channels, cut by the sudden short storms of summer, sprang, unexpectedly, a maze of obstacles at your feet, or here and there gave life to an irregular belt of greater

trees. But here all living things, fauna and flora, were by Nature hardy, self-reliant, independent of water, fighting their eternal strife with drought and parching sun.

Villages were miles apart, restricted by their wells. Herds of cattle and goats bent their lives on the two or three days a week when they were driven in to drink. Wayfarers were rare, and nursed but one anxiety—water. A man's waterskin was his life. A land of solitudes.

We joined the advanced force in an entrenched camp about half-a-mile from the village and the only two wells of Gebel El Hilla, and heard from them of their first brush with the enemy.

The enemy, not much more than a cavalry screen apparently, had not made much of a fight, and before retreating, in the direction of Brooshe, the next village westward, had burnt and partially destroyed their own huts and stores of grain at Gebel El Hilla.

The two wells, though yielding more water than the average, were over 100 feet deep and apt to run dry. Happily there were five wells at Lugud, six miles away, only 80 feet deep, which saved the situation. Most of the mounted troops were sent to Lugud, where the camels of the whole force were watered.

But no one, who was there, is likely to forget the water difficulties of the first few days. There was no rest for anyone those days, and twelve hours on water fatigue by day and night was not out of the common. The wells had no rest either, for when it was possible to cease drawing water for ourselves the local inhabitants rushed in.

The situation was now as follows. The striking force was now concentrated at Gebel El Hilla with 113 miles of L. of C. via Um Shanga to the advanced base at Nahud. The only enemy seen so far were about 400 mounted men armed with rifles, who had retired towards Brooshe. Of the route westward, according to reports, there was one good well at Umgedada, 34 miles, and several fair wells at Abiad, 22 miles further. Thence it was 68 miles to Fasher direct across the desert, but no water between. An advanced base must be established at

Abiad, and water both there and en route proved and made good before a thrust could be made at El Fasher.

If the enemy were wise, the struggle would come somewhere where we were pressed for water. That pointed to the desert strip between Abiad and Fasher. We felt sure that they would harry us en route, try to destroy the wells, and even defend Abiad with its wells and its launching place to the desert march.

On 2nd April a strong force marched on Abiad, and within ten days were back, leaving a garrison on the wells. The whole of their march had been dogged by the enemy's cavalry and there had been a brush at Umgedada, which had given a hint at the enemy's tactics. He had posted entrenched infantry covering the wells and his cavalry had tried to draw our force into an ambush. Thanks to our M.I. the trap had been exposed and the enemy shelled out. They had retired towards Fasher.

At last, on 10th May, all the preparations were ready, and the final advance on El Fasher commenced. The G.O.C., Colonel Kelly, had decided to strike before the rains.

The force was split into two columns, as follows :—

“A” Force—Main Body.

Colonel Kelly and H.Q. Staff.

60 M.I., all mounted on ponies.

No. 2 Battery of 4 guns.

6 Companies of 13th Sudanese Infantry.

2 Companies of Arab Battalion.

1 Company Camel Corps.

2 Sections of Maxims (8 guns).

Medical Section with 2 British officers.

Camel Transport, including those with water in tanks.

“B” Force.

4 Companies Camel Corps.

No. 4 Battery Maxim Nordenfelds.

British Detachment of 4 machine guns.

The plan was for “A” force to concentrate at Abiad and start the final 70 miles waterless march on 15th May. Meanwhile,

"B" Force was to move independently a day later on a parallel track towards Fasher and to rejoin "A" Force before any decisive action took place.

Herein lay a strategy that was to reward us mightily. For 30 miles north of Fasher lay the oasis and wells of Melit, where by report was water sufficient for all our force. Thus Fasher and Melit lay almost equidistant from us, forming the ends of the base of a triangle, of which our last water at Abiad was the apex. Between stretched a 70-mile strip of waterless desert.

Now by detaching "B" Force to move independently served two purposes. Not only did it relieve the water tension at Abiad by 1,000 camels, but it acted as a feint on Fasher, and compelled the enemy to split into two forces to protect Fasher from the east and from the north. "B" Force were quick-moving and self-contained, and could push the bluff and rejoin "A" Force one march short of Melit.

Kelly's plan was to seize and make good the water supply at Melit before risking the decisive action. There could be no retirement. An 80-mile strip of waterless desert in one's rear spells neck or nothing. Four days' water supply was enough to take us to Melit, but not back.

The weather was very hot and muggy as ever before the rains, and man and beast were troubled with an everlasting thirst. The water ration was $1\frac{1}{2}$ gallons per man and 7 gallons per horse per day. All camels (about 2,000) were watered at Abiad on 14th, and would get no more until we had won our way into Melit.

A stroke of luck was to play a vital part in Kelly's plan.

* * * *

At 4 a.m. on 15th May the various units of the square rose from their desert billets and crept stealthily to the point of concentration. As the square formed up 40 M.I. mounted their ponies and glided out fan-wise, split into pairs, and wraith-like, vanished into the haze. The eyes and ears of the "roller" were set. Already, an hour previously, 20 other M.I. had left camp on a special mission.

Slowly the square moved forward. Secrecy on our part was imperative, and see to it that no scout or spy should carry news of our advance and intentions.

Just as the dawn brightened and the hazy outline of a near group of hills began to take shape, the faint echos of distant shots reached the ears of the M.I. commander in the scout line. He thought of his 20 picked men on special mission and of their fate.

As the square crawled nearer to the hills a pair of mounted figures trotted in to the scout line from out the haze. A message passed "All's well. The patrol has been successful." Straight to the G.O.C. it was carried. Soon a Sudanese officer and his 20 M.I. joined us with several prisoners and captured camels. They had surprised the Darfuri patrol, who for weeks past had hovered like jackals in the hills and watched every movement of the Aliab garrison. Only two men had escaped on foot. With 80 miles of waterless desert behind them and without camels, no news of our advance would reach Ali Dinar in Fasher. By good luck and good patrol leadership the Darfuris had lost their eyes. They would know no more until out of the void of the unknown, an army hammered on their gates. Unwarned, two divided Darfuri armies would be smashed piecemeal.

No need to follow the fortunes of the floundering square for the next 96 hours. Yet a series of pictures remain for ever.

A sea of gently undulating desert, glaring harshly in the stark sunlight. Patches of thin scattered scrub, head high, shadeless. Dips and hollows and dry water-courses, cut deep by the sudden rains. A low line of hills on the horizon, growing distinct, only to fade away. Mirages of men and camels, of walled cities and of blue lakes of tempting water.

A score of alarms with helios flashing, and the eyes of the army continually signalling, from ridge and rise, "all clear."

And across that sandy sea moved what looked like a town on wheels. A town that crawled and jerked and concertinaed and for ever tailed out to the rear, till never-ceasing halts built it up again and pushed back its walls to shape.

The midday halt. A blistering sun and a mouth like leather; too dry to sweat and no shade anywhere. Camp in square and infantry picquets to relieve the M.I. screen. Guns to the corners. Camels barracked inside and the horse-line ropes pegged down. A whistle. Issue of water. A dozen canvas water troughs, bath shaped, to hold 40 gallons, are set and filled gingerly, not too near the thirst-crazy horses. Ponies are led up two by two. Beware a rush. "Let each pony drink his fill, oh comrade, though he nose and paw and threaten to upset the trough. He's your mount and maybe carries your life."

But they were wonderful, those Arab M.I., and never a one was seen to pinch a surreptitious mouthful of his pony's ration, much as his parched throat tempted him.

So hour by hour, and day by day, till the fiery sun sank on the horizon and the welcome shadows grew. Till the desert turned to silver and the heavens darkened. Till one by one our familiar friends, the stars, winked at us and we knew our way again. Over there, beyond the distant rise, the desert suddenly caught fire—a huge golden rim loomed up, took shape and grew into a globe; a flood of golden colour swept to us, enwrapped us, caught up our hearts in its golden track.

Slowly the camp sinks to silence; the last fire flickers. A tired whinny from the horse lines—a grunt and a jingle from the camels. A cool eddy of breeze fans up—aye, cool, praise be. From the watchful pairs that guard us comes in Arabic: "No. 1 and all's well."

On the third day "B" Force joined us without misadventure. The same day one of our aeroplanes passed us, reconnoitred Melit, and returned to say "all clear." Next day we marched in without opposition.

We halted at Melit three days. It is a regular oasis in the desert. There was ample water in the khor from holes ten feet deep. It was the best water supply we had seen since the Nile. We all revelled in green vegetables, fresh milk and unlimited baths. Ponies, rifles, and swords were surrendered by the local inhabitants, whose people seemed friendly enough. Some at

least of the Darfuris believed that the Hakuma had come to stay.

But we all knew that the big fight lay ahead of us, and everything now indicated the road to Fasher as its scene.

On Sunday, 21st May, the final advance commenced. All the men and animals had been rested, all the water tanks had been filled. But above all we now had Melit and its ample water supply behind us with a small garrison. The brooding nightmare of a desperate, hopeless struggle with thirst had flapped its wings and vanished. There might be a straight fight before us, but we were on the last lap. Thirty miles to go.

On the 21st we did the usual two marches, but care was taken to camp before dark, despite a full moon, and shallow trenches were dug.

The country was more broken with small hills, dry khors and dense patches of scrub—a difficult country to scout. A few deserted villages with poor wells were passed.

One familiar accompaniment was back with us. Our old friends, the enemy's cavalry, hovered like bees round the honey pot. Fewer than of yore, more for observation than resistance, yet a timely warning to be prepared.

Scattered firing continued all day, but the M.I. saved the square from casualties, if not from halts and delays. A pony-mounted support to the scout line was badly needed, but could not be supplied. All the 60 M.I. were strung out in pairs round the square, and none could be spared for a massed nucleus. Our mounted pairs at 200 yards intervals made no mistake at their rôle of scouting, but could not hope to push back any firm resistance, without support. By the time a C.C. company could be pushed out to clear up the situation the opposition had melted; but the delays were irksome.

On the 22nd the square moved early. We had begun to wonder if we should reach Fasher without a fight. But immediately after leaving bivouac at 6 a.m. the M.I. made touch with the Darfuri cavalry and the resistance was stouter. The enemy had trebled in number, perhaps to 600, and groups of camel

men appeared. Firing in the scout line was incessant and progress very slow.

We were now crossing a high plateau, which led to a broad valley on the left. The low plain in front was rippled with a succession of rolling gozes, dotted with scrub. As the day aged the heat haze shortened observation. The scout screen scarcely moved, hard pressed by threatening feints, by fire from every dune, by mounted bodies which clumped menacing at one moment, only to string out and wither at the next.

The units of the square chafed impatient, irked to fever pitch by inaction; the M.I. scouts, like hunting spaniels, yearned for the guns of their masters to clear the way and share the sport.

Time and again a heavily bunched squadron of Darfuris gave a fleeting target for the guns, only to melt at once at the first shell. Thus the enemy continued his cunning game of causing delay, tiring us out and of carefully leading us on to his carefully prepared position.

At last Kelly pushed out a C.C. company and his four British M.G.s in support of his M.I., and we moved down into the lower plain of scrub. The progress was now more rapid, but from 6 to 11 a.m. we had scarcely made five miles progress.

The screen of scouts had been swallowed up in the thin bush, dropping here and there a link to keep touch. They were all in action individually at flitting targets. The C.C. company and machine guns, now acting as A.G., were constantly mounting and dismounting as targets presented themselves.

But at last the advance faltered and came to a stop. Message after message had come in from the M.I. to say they were held up. Now the commander himself rode in to report. He was held up by very strong forces of massed cavalry, who refused to give way and seemed to be working round our flanks. More important, he suspected strong forces of concealed footmen 1,000 yards in front. He had seen suspicious groups which had disappeared. So had his men. But he could not move forward.

The C.C. company and M.G.s were now engaged in long-range fire against the massing cavalry on our left.

The G.O.C. and Staff rode forward to reconnoitre.

A thousand yards ahead, and half hidden in the straggling bush, was a native village. Between us and it, two opposing lines of scouts, trim khaki-clad M.I. and red or white gibbated Darfuris, skirmished, fired, advanced and retired, to each man his own particular duel. Well, our M.I. were busy enough and doing their job.

Azab Eff. Selim, O.C. of M.I. scouts, pointed. On each flank of the distant village he had seen Darfuri footmen. Each big tree sheltered its group of horsemen who watched and waited. He suspected a trap. This was the first time they had really held his M.I. They were three to one against him in front, and look at the mounted crowds on each flank, just out of dangerous range. He could not get on. What was he to do ?

Some of the Staff scoffed. The gunners had leave to shell the village and the massing horsemen on the flanks. Everyone itched to do something. Machine-gunners, still locked in the square, bemoaned the vanishing targets. M.I. cursed for supports. O.C. Camel Corps, ever a thruster, strode back from his firing A.G. and begged leave to pull out his other three companies and to storm the village. All prayers Kelly stoutly resisted. He must not engage piecemeal. He must have news. "Damn the M.I." cursed the square, "why don't they get on ?" "Damn the square," cursed the M.I. "why don't they come on ?"

Meanwhile the shells drew nothing. All round the village leapt up white shell-bursts. Nothing moved.

The massed cavalry on the flanks broke up and moved further round towards the rear. A solitary aeroplane, back from bombing Fasher, passed high over head, towards Gebel El Hilla. He never suspected the fever of uncertainty below him, a veil which he alone might have lifted.

Kelly looked at his watch and made up his mind. The square to advance 200 yards, halt and dig in. One infantry

company to relieve the M.I. on outpost. Three companies of infantry to form up on the left and storm the village. All M.G.s and both batteries to the corners and front faces of the square. The whole force to be under arms and on alert.

Within ten minutes everybody was busy, the fever of impatience appeased. M.I. from the relief slowly trickled in.

The sound of firing still came from the distance. The assault companies were forming up on the left. The A.G. of C.C. were still out. A rough-and-ready trench line in soft sand had already taken shape.

Suddenly, from out of the surrounding scrub, came two M.I., galloping hell for leather. Long e'er they had time to deliver their news, events spoke for themselves.

A roar of musketry broke out from the direction of the village. A roar too strenuous to be prolonged, which quickly dwindled. The air buzzed and twanged overhead as if we were attacked by a swarm of bees. Here and there a man collapsed suddenly, a camel jumped and crumpled, a pony in the lines grunted and swung a broken leg. Phits of dust leapt and pebbles whistled.

We were attacked, then, but where from? Whistles blew and we tumbled into the trenches, facing each his front.

Then out from the thinning scrub, 400 yards away, came a dribble of led camels; beyond them, retreating sullenly, a line of Camel Corps men, retiring by sections, and firing madly. Beyond again and almost on top of them a dense line of Dervishes, jumbled and elbowing, ten deep and stretching out infinitely to both flanks—500 yards at a guess. God knew how many, and the fire of our front masked by our own C.C. men!

The C.C. company, acting as A.G., had gone prospecting on their own, led by their impetuous C.O., and had drawn a hornet's nest. At that moment the betting was 10 to 1 against a single C.C. man getting back alive. To us it looked as if at any moment that endless wave of spearmen must overtake them, break over and overwhelm them.

But two things saved them. Although they had 400 yards to go to reach the square, and the threatening wave only

200 yards behind them, the going was so heavy in soft sand that no man could force his pace beyond a staggering walk. The enemy had emptied their rifles in one wild discharge and were now bent on close quarter work with the spear. Moreover, their very numbers hampered them.

The discipline of the retreating C.C. company was wonderful. The impetuosity of their leader had turned to complete sangfroid. I can see him now, strolling back quietly, walking stick in hand, his syce leading his grey pony beside him, while the leader calmly conducts the retreat as per Training Book regulations, each section covering by its fire the retirement of the next.

As the C.C. company slowly converged and neared the square, our guns and M.G.s at the corners became unmasked. At 400 yards a raking and converging fire caught the Darfuri wave from both sides.

From that moment the whole aspect of affairs changed. From the fear that our own retreating comrades would open the way for the hostile wave to burst on top and over us before we could shoot, and the apparent certainty that all that Camel company were doomed, emerged the sudden conviction that both square and Camel company were safe. That the wave of spearmen would never cross the last 200 yards of desert.

The Great War has dwarfed all battle scenes for years to come ; yet there is no one who saw that vital charge of Darfuri spearmen—the first and last chapter of that brief campaign—who can have aught but admiration for the Arabs and Blacks who charged home that day.

Two hundred yards from that face of our square the encroaching sand dunes dwindled out to a low ridge, parallel to our face, and capped one end by a sandy knoll. It was on that low ridge, where the men in the wave first came into full view, that the “case” shell and M.G. fire was concentrated at point-blank range.

The wave, closely packed, six deep, and stretching far to each flank, just withered away like corn before the reaper. As the guns flashed case shot, on the instant deep grooves were cut

clean through the wave ; as the M.Gs. crackled, line after line sank forward and the barrier of dead on the ridge deepened.

Now and again, red gibbated leaders, bearing banners inscribed to Islam, burst forward out of the shambles, advanced a yard or two and crumpled. At last the wave was gone ; remained only a few odd currents, fanatic led, who covered by the knoll or such like buttress, still advanced in mad desperation.

For two minutes the knoll was a boiling mass, which slowly sank and subsided. One white gibbated leader, bearing a green banner, for long stood on the knoll top, indomitable, relentless, waving forward, till at the very end he sank forward on his knees and slowly collapsed, arms and banner high flung, as if in last obeisance to Allah.

It was a great charge. If they had reached us it would have been decisive—the other way round. A second Isandhlwana.

Meantime, on the left face, the attack had never been pressed home. That half of the wave had been thrown back ; it had been hard hit further away. Then seeing its left wing exterminated it had faltered and finally given way and fled. The enemy's cavalry had never engaged. They had been content to sit on their horses and watch from afar. Now, seeing their fortunes lost, they vanished.

A trumpeter sounded the general advance. The square rose, and bayonet-armed, swept forward. But the day was won. Naught remained but the dead and the mortally wounded. Amid the far-scattered scrub and a haze of dust, groups and single men on foot, on donkey or camel back, hastened Fasherwards to bear the tidings. In the tail of the rout single men and pairs limped and staggered. For a mile every shade yielding shrub held its prey of dead and mortally stricken.

Thus ended the fight at Berengia, where most of 1,000 Darfuris fell, including four of their most famous leaders. Our losses were trifling : three officers wounded and 27 O.R. killed and wounded. But it was touch and go. One twist of bad fortune and the whole result might have been reversed.

The enemy had dug a double line of trenches 700 yards long on both sides of the village. Here their 4,000 footmen had remained hidden, and by the cunning use of their cavalry they had hoped to draw us into a trap. It was only their want of discipline and inability to hold their fire, plus the rash but inspired reconnaissance of the O.C. Camel Corps, that had withheld disaster.

That night we camped just short of Fasher, and there was a false alarm of a night attack. Probably the wives and kindred of the dead seeking their menfolk.

Next day we marched into Fasher without opposition. Ali Dinar, with the last handful of his faithful adherents, had fled to the hills of Gebel Marra, 70 miles to the west.

Although El Fasher was not the native city of wonder, which local rumour had painted, yet to us, desert-starved, it was remarkable enough. Water in abundance from many shallow, easy wells. Fair built and spacious houses, shady courtyards and wonderful thatched roofs.

Loot as of Aladdin's cave. Scores of varieties of rifles, brass cannons, cross-hilted swords and chain armour of Crusaders' day or modern Tuareg. European band instruments. Crown jewels. Embroidered banners and robes of state.

Grain for the taking ; ammunition by the ton ; 2,500 rifles ; ponies, camels, donkeys and livestock innumerable.

Each day more and more people came in to surrender. Proud Arab Sheikhs, like feudal barons of old, with their bands of black retainers. Rich merchants of the town, who had fled at our approach ; farmers and camel breeders. All came to make obeisance to the new order and on the best terms they could. Perhaps they were not sorry to see the tyranny of Ali Dinar at an end.

The back of the campaign was broken. Ali Dinar, for whom there could be no terms, alone held out in the isolated fastness of Gebel Marra. With him were a gang of faithful slaves and retainers, who by feud or crime had made their lives unsafe elsewhere.

The hot weather was upon us ; the rains had broken ; supplies were running short, and the G.O.C. with half his forces had returned to Khartoum. Final operations were to be resumed in the coming winter.


But in early October Major Huddleston, O.C. the Camel Corps—the same who had bearded the hidden trenches of Berengia—found himself in command at Fasher. To him came reliable tidings of the actual hiding-place of the fallen tyrant. Despite injunctions to play ever for safety, Huddleston was never the man to consider too long the order of his going. He struck and struck hard with the queerest, most quickly trained mounted corps that has ever gone forth to fight.


Luck was with him, and in a few short weeks he had hunted down Ali Dinar, and in a quick surprise one dawn, he made an end. The body of Ali Dinar himself was found among the few who fell.

Thus at the conclusion another veil had lifted. Civilization and progress had taken another bound westward into the Unknown.

Darfur is now a quiet and contented country, save for a rare sporadic outburst of fanaticism. Its people are doubtless happier and glad to be free of the rule of a despot. For the nonce all is well ; unless they have but exchanged one tyranny for a worse—the tyranny of education and progress.

When the pilgrims from the far west travel Mecca-wards in motor-bus and aeroplane, will the gods laugh or weep ?





CAVALRY IN THE GREAT WAR.

A Brief Retrospect.

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL A. G. MARTIN,
formerly 6th Dragoons, German Army.

PART IV.

The Battle of the Aisne, and twilight of strategical cavalry on the Western Front, Autumn, 1914.

THE late Field-Marshal, Viscount French of Ypres, referring in his memoirs to the first impression made on him by the German retreat from the Marne, writes: "We fully believed we were driving the Germans back to the Meuse, if not to the Rhine."

It was not realised at the moment, that the enemy, far from admitting himself beaten, was withdrawing—metaphorically speaking—with drums beating, and colours flying. The Allies' hopes were quickly disillusioned, for on the third day of the pursuit they found themselves confronted by a new enemy battle-front, bidding them defiance from the right bank of the river Aisne.

The Battle of the Marne—to employ another figure of speech—wiped the slate clean. The original German plan of campaign was shattered, and from its wreck arose a situation totally new and unforeseen. Unlimited strategic prospectives opened out, but it was not before the short fierce struggle on the Aisne ended in stalemate, that the war of movement started again.

At the outset of this contest, the Allies had the advantage on their side, if they but knew how to profit by it. Von Kluck's and von Bülow's respective armies were still separated by the breach, which had been their misfortune at the Marne. Were the B.E.F., together with the left wing of the Fifth French

Army to march into the gap before the Germans had time to close it, von Kluck would be cut off, and von Bülow's right wing turned.

Both sides therefore very naturally concentrated their main efforts on the gap, which, at the moment the German armies faced about, extended approximately from Berry au Bac to Vailly.

The Germans were now hurrying up several army corps to forestall the disaster that threatened: the VIIth Reserve Corps, released by the timely fall of Maubeuge; the XVth Corps from Lorraine, and others. However, since the nearest of these reinforcements could not reach the battlefield before September 13th or 14th, the cavalry had to delay the enemy's advance meanwhile, as best it could.

With this object in view, the 9th and 2nd German Cavalry Divisions withdrew from the Aisne to the high ground along the Chemin des Dames, taking up positions at Bray and Cerny-en-Laonnois, where they awaited the attack of the British 1st Army Corps advancing against them from Bourg.

Fortunately for the German cause, the British assault did not fully materialise till September 14th, by which time the German VIIth Reserve Corps had come up, and now intervened between Sir Douglas Haig and his strategical objective Laon.

The two cavalry divisions thus relieved, were withdrawn from the front line and concentrated in the rear, ready for mounted or dismounted action, whichever should be required of them in the forthcoming battle. The Guards Cavalry Division which had been fighting rearguard actions in the Vailly sector till relieved by units of the IIIrd Army Corps, was assembled at Chevigny, likewise in reserve.

On September 14th the British attacked in full force along the whole breadth of their front. The fighting was most desperate in the neighbourhood of Troyon—Cerny. Here the 9th Cavalry Division came to the assistance of the hard pressed infantry, and helped hold the position.

Both sides afterwards claimed to have been victorious; the British, for having pushed the German line back locally; the Germans because they effectually frustrated the enemy attempt to break through.

The British cavalry, now formed in two divisions, took no prominent part in the battle, there being no room to manoeuvre between the valley of the river Aisne, and the German positions. On the other hand, the French Cavalry Corps under General Conneau, scarcely 10 miles further east, came in for a rare opportunity. The left wing of the French Vth Army, which was composed of the XVIIIth Corps, General Valabrègue's Group of Reserve Divisions, and the Cavalry Corps (Conneau), negotiated the River Aisne between Berry au Bac and Maizy unopposed so that by evening of September 13th a wedge had actually been driven between the First and Second German Armies. To all appearance, the Allies were on the threshold of great strategical possibilities. Conneau's foremost Division, the 10th, reached Sissonne, a long way behind the German front.

The French Generalissimo, Marshal Joffre, intended these forces to push on due north, but directions to this effect reached Army H.Q. too late to be acted upon, or other considerations may have prevented the G.O.C., General Franchet d'Esperey, from carrying them out. Anyhow his, the Army Commander's, dispositions for the 14th were based on a totally different appreciation of the general situation.

Instead of perfecting the breakthrough, as Joffre desired, General Franchet d'Esperey ordered the XVIIIth Corps and Valabrègue's Group of Reserve Divisions to wheel left and right respectively, the former attacking Craonne, where weak enemy forces were covering the eastern extremity of the Chemin des Dames position; the latter breaking in on von Bülow's right flank and rendering his front north of Reims untenable.

The Cavalry Corps was to participate in this double-barrelled offensive, by re-inforcing the XVIIIth Corps with one division, and operating with the other two in unison with General Valabrègue's Group.

Well might General Conneau indulge in some optimistic speculation, as he turned the heads of his columns in a southeasterly direction, making for Neufchatel, from where, to all appearance, the way into von Bülow's rear lay open.

However, as the saying goes : : " There's many a slip, etc.," for the inconstancy of the fortune of war dashed the cup of

triumph from his lips, before allowing him as much as a taste of it.

General Valabrègue had met with unexpected opposition at Guignicourt, and suffered so sharp a reverse, that he was obliged to retire across the Aisne, lest worse befall him. General Conneau thus deprived of his main support and believing himself in danger of being cut off, abandoned the raid, and also sought safety for his cavalry divisions on the south bank of the river.

In the meantime, the cavalry division attached to the XVIIIth Corps was having no better luck. Advancing from Amifontaine northwest to attack the enemy opposed to the XVIIIth Corps from the rear, it was stopped by strong German cavalry suddenly appearing upon the scene. The Divisional Commander evidently believing that he stood no chance against such odds, retired behind the right wing of his infantry, and, later in the day disappeared across the river altogether.

It was von Richthofen's Cavalry Corps, now composed of Guards and Second Division (the 5th Cavalry Division had been transferred to Third Army) which came in for this unexpected success. Though the newly arrived XVth Corps bore the brunt of the battle now ensuing in the Craonne sector, Richthofen's Corps also deserves to be given its due for having helped to master the crisis.

On the alarming report that enemy cavalry had broken through at Amifontaine the evening before, Richthofen's squadrons were in the saddle and riding east in the early morning of September 14th. Arriving on the high ground in the neighbourhood of St. Erme a large force of enemy horse was sighted in the plain below, which the Corps Commander decided to attack in mounted combat.

However, the enemy refused the challenge, though replying with a few shells to the preliminary greeting by German horse batteries, the mass presently turned about and vanished from the field.

* * * * *

Whereas, as has been seen, Joffre's hopes of breaking through between the First and Second German Armies were finally des-

troyed by the outcome of the battle of the Aisne, the other string to the Marshal's bow, viz., outflanking and turning von Kluck's right wing, was as promising as ever.

Von Kluck's retirement from the Ourcq had not only released the French VIth Army from the predicament it was in, but also restored freedom of action to General Bridoux and his cavalry corps. No obstacle now stood in that commander's path. What the C.-in-C. demanded of him, was that he should ride north at his best speed, overtake the retreating enemy, and then, turning east, play havoc among his lines of communication.

Undoubtedly the tired condition of Bridoux' divisions immediately after the Marne battle, rendered them unfit to make the best of their chance and get started quickly, for it was not till September 14th they reached Chaulnes, and next day Péronne, the place from where the raid proper was to be launched.

General Bridoux' orders were, to advance on St. Quentin, and destroy the railway connection between Bohain and that town. This was a task of the very greatest strategical importance, for the line in question represented the sole and only means by which the Germans could rail up reinforcements from a far distant base, to their right wing. A route involving an enormous detour via Liège—Brussels—Mons—Cambrai—St. Quentin to La Fère. The Allies, during their retreat in August, had blown up all important bridges further east, thereby making for the time being, shorter railway communication impossible to the enemy. They themselves enjoyed a great advantage in having at their disposal an undamaged rail system, by means of which they could move troops and all the necessities of war to and fro behind their front unrestrictedly.

As the railway line Mons—Cambrai—St. Quentin—La Fère now practically formed the western boundary of the territory occupied by the German lines of communication, it was extremely vulnerable. No adequate force of troops could be spared at this critical stage of the operations for covering purposes, so that the only barrier intervening between the exposed railway and a possible French raid, was a thin veil of Landwehr

(units of the 41st Landwehr Brigade) scattered over some 30 miles of country between Cambrai and the upper Somme.

Although the auspices under which General Bridoux set out from Péronne on the 15th appear to have been most favourable, the enterprise as a raid was a failure. The Germans defending St. Quentin stubbornly held their ground, and the damage done to the railway only sufficed to block the line for a number of hours.

The German official history, "Das Deutsche Feldeisenbahnwesen," Vol. I, p. 117, refers to the incident as follows:—

"During transport of the XVth Corps, the railway between Cambrai and St. Quentin was repeatedly attacked. A French cavalry division was repulsed at St. Quentin on the 16th, and in the afternoon of the same day, the line was blown up at Busigny, and also damaged by artillery fire near Bohain station.

"Though no serious harm resulted, the traffic was held up for 15 hours, which added considerably to the difficulties on this congested line."

On September 17th General Bridoux was killed in his motor car, and his papers captured. It would be interesting to know at the hands of which German unit and under what circumstances the gallant General met with his death; also whether the captured papers betrayed anything of importance. But the German sources available to the writer merely mention the incident without going into detail.

The military reader, interested in the subject of cavalry raids, would probably also care to know by what means the officer commanding at the base at St. Quentin parried the blow aimed at him. But these particulars, too, are passed over by the official historian as not being of general interest.

A flash-like glimpse is given by the report of Captain Baron Gemmingen, 26th (Württemberg) Dragoons, cited in von Poseck "Die Deutsche Kavallerie in Belgien und Frankreich, 1914."

This officer's squadron—as reconnoitring squadron, 7th Cavalry Division, newly arrived from Lorraine—was falling back from Amiens on St. Quentin before the French advance, when coming within the sphere of influence of the indefatigable G.S.O. Lines of Communications, Major Count Kirchbach, it

was immediately commandeered to help stem the oncoming flood of enemy horsemen.

The Major collected every German in the town capable of carrying a rifle; clerks, transport drivers, and so forth, and employed them in the defence. Besides these miscellaneous levies to augment his scanty force of Landwehr, he was further supported by a mixed detachment of the XVth Corps, detrained at St. Quentin in view of the emergency.

With Bridoux' death, his cavalry corps reached the end of its tether. It had not sufficient momentum left to carry on with the job. According to a report made at the time by General Buisson (Bridoux successor) the cavalry was in so deplorable a state, that it could hardly move.

And yet, the issue at stake was so important, that—so one cannot help thinking—it would have paid the French cause to sacrifice this corps down to the last man and the last horse. If impossible to break through the enemy protective cordon with the main body, one or the other of a dozen or more independent squadrons or small detachments could surely have reached the vital artery, and been able to sever it effectually.

As it was, the Germans continued to work this railway, that had practically saved them in the Battle of the Aisne, and was now enabling them to concentrate a new 6th Army wherewith to attack the French flank.

The French cavalry raid under General Bridoux was the introduction to that series of "leapfrog" operations, by means of which both sides strove, in alternative bounds, to overtake and outflank each other. A strategical "modus," repeating itself with automatic regularity, until the shores of the North Sea barred further expansion, and the Western Front finally congealed to that state of hopeless rigidity, which the soldier soon learned to know, and hate, as trench warfare.

The "Struggle for the Flank," also popularly called "Race to the Sea," started from St. Quentin during the last convulsions of the Battle of the Aisne, and ran "fast and furious" to the tragic finish at Ypres two months later. Tragic, because in spite of colossal sacrifices and unsurpassed heroism on both sides, no definite decision, one way or the other, could be enforced.

Three great battles mark the progress of the race: The Somme, September 25th to October 1st; Arras-Lille, October 2nd to 18th; Ypres, October 29th to November 14th.

The far-reaching battle arena of the Somme offered unlimited scope for operations with large bodies of strategical cavalry. But, as we are obliged to admit, the War, so far, had produced no cavalry leader with the bold genius of a Stuart, who might have made different history of the Campaign, and helped bring it to a speedy conclusion.

Army Commanders were prone to keep their cavalry on the leash. On the German side, G.H.Q. showed itself unwilling or incapable of making timely and wholehearted use of the mass of available cavalry. The French on the other hand, though more fortunate in the person of their C.-in-C. derived no advantage from their superior numbers because Marshal Joffre's subordinate cavalry generals were lacking in initiative. In how far this lack of initiative was the sequel of insufficient training in the French cavalry (till 1913 only two years service with the colours) the writer is not competent to decide.

The German cavalry was not given the chance it deserved in virtue of its efficiency.

At the same rate of speed with which the northern wing of the opposing armies was being propelled, in leaps and bounds, towards the sea, the space available for stragetic manoeuvre diminished. The opportunities missed during the second half of September, were irredeemable.

On two belated occasions only did the German High Command direct raids to be made. These attempts failed in their main object, not only because they were half measures, undertaken with inadequate forces, but principally for the reason that every flanking movement—whether made by the Allies or Germans—was invariably and promptly outflanked in return.

The first of the two instances alluded to, occurred at the end of September, when the right wing 6th German Army was advancing—right shoulder forward—to attack what was believed to be the northern limit of the entire French front.

On this occasion von Richthofen's Cavalry Corps was ordered to execute a wide encircling movement, operating

against the River Somme, below Amiens, and rear of the enemy left wing. Richthofen's two divisions were but a fraction of the force which, under favourable circumstances, might have been collected for the purpose. Von der Marwitz, 2nd Cavalry Corps, for instance, though close at hand, was tied to the separate task of covering the northern army flank. The 4th Cavalry Corps (General von Hollen), destined to be launched shortly on a similar enterprise as von Richthofen further north, had not yet appeared on this front.

As in due course Crown Prince Rupprecht (commanding 6th Army) developed his offensive, it became apparent, that the French left now extended to Bethune, and that the German right wing, instead of striking De Maud'huy's left flank, was involved in a frontal battle, with its own right flank imperilled.

Under these altered circumstances, von Richthofen's contemplated raid was called off.

It would hardly have been possible, anyhow, for von Richthofen to gain the rear of the French wing early enough to ensure the desired result, even if a way round had been left open by the enemy. And this was so, because his first movements were so hampered by the advance of the IVth Army Corps, whose roads he had to cross in order to get clear away from the army flank, that he was barely able to proceed 10 miles the first day. A hitch in the staff work somewhere!

In consequence of the complete change of situation the 1st Cavalry Corps was now urgently needed to help defend the army flank against the new menace from the north. Richthofen joined forces with von der Marwitz, and together, for several days they rendered invaluable service by stopping the enemy advance from that quarter.

The four German divisions were confronted by a formidable group of French Cavalry, comprising the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 10th Division, united under the command of General Conneau. More serious was the advance against their right by the 1st French Army Corps, or parts of it from the North East.

Sic Transit Gloria Mundi! Here were two opposing hosts of cavalry, some 12,000 German and 15,000 French horsemen, face to face. Yet, instead of eagerly mounting into the

saddle, and charging in serried ranks full gallop at one another, lances couched, swords at the engage, to the intoxicating sounds of the trumpets and roars of defiant cheering, according to the way they had been trained to fight since times immemorial, they resort to carbine and machine gun, dodging behind what cover they can find, or scrambling in breathless rushes to the attack on foot, over field and furrow, while that faithful battle comrade of better times, the horse, is " eating off his head " uselessly miles away in the rear.

The cavalry were going through a school still new to them; learning to win fame of a kind, that differed from the spectacular laurels of old fashioned war, though none the less heroic in soldierly endurance and sacrifice.

During the night of Oct. 8th, the anxiously awaited relief (XIVth Army Corps) arrived, and the four German Cavalry divisions were available once more for new tasks. They were pushed forward immediately beyond La Bassée towards the River Lys, where now General von Hollen's Cavalry Corps formed the extreme right of the German front.

This Corps, consisting of the 3rd, 6th and Bavarian Cavalry Division, had been assembled in the Mons-Valenciennes region, between 1st and 4th of October, for the purpose of making a renewed attempt to raid the enemy flank and rear. But it was now too late for such operations. Von Hollen pushed ahead laboriously towards Hazebrouck, his progress retarded by the resistance of a miscellaneous enemy: troops from the garrison of Lille, numerous French Cavalry (two to three divisions), Belgians and, last not least, the first British to appear in these parts.

Hazebrouck proved to be held by the enemy, and it was quite obvious that a raid into the enemy Hinterland had become an impossibility. General von Hollen therefore abandoned the idea, desisted from an attack on Hazebrouck, and retired to the South bank of the River Lys there linking up with Marwitz and Richthofen.

Now at last, too late to serve their befitting strategical purpose, the entire cavalry in France are massed on the northern wing. Eight German divisions (5th and 8th previously dis-

patched to Russia), and probably 10 French, to which three British are to be added presently.

The thunderclouds of war gather darkly over Ypres, and the devoted Flanders country. Coming up from the Aisne, the B.E.F. arrives, to join hands with Rawlinson's 7th Division landed at Zeebrugge, and the 3rd British Cavalry Division. Together they close the last gap between the French army and the sea. One final effort ensues to turn the German Right, colliding with a corresponding final effort on the part of the Germans, who throw four newly raised Corps of barely trained volunteers—the flower of the German universities and schools—into the scale. No amount of heroic sacrifice is of avail. The front withstands the shock of both sides; neither can win through.

The cavalry played a prominent part in that great epic, the First Battle of Ypres, but exclusively on foot. Both in attack and defence they stood the supreme test no longer a makeshift auxiliary, as they were looked upon in pre-war days by their comrades of the infantry, but equals.

Owing to the advantage of long term service, as well as to the lesson learned in the South African War, the British Cavalry were indisputably far better trained for dismounted action than their Continental fellow horsemen. Impartial cavalry soldiers, independent of nationality, will admit that perhaps the finest example of sacrifice to duty was performed by certain units of the British Household Cavalry at Zandevoorde on Oct. 30th. One Squadron 1st Life Guards is said to have held out to the last man; not a living soul—wounded or prisoner—left to tell the tale.

“It's an ill wind that blows nobody any good.” So may many a German cavalryman have thought, on his way from Flanders to the Russian front, November 1914. No business of his to worry about the formidable difficulties of a “double-fronted” war. In Russia at least, that vast empire of unlimited space and distance, the cavalry would come in to its own and be cavalry again; not cooped up like it had been in France incapacitated by cramped conditions both of space and generalship.

The Germans began transferring their cavalry divisions to Russia early in November, where, in the course of the next two years they were destined to achieve great things, largely contributing to the collapse of the Russian Giant in 1917.


The vicissitudes of the cavalry on the eastern front, its triumphs and setbacks, make a chapter for itself, affording a bright contrast to the first experiences in France.

Having no Russian Dorado to betake themselves to after once trench warfare set in for good, the French and British cavalry were condemned to wait patiently for one of those periodically undertaken great offensives to break through the German front and give them their chance. When that chance came at last, after four long weary years, it was, somehow, no longer the same thing, quite apart from the circumstance that the armistice put an end to hostilities at an early stage of the German retreat.

The writer of this retrospect has often wondered whether the Western Allies ever considered the possibility of employing their numerous and efficient cavalry on the Russian front, where, by their example they might have put some life into the Russian cavalry.



distribution of cavalry Sept. 15th
advance into the gap.
about to start.



CAVALRY AND TANKS

By "A. F. V."

THERE have been numerous disquisitions on the subject of the relations between mounted and mechanical arms, and from the tone of many of them, it has almost appeared as if the tank and the horse, or rather the two kinds of soldiery who use them, were sworn natural enemies, that it must be uncomfortable or even perilous for a tank officer to enter a cavalry mess, or that there was as bitter a feud between the Royal Tank Corps and the Cavalry of the Line as between the regiments described in Mr. Kipling's "Belts," who goaded each other to blood-letting with cries of "Delhi rebels," and "Threes about!"

In so far as the above picture is not, as we gladly admit it largely is, a travesty of the truth, it seems to be forgotten by the disputants that the horsemen, and the tank men of any given army will—except perhaps in the unlikely event of civil strife—have to fight in any future war beside, and not against each other. Whatever personal or professional differences there may be between them, they are hardly likely to be openly manifested on the field of battle or in bivouac. As members one and the other of the same army, our task in war will be one of co-operation, not antagonism; and the more efficient each of us is at his own job, the more likely is he to be able to contribute powerfully to the common cause, that of achieving victory. This community of interest must enable us, if we have not lost all sense of reason, to hope for, and even rejoice in, the success of the rival arm over our own, when that rival arm consists of our comrades in arms. The writer of course hopes that in any future war, British tanks will sweep the hostile machines from the field; he also hopes that if hostile cavalry be present to assist them, they may suffer the same fate. The point is that his readers in the

cavalry should and must share these hopes, even though there should thereby be exemplified the helplessness of cavalry against tanks under the conditions existing at the time. But in the same way, if a British mounted force should succeed by skill or stratagem in putting paid to the account of an enemy armoured unit, the achievement should be hailed by the Royal Tank Corps with no less satisfaction because it might be regarded as a point in favour of the horseman as against the tank-soldier. These rival arms may tend to think of each other on the one hand as effete and useless encumbrances of the battlefield lagging superfluous on the stage, or on the other as monomaniac visionaries, foes of romance and chivalry; but there they both are, and such rivalry as exists can only be a purely friendly emulation in mutual achievement for the common cause.

The trouble is that the exigencies of peace time service do somewhat tend to create artificial rivalry between arms, by reason of the very fact that both are competitors in the service budget. Each arm has ideas for its improvement in numbers, organisation, armament, and equipment, none of which can be satisfied without expenditure of money. But money is scarce and there is nothing like enough to go round for all. If the cavalry regiments count on increased establishment of machine guns, this demand may have to be set aside owing to shortage of funds, but it will be hard to persuade the cavalry machine-gun enthusiasts that it can be right and reasonable so to refuse it, and at the same time to give ear to a call for two extra tanks per company throughout the Royal Tank Corps. The enthusiast for a new arm for his part will be more or less than human if he does not regard expenditure on other matters, less pressing, less up to date, less in fashion than his own, as money ill spent because of the tradition bound point of view of those responsible for such a misallotment of funds. When these two opposed schools of thought sit down to air their views on paper, there are the makings of embittered controversy and resultant ill feeling on both sides. "Why," say the one party, 'should good money be spent on useless horses eating vast quantities of forage and needing masses of remounts to maintain them at strength, and horse-soldiers who when dismounted can fight only as numerically weak and com-

paratively inefficient infantry, and when on their horses can be held up or demolished by a hostile machine gun or two? Much better mechanise them and have done with it; the A.F.V. is the future queen of the battlefield." The other side point out that there are battlefields and battlefields; the next war will not necessarily be fought on Salisbury Plain; it will be in a country such as Palestine, where, as the late war showed, there will still be a brilliant rôle for cavalry to play. And what about the part of Imperial policeman, to which the British army has been, and at any time may again be called on to devote so much of its energies? There at least the horseman retains much if not all, of his old time value. And so the controversy continues, and is likely to continue, if only because each party has some reason on its side and truth as usual has a foot in both camps.

But we should do well to keep before our minds that we are not and ought not to be seeking mainly to score debating points over opponents in a dispute in which, after all, only the facts of the future can give a casting vote not forgetting the old dictum that in peace time we can only rehearse for a performance that may never be played, and if it is played, is often quite unlike the rehearsal. We may take it that in our military lifetime at any rate, the British army will have its A.F.V. units, and its cavalry units too; the chief question for us is how we shall best make use of both their potentialities for the common benefit. To discuss this question in detail would take us outside the scope of this short paper; a few general considerations however may not be out of place.

Broadly speaking, the rôle of cavalry as regards information and protection remains as great as ever it was, despite the invention of A.F.Vs.

A.F.V. formations can and must provide mainly for themselves in this respect, by means of their own light tanks, and are perfectly capable of doing so against their own particular enemies, the anti-tank gun and land mine (that is assuming that these are properly and wisely used; but we must assume so much, or there is no reasonable basis for discussion at all.) But then no one supposes that cavalry can supply these needs as far as A.F.Vs. are concerned. At the battle of Amiens on August 8th,

1918 the experiment was tried of sending mounted troops ahead of tanks for this purpose : and it was found that when the enemy was not there the cavalry outran the tanks, and when he was there the tanks outran the cavalry. With the greatly increased speed of present day machines, cavalry would find it impossible to keep up with them in any case, whether the enemy were there or not. But as long as the British army includes infantry who walk on their feet, or has to remain halted for any length of time—and no army has yet solved the problem of perpetual motion, horse soldiers will be needed to protect it, and to find out for it what the enemy is doing.

In normal conditions armoured cars and air squadrons can relieve it of the latter duty to some extent ; but such adjuncts for the purpose of obtaining information may reasonably be regarded as extending rather than taking over this primarily cavalry task ; they enable the commander to see further afield, but for close-range reconnaissance the horseman retains practically all his former value. Moreover there are occasions when there are no roads or tracks for armoured cars, and when weather conditions keep the air force on the ground ; and on these occasions, of which a wise enemy may be expected to avail himself to spring a surprise, cavalry must be relied on to do what these newer arms for the moment cannot, and act as the army's eyes and guards.

As regards battlefield work, the days when cavalry could be called on to play the decisive role are certainly over, but they have been over much longer than most people seem to realise. Napoleon's cavalry made some famous charges and played a brilliant part in his victories, but there exists no record of them ever having been successful in mass attacks on unbroken infantry, or deciding the day after the manner for instance, of Marston Moor or Ramillies. On the most famous occasion on which the feat was attempted, at Waterloo, not only was their effort unavailing, but it was severely blamed by the critics as being bad tactics—proof positive that cavalry had then by general consent lost its former position as queen of the battlefield. But it is hard to believe that in any other than a completely stabilised trench battle, a contingent of well trained mobile troops, able to fight on horse or on foot, in small or large bodies, will not

find very considerable opportunities for useful employment, particularly if, as will often be the case in British warfare, the enemy is inferior from the point of view of training, armament, or morale.

Again, pursuit can be undertaken most effectively by mobile troops, who are fresh, and can be used to sweep rapidly round the flanks by routes parallel to the hostile retirement and block the line of retreat of the beaten enemy. For this purpose cavalry, who are unlikely to be called on to play a major rôle on the battlefield and are capable of swift movement, of harrassing tactics, or of seizing and holding a position astride the hostile line of withdrawal, are most eminently suitable; and one outstanding lesson of history is that a successful pursuit, if the rarest of phenomena, is of equally decisive value as tactical victory on the battlefield, to which it is the complement and completion. None of these important tasks can normally be any better performed by A.F.Vs. as they exist to-day, even if any army were likely to have sufficient numbers of these expensive and valuable machines to perform them under present conditions of organisation and comparative strength. Tank units must be kept for their real rôle—to serve as shock troops for the offensive or the counter-offensive. It is for them to take a leading part in the decisive attack which is the culmination of the battle; and most armies, certainly our own, have none too many of them for this purpose alone. A small proportion may be available for operations preliminary to the decision; some may be at hand to co-operate in pursuit after victory. But the tasks, less spectacular though not less important, which prepare the delivery and exploit the success of the decisive attack, must be left, not only at present but for some time to come, to the older arms; and in these, as we have seen, cavalry will be called on to take their full share.


Further, the possibilities of using A.F.Vs. with advantage at all must depend on whether there is favourable ground for their employment—and of this a wise adversary will always attempt as far as he can to deprive them. Should he succeed, even in the case of a major war in Europe, all the duties falling on mobile troops will have to be undertaken by cavalry. Again, in

the more probable case of a war in the Near East or some similar region, though the enemy may not be of first class quality, fighting may well take place in one of the many large areas of country where A.F.Vs. cannot operate at all, or can do so only by sacrificing much of their advantages of speed and manœuvring power. Here again the decisive rôle will become the prerogative of the slow moving, less well-protected arms, and the infantryman and the horse soldier will come into their own again.

The final phases of the Mesopotamian and Palestine campaigns in the Great War strikingly exemplify of what these arms, given favourable conditions and skilful leading, are capable, and prove that even the complete absence of A.F.Vs. need not necessarily cripple the offensive power of an army. And in both these cases the rôle played by the mounted troops will compare in brilliance and effectiveness with any thing that history tells us of the days when the prestige of cavalry was at its zenith.

We have purposely said nothing of the occasions on which cavalry and A.F.Vs may be called on to work in close co-operation because we believe that in this era of rapid changes in armament and equipment, such methods must be devised and adapted to meet the circumstances of the moment, and cannot usefully be laid down beforehand, except in the most general terms. We have rather tried to point out that such co-operation as must take place between horse and tank units will be rather indirect than direct. Both arms will have their parts to play in the war of the future; the one may have the more spectacular rôle, but that of the other will be none the less necessary and reliable—and what higher praise any unit, or any arm wish for than that it did its job, and did it well? But for such co-operation, for any co-operation, each of us needs to know the other fellow's difficulties and possibilities, to know what he can do best alone, and when and where he will want our help. Let us not be led on by petty envy or injudicious rivalry to claim to be able to do ourselves what he can do better, or to despise his aid if he offers it; but let us realise that each of us has his part to play, and concentrate first on being able to play that just as well as we can play it, contributing to the fullest extent

possible to that common high standard of efficiency, and the gaining, if and when the time comes, of that success in war, which it is or should be our object as soldiers to obtain. And however great our keenness and admiration for our own arm, and however much we may delight in a controversial discussion, let us not forget that no one arm alone can win battles, and that discussion and controversy are only means to one end—that the army as a whole may attain as nearly as possible to the ideal standard of fitness for the heavy and multifarious tasks the future may call upon it to fulfil.



CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor, CAVALRY JOURNAL.

SIR,—Dhanni Baba, the grand old man, who has been the Saugor Tent Club Shikari for the last fifty years has at last retired.

It was most distressing to dispense with his services, but the old boy is now definitely past his work. It took a severe attack of bronchitis, which would have killed many a younger man, to destroy his vitality and allow him to admit that he could no longer compete.

Many of you will remember reading Dhanni's reminiscences, which appeared in the *Hoghunter's Annual* in 1931 and a finer record it would be difficult to find.

I now wish to collect a donation to present to the old man, and I feel sure that those who enjoyed sport due to his efforts here in Saugor and many other keen hughunters out of sheer admiration for old Dhanni, would like to subscribe something in token of their appreciation of his very fine services to the best of all sports.

The smallest contribution will be welcome; so will those who wish to subscribe please send their donations payable to "The Honorary Secretary, Dhanni Fund, Equitation School, Saugor (C.P.)."

C. H. H. EALES,
Hon. Secretary,
Saugor Tent Club.

To the Editor, CAVALRY JOURNAL.

SIR,—In his interesting article on Cavalry Head-dress (Lancers), in the last number of the CAVALRY JOURNAL, Colonel Ryan tells us that the German Uhlans were introduced into the Prussian Army at the beginning of the last century.

A reference to "Seydlitz: Kassel, 1882" (copy in the R.U.S.I. Library) shows that Frederick the Great, who had no use for the lance, converted his Lancer regiments into Hussars about 1743. When he gave the order for the change he is reputed to have said: "Die Hullaner allein seindt das brodt nicht werth." (The Uhlans alone are not worth their keep.)

Seydlitz's first appointment as squadron-leader was in the White Hussars, a regiment which had recently been converted from Lancers.

It would appear, therefore, that Uhlans existed in the Prussian Army during the first half of the 18th century.

Yours, etc.,

April 14th, 1934.

OSKAR TEICHMAN.



HOME AND DOMINION MAGAZINES.

THE "Army Quarterly" for April contains several historical articles on subjects ranging from siege warfare among the ancients, the military writings of Polybius, and episodes of the Great War. There is an admirably written, and charming article by Captain Gore Hickman on war time poetry, several articles on mechanization topics, of which that by Major-General Collins on tank umpiring is the pick, and an amusing plea by Major Sim for "Brighter Weapon training" in which he suggests that much time is wasted in vain endeavours to turn bad shots into good ones for the sake of getting a high unit average, and that more time and ammunition should be devoted to battle practice as the best form of training for the demands of modern war.

The "Fighting Forces" for April deals in some detail with present-day problems of world politics, Major-General Fuller, pleading that an European Police Force is the only really satisfactory means of ensuring world peace, puts forward a scheme for the organization of a "brain" and a "mouth" of such a force, pending its materialisation. The organisation he proposes would comprise a tribunal to suggest the solution of disputes and a general staff to examine the possible employment of the Police Force, if and when it should come into being. This is a very suggestive and useful article. Mr. Carter and General Bruce examine the present-day positions in Europe and the Far East respectively, and both come to the conclusion that the outlook for peace in both areas, though serious, is not hopeless. The Editor discusses the vexed question of a Ministry of Defence in the light of the recent debate in the House of Commons on this evergreen topic.

The January "Journal of the Royal Artillery" unfortunately came too late for review in the April number of this journal. It contains an interesting article to our readers, by Major O. G. Body, discussing the tendency of tanks to take over from cavalry its former rôle in flank or rear attacks and in pursuit. He attributes this to the desire to exploit speed, which he shows from the analogy of our Civil War and Wellington's campaigns, often led to wild and reckless pursuit which in no way furthered the success of the whole force. "Co-operation between tanks and infantry in the form practised between infantry and cavalry in the hey-day of the latter arm, is," the author concludes, "the ideal at which we must aim." Apart from this article there is an interesting description of Transjordan and its Frontier Force, an amusing little account by a naval officer of his experiences during a ten days' attachment to an artillery brigade, and a most useful discussion by Mr. Reid of the present economic situation, the prospects of which he sums up as an improvement slowly spreading from this country.

In the April number the article most likely to be of interest to cavalry readers is the report of a lecture by Major-General Powell on Hunting as Training for War, illustrated by a couple of sketches by "Snaffles." The author produces a great weight of opinion, in prose and poetry, in support of his thesis, and includes some valuable practical hints conveyed in the breezy popular style suitable to a lecture. An account of his experiences in the present theatre of war in the Gran Chaco by Mr. Larden is also of considerable topical value.

The "Royal Engineers' Journal" for March has an interesting account of a visit to another recent area of hostilities, Jehol, and of the Japanese operations there up to the Chinese retirement to the Great Wall. There is also a full narrative of the tour of the War Office Experimental Convoy, which made a trip of over 5,000 miles in Egypt and the Sudan in the spring of 1932. The remainder of the articles are devoted in the main to purely R.E. topics.

The contents of the "R.A.S.C. Quarterly" are always of interest to other arms and the issue of November, 1933, is no

exception to this rule. Most cavalry readers will turn first to the paper on the Advanced H.T. Depot in War, but those on the supply of ammunition to the Division in the approach march, the operation of the Divisional Baggage Company, and the protection of R.A.S.C. units in mobile warfare will equally repay reading.

The "R.A.M.C. Journal" has nothing of much appeal to the layman apart from two historical articles on the Walcheren Expedition in 1809 and the American War of 1812-14.

The "Journal of the R.U.S.I. of India" has another article by the always amusing "Mouse" on "What Every Young Officer Wants to Know"—much less, he opines, than the army to-day seems to think, to judge from the numerous schools and courses organised for his benefit. Besides this there is a rather grim description of the possibilities of bacterial warfare, and a vivid narrative by Lieutenant Thompson of the experiences of the 1933 Everest Expedition—both well worth perusal.

The 'Canadian Defence Quarterly' for January is devoted largely to the life and work in the Great War of the late General Currie; but there are other papers on such topics as the German crisis, the early British Army down to the Hundred Years' War, and personality in leadership, which will also be found very readable. The April number of the same periodical includes an account of the Japanese operations against Tsitsihar in Manchuria in the autumn of last year, and some valuable hints on self-training by Lieut.-Colonel Alexander, together with other interesting items on a variety of topics, Canadian and otherwise.



FOREIGN MAGAZINES

THE French "Revue de Cavalerie" for March-April shows how seriously the problem of mechanization as applied to cavalry is being studied in France. The opening article describes a large-scale exercise between two Cavalry divisions held in the region of Cambrai last autumn. It was attended by every general officer holding any cavalry appointment in France; by a skeleton staff supplied by each of the five cavalry divisions; by all commanders of cavalry divisional formations, cavalry mechanized units, etc.; by 50 per cent. of the regimental cavalry commanders in France, together with some specially selected officers.

As a result of the exercise it was decided that the composite horse and motorized division, as evolved in 1932, is a mobile and practical formation. It is to be further improved by the addition of some supplementary machine-gun squadrons, some tractor drawn howitzers to accompany the motorized brigade, anti-tank and anti-aircraft armament, and more bridging material. In spite of its heterogeneous composition, this type of division is regarded as still remaining a workable unit provided the commander knows how to handle it when on the march. The combination of horses and motorized troops is, in fact, said to be a definite advantage owing to the opportunities for manoeuvre which it affords. With this division forward movement is always to be carried out by bounds. The armoured vehicles should receive the first enemy shots since they are to be employed for distant reconnaissance; indeed these vehicles have revived the possibilities of all distant enterprises of the nature of reconnaissance and raid. It is, of course, impossible to conceal all the movements of such a formation against aerial observation, but by judicious extension and breadth of advance it is still feasible to mask the intended point of impact. The low proportion of artillery demands that gun-fire should be husbanded and massed at few points. Above all a division of this type must be instinct with the idea of movement and of extension of

front; it must always push on with the idea of acting far afield, and quickly.

Two other articles based on the army manoeuvres and exercises of 1932, deal with the same subject and much on the same lines.

Another article deals with the use made of a group of armoured cars by the French Fourth Army at the Battle of the Somme on 30th July, 1916. These vehicles were extemporized armoured cars equipped with a 37 mm. gun each. Being fitted with pneumatic tyres, they were naturally unable to leave the roads; even so the cars suffered from the bad state of the roads. After some hesitation the French Command decided to employ them on 30th July along the Curlu-Clery road, and subsequently along the tow-path of the Somme canal. Finally, the cars contributed largely to the capture of Monacu farm. They had done excellent work and had fired, 1,500 shells and 78,000 rounds of m.g. ammunition. The author dilates on the openings such machines might have found had they been used in the battle on 2nd and 3rd July. He considers their effect might have been decisive.

The United States' Cavalry Journal for January-February opens with a convincing article by Colonel C. F. Martin, advocating the adoption of "command cars" in cavalry regiments. "There should be three such cars in every war-strength regiment," he writes. Each should have a chauffeur, a radio operator and typist, a machine gunner, space for two additional passengers. Each should carry a radio set, panels for signalling (halted or moving) to airplanes, a modern typewriter [capable of bringing out as many as 14 copies of orders, etc], a 50-calibre machine gun (detachable and equipped with a light mount for use on the ground), and a sub machine gun. The weapons would be for purely defensive purposes, the cars being primarily for use within the unit and behind protective detachments." Similarly the writer urges a reconstitution of the headquarter troop of specialists and technicians, reinforced with a group to undertake the entire administrative duties of the regiment; in addition the new armoured car platoon to be allotted to each regiment (six cars) should be part of the Troop. The latter would then comprise:—Troop Headquarters; 1 Headquarters Platoon; 1 Trans-

portation Platoon; 1 Communication Platoon; 1 Armoured Car Platoon—a total of 78 other ranks.

Next Colonel T. M. Coughlan contributes a tactical study of the Battle of the Little Big Horn in June, 1876. In this fight an American detachment under Custer was badly beaten and cut up by the Sioux Indians. This is a most instructive study as to the handling and work of cavalry in irregular warfare. There was no plan of action; the American troops were poorly trained and—strange to relate—their armament was defective.

Captain Gordon-Smith continues his narrative of the Serbian operations during the Great War in 1916. The photographs of the Serbian retreat are remarkable in that they show the terrible conditions encountered by the Serbians in the snow-covered mountains. It is a good popular account. We would, however, point out that the writer is sorely at fault in his relation of the causes of Sir William Robertson's retirement from the post of C.I.G.S. in 1917 and the nomination of General Foch as Allied Generalissimo.

The "Austrian Militärwissenschaftliche Mitteilungen" for May contains the second of a series of articles by Colonel von Wittich, dealing with the Russo-Polish war of 1919-20. The chief matter of interest in this instalment is Section No. 8, which contains a detailed description of (the Russian) Budjenniy's cavalry army. Budjenniy, a former private soldier, had raised a cavalry division with which he defeated Denikin's horsemen in the winter 1919-20. He therefore increased his command to a strength of four cavalry divisions, each of six regiments, together with one independent brigade of three regiments. These troops consisted mainly of Cossacks of all kinds: Kirghiz, Tartars and Turcomans. They were mostly a wild lot of ruffians and their brutalities and excesses of all kinds recalled the old Asiatic invasions of past centuries. This army also comprised artillery, armoured cars and numerous machine guns; Budjenniy, who possessed remarkable energy and ruthlessness, preferred to attack by surprise and to avoid all loss: he was a master of rapid movement. Against these gifts must be set his caprice and obstinacy. Although he could claim some great achievements to his credit, he suffered not infrequent failure.

He excelled in raids and against the loosely organised Polish cavalry at the beginning scored success after success, but when he encountered the better organised corps of (the Polish) General Romml, his troops could not stand the test. It is doubtful whether Budjennyi can be regarded as a model of a cavalry leader—in spite of his remarkable achievements. Apart from this most instructive section the article describes in rather dry fashion the campaign from the middle of May until the end of June, 1920.

The Swiss "Allgemeine Schweizerische Militärzeitung" for February is entirely devoted to articles concerning the proposed re-organization of the Swiss Cavalry. It seems to be admitted by the writers of three different articles that there is much room for reform. To begin with, cavalry must be supplied by aircraft and armoured motor vehicles; and these must learn to work together. But in the Swiss horsed units themselves there appears to be need for change: in the first instance a number of employed men must be struck off the establishment of mounted troops—they must be carried on vehicles; the number of machine guns needs considerable increase. Divisional cavalry presents a difficulty; it is suggested that cyclists and despatch riders should be employed for communication duties and that first-line transport be increased together with the reduction of all "employed" men's horses. Army cavalry should be organised as a division of two brigades, each consisting of five sub-units. The first brigade should be entirely horsed; the second should comprise three regiments of "dragons portés," one cyclist regiment and one motorised machine gun regiment. With such a re-organization there would still be six divisional cavalry squadrons of the new type. The total of this entire cavalry force would still amount to 5,523 other ranks, while it would be immensely more powerful by reason of the increase of machine guns.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

“Old Cavalry Stations.” By B. Granville Baker, with a Foreword by F.-M. Viscount Allenby. (Published by Heath Cranton, Ltd. 12s. 6d.)

Dedicated to “All good horsemen” and praised by Lord Allenby in his foreword, this book by Lieut.-Colonel Granville Baker should appeal to all readers of the *CAVALRY JOURNAL*. It contains a veritable mine of information about the various stations where Regular Cavalry and the Yeomanry of England have been quartered from time to time.

Colonel Baker takes each station one by one, and traces its history back to the earliest days, when a small handful of mounted troopers were used to keep the peace in outlying districts. They put the “fear of God” into the inhabitants but were at the same time the friends of the country people and gave them a feeling of security from foreign raiders.

Those of us who have finished our active service will regret that, in our time, there was no book of this sort to add pleasure to our stay at the various stations described, but it is none the less a pleasure to look back on the places we used to know. To those who are still serving I would say, get this book and read it.

T. T. P.

“Elementary Tactics.” By Lt.-Col. Pakenham-Walsh, M.C., and Major Dorman-Smith, M.C. (Sifton Praed.) 10s. 6d.

The first volume of this book, published in 1932, dealt with the lessons to be learnt from the manuals; this, the second volume, consists of a complete series of tactical and administrative schemes and problems, with suggested solutions and notes. The authors have dealt with every phase of the battle in the most comprehensive way, dealing with the schemes, not only as if on paper, but also as T.E.W.T.s.

This is certainly the best collection of published schemes and solutions, and the book should be of real value not only to those studying for examinations but also those drawing up schemes as T.E.W.Ts for training purposes, as the schemes provided are suitable for any unit or formation. A few minor errors of staff duties have crept into the suggested solutions but otherwise they seem thoroughly sound and up-to-date.

The book has been well produced and the maps are good and clear, and it is one to be strongly recommended for the individual and the library.

“ England under Queen Anne: The Peace and the Protestant Succession.” By G. M. Trevelyan. (Longmans. 21s.)

This is the third and final volume of Professor Trevelyan's history of England under Queen Anne. It is, in the main, a sad tale of diminishing military prestige and of tangled and possibly rather unedifying domestic politics.

Marlborough gains the somewhat Pyrrhic victory of Malplaquet, the losses in which gave his enemies great opportunity of assailing his already weakened position in home politics and at Court, and finally achieves what he always considered his masterpiece—the bloodless passage of Villar's “ Ne Plus Ultra ” lines and the taking of Bouchain. Then he fades from the picture, driven and harried by the exultant Tories, and certainly not assisted by the acid tongue of Sarah, who expressed her views only too clearly. “ The soldier who serves the State,” writes the author, “ should be thanked for doing his part, and no soldier has ever done it better than Marlborough. The thanks he received, on his return home that winter, was to be arraigned before Parliament as a swindler, attacked in the Press as an incompetent and even a cowardly soldier, and driven back, as an exile in disgrace, from the island he had saved to the continent he had set free.”

The rest of the picture is one of domestic politics. The “ No peace without Spain ” slogan of the Whigs, the influence of the High Church Party coupled to the bad handling by the Whigs of the Sacheverell case, and general war weariness had sickened the country of the Government, which was already being under-

mined by the somewhat unconstitutional favour being shown to individual Tories by the Queen. The Whigs are swept from power, and the author gives an intricate account of the duel for power within the Tory party between Harley and St. John. The Tory outlook was explained candidly, in later years, by St. John himself. "I am afraid," he wrote, "that we came to Court in the same dispositions as all parties have done; that the principal spring of our actions was to have the government of the state in our hands; that our principal views were the conservation of this power, great employments to help ourselves, and great opportunities of rewarding those who had helped to raise us, and of hurting those who stood in opposition to us." It is an interesting light on the politics of the day to note that the original design against Quebec was based partly on intimate domestic intrigues. "It was an essential part of his (St. John's) design against Quebec to employ Mrs. Masham's brother, the notoriously incompetent "Jack" Hill, in command of the troops, because Abigail's favour would be a key position in the coming struggle with Harley for the headship of the State. It was not on such grounds as these that Pitt chose Wolfe for the same enterprise."

All through the story runs the under current of the possible Jacobite restoration. Peace in Europe, and the Protestant succession—those were the two great problems before the Government, and their solution is most interestingly told.

The story ends with the succession settled and Marlborough and Sarah once more restored to public honour.

The reign of Queen Anne was really the second critical period in the constitutional history of England. In these three volumes the author has produced a classic of historical narrative.

H.G.E.

"T. E. Lawrence." By Captain B. H. Liddell Hart. (Cope. 15s.)

This is a most fascinating biography, of which there can be no higher praise than to say that it is worthy of its most fascinating subject. The career of Colonel Lawrence is one to which it would be hard to find a parallel, at any rate in our humdrum

modern days; perhaps the nearest to be found is Garibaldi, as far as romance and achievement are concerned; but as regards brain power and character there is literally no comparison, so far did the Englishman surpass the Italian. This book is all the more striking a testimony to its hero's remarkable personality and accomplishment in that Captain Liddell Hart entered upon it in the belief that the part played by Lawrence in the winning of Arab independence had been somewhat exaggerated in popular opinion, and became convinced in the course of his study that in fact it had been unique and indispensable. The narrative of the military events is, as one expects from the author, crystal clear, admirably vivid, and full of valuable lessons; he expatiates at length on Lawrence's inspired unorthodoxy, based none the less on a thorough and thoughtful study of war and history, and places him very high on the list of great commanders—judging him, as is only right, not by the scale but by the quality of his achievement. The picture of his hero as a man is no less penetrating and sympathetic; it is easy enough to realise from it why Lawrence's impish disrespectful genius made him enemies among the orthodox-minded, and yet won him the adoration and respect of simple souls, such as the Arabs essentially were; and how his deep sense of conscience, and scorn of convention's fetters, induced him, when his work for the Arabs was done, to retire voluntarily into an obscure sphere of duty. For his biographer Lawrence is the embodiment of wisdom, simplicity, and the spirit of liberty; it is impossible to read this story of his life without the admiration that comes from the feeling of having encountered something so far finer and greater than oneself as to leave no room for envy or any similar unworthy sentiment.

E. W. S.

“The Rule, Statutes and Customs of the Hospitallers, 1099-1310.” By Colonel E. J. King. (Methuen. 21s.)

This volume, which is well illustrated by old prints of the towns held by the knights of St. John of Jerusalem, and by photographs of the seals and of the Order at various dates, is of concern mainly to students of the history of the Hospitallers and lacks the general interest of Colonel King's previous work

on the achievements and vicissitudes of the Order in the Holy Land. There is a brief historical introduction and a number of notes on points of detail are appended.

“A Digest of the Law of Evidence in Courts Martial.” By Sir H. L. Stephen and Captain R. Townshend Stephens. (Macmillan. 7s. 6d.)

In this resume of the classic work of Sir James Stephens on the laws of evidence, adapted for court-martial purposes, will be found clearly and interestingly dealt with various knotty points, such as relevancy and admissibility of evidence, opinion and character; the various sorts of proof (oral, documentary, etc.), the burden of proof, competency of witnesses and methods of taking evidence and cross examination—all of which, applicable as they are equally to civil and court-martial cases, are full of problems for officers untrained in legal matters. A valuable feature of the book is the long list of examples from actual cases, mostly from civil trials, but some few from military procedure which simplify and explain the exposition of the law itself. Correct deduction from evidence available being the only means of ascertaining truth in the courts, the book is well worth study by all officers who by reason of their rank and standing in the Service may be called on at any time to preside over or serve on courts martial.

“The Grey Battalion.” By May Tilton. (Angus & Robertson, Sydney. 6s.)

This volume of experiences in the war by an Australian nursing sister is based on a diary written at the time. Sister Tilton saw service in England, on the Western Front, and in Egypt, and has an easy light-hearted style, which by no means neglects the funnier side of a nurse's life and brings before us many of the strange and gallant men who at one time or another figured as her colleagues and patients, yet reveals her genuine love, admiration for their bravery and endurance of pain and suffering. One cannot but believe also—though she herself is of course too modest to say so—that the affection she felt for them was reciprocated, and that she must have been as excellent and

useful a nurse as this book proves her to be a capable and interesting writer.

“The Fighting Cameliers.” By Frank Reid. (Angus & Robertson, Sydney. 6s.)

The Imperial Camel Corps in the Great War has already found one historian in Major Hogue. Formed early in 1916 on the return of the Anzac Corps from Gallipoli, from the infantry of the corps, the unit served at the action of Rafa, in the first battle of Gaza, in the Beersheba operations, and in the final battles of the autumn of 1918, and all with great gallantry and credit. The spirit of the Cameliers seems, from Mr. Reid's pages, to have been a pleasant blend of Anzac insouciance and light-heartedness with cavalry dash and fire, producing a type of soldier somewhat trying perhaps from its scorn of meticulous disciplinary and military orthodoxy, but wholly admirable for the serious purposes of war. Mr. Reid has an easy readable style, and a keen if somewhat elementary sense of humour, and his book gives an excellent picture of the life and work of the Imperial Camel Corps in Palestine, from the point of view of one who served in its ranks throughout.

SPORTING NEWS

THE INDIAN CAVALRY CHASE, 1934

The Indian Cavalry Chase, distance about two miles, was, as usual, run at Meerut on the last day of the Spring Meeting (3rd March, 1934).

Of late years the entries for this race have been very poor ; last year there were four entries, of which three ran and only two finished.

There were eight entries this year ; of these the following five started :—

Mr. C. R. D. Gray's ch. Aust. g. Upon.	12.5	Owner.
(Skinner's Horse).		
Mr. W. F. Lamb's ch. Aust. g. Moon Magic.	11.10.	Owner.
(Sam Browne's Cavalry).		
Capt. L. M. H. Benn's gr. E. m. Galtee Princess.	10.11.	Mr. P. A. H. Heneker.
(Probyn's Horse).		(3rd Cavalry).
Mr. C. P. Sherston's b. Aust. g. Var Plum.	10.4.	Capt. H. A. Wansborough
(8th K.G.O. Light Cavalry).		Jones (Central India Horse).
Capt. L. M. H. Benn and Mr. R. O. Critchley's b. Ind. g. Paris Song.	9.12.	
(Probyn's Horse).		Capt. Benn.

From a good start the field jumped the first fence together ; after the first fence Upon drew ahead, followed by Moon Magic. As they passed the Stand, about three furlongs from the start, Upon was leading with Moon Magic close behind, and the ultimate winner, Var Plum, about six lengths behind the leaders ; Upon maintained his lead till the sixth fence (about ten furlongs from the start) ; at this fence Moon Magic (last year's winner), who was jumping beautifully, passed Upon and took the lead ; from this point onwards the weight seemed to be telling on Upon, and he gradually dropped out of the race ; Var Plum began, meanwhile, to draw up, and between the sixth and seventh fences was about three lengths behind the leader ; Var Plum continued to draw up to Moon Magic, and at the last fence but one (about two and three quarters furlongs from the finish) the two leaders jumped the fence together ; Wansborough Jones then started to set Var Plum going, and jumping the last fence about three lengths ahead of Moon Magic, won comfortably by five lengths.

The time of the race (about two miles) was four minutes, two and three-fifths seconds.

The betting was three to one against Upon, Moon Magic and Galtee Princess, and seven to two the rest.

The entries in the Indian Cavalry Chase this year showed a distinct improvement on last year, and were satisfactory, considering the small number of chasers up-country.

SUBALTERNS' POLO TOURNAMENT, 1934

DRAW.

25th Field Bde., R.A. (3)	}	10th Hussars (Bye)	10th Hussars	(2)	}	Probyn's Hse. (5)
10th Hussars (5)						
Probyn's Horse (7)	}	Probyn's Horse (4)	}	Probyn's Horse (3)		
Durham Light Inftry. (1)						
19th Lancers (Bye)		19th Lancers	(2)			
The Royals (7)	}	The Royals (11)	}	The Royals (11)	}	The Royals (6)
12th Field Bde., R.A. (0)						
The Black Watch (Bye)		The Black Watch (2)				
Bye : 13/18th Hussars		13/18th Hussars	(3)			

WINNERS : THE ROYALS.

Owing to the run of the Inter-Regimental Tournament, the Subalterns', although only eleven teams competed, took four rounds to decide. In the first of these the 10th Hussars had a good game with the 25th Field Brigade, R.A., winning by a small margin, while Probyn's and The Royals won their respective rounds comfortably. In the second round The Royals again had no difficulty in defeating their opponents, The Black Watch, while Probyn's beat the 19th Lancers after a fast and well-contested game.

The first semi-final match, between Probyn's and the 10th Hussars, which was played in a slight drizzle, resulted in a win for the former after a good hard struggle. In the next, The Royals, after one or two lapses, settled down well as a team and proved themselves much too good for the 13/18th Hussars.

The final was postponed owing to rain, which gave the ponies a welcome rest, and was eventually played on 10th March. The ground was naturally a good deal softer than usual, and played rather slow. The Royals were always on top, though Probyn's fought hard and never let up. Todd and Critchley worked hard for Probyn's, but The Royals gave the impression of being the better-balanced side. They are not quite the same team that won last year, Hamilton-Russell coming in at back in place of Hermon, who had recently had an operation for appendicitis, Calvert dropping back to 2 instead of Heathcote-Amery, and Cooper coming in at 1.

THE EQUITATION SCHOOL HORSE SHOW, 1934, SAUGOR

The Equitation School Horse Show was held in "Leicestershire" on March 13th and 15th.

The weather was pleasantly cool on both days. Entries were, as usual, good.

Donors of Cups included His Excellency The Viceroy, His Excellency The Governor of the Central Provinces, His Excellency The Commander-in-Chief, His Highness The Maharajah of Jodhpur, His Highness The Maharajah of Patiala, and the Officers, 1st Hyderabad Imperial Service Lancers.

To judge the classes the Committee had the assistance of Lieut.-Colonel E. H. Pease-Watkin, D.S.O., Lieut.-Colonel A. C. Brooke, D.S.O., M.C., Brevet Lieut.-Colonel E. W. D. Vaughan, M.C., Major A. L. B. Anderson, Major G. G. Collyns, Captain V. C. Ritchie, Captain R. N. Lovett, and others.

RESULTS :

CLASS I.—CANTONMENT TONGA PONIES.

- 1st Sheikh Gulab.
- 2nd Nasib Ali.

A marked improvement in condition on previous years.

CLASS II.—POLICE PONIES.

- 1st Dafadar Abdul Rahman's ch. Ind. m. Joan.
- 2nd Sowar Sheo Gopal's b. Ind. m. No. 9.

A well-mannered class showing good condition.

CLASS III.—TROOP HORSES (I.Os. AND I.O.Rs.).

- 1st L/Dafadar Jai Bhagwan Singh (Skinner's Horse) b. Aust. g. Whiskers.
- 2nd L/Dafadar Mahmud Ali Beg (8th K.G.O. Light Cavalry) b. Aust. m. Mochi.

Winner outstanding. Next seven a well-trained lot.

CLASS IV.—TROOP HORSES (BRITISH N.C.Os.).

- 1st Sergt. F. Lee (17th/21st Lancers) b. Ind. g. Love-in-Idleness.
- 2nd Cpl. R. L. J. Lockwood (13th/18th Hussars) b. Ind. g. Carefree.

A very well-schooled class, condition and turn-out excellent. The winner outstanding.

CLASS V.—HORSES AND PONIES IN HAND (STATES FORCES). A Cup presented by the Officers, 1st Hyderabad Imperial Service Lancers.

- 1st Capt. Habib Ahmed (1st Hyderabad Imperial Service Lancers) bl. Aust. g. Sultan.
- 2nd (and Cup winner), Lieut. Rajvi Nand Singh (Bikaner Lancers) b. Aust. g. Bijay.

Winner a very nice horse.

CLASS VI.—PIGSTICKERS.

- 1st Major C. H. H. Eales, M.C. (The Guides Cavalry) br. Aust. g. Schoolboy.
- 2nd Lieut. Hon. R. A. H. Plunkett (The Guides Cavalry) b. Ind. m. Piara Singh.

A handy well-trained class of the genuine article.

CLASS VII.—JUMPING (INDIAN RANKS STUDENTS). The "Golconda" Challenge Cup.

- 1st A/L/Dafadar Par-Upkari Singh (P.A.V.O. Cavalry) b. Ind. g. Pigeon.
- 2nd L/Dafadar Chain Singh (Probyn's Horse) ch. Ind. g. Gulzar.

Below the average of previous years.

CLASS VIII.—JUMPING (BRITISH N.C.O. STUDENTS).

- 1st Sergt. F. Lee (17th/21st Lancers) b. Ind. g. Love-in-Idleness.
- 2nd Cpl. T. B. Parker (17th/21st Lancers) b. Ind. g. Milk Punch

A good standard of jumping.

CLASS IX.—JUMPING (BRITISH AND STATES FORCE OFFICER-STUDENTS). The 2nd Lancers Challenge Cup.

- 1st Lieut. Hon. R. G. Hamilton-Russell (17th/21st Lancers) Roan Aust. g. Tiptree.
- 2nd Lieut. I. L. Wood (13th/18th Hussars) ch. Ind. g. Ginger.

A very fair standard of jumping.

CLASS X.—JUMPING (EQUITATION SCHOOL STAFF).

- 1st S.S.M. W. Frisby (10th Royal Hussars) gr. Ind. g. Silver Dawn.
- 2nd S.S.M. W. Frisby (10th Royal Hussars) gr. Ind. g. Grey Sprite.

A small class with a high standard of jumping throughout.

CLASS XI.—OPEN JUMPING. A Cup presented by His Excellency The Viceroy.

- 1st S.S.M. L. Midgley (The Royals) b. Ind. g. Viceroy.
- 2nd S.S.M. W. Frisby (10th Royal Hussars) gr. Ind. g. Silver Dawn.

Good jumping over a difficult course, the winner putting up a very good performance on a young horse.

CLASS XII.—OPEN HANDY HUNTER COMPETITION. A Cup presented by His Excellency The Commander-in-Chief.

- 1st Bombardier R. J. Bicknell (69th Field Battery, R.A.) ch. Ind. g. Woodbine.
- 2nd Lieut. Hon. R. A. H. Plunkett (The Guides Cavalry) b. Ind. g. Piara Singh.

The final was contested over a stiff course and the placed horses put up very good performances.

CLASS XIII.—HANDY HUNTER COMPETITION (OPEN TO EQUITATION SCHOOL STAFF).

- 1st S.S.M. W. Frisby (10th Royal Hussars) gr. Ind. g. Silver Dawn.
- 2nd S.S.M. W. Frisby (10th Royal Hussars) gr. Ind. g. Grey Sprite.

A good class. The winner did a faultless round at a very fast pace.

CLASS XIV.—POLO PONIES (GOVERNMENT OR STATE-OWNED).

- 1st Lieut. Hon. R. A. H. Plunkett (The Guides Cavalry) b. Ind. m. Red Rag.
- 2nd The Poona Horse b. Ind. g. Pindi.

A very large class with considerable competition for the leading places.

CLASS XV.—HACKS.

- 1st Major G. G. Collyns (15th Lancers) gr. Aust. m. Purple Down.
- 2nd Lieut. A. E. Moore (15th Lancers) ch. Aust. m. Sonia.

A small class.

CLASS XVI.—PONIES LIKELY TO MAKE POLO PONIES.

- 1st Lieut. J. N. Chaudhuri (7th Light Cavalry) b. Aust. m. Lido Lady.
- 2nd Lieut. Mohd. Iftikhar Khan (3rd Cavalry) br. Aust. m. Dynamite.

An average class.

CLASS XVII.—POLO PONIES (LIGHT WEIGHT). A Cup presented by His Highness The Maharajah of Patiala.

1st Lieut. Hon. R. A. H. Plunkett (The Guides Cavalry) br. Aust. m. Nutmeg.

2nd Lieut. R. H. Hannay (R.A.) br. Ind. m. Daffon.

A very nicely trained class.

CLASS XVIII.—POLO PONIES (HEAVY WEIGHT).

1st Lieut. Hon. R. G. Hamilton-Russell (17th/21st Lancers) ch. E. m. Raffandale.

2nd Lieut. Mohd. Iftikhar Khan (3rd Cavalry) b. Ind. g. Ahmed.

A small and moderate class. The first two well ahead of the rest.

CLASS XIX.—HORSES (ENGLISH, INDIAN AND COLONIAL).

1st Capt. H. D. Caldecott (13th D.C.O. Lancers) ch. Aust. g. Sunstorm.

2nd Lieut. Hon. R. A. H. Plunkett (The Guides Cavalry) bl. E. g. Black Velvet.

The winner was outstanding. Remainder rather a mixed lot.

CLASS XX.—OFFICERS' CHARGERS.

1st Lieut. A. Goring (Probyn's Horse) b. Ind. g. Danegeld.

2nd Lieut. A. Goring (Probyn's Horse) b. Ind. g. Duke of Dantzig.

A fair class.

CLASS XXI.—BEST STABLE OF THREE.

1st Lieut. Hon. R. G. Hamilton-Russell (17th/21st Lancers).

2nd Lieut. Hon. R. A. H. Plunkett (The Guides Cavalry).

First two stables very good and difficult to separate.

CLASS XXII.—LADIES' HACKS.

1st Capt. H. D. Caldecott (13th D.C.O. Lancers) ch. Aust. g. Sunstorm (Miss Ritchie).

2nd Lieut.-Colonel R. Denning (19th K.G.O. Lancers) br. Af. m. Paloma (Mrs. Denning).

First two very well mannered.

CLASS XXIII.—BEST PONY IN THE SHOW. A Cup presented by His Excellency The Governor of the Central Provinces.

Lieut. Hon. R. G. Hamilton-Russell (17th/21st Lancers) ch. E. m. Raffandale.

A very nice pony, full of quality.

CLASS XXIV.—BEST HORSE IN THE SHOW. A Cup presented by His Highness The Maharajah of Jodhpur.

Capt. H. D. Caldecott (13th D.C.O. Lancers) ch. Aust. g. Sunstorm.

Winner outstanding.

NATIONAL HORSE BREEDING AND SHOW SOCIETY OF INDIA MEDAL FOR THE BEST INDIAN HORSE IN THE SHOW.

Lieut. Mohd. Iftikhar Khan (3rd Cavalry) b. Ind. g. Ahmed.

A very well-shaped horse with good clean limbs.

KADIR CUP, 1934

The Kadir Cup was held at Sherpur on March 19th, 20th, and 21st. There were the record number of entries of 134, and after assembling at Sujmana Bagh, Bachraon, the usual last-minute scratchings still left 63 spears, with

119 nominations to compete ; amongst them were Major Richards, R.A., Mr. Arthur Grenfell, X.R.H., and Mr. H. H. Jones, X.R.H., all previous winners. The two former had their good horses Centaur and Australian Star entered again, but Mr. Jones's Horse's Neck, though present at the scene of his former triumph, was not competing. Manifest was ridden by the Hon. Secretary, Captain P. H. J. Tuck.

Mr. Percy Marsh, I.C.S., again consented to be Chairman of the Committee and Field Master, and his invaluable help and advice contributed greatly to the success of the meeting.

Captain P. H. J. Tuck acted as Hon. Secretary for the second time. The fact that it was possible to run off 30 heats in the first round and a total of 43 in all, speaks in itself for the organization and the hard work which he put in.

The draw for the first round took place on the first evening, after which there were the usual speculations amongst the competitors as to their chances for the morrow, in which all were in great form, and some extra hearty spears sang songs well into the early hours of the morning.

On the morning of the 19th all competitors and spectators assembled at 7.30 a.m. to get on their elephants to join the line. The thanks of all present are due to the elephants' owners, amongst whom the Nawab of Rampur was a generous contributor.

The line started at 8.30 a.m., and at first no pig were found, but after about an hour and a half a very good patch was arrived at, and by lunch-time 13 heats had been decided. The country was found to be in very good condition for hunting, and more rideable boar were seen than usual.

The competitors returned to camp at 7 p.m., by which time 25 of the 30 first round heats had been decided. This was a long day, but on account of the large number of entries, the only possible way of running off the heats was by very hard work on the part of the officials and especially the umpires getting their heats off whenever possible. The latter were frequently subjected to rather rough treatment by the keenness of competitors to keep their coveted positions and get a good start ; so close were the attractions of one heat to by no means the lightest umpire, that he was literally squeezed off his horse and deposited rudely on the ground !

The second day started with 14 heats to be decided, of which 5 were the remaining heats of the first round. Before lunch there was rather a shortage of pig, and only 5 heats were run off. A good patch had been found, but on account of the thickness of the country at this stage, a certain number of pig were lost.

After lunch no pig were found until 4 p.m., when several heats were then slipped, but few were decided on account of the thickness of the country and numerous falls. It was at this time that one heat, galloping up when just about to be slipped, came suddenly on a blind and deep nullah with all five knee to knee in line. With one voice they all called upon the Deities for assistance ; this was responded to, and fortunately it was only the outside man who fell. Then came another bad patch and an anxious time for the

Hon. Secretary ; all second nominations had to be taken off the line, and it was feared they would have to be cancelled. At 5.45 p.m. there were still about 7 heats to be run off with some first round first nominations still amongst them, but the luck suddenly changed again. Several heats were decided quickly, and the day was saved, second nominations being brought back on the line.

The day concluded with a spectacular and fast hunt right across the front of the line, with each spear in turn getting on ; it was a great hunt from the spectators' point of view as well as the competitors, and all returned to camp in good form, in spite of a very long and, at times, trying day.

The following were the heats for the semi-finals :—

HEAT I.

Mr. Heathcoat-Amory	(The Royals)	Albert.
Capt. Starling	(R.A.)	Jonathan.
Mr. Gray	(Skinners' Horse)	Granite.

HEAT II.

Capt. Moseley	(The Royals)	Harkaway.
Capt. Tuck	(R.A.)	Manifest.
Mr. Gray	(Skinners' Horse)	Hermione.

HEAT III.

Capt. Harvey	(X.R. Hussars)	Spider.
Major Richards	(R.A.)	Centaur.
Lieut.-Colonel Norrie	(X.R. Hussars)	Panther.

On this final day there was a plentiful supply of pig, and Heat I was soon slipped on a good boar. Starling and Gray were the first on, but a few jinks gave each spear a chance. Eventually Gray speared a fraction of a second before Starling.

Heat II. A boar was seen standing on a sandy mound watching the line approaching. The heat was quickly slipped and, in the run up, Tuck and Moseley at once showed in front, riding knee to knee. Moseley gained a slight lead, but the first jink let in Tuck, who then hunted him for several jinks. A very sharp jink let Moseley in but he nearly fell, Tuck quickly getting on again ; all three spears then closed together, but another sharp jink gave Gray a chance, which he quickly took. A long hunt on a fast rideable boar.

Heat III. The heat was first slipped on a good boar, but both the umpire and Richards fell and the boar was lost. Finally they were slipped on a heavy boar, which gave a good hunt. Harvey and Richards made the running until Norrie got in on a jink. The pig then began to jink badly, which put Richards on with Harvey pressing hard. Richards tried but missed his spear, and Harvey speared soon afterwards, with Richards close up to him.

This brings us to the final with Mr. Gray's two horses, Granite and Hermione, and Captain Harvey's Spider. Mr. Gray decided to ride Granite himself, and deputed Mr. Armstrong of his own regiment to ride Hermione. The final heat was umpired by Mr. C. H. Parr, who soon got them away on a good boar. Harvey first showed in front closely attended by Gray. They were soon on terms with their pig, and both tried to spear almost together.

Harvey dropped and broke his spear, leaving Gray to go on and spear at his leisure.

Mr. Gray is very much to be congratulated on getting two horses into the final. Although this has been done a few times in the past, it has only been accomplished once since the War.

Granite is 17 years old, and was only put to pigsticking late in life, having carried a trumpeter for some years. Mr. Gray was taking no chances that Granite might be pig-shy—he gave him a pig as a stable companion during the hot weather. Granite then played polo in the first tournament of this year, to ensure his handiness, and has now shown that he is a grand pigsticker in his triumph in the Kadir. All this Mr. Gray told us in an excellent speech on the final night, when there was still a good gathering left in camp to do the honours to a worthy winner.

The Lightweight and Heavyweight Hog Hunters' Races were run after lunch on the final day, for the first time under the new conditions.

The results were as follows :—

HEAVYWEIGHT			
1st	Mr. Norman	(R.A.)	Khazipur.
2nd	Capt. Miller	(X.R.H.)	Tiger Tim.
3rd	Capt. Pepys	(The Royals)	Roulette.

This was a good race, and the field kept in close company with very little grief. The last quarter-mile produced a thrilling race between Mr. Norman's Khazipur and Mr. Archer-Shee's M.G., but the latter, unfortunately, fell heavily when only 10 yards from the winning post, though at the time the winner appeared to have just a little in hand.

LIGHTWEIGHT			
1st	Capt. Atherton	(Royal Deccan Horse)	Refugee.
2nd	Mr. Campbell	(Cameron Highlanders)	Janus.
3rd	Mr. Llewellyn Palmer	(X.R. Hussars)	Bed Socks.

Another good race, in which the field kept well together throughout. Half-a-mile from home at least five could be seen to have great chances. Eventually Captain Atherton won rather convincingly on Refugee for the second year in succession.

SECOND YEAR REMOUNT COMPETITIONS, 1934

1. All second year remounts in the School competed for the under-mentioned trophies on April 4th and 5th, 1934 :—

- (a) THE CHETWODE CUP for the best trained horse and student of the year (i.e., the student obtaining highest marks in (b), (c) and (d) below).
- (b) THE JAIPUR TROPHY—Open to British Officer and Indian State Force Officer students.
- (c) THE GRIMSHAW CUP—Open to British N.C.O. students.
- (d) THE KATHMANDOO CUP—Open to Indian Officer and Indian N.C.O. students.

2. The test included :—

- (a) A handy hunter course of approximately
- $1\frac{1}{2}$
- miles over varied going and 22 obstacles.

No practice over the course was allowed.

The course was considered to be through hostile country and 10 dummies (representing enemy riflemen) were encountered in awkward places.

Competitors were expected to attack these dummies with the object of killing in what they considered to be the most effective way.

There was a time limit for the course based on a fair hunting pace.

- (b) A Manege Test.

The Test was designed to find out the student who had turned his remount into an efficient war horse, i.e., handy, bold and safe across country ; handy and quick in obeying the correct aids ; capable of being ridden with one hand to enable his rider to use his weapon efficiently and to be steady on parade.

It also brought out in the student his ability quickly to appreciate the best and most effective way of taking on his adversary and his skill in the use of his weapon mounted.

3. Marks for the Test were allotted as under :—

Cross-country and weapon-training test 150 marks.

Manege test 100 marks.

4. Results of the Tests were as under :—

(a) THE CHETWODE CUP.

1st	Bdr. A. Grieves	(" G " Battery, R.H.A.).
2nd	Cpl. R. L. J. Lockwood	(13th/18th Hussars).
3rd	Lieut. J. F. Williams Wynn	(73rd Field Battery, R.A.).

(b) THE JAIPUR CUP.

1st	Lieut. J. F. Williams Wynn	(73rd Field Battery, R.A.).
2nd	Lieut. I. L. Wood	(13th/18th Hussars).
3rd	Lieut. J. B. Hobbs	(20th Lancers).

(Ridden by Lieut. J. W. Malet, 10th Royal Hussars).

(c) THE GRIMSHAW CUP.

1st	Bdr. A. Grieves	(" G " Battery, R.H.A.).
2nd	Cpl. R. L. J. Lockwood	(13th/18th Hussars).
3rd	Bdr. R. J. Bicknell	(69th Field Battery, R.A.).

(d) THE KATHMANDOO CUP.

1st	Jem. Inder Singh	(The Royal Deccan Horse).
2nd	Dfr. Didar Singh	(20th Lancers).
3rd	Jem. Niaz Mohd	(The Scinde Horse).

SAUGOR.
3/5/1934.

INTER-REGIMENTAL POLO TOURNAMENT, 1934

The Ties have been drawn for each round as follows :—

1st Ties		2nd Ties	3rd Ties		
16th/5th Lancers	} 11th Hussars (14—1)	} 4th/7th D. G's (8—4)	} 9th Lancers (6—3)	} Semi Final To be played by July 5th	} Final July 7th
11th Hussars					
4th/7th Dgn. Gds.	Bye				
27th Fd. Brigade	Bye	} 9th Lancers W.O.			
9th Lancers	Bye				
Life Guards	Bye	Bye			
R. Scots Greys	Bye	Bye			
4th Hussars	Bye	} 4th Hussars (10—4)	} 7th Hussars (8—4)		
R. Horse Guards	Bye				
15th/19th Hussars	Bye	} 7th Hussars (5—4)			
7th Hussars	Bye				
Queen's Bays	} Queen's Bays (12—7)	} Queen's Bays (8—4)	} Queen's Bays (10—3)		
3rd Carabiniers					
19th Fd. Bde. R.A.	Bye				
R.H.A. Aldershot	Bye	} 5th D. G's. (7—6)			
5th Dragoon Guards	Bye				

SUBALTERN'S GOLD CUP, 1934.

The Ties have been drawn for each round as follows :—

5th Dragoon Guards 3rd Bde. R.H.A.	} 3rd Bde. R.H.A. (12—7)	} 2nd Ties to be played by June 30th	} Semi Final To be played by July 12th	} Final July 14th	
3rd Carabiniers The Bays					} The Bays (8—2)
Royal Scots Greys 3rd King's Own Hrs.	} Bye Scratched				
Life Guards					Bye
Royal Horse Guards	Bye				
15th/19th Hussars 7th Hussars	} 15th/19th (5—3) Hussars				
11th Hussars 9th Lancers					} 9th Lancers (12—3)
16th/6th Lancers 4/7th Dragoon Gds.	} 4th/7th D. G's (10—1)				

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Anton JOSEF ANTON MÜSCHER

From "Das Heer des Blauen Königs."
A GENERAL OF CAVALRY
at the period of Marlborough's Campaigns.

CAVALRY IN THE WAR



CAVALRY IN THE WAR

By MAJOR P. P. SMITH, R.F.D.

This year, beginning the 29th of January, we have been marked appropriately by a day that has been one of the greatest periods of British history, the days in which our arms were led to victory at the Battle of Marston. To our good fortune, our connection with those times is now being celebrated.




From "Das Heer" (The Army).

A GENERAL OF CAVALRY
at the period of Marlborough's Campaigns.

THE CAVALRY JOURNAL

OCTOBER, 1934



CAVALRY IN MARLBOROUGH'S DAY

By MAJOR H. FITZM. STACKE, M.C., *p.s.c.*

THIS year, bringing the 230th anniversary of Blenheim, has been marked appropriately by a very definite revival of interest in one of the greatest periods of British military history, the days in which our armies were led to victory by John Churchill, Duke of Marlborough. To our good fortune, the literature dealing with those times is now being enriched by the almost

simultaneous publication of two important works—Professor Trevelyan's comprehensive history of England under Queen Anne, and Mr. Winston Churchill's vivid biography of his great kinsman. In addition this year has seen in London a loan exhibition of "the period of Marlborough and the reign of Queen Anne," admirably arranged to illustrate the history, the art and the taste of that day.

Interesting as it was from every broad aspect, this exhibition was nevertheless disappointing from the narrower point of view of a soldier seeking knowledge of the Army at that period. There were many documents of historical or social interest, but few of military importance. Apart from some small prints, mostly subsequent in date and all untrustworthy in detail, there were very few depictions of troops or of battle-scenes, save indeed the great tapestries; and in these accuracy of detail had been sacrificed all too obviously to artistic effect. The portraits in the exhibition were numerous and of a high standard; for it was the age of Godfrey Kneller and of Michael Dahl; nevertheless, they were curiously unsatisfactory. The most casual observer could not have avoided noting that the fashion of the day had imposed on the painters a convention by which the great majority of the sitters had been moulded into an apparent resemblance, a "typical-Early-Eighteenth-Century face," a rounded oval visage, sometimes heavy-jowled, often arrogant, but otherwise expressionless, each face framed in a great peruke of brown hair, which completed the impression of almost fraternal similarity between one and all.*



In particular the portraits of Marlborough himself failed to satisfy. To a present-day observer it seemed almost incredible that so bland, mild and youthful a visage as that shown in the

* There was, however, one exception: the strange face of Lord Peterborough, which would have made him stand out even at the present day.

portraits could have been a truthful likeness of the great commander, who planned in secret far-reaching strategic combinations, carried out most intricate operations with a bare minimum of staff, and swayed by sheer force of personality his discordant allies ; who was, moreover, at the outset of his great campaigns more than fifty years of age. The convention which in these portraits had smoothed every wrinkle from his face produced a strangely unreal effect.

A second convention of that period has had results equally provoking : namely the custom by which military leaders then were portrayed not in uniform but in conventional armour. At that epoch armour had vanished from the battlefield, save for such remnants as the officer's gorget and for the cuirass still worn beneath the coat by senior officers and by some heavy cavalry. Distinctive uniforms for national armies and for individual regiments had been in use for at least half a century, and were the accepted dress both for active service and for ceremonial at home. Yet, by a curious deference to the past, it was still customary for gentlemen of the profession of arms to be depicted in formal portraits as wearing armour such as their grandfathers might have borne in the days before the Civil War* a custom more irrational than if our fighting leaders of to-day were to don for their portraits the uniforms of the Crimea.

As a result of this convention and of the poverty of the contemporary prints, we have very little pictorial evidence as to the soldiers of Marlborough's day, and our knowledge as to their uniforms is scanty ; for hardly a single specimen has been preserved. This was amply demonstrated by the loan exhibition. Civilian costumes were much in evidence, including some beautifully embroidered garments. The military dress of the period was represented only by a pair of jack-boots, some spurs, half-a-dozen swords, a variety of pikes, partisans and muskets, and one solitary grenadier cap, of crimson velvet embroidered in silver with the cipher of Queen Anne, which by good fortune

* In the whole exhibition there were only two exceptions to this rule—the portraits of Peterborough and of Stanhope. Unfortunately, in neither case could the red coat worn by the sitter be identified as belonging to any particular regiment.

has been preserved by the H.A.C. Otherwise it seems that there remains no vestige of the uniforms which showed so splendidly on every field of battle throughout the ten long years of fighting from Venloo to Bouchain. In consequence, although the general style of those uniforms is known, the details are yet to seek. There are but few regiments in the Service which could produce trustworthy evidence as to the details of their uniform at any date before 1740, and fewer still, if any, which could say exactly how their officers and men were dressed when they tramped or rode across Europe with the Duke of Marlborough.

The information lacking in this country can in part be supplied from abroad. Other countries had more competent military artists at that period,* produced better prints and commemorated their victories by accurate depictions of the scenes and of the troops engaged. All over Western Europe, in museums, in palaces or in private houses, are to be found contemporary pictures of those wars; and from these much is to be learned as to the appearance of our own troops at that time. For British troops took part in very many of the battles then fought all over Europe; contingents of our Army were engaged not only in the Low Countries but also up the Rhine, in Bavaria and the Austrian provinces by the Danube, in Portugal and in every province of Spain; whilst our opponents the French and our allies† the Dutch, the Prussians, the Hessians, the Hanoverians and the Danes had all good reason to commemorate in pictorial form the battles in which our troops as well as theirs were engaged. In any of those lands research might disclose valuable evidence as to the British Army of Queen Anne.

Pending such discoveries, the best way in which we can gain ideas as to the appearance of our troops at that time is by noting the uniforms then worn by soldiers of other countries; for the general style of costume was then very similar in all the armies of Western Europe, and the British Army, recent

* For example, the vivid sketches by Parrocel (1688-1732) are far superior to any contemporary British representations of soldiers.

† The term "allies" is here used in the widest sense. Strictly speaking, most of them were rather "auxiliaries" than allies, being to a large extent subsidised from British funds.



From "Das Heer des Blauen Königs."

A STAFF OFFICER
at the period of Marlborough's Campaigns.

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in formation as compared with those on the Continent,* copied closely the styles set abroad, adopting such fashions as the pointed cap of grenadiers or the equipment and title of carabiniers almost as soon as they appeared in France. Further, most countries abroad have taken care to preserve specimens of their early uniforms. In the museum of the Invalides in Paris and in the Zeughaus in Berlin can be seen actual uniforms worn in Marlborough's day ; and an even more carefully preserved collection is in the Bavarian Army Museum at Munich. This collection, and the



Carabinier
(after Parrocel)

details recorded in the contemporary pictures which decorate the Bavarian royal palaces, have made possible the careful reconstruction of the Bavarian uniforms of that epoch carried out by Anton Hoffmann in his authoritative work "Das Heer des Blauen Königs." Two of the drawings from that book are here reproduced, and the types depicted, both of individuals and of uniform, must have been closely paralleled in the British Army of that day. In details, such as the method of knotting the sash and the pattern of the embroidery, the kit of our officers may have differed ; also in England moustaches had been out of fashion since the days of Charles II ; but in general effect these drawings can be taken as accurate representations of the appearance of the officers who directed our armies in Marlborough's campaigns.

The fact that these once famous campaigns have been until recently so largely forgotten in this country that the very

* Many of the older regiments of the French Army had been in existence before 1620, the four senior regiments of the French Line dating back to 1558, the year in which our Elizabeth came to the throne. The Spanish Army was even older, its two first regiments having been formed in 1534 and 1537 respectively.

uniforms worn are thus in doubt, is due to a combination of adverse factors of which the absence of pictorial representation is only one. A still more potent cause of oblivion was that there was then no capable military historian, no forerunner of Napier, to describe the exploits of that day in enduring prose. Then again, a political aversion to Marlborough led subsequent historians, culminating in Macaulay, to belittle his achievements. Less obvious but equally effective as a reason for neglect so far as the British Army was concerned was the fact that until so late as the year 1882 Marlborough's victories were not represented amongst the battle-honours displayed by British regiments, and that the four battle-honours then granted are not in reality an adequate record. To the good fortune of the old regiments concerned, the Army Council has recently announced that the whole subject of past battle-honours is to be taken into review, so that there is now an opportunity to make such additions to the present roll as will more adequately record the deeds of Marlborough's soldiers. It may perhaps be of interest very briefly to summarise the work of our cavalry in those campaigns, noting those deeds which seem especially to merit their long-delayed recognition.*

It must first be noted that at the beginning of the XVIIIth century the cavalry of the British Army were divided into two classes, Horse and Dragoons. The latter had originally been virtually mounted infantry, armed with musket and bayonet,† trained to fight on foot as much as on horse, drilling by tap of drum instead of by trumpet, terming their non-commissioned officers "Sergeants" like the Foot instead of "Corporals" like the Horse, and mounted only on cobs.‡ Useful for protective duties and for minor mobile operations, also for reinforcing the infantry in case of need, the Dragoons were not at that period intended to compete on equal terms with the regiments of Horse, big men on heavy weight-carrying chargers trained for

* The writer wishes here to acknowledge the invaluable help given to him in the preparation of this article by Mr. C. T. Atkinson, the distinguished author of "Marlborough and the Rise of the British Army" and of the History of the Royal Dragoons.

† They also carried a short sword, but so, at that period, did all privates of the Foot.

‡ "'A good squat dragoon horse' is a phrase frequently to be met." (History of the Royal Dragoons, p. 36).

shock action.* The regiments of Horse took precedence of Dragoons, drew higher pay, regarded themselves in every way as superior folk ; but they were cumbrous both in equipment and in manœuvre, and were not so generally useful as the less expensive Dragoons.

In appearance and equipment the two separate types of cavalry were differentiated. In the British Army both Horse and Dragoons wore the red coat and the three-cornered hat, but the trooper of Horse slung his long heavy sword from a broad cross-belt over the right shoulder, whereas the Dragoon hung his lighter sword from a belt round the waist. In France the dress distinctions were still more marked, for there the Dragoon had a distinctive cap with a falling flap of coloured cloth, and at that period most of the French Dragoon regiments wore red uniforms instead of buff or blue like the other cavalry. In most continental armies the Horse wore cuirasses, often carried under their heavy coats, but the British regiments of Horse had discarded cuirasses after the Flanders campaign of 1691-7 and did not resume them until 1707. To protect their heads, however, they wore iron skull-caps fitted inside their three-cornered felt hats.



French Dragoon
(after Parrocel)

At this point it will be convenient to note that these old regiments of heavy Horse were eventually found too cumbrous for practical work in the field, and that in nearly all armies, including our own, they were gradually converted into Dragoons, until nowadays our Household Cavalry are virtually the only representatives of their kind now surviving. The rest of our heavy Horse were all converted to the lower grading,† but to

* The Horse carried carbines, and in the days of the "New Model" Monck had impressed on them the need for an effective firearm. Marlborough, however, concentrated on shock action, and, as Kane tells us, "would allow the Horse but three charges of powder and ball to each man for a campaign, and that only for guarding the horses when at grass and not to be made use of in action."

† The conversion began with three regiments in 1746, followed by the remaining four in 1788. In the French Army the same progress began in 1776, when seven regiments of heavy cavalry were converted into dragoons. Other armies followed suit, the last to make a similar change being the Austrians, who converted their old Cuirassier regiments into dragoons after the disastrous war of 1866.

mark their former superior status they were allowed the special title of Dragoon Guards.

When Marlborough took command of the Allied Army in the Low Countries, in the June of 1702, his cavalry included seven British regiments, four of Horse and three of Dragoons, the regiments which were afterwards known as the 1st, 3rd, 6th and 7th Dragoon Guards, the Royal Dragoons, the Scots Greys and the 5th (Royal Irish Dragoons).^{*} These regiments, reinforced during the ensuing year by an additional regiment of Horse (afterwards the 5th Dragoon Guards), saw a good deal of hard work and some sharp skirmishes during the campaigns of 1702 and 1703, assisting to cover the sieges of Venloo, Liege, Huy and Limburg. Then the Royal Dragoons were selected for special service in Portugal and sent off thither during the winter of 1703-4; the other regiments marched in the following summer with Marlborough up the Rhine and over the mountains by the pass of Geislingen to the valley of the Danube. There the British troops fought their first great battle, storming the entrenched camp of the Bavarians on the Schellenberg by Donauwerth and completely routing the defending force. In that battle the Scots Greys were put in dismounted to reinforce the attacking infantry, though they remounted afterwards for the pursuit; but the heavy Horse took no part in the opening attack. Their turn came later, when the entrenchments had been stormed and they were loosed to ride down the fugitives who were crowding in panic towards the pontoon bridges across the Rhine. The victory was complete, and of great strategic importance.

Six weeks later was fought the battle of Blenheim, in which for the first time the British heavy Horse had the opportunity of meeting a large force of the French cavalry in a fair fight. Marlborough had trained his Horse to that end, teaching them to rely on shock action, but it seems that the same doctrine

^{*} The last named, disbanded in 1799, is now represented by the 5th Lancers. It may be of interest to note that at this period the normal proportion of cavalry to infantry in a field army was about one to three. Previously it had been higher: in the Civil War it averaged one to two. At Blenheim, however, the proportion in the British contingent of the allied army was about 2,900 cavalry out of a total strength of 10,800.

had not been instilled to the same extent into the French cavalry; for it appears that they received the final charge of Marlborough's squadrons halted, firing their carbines from the saddle—and were swept away. That last great charge, led by Marlborough in person, broke the centre of the French army and decided the issue of the battle. Meanwhile the two British regiments of Dragoons had been co-operating with the British infantry in the attack on Blenheim itself, where the French defenders, it may be noted, had been reinforced not only by additional battalions of foot but also by four regiments of Dragoons, put in dismounted to strengthen the garrison.* There the fight hung in the balance until the French centre had been broken, when the British Dragoons were sent forward to encircle the village from the further side. This they effected, and skilfully blocked the retreat of the French force in Blenheim, until it had no alternative but to surrender.



Officer of Horse
(after Parrot)

So far the most conspicuous services of the British dragoon regiments had been, in accordance with the original conception of their arm, more as mounted infantry than as true cavalry, but from this time onward their role definitely changed. Three years in the field had brought ever-increasing efficiency as mounted units, until the British dragoons were felt capable of meeting in fair fight the enemy's Horse. In the only great fight of the ensuing year, at Elixem during the forcing of the Lines of Brabant (18th July, 1705), the Scots Greys and the Royal Irish Dragoons charged in line with the heavy Horse, and the Greys were specially commended for their prowess. That engagement, in which 38 allied squadrons, of which 17 were

* It may be of interest to note that at least two of those regiments of French dragoons wore red uniforms (Mestre-de-Camp-General and La Reine). The other two regiments (Rohan and Vassé, both subsequently disbanded) probably wore red as well, but the information on this point is at present incomplete. The French infantry then, of course, wore white coats.

British, routed in hand-to-hand fight 40 squadrons of the enemy, broke up five battalions of infantry and took ten guns, was one of the most striking successes ever gained by British cavalry, and fully deserves a battle-honour.

In one way this action is of great interest, showing Marlborough using his cavalry for the role which one school of thought nowadays would allot to a mobile armoured force. The problem he had to solve might easily be paralleled at the present day—the opposing forces facing him behind an entrenched front strongly fortified but far too extensive to be occupied at every point, so that of necessity their line was but lightly held, their main body being held back in reserve. He solved the problem by finding a weak spot well away from the hostile main body, by a rapid flank march of his own main body under cover of night, and by pushing his cavalry ahead to make good the gap forced in the line by his advanced guard until his main body could come up. His opponents countered by a similar manœuvre, sending their “mobile armoured force”—40 squadrons of heavy cavalry, mostly cuirassiers—at high speed to close the gap; and the fight between the two mobile forces decided the issue. Except for the battalions of the advanced guard, Marlborough’s infantry was hardly engaged.

In the following year at Ramillies the British cavalry were greatly distinguished. In the early stages of the battle they were not heavily engaged, being employed to support the operations of the infantry on the right wing; and it was the Dutch and Danish cavalry which eventually overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers the superb squadrons of the *Maison du Roi*. But in the later phases the British squadrons, charging at a gallop and in notably perfect order, were largely responsible for the conversion of the French retreat into a rout. In particular the Scots Greys



French Heavy Cavalry
(after *Panonce!*)

won especial distinction, riding down two battalions of the Regiment du Roi and cutting them to pieces,* proving that the British dragoons were now fully equal, so far as mounted action was concerned, to the regiments of Horse.

The part played by the British cavalry in the succeeding victories of Oudenarde and Malplaquet is well known, but these two individual battles by no means represent the whole work of the British cavalry during those long campaigns. The seven British regiments, reinforced subsequently by several others, among which were those which still survive to-day as the 3rd, 4th and 7th Hussars, did constant hard work in minor enterprises, in reconnaissance, in the protection of convoys and especially in the operations of the covering forces during the frequent sieges of fortresses which characterised those campaigns. Those services would seem to deserve a general distinction on the same lines as the covering honours granted for such campaigns as South Africa, 1899-1902.

But the Low Countries and Central Europe were not the only fields of action in which British cavalry distinguished themselves at this period. Another series of campaigns, little known to-day and as yet unrecorded by any battle-honour in the Army List, was proceeding at the same time in Portugal and Spain—campaigns which witnessed operations as remarkable and as picturesque as any in the Army's history. These operations were to some extent a civil war in Spain between two factions supporting respectively the French and the Austrian claimants to the Spanish throne. The Bourbon prince, grandson of the French king, was supported by troops of Louis XIV.

* "Ce jour fut funeste au régiment du Roi. En se retirant à travers la plaine entre Ramillies et Judoigne, où il avait laissé ses havre-sacs avant le combat, il se débânda mal à propos pour les aller reprendre, quoi qu'il eût sur les talons un gros corps de cavalerie. Il fut sabré, et peu d'hommes eussent échappé sans un bois qui facilita le ralliement et la retraite de ceux qui purent le gagner. Cet incident, qui eut pour cause le désir bien naturel aux soldats de ne pas perdre leurs sacs, pesa d'un poids considérable dans la balance de la journée, qui se termina par un désastre." (*Suzanne*).

The Regiment du Roi was one of the cherished corps of the French Service. Although comparatively young (it was formed in 1663), it had by special favour been ranked next to the "Petit Vieux" regiments—the five corps which stood immediately after the six "old" regiments at the head of the French line. It had a distinctive uniform—the white coat of French infantry, with bright blue facings and red braid on the breast, arranged in groups of three (as in the drummers of our Scots Guards to-day). It must be noted, however, that they did not wear grenadier caps (which in fact were little worn in the French Army at this period), so that there is no obvious confirmation of the tradition that the distinctive headdress of the Greys originated from this episode.

The Hapsburg archduke was backed by composite forces of Austrian, British, Dutch and Portuguese troops, his chief supporters in Spain being the Catalans of the districts around Barcelona. In concert with these allies, small forces of British troops fought up and down the whole length of the Peninsula during six long years. In contrast to the slow siege warfare of Flanders, these were essentially campaigns of movement and manœuvre, giving every opportunity for the work of cavalry, and many strange vicissitudes befell the British regiments engaged.

These operations in the Peninsula had a curious prelude in the expedition to Cadiz under Ormonde and Rooke. Their force of some 10,000 men included one regiment of cavalry, Lloyd's Dragoons (now the 3rd Hussars), who took their horses and had some sharp skirmishing with parties of the Spanish cavalry around the beleaguered city; but there was no heavy fighting. Cadiz was adjudged too strong to be taken, and the expedition re-embarked. On their way home, however, the commanders redeemed their credit by the attack on the Spanish treasure fleet in Vigo Bay, the warships ramming and breaking the boom which closed the harbour, whilst a landing force of 2,500 troops stormed the batteries on shore. There is no evidence that Lloyd's Dragoons were with this landing force, and since the Navy allowed the dragoons a generous share in the prize-money it would seem that the 3rd Hussars have a right to a unique distinction—the only cavalry regiment which could claim the Naval Crown for a battle on board the Fleet.*

After an interval of two years, British regiments again appeared on this scene of action, when, late in 1703, an allied expeditionary force was sent to Lisbon. The British contingent included two cavalry regiments, Harvey's Horse (now the Queen's Bays) and the Royal Dragoons, fresh from their service under Marlborough in Flanders. Details quoted in the history of the Royals show how definite was then the distinction drawn

* The share allotted to Lloyd's Dragoons was £187 3s. 4d.—worth, of course, far more than that sum at the present day (for example, a charger then cost £8 to £10, but a "dragoon horse" a mere £4). Incidentally the history of the 3rd Hussars modestly says that only "a detachment" of the regiment went on this expedition; but since this "detachment" mustered 242 of all ranks, including the Commanding Officer, two majors and fifteen other officers, whereas the Peace Establishment shortly beforehand had been only 286 (rank and file), it would seem clear that but little of the regiment can have been left behind—probably only enough to train recruits.

between the two branches of the mounted arm. The regiment of Horse was landed first, was given the choice of barracks and first choice of remounts—for both regiments had been sent out dismounted to receive horses in Portugal—so that they had half their regiment mounted before the Royals had received a horse.* Even some months later the dragoon regiment could mount no more than ten men per troop, until a year later the problem was solved by the purchase of remounts in Ireland. Thus mounted, the Royals, accompanied by a fresh regiment of dragoons, Conyngham's (now the 8th Hussars) were shipped from Portugal through the Straits and eastward to Barcelona.

During the campaign which followed in the eastern provinces of Spain both these regiments of dragoons did brilliant work at the successful siege of Barcelona. Then they separated, Conyngham's being sent westward with the troops guarding the land frontier of Catalonia to the districts around Lerida, where they fought a most gallant little action at San Estevan de Litera, gaining success at cost of heavy loss, including Conyngham himself, the first Colonel of the present 8th Hussars, among the killed. The Royals meanwhile had ridden southward with Peterborough into Valencia, where they carried out the remarkable series of operations by which, without any heavy fighting, he bluffed and bullied each fortress into surrender, "taking walled towns with dragoons" and terrorizing much larger forces with a mere handful of mounted men. So effective did his small force of cavalry prove that he soon decided to increase their number, and without warning converted one of his regiments of Foot (Barrymore's, now the Somerset Light Infantry) into dragoons, mounting them on horses secured from the enemy.

As the campaign progressed the British dragoons in Spain were more and more becoming true cavalry instead of mounted infantry. "We are used in Catalonia entirely as Horse," wrote an officer of the Royals, "and the sword is the weapon we have to trust to. Those we have are useless." So urgent requisitions

* The preferential treatment given on this occasion to the regiment of Horse may also, it is to be feared, have been due to another reason; for the commander of the cavalry brigade was their own Colonel, Brigadier Harvey.

were sent home for swords of effective cavalry pattern* ; and many successful minor actions were fought, whilst the British cavalry in Spain was increased by three more regiments of dragoons, two of which—Carpenter's and Essex—are to-day the 3rd and the 4th Hussars.†

The newly arrived regiments were unlucky, in that their first big fight was the disastrous battle of Almanza in which they were almost swept out of existence, through no fault of their own, for all the British regiments present fought magnificently. Carpenter's and Essex' were afterwards sent back to England to be reformed ;‡ but the other three old regiments, Harvey's Horse (the Queen's Bays), the Royals and Pepper's (formerly Conyngham's) Dragoons (now the 8th Hussars) remained on active service in Spain. At the end of 1707 they were given swords with still longer blades and iron skull caps to fit into their felt hats, exactly like the regiments of Horse. The old distinction between the two branches was fast disappearing and dragoons were becoming true cavalry in every sense of the word.

After two inconclusive campaigns, marked by much hard work but by no big battle, the British cavalry were at last able, in 1710, to take a brilliant revenge for Almanza in the two striking successes of Almenara and Saragossa. The first was a cavalry action, in which 22 squadrons of allied cavalry, ten of which were British, met 40 squadrons of the enemy in fair fight and utterly overthrew them, killing or capturing 1,200 of them, taking several guns



Trench Heavy Cavalry
(after Parron)

* This rearming of the British dragoon regiments as a result of experience in the field found an echo in the last War, when, as a result of their experience in Palestine, the Australian Light Horse, who had started as mounted rifles, applied for and were issued with swords like the British cavalry.

† The third regiment was formed in Spain from various details by Peterborough himself, and was known by his name. It was subsequently disbanded.

‡ These two regiments afterwards, as already noted, joined Marlborough's army in the Low Countries. The force in Spain was later strengthened by an additional regiment of dragoons, Rochford's, afterwards disbanded.

and hunting the routed fugitives for miles until darkness stopped the pursuit*. Stanhope, the British commander, was said to have killed the Spanish commander in hand-to-hand fight; but this triumph was even surpassed by the ensuing victory at Saragossa (9th August, 1710). Here the two armies were approximately equal, about 20,000 each, and after a hard struggle the Spanish force was completely defeated, losing 3,000 killed or wounded and 4,000 prisoners with 22 guns. As a result of this victory not only was Saragossa captured but also the Spanish capital, Madrid.

The last phase of this war in Spain was clouded by the reverse at Brihuega, where Stanhope and most of his force was compelled, after a most gallant resistance, to surrender; but that reverse is no reason why we should forget to-day the brilliant victories of Barcelona, Almenara and Saragossa, the splendid little fight at San Estevan and the really remarkable operations of the reduction of Valencia.

To sum up. Despite the recent revival of interest in the period, the work of our cavalry in the wars of Queen Anne is all too little known. This is to be regretted, since several episodes provide useful lessons, even for warfare to-day; notably Marlborough's employment of his cavalry as a mobile striking force at Elixem in 1705, and Peterborough's bold use of his handful of mounted men in the conquest of Valencia. One reason for the present lack of knowledge as to these operations is that they are, as we have seen, most inadequately represented in the present roll of battle-honours. It is to be hoped that the opportunity now offered of revising the list of battle-honours will be taken, and that the engagements of Marlborough's wars will at last receive their due honour on the standards, guidons and appointments of our regiments.

* * * * *

* During this pursuit, Pepper's (now the 8th Hussars) are stated to have rounded up as prisoners a large body of the Spanish Horse, and to have disarmed them by taking their sword-belts and slinging them over their own shoulders. In commemoration, this regiment of British dragoons was permitted to wear special equipment like the regiments of Horse (see page 487), and are so depicted in the official plates of uniforms issued in 1742. This special equipment was discontinued when the regiment was converted into Light Dragoons (1783-4), but the memory of it survived in the nickname of "The Cross-belts" which furnishes the present title of the regimental journal.

THE CAVALRY IN FRANCE, AUGUST-NOVEMBER, 1918

By **LIEUTENANT-COLONEL T. PRESTON, M.C., T.D.,**
Yorkshire Hussars.

PART III.

After the close of the Battle of Amiens on 12th August, it was not found possible to employ the Cavalry Corps again until the first week in October. Seeing that, in these two months, our armies pushed back the Germans over some twenty to twenty-five miles of territory, it was very disappointing that no chance of cavalry action on a large scale arose ; but this was in no way the fault either of the cavalry themselves or of the Higher Command : it was simply that the ground was totally unsuitable, almost every mile of it having been severely damaged by shell-fire in the heavy fighting of 1916 and 1917.

The Commander-in-Chief in his despatches divides the last three months of the War into two phases : first, the fighting in entrenched positions (8th August to 8th October) ; and secondly, the fighting in open country (8th October to 11th November). In the first phase, the three opening battles were those of Amiens, Bapaume, and the Scarpe : thanks to suitable ground, considerable use was made of mounted troops in the Battle of Amiens, as already described in the first two articles of this series. Further attempts to employ cavalry were made in the next attacks, and although it was not found possible to pass them through the infantry, it is only fair to the regiments concerned that short accounts of their efforts should be given.

It must first be explained that the British offensive, to begin with, was directed towards the strategic objective St. Quentin-Cambrai (see Sketch 1). The Battle of Amiens disengaged that

town and the railways centring upon it, compelled the enemy to evacuate a wide extent of country to the south of our advance, and dealt him a very heavy blow both materially and morally. By 13th August, however, his resistance had stiffened and the surprise effect had worn off: our Fourth Army had reached the edge of very difficult country, and Sir Douglas Haig, therefore, decided that the next attack should be further north, in the Third Army sector. His reasons for choosing this sector were:—

Aug.-Sept.
Sketch 1

- (1) The enemy did not seem prepared to meet an attack here, and he occupied a salient whose left flank was already threatened from the south owing to the Fourth Army's success.
- (2) The ground north of the River Ancre was not greatly damaged by shell-fire and was suitable for tanks.
- (3) A successful advance south-eastward would turn the line of the Somme south of Péronne, and would be a step forward towards the objective, St. Quentin-Cambrai.
- (4) We now held the commanding plateau south of Arras about Bucquoy, giving advantages of observation which we had not enjoyed in the 1916 Somme battle. We were now astride or east of trench lines which in that year we had had to attack frontally.

This operation was fixed to start on 21st August, and is known as the Battle of Bapaume.

THE 1ST CAVALRY DIVISION AT THE BATTLE OF BAPAUME.

It was correctly anticipated that there was not likely to be much scope for cavalry in the coming operation, so only one cavalry division, the 1st, was allotted to the Third Army. The plan of General Byng was to attack in the first instance on a front of about nine miles with the idea of gaining the Albert-Arras railway line (on which it was rightly assumed that the enemy's main line of resistance was sited) from Miraumont to Moyenneville. The task allotted to the 1st Cavalry Division was to exploit any infantry success in the direction of Bapaume,

21st Aug.
Sketch 2

and as a first step to try and seize the line Irles-Bihucourt-Gomiecourt, about three miles beyond our then front line. To ensure the closest possible touch with the infantry, the two corps who were delivering the assault were each to have a cavalry brigade under their orders: on the right, the 9th Cavalry Brigade (Brigadier-General d'Arcy Legard) was under the IV Corps,* which had the 42nd, New Zealand and 37th Divisions in front line and the 5th and 63rd Divisions in support and ready to pass through the others. One squadron 15th Hussars was detailed to keep close touch with the 5th Division and report its progress, whilst the 19th Hussars were with the 63rd Division, with orders to take any opportunity of pushing on to the objective mentioned above.

On the left, the VI Corps† was attacking with the 2nd and Guards Divisions in front, and the 3rd Division just behind to pass through them: the 2nd Cavalry Brigade (Brigadier-General A. Lawson) was to be in close support of the 3rd Division and was to act on its own initiative as regards carrying out his part of the cavalry's mission.

The 1st Field Squadron, R.E., sent one troop with the 9th Cavalry Brigade and two with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade to make cavalry tracks: each field troop had a few men attached from one of the regiments, but as things turned out they had little to do except fill in a few shell-holes and clear away some wire. The remainder of the 1st Cavalry Division (one brigade and divisional troops) was held in Third Army reserve.

Zero hour was at 4.55 a.m., and the initial assault was launched in a thick fog, which did not really lift until about 11.30. At first this was an advantage, as it concealed our advance from the Germans; but later it led to some loss of direction and hampered reconnaissance considerably. The lead-

* IV Corps	Lieutenant-General Sir G. M. Harper.
37th Division	Major-General H. B. Williams.
New Zealand Division	Major-General A. H. Russell.
42nd Division	Major-General A. Solly-Flood.
5th Division	Major-General J. Ponsonby.
63rd Division	Major-General C. E. Lawrie.
† VI Corps	Lieutenant-General J. A. L. Haldane.
Guards Division	Major-General G. P. T. Feilding.
2nd Division	Major-General C. E. Pereira.
3rd Division	Major-General C. J. Deverell.

ing cavalry squadrons moved forward soon after 7 a.m., at which hour Major-General Mullens opened his advanced divisional headquarters at a point 2,000 yards west of Ablainzevelle. At 7.30 the 9th Cavalry Brigade received the news that the 37th Division had taken its first objectives and that the 5th Division was advancing through it: the brigade, therefore, moved through Fonquevillers, Essarts and Bucquoy. By 8.30 a.m. Achiet-le-Petit was reported to be in our hands: the 15th Hussars (Lieutenant-Colonel H. Combe) were moving in that direction, whilst on their left the 19th Hussars (Lieutenant-Colonel G. D. Franks) were making for Longeast Wood. There had, however, been great difficulty since reaching Bucquoy, partly owing to traffic in that village and still more on account of the ground, which was so cut up by shell-holes and wire that it was impossible for any rapid movement, and the troops often had to ride in single file at a walk. At 10 a.m. our infantry were attacking Longeast Wood: there was considerable hostile shell-fire both in the wood and in the areas outside it, and some of the 19th Hussars had to put on respirators owing to gas shells.

21st Aug.
Sketch 2

The situation here at 11.30 a.m. was that Longeast Wood had been captured, and that the 19th Hussars had one squadron south and another north of it. A troop was then sent forward to the high ground east of the wood, its task being to report whether the railway north of Achiet-le-Grand was in our possession or not. The troop rode forward under heavy fire and sent back valuable information by despatch rider: visual signalling was found to be impossible as it attracted the enemy's fire. About this time, a flight of German aeroplanes passed over the 19th Hussars; the regiment was immediately moved, and the ground they had vacated was shelled a few minutes later. At 2.20 p.m. a report came in that the 5th Division had gained the line of the railway but had been forced back by a counter-attack.

In the meantime, immediately to the north, the 2nd Cavalry Brigade had also moved forward, with the 18th Hussars (Lieutenant-Colonel A. W. Parsons) in front. Riding along the

road from Ablainzeville towards Courcelles, they came under heavy artillery fire from the Gomiecourt direction, and the thick mist made it exceedingly hard to keep touch with the infantry. At 8.30 a.m., having reached rather more open country, the Brigadier sent forward the 4th Dragoon Guards (Lieutenant-Colonel E. M. Dorman) on the right of the 18th Hussars: they reached the north-east corner of Longeast Wood, whence patrols pushed on towards the railway close behind the infantry, an 18th Hussars' squadron being also sent to a point north of Courcelles. This squadron reported at 2.20 that it was in touch with the G.O.C., 8th Infantry Brigade (3rd Division), and that the enemy here was putting up a stubborn resistance.

The 1st Cavalry Brigade (Brigadier-General H. S. Sewell) had meanwhile moved forward to a position some 1,000 yards east of Fonquevillers, with the 11th Hussars in touch with the 2nd Cavalry Brigade: but as the afternoon wore on it became obvious that the situation was not one where cavalry could do any good. General Mullens saw General Byng some time between 4 and 5 p.m., and explained matters to him, with the result that, after consulting the commanders of the IV and VI Corps and telling the neighbouring infantry formations, the cavalry regiments were withdrawn. Fortunately, the total casualties in the 1st Cavalry Division on 21st August were only 113, made up as follows: officers, 2 wounded; other ranks, 12 killed, 88 wounded, 11 missing. It was found during this day that wireless was most reliable, but that it was important to have trained cypher officers who could work quickly. This, and D.Rs., proved to be the only trustworthy means of communication, as cables were often cut by shell-fire and visual signalling was impracticable—first because of the fog in the morning, and secondly because, when the fog cleared, it drew fire from the enemy.

THE NORTHUMBERLAND HUSSARS ON 22ND AUGUST.

On the second day of the Battle of Bapaume, that is on 22nd August, the III Corps* of the Fourth Army joined in,

* III Corps	Lieutenant-General Sir R. H. K. Butler.
12th Division	Major-General H. W. Higginson.
18th Division	Major-General R. P. Lee.
47th Division	Major-General Sir G. T. Gorrings.

22nd Aug.
Sketches
1 & 3

capturing the town of Albert and bringing up the left of the Fourth Army level with the remainder of the line. On the eve of these operations the Commander-in-Chief had issued an order emphasizing the necessity for all ranks to act with the utmost boldness and resolution, and doubtless this was partly why the III Corps commander included in his plan a special task of exploitation for his corps cavalry regiment, the Northumberland Hussars.* As things turned out, the enemy was so completely prepared for our attack, and his fire was so severe, that the cavalymen found their task an impossible one: but in their attempt to carry it out they gave a fine display of bravery which deserves to be recorded.

An examination of Sketch 3 will enable the reader to understand the plan of attack. The III Corps, with its right flank on the Corbie-Bray road and its left at Albert, was to advance with three divisions (the 47th, 12th and 18th from right to left). The 3rd Australian Division was to advance simultaneously towards Bray-sur-Somme. The immediate object of the operation was to secure the high ground north of Bray, on the general line Chalk Pit—Bécordel-Bécourt, just beyond Happy Valley: this meant an advance of about a mile and a half. Then, if the enemy showed any signs of a withdrawal, the Northumberland Hussars (less "C" Squadron, which was split up among the divisions) were to push forward to the next ridge and endeavour to seize the line from Great Bear copse to Bois Français. They were to be supported by six whippet tanks and a troop of Australian Light Horse from the 3rd Australian Division, but as will be seen later, these did not turn up in time. A number of enemy guns were believed to be in Citadel Valley, and it was hoped that these would be captured by the cavalry and tanks.

* This Yeomanry regiment, the first Territorial unit to be in action on the Western Front—though not the first to land—had been dismounted on 19th March, 1918, for conversion into cyclists. On 24th March one squadron was remounted on horses, and during the summer the regiment became again a complete mounted unit. Lieutenant-Colonel A. B. Reynolds, a 12th Lancer officer, was the C.O. from 21st February, 1917 to 8th October, 1919.

Many of the particulars given here are taken from their regimental history.

The country over which the attack was to be launched consisted of open rolling fields, but the area north of Bray was considerably cut up by old trenches, shell-holes and belts of wire—legacies of the 1916 Somme battles.

22nd Aug.
Sketch 3

The Northumberland Hussars spent the night 21st/22nd August in bivouacs near Heilly ; it was a perfect summer night, without a sign of an enemy aeroplane. Zero on the 22nd was at 4.45 a.m., and our artillery, hitherto silent, opened with a crash. Lieutenant-Colonel Reynolds and his adjutant went to the headquarters of the 141st Infantry Brigade, leaving the second-in-command, Major S. Burrell, to lead the two squadrons to a previously selected assembly position west of Tailles Wood. It was found, however, that the wood was being bombarded with gas shells, so the squadrons formed up about half-a-mile to the west, the leading squadron ("A") in a sunken road, and the other in folds in the ground a little further back.

Except for a few horses being frightened by a stray shell, and some unpleasantness from the gas, all had gone well so far : two patrols (under corporals) were sent out to report how far the infantry had got, but although they did valuable work during the day, they were unable to return before the regiment moved forward, and the commanding officer decided to advance without waiting for their reports. After despatching Captain Ramsay towards Happy Valley to reconnoitre the route, Colonel Reynolds learnt about 7.30 a.m. from an artillery observer that the first two objectives had been taken : he therefore gave the order to mount, and moved off at 7.45. "A" Squadron (Major J. G. Rea) rode in front, with one troop ahead as vanguard, whilst "B" Squadron (Major R. L. Stobart) followed some 300 yards behind—an interval which saved them many casualties a few minutes later. The going was not good, but a smart pace was kept up towards and then along an old railway line.

The head of the regiment soon reached the Etinehem-Méaulte track which, being on high ground, was in full view of the enemy. Shells began to fall, which luckily did no harm, but the leading troops were getting hung up by old trenches

and wire, and several men took falls ; nevertheless, the advance continued, partly on and partly alongside the railway track. Heading for the north end of Happy Valley, the troops were able to open out, and rode at a hand gallop for the Forked Tree, a good landmark : here they hoped to see something of the whippet tanks, but there was not a sign of them. Inquiries of the infantry, however, seemed to indicate that all was well in front, and the Yeomen dashed over the Bray-Méaulte road at full gallop in a cloud of dust. The German guns had now got the range and were shelling hard, but the cavalymen, cheered by the infantry, charged down the steep western slopes of the valley and up the other side, only to be met by a terrific shell and machine-gun fire from all sides. They could now see in front of them a sunken road and a large wire entanglement, and any further advance was quite out of the question. A quick signal amid the bursting shells swung the leading troop to the south, away from the wire, and a dash was made for the Bray road, the leading squadron eventually halting in a sunken road west of the southern end of Happy Valley, where they were under a certain amount of cover. The second squadron, seeing the first one wheel to the south, conformed to the movement and extricated itself with comparatively few losses.

As it was now clear to Colonel Reynolds that no more good could be done, and as " A " Squadron was reduced to twenty-three men,* the survivors were led back in small parties ; this was done in good order and without mishap, except for a few falls caused by trenches and the fatigue of the horses. On the way back the whippets were met : they had been delayed by mechanical trouble and the loss of their C.O. (wounded), but even if they had accompanied the Hussars it is very doubtful whether they would have made any difference, as the Germans were in great strength and fully prepared.

There were many individual acts of bravery, of which two are typical. Major Rea, commanding " A " Squadron, was

* The casualties were not as heavy as was thought at first, various men turning up later. The total figures for the regiment were :—officers, 4 wounded, 1 wounded and missing ; other ranks, 6 killed, 49 wounded.

22nd Aug.
Sketch 3

wounded close to the German wire, and was carried to shelter by his orderly, Private A. Oliver, and his trumpeter, F. Cherrington. A shell bursting close to the three men wounded the trumpeter, but Oliver carried his officer on foot some three miles to safety. Another case of devotion to duty was that of Private A. H. Nicholas, the Commanding Officer's orderly, who carried his headquarters flag even after being wounded. Finally, when the regiment was re-formed after the withdrawal, Nicholas had to leave his horse in the sunken road, but nevertheless struggled on, still bearing his lance and flag. When at last he became too weak to carry the lance, he tore the flag from it and in the end brought the latter home.

It may amuse readers to quote some verses, parodying Tennyson's "Charge of the Light Brigade," sent to the *Daily Mail* by an Australian officer who witnessed the Northumberland Hussars' advance. The writer is poking fun at the official war-time rule of not mentioning regiments' names in despatches :—

THE CHARGE OF A BODY OF MOUNTED TROOPS.

Forward a certain cavalry unit !
 Was there a man dismay'd ?
 Not tho' the soldier knew
 Someone had blundered.
 Theirs not to make reply,
 Theirs not to reason why,
 Theirs but to do and die ;
 Into the Valley of Death
 Rode the certain number of mounted troops from nowhere
 in particular.
 When can their glory fade ?
 Oh ! The wild charge they made ;
 All the world wondered.
 Honour the charge they made,
 Honour the unmentionables,
 Noble indefinite number !

* * * *

Reading the foregoing account—taken largely from their regimental history—it seems at first sight that the Corps staff were wrong in attempting to try and pass through the infantry so small a mounted force as two squadrons, and that even if assisted by whippet tanks (which in fact never turned up) the Yeomanry were set an impossible task. But we must remember that only a fortnight before, large numbers of cavalry had operated ahead of the infantry with great success and with surprisingly few losses, and that the C-in-C. had only just issued an order to all armies urging them on to a resolute offensive regardless of risks. It is also very likely that the III Corps commander, General Butler, recalled how useful the cavalry had been to him during the great German offensive in the spring.

* * * *

“C” Squadron of the Northumberlands, as already noted, were allotted by troops to the three divisions of the III Corps: these troops for many days did most valuable patrolling work, of which one example—on the 18th Divisional front—may be given. Sergeant W. Brewis was sent out with a patrol to locate the enemy’s position in Caterpillar Valley, north-west of Montauban, on 25th August. Coming under very heavy machine-gun and shell-fire and having some of his horses hit, he dismounted his patrol under cover and, advancing on foot at great personal risk, got through the German forward posts and found out where their main line lay. Remaining in observation himself, he sent back information to Brigade Headquarters, which proved to be of the utmost value in an attack they made later. He was awarded the D.C.M.

THE 3RD CAVALRY BRIGADE ON 24TH AUGUST.

The next attempt to use mounted troops was on 24th August, on which date Brigadier-General Bell-Smyth’s 3rd Cavalry Brigade was ordered to be at Ayette (see Sketch 2) by 7 a.m., with patrols forward in touch with the infantry. This was in the Battle of Bapaume (Third Army) and immediately north of where the 1st Cavalry Division had tried to find an opening three days previously.

24th Aug.
Sketch 2

Two troops of the 16th Lancers were the first to move, and at 8.30 a.m. the Brigadier ordered the remainder of that regiment (Lieutenant-Colonel G. H. F. Brooke) to go forward in the direction of Ervillers and Mory, taking with them a subsection of the 3rd Machine Gun Squadron. At 9.15. a.m. the 4th Hussars (Lieutenant-Colonel N. O. Laing), with a section from "D" Battery, R.H.A., and a subsection of machine guns, were directed through Moyenneville towards St. Leger, the rest of the brigade moving at 9.30 towards Moyenneville. As it was leaving Ayette, however, a message came in from a 16th Lancer patrol that Ervillers was being heavily shelled and that the high ground to the east was held by enemy machine guns: the main body of the 16th, therefore, halted west of Ervillers.

A further order came in at 10.35 a.m. to the effect that the Guards Division were to attack St. Leger and that the 3rd Cavalry Brigade was to send one regiment to co-operate on their right. The 4th Hussars were detailed, but sent a message half an hour later that the Guards were held up by machine-gun fire and that the village was being heavily shelled. Their patrols in trying to work round south of St. Leger, and also a 5th Lancer troop sent up by the Brigadier to reconnoitre between St. Leger and Croisilles, reported moreover that the ground was impracticable for cavalry owing to wire and trenches, and after waiting about nearly all day, the brigade was at 6 p.m. withdrawn west of Ayette. Fortunately, only a few men were wounded and gassed.

THE ROYAL SCOTS GREYS AND THE IV CORPS.

From 21st August to 3rd September, "B" Squadron of the Royal Scots Greys under the command of Captain E. J. Hardy was lent to the IV Corps which, as we have seen, was then engaged in the Battle of Bapaume. On 28th August Lieutenant A. R. Cooper's troop was attached to the 42nd Division, whose infantry lost touch with the retreating enemy for a time. The troop was sent forward to regain contact, which—although under constant machine-gun and rifle fire—it succeeded in doing, and sent back most valuable information. Lance-

28th Aug.

Corporal Seaton distinguished himself by the skilful manner in which he led a patrol, and Private McConnachie received the Military Medal for his conduct as advanced "point" of this patrol. He exposed himself time after time with the utmost coolness for the purpose of drawing the enemy's fire, thus enabling the patrol to locate the German machine guns.

It must be confessed, however, that some infantry commanders had somewhat hazy ideas as to what cavalry could do. On one occasion a troop was attached to a division and was ordered to do advanced guard to three infantry brigades moving forward on three parallel roads! At the time the order was given, the brigades were scattered all over the country and had been fighting for several days, and in addition, the point of assembly from which the march of the columns was to start had not yet been captured. However, the troop officer obediently saddled up and reported to the brigadiers concerned, and was more relieved than surprised to find that none of them wanted him.

The other two squadrons of the Greys were similarly employed on the Third Army front at the end of August and beginning of September; the regiment then rejoined the 5th Cavalry Brigade, which came under the orders of the Fourth Army on 5th September, and next day joined the Australian Corps near Albert.

THE 10TH HUSSARS AT THE DROCOURT-QUÉANT LINE.

It can fairly be claimed that, though the attempts to employ cavalry in the last ten days of August, 1918, proved unsuccessful, the Higher Command was quite justified in making them. The same can hardly be said of the proposal to use mounted troops with the Canadian Corps on 2nd September, and it would surely be difficult to find a better instance of "how not to do it."

2nd Sept.
Sketch 4

A reference to Sketch 1 will show that by 26th August the British offensive had spread north, our First Army on that day commencing what is known as the Battle of the Scarpe. Great success was achieved, and it was arranged to attack the

Drocourt-Quéant switch line on 2nd September, the Canadian Corps to advance astride the main Arras-Cambrai road.

It will be recalled that on 8th August an "Independent Force" under Brigadier-General Brutinel, consisting mainly of motor machine-gun batteries, had operated down the main Amiens-Roye road. The experience gained on that day now induced the Canadian Corps staff to try and do the same thing under the same general on 2nd September. The Canal du Nord lay some $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles ahead of our then front line, and it was hoped that the Independent Force might be able to push down the main Arras-Cambrai road, seize the canal crossing at Marquion, and form a bridgehead east of that place. At first sight this sounded quite a legitimate operation, but actually the circumstances were totally different from those on 8th August. In the present case, the Force's advance could only be down the road itself and in an area 500 yards wide on either side of it—a strip 1,000 yards wide altogether—all the country outside this strip being under a creeping barrage from our own guns. Further, the Force was this time to include two regiments of cavalry, who were evidently expected to advance down a corridor some 5 miles long by 1,000 yards wide, the sides of which would be formed of our own bursting shells (see Sketch 4). It was virtually certain that the corridor itself would be heavily shelled by the enemy, especially its eastern exit near the canal crossing, where the Germans were known to have prepared strong fortifications.

On Sunday, 1st September, a conference was held at the Citadel, Arras, when the task of General Brutinel's Independent Force was explained and discussed. The Force was to be organized in three groups: the Leading Group comprising the 10th Hussars, one section 6th M.G. Squadron, Canadian Light Horse,* two Canadian motor machine-gun brigades, an artillery battery, a cyclist battalion, some trench mortars in lorries, six heavy and two light armoured cars, and a few other details. The Leading Group was placed under the O.C. 10th Hussars (Lieutenant-Colonel F. H. D. C. Whitmore†), who at once saw

* This regiment was corps cavalry to the Canadian Corps.

† Colonel Whitmore himself wrote some notes on this action in the *Cavalry Journal* of April, 1925.

the weak points of the scheme ; all he could do, however, was to ask for additional areas, not to be shelled by our artillery, to be added to the "corridor." This request was complied with, and the extra areas are shown enclosed by thick black lines on Sketch 4 ; the small triangular piece was chosen to allow for difficulties on the ground at that point, and the larger area east of Marquion was to allow room for deployment and led horses.

As the event turned out, no progress was possible on the lines anticipated, although the attack as a whole was a great success. Zero hour was at 5 a.m. on 2nd September, by which hour the Leading Group of the Independent Force (with the armoured cars and "A" Squadron, 10th Hussars, leading) had its head at St. Rohart Factory on the Arras-Cambrai road, some three miles behind the front line. Orders to move were received at 8.20 a.m., and the column started off ; the armoured cars and horsemen were obliged to keep the main road, the ground on either side being impassable through trenches, shell-holes and wire for the first two miles or so. At 9.10 a.m. Captain the Earl of Airlie (O.C. "A" Squadron, 10th Hussars) sent in a verbal message saying that his leading patrols were up with the infantry on the "Red Line" (the first objective), but that the advance was at present held up. There was heavy shell-fire at the various cross-roads, especially those north-east of Villers-lez-Cagnicourt : the armoured cars could not get on, and two were out of action.

Orders were therefore issued for the patrols to keep in touch with the infantry and report any further development : the leading troops of the cavalry waited in groups south of the main road and west of l'Esperance cross-roads with the rest of the Force further back, and the Canadian field guns came into action against Villers-lez-Cagnicourt and the cemetery. Trench mortars in lorries were then brought up from the second group of the Independent Force and fired on Cagnicourt, but the Germans put up a stubborn resistance. At 5 p.m. Colonel Whitmore issued orders to the effect that, if Villers-lez-Cagnicourt fell, "B" Squadron, 10th Hussars, and one squad-

ron Canadian Light Horse, with machine guns attached, should seize the high ground running eastward from Gibraltar Mill. However, enemy machine guns continued to hold out in Villers-lez-Cagnicourt and at the cemetery, and later in the evening the Independent Force was told to withdraw. As a matter of fact, the Higher Command need not have worried about the Marquion bridgehead, for the Germans retired during the night beyond the canal.

There can be little doubt that the decision to include cavalry in the Leading Group of the Independent Force was tactically unsound. The chief asset of cavalry, when under modern shell or machine-gun fire, is mobility: they must be able to split up into small bodies and move rapidly over the exposed ground. But in this case their movement was limited by a box-barrage which would have made it impossible to manœuvre or get round the flank, and if by any chance they *had* managed to cross the canal and reach the high ground beyond Marquion, it is hard to see what the two regiments could have done with their led horses when they took up their bridgehead position.

“D” SQUADRON, QUEEN’S OWN OXFORDSHIRE HUSSARS, ON
3RD SEPTEMBER.

(See Sketch 2).

3rd Sept.
Sketch 2

Although the September fighting did not allow of the use of large bodies of cavalry, the infantry divisional commanders and brigadiers soon felt the need for small parties of mounted men for local reconnaissance and protection. Their divisional cavalry had, however, been done away with a year ago, and regiments had, therefore, to be lent to them from the Cavalry Corps, which had to break up the 2nd Cavalry Division for this purpose.* On 1st September the Queen’s Own Oxfordshire Hussars (Lieutenant-Colonel A. Dugdale)† went as corps cavalry to General Haldane’s VI Corps; on the following day “D” Squadron (Major the Hon. A. G. C. Villiers) was detailed for

* The reasons for the abolition of divisional cavalry in 1917, and for breaking up the 2nd Cavalry Division in September, 1918, will be dealt with in the next article of this series.

† This Yeomanry regiment was the first Territorial unit to cross the Channel, though not the first to be in action. It landed at Dunkirk on 22nd September, 1914, and served in the 4th Cavalry Brigade from 11th November, 1914, till the end of the War.

duty with the 2nd Division, which was to take part in an attack on 3rd September. The experiences of this squadron give a good idea of the use made of cavalry at this period of the War.

After spending the night 2nd/3rd at Humbercamp, "D" Squadron rode 14 miles to 2nd Divisional headquarters at Ervillers, halting en route at Douchy where the horses were watered, and reaching Ervillers at 7.30 a.m. It was then explained that the 6th Infantry Brigade would lead the attack on a 4,000 yards front and would advance to the ridge north-east of Hermies; the Yeomanry would come under the orders of this brigade, two officers being sent at once to report to the brigadier whilst the rest of the squadron moved to Maricourt Wood, about a mile north-west of Morchies. The advance would start at 1 p.m.

It was arranged with the G.O.C., 6th Brigade, that mounted patrols should be sent to (a) Boursies, (b) Doignies and Demicourt, and (c) Hermies, reports being sent back to the crucifix on the main Bapaume-Cambrai road just north-west of Beaumetz-lez-Cambrai.

Our front line before the attack ran roughly north and south past the eastern edge of Beaumetz, but there was no definite information as to the position either of the 5th Division on the right of the 2nd, or of the Guards Division on the left.

The Oxfordshire Hussars patrols started off, and soon reported Boursies and Doignies clear of the enemy. They had seen infantry on the high ground east of the former village and thought they were British, but they turned out later to be Germans. The Doignies patrol rode straight on down the road towards Demicourt and took two prisoners; but on seeing forty to sixty Germans in Demicourt, the Yeomen could get no further and sent back a report to that effect. Three of their horses were killed.

The Hermies patrol, crossing the railway south of Beaumetz, saw several hundred of the enemy retiring on Havrincourt Wood, and was shot at by machine guns in Hermies. All patrols reported back to the crucifix, and the information given above

was in the hands of the brigade before 1.30 p.m., the squadron then moving forward to a valley between Doignies and Boursies.

3rd Sept.
Sketch 2

At 3.15 p.m. another patrol reported parties of the enemy entering the east edge of Boursies, and some Grenadier Guards in a trench north-west of that village: this last news was important, as it showed where the right flank of the Guards Division lay. About the same time, two of our tanks passed through the southern parts of Demicourt and Hermies, and the Oxfords sent a patrol after each: these reported that Hermies was now clear, but that German machine gunners were still in Demicourt and covering its western approaches. On this, one troop of the Yeomanry was sent to occupy Hermies and another to try and take Demicourt; in spite of considerable shelling, both troops succeeded in their task, and established Hotchkiss rifle posts on the high ground beyond the two villages. A patrol pushed forward east of Hermies to clear up the situation between there and the Canal du Nord, was heavily fired on and reported a number of the enemy west of the canal.

At 6 p.m. the squadron was ordered to concentrate at Morchies, the troop at Hermies having been relieved by infantry; the Demicourt troop, however, was not relieved until 7.30 p.m., and rejoined later. In the meantime other patrols had gained touch with the infantry of the 5th Division about 500 yards south-west of Hermies.

Throughout the day the German artillery was very active, shelling any parties larger than two or three horsemen whenever they showed themselves on rising ground. There was a lot of wire about, and movement was quicker on the roads than in the fields, but the country was not unsuitable for a small body of cavalry such as a squadron.

The Yeomen bivouacked that night at Vaulx-Vraucourt. They had lost one officer and eight other ranks wounded as well as several horses, including both Major Villiers' chargers. The horses had been saddled up and on the move since 5 a.m. that morning, since which hour they had covered 40 to 45 miles. During the 36 hours ending 9 p.m., 3rd September, it was reckoned that the squadron as a whole had ridden 84 miles,

whilst many men on the patrols had done 100 to 110 miles. It had been found impossible to water the horses after 6.30 a.m. on the 3rd.

The above account shows how valuable was this one cavalry squadron to an infantry division, and how the horsemen did work that no other arm could have done as well, even if at all. They reported the location of the enemy to the front, and of our own divisions on the flanks; they took prisoners; they pushed forward and held ground until the infantry came up. Nor was this an isolated example: during the remaining two months of the War there was hardly a day when cavalry patrols were not operating ahead of the infantry at one or more points on the British front.

THE 3RD HUSSARS JOIN THE IV CORPS.

On 3rd September the 3rd Hussars (Lieutenant-Colonel W. T. Willcox) relieved the Royal Scots Greys as corps cavalry regiment to General Harper's IV Corps, with whom they were destined to remain till the Armistice. Next day they were divided up as follows:—

Two troops of "A" Squadron to the 42nd Division;

Two troops of "A" Squadron to the New Zealand Division;

3rd Sept.
4th Sept.
Sketch 2

Two troops of "B" Squadron to the 37th Division.

The latter division was in action on 4th September, and its commander (Major-General H. B. Williams) wrote later:—

"One troop of 'B' Squadron, 3rd Hussars, was divided into three patrols in front of the 112th Brigade, advanced guard to the division. The centre patrol, under 2nd Lieutenant J. W. Sutherland, was stopped at the Canal du Nord by machine-gun fire from Havrincourt Wood. The patrol dismounted, and the officer, with Lance-Corporal T. H. Hawkins, climbed down into the dry bed of the canal and ran up it to a bend just north of the wood, where they saw a slag heap on the east bank. Climbing cautiously up, they found themselves within 200 yards of a German machine-gun post and some


riflemen, who were in action against our infantry and holding them up. Leaving the corporal in observation, the officer went back to the nearest infantry and brought up a Lewis gun, with which he knocked out the German post, and the infantry were able to continue the advance."

This little incident—which happened just south of the Oxfordshire Hussars' adventures on the previous day—reflects the greatest credit on the young officer concerned. We must remember that the mission of a cavalry patrol is to find out and report things, rather than to fight, and no one would have blamed Sutherland if, when held up by machine-gun fire from Havrincourt Wood, he had merely reported the fact, giving such details about the enemy as he could observe. He and his companion certainly rose to the occasion.

(To be continued)



SKETCH 1



1934

A BIG GAME SHOOT IN INDIA

By COLONEL F. A. HAMILTON, late 3rd Cavalry, I.A.

“ One of the poets which is it ?
Somewhere or other sings,
That the crown of a sorrows sorrow
Is remembering happier things.
What the crown of a sorrows
Sorrow may be, I know not, but this I know,
It lightens the years that are now,
Sometimes, to think of the years ago.”

LINDSAY GORDON.

At Sitapur in the hot weather of 1909 Algy and I were sharing a bungalow with George. We three were great pals and got on famously in spite of the heat, which was intense. We had no electric light or fans; we had oil butties, and the old-fashioned punkah pulled by the laziest of individuals who seemed to think they had more right to sleep than we had. George, a stolid Australian, slept with a pile of small stones by his bedside, and between short spasms of fitful sleep there were intervals in which he pelted the punkah coolie. He and the coolie seemed to take it in turns to sleep, until sheer fatigue sent them both off in the cooler hours of the morning—that too brief respite of the Indian hot weather. About the end of May, Algy and I got fifteen days' leave and went for a big game shoot in the hills. We had taken a block in the forest, through which flowed a rapid river. We hoped for tiger, panther, deer of sorts and perhaps a bear. Over the train journey let us draw a veil; it was too hot for words, and the ice ran out. That reminds me of a true story about an obliging guard on an Indian railway train in the hot weather. A certain Colonel

was travelling in the Madras Presidency one stifling night in June. His servant had forgotten his ice-box containing sodas. The Colonel was almost at his last gasp when the train pulled up at a small wayside station. The guard, seeing the Colonel's perspiring face protruding from the carriage window, politely asked him if he could do anything for him.

"For heaven sake get me a soda or some water," was the gasping reply.

"Sir, I will do my best," said the guard, who returned in due course with not only a soda but a piece of ice.

"Good man, it's like oil to a rusty lock," said the Colonel as he gulped it down, mixed with whiskey. "Bring me another at the next stop like a good fellow." This continued until the early hours of the morning, the Colonel's thirst getting worse instead of better, as is often the case in like circumstances. At last

the guard said regretfully: "Sir, I am sorry, if I take any more ice from the corpse it may not keep until we reach Madras." The Colonel's remarks are not recorded!

We arrived at the nearest railway station to our shooting ground. Two elephants were awaiting us there, sent by a friendly Rajah, to be at our service for the duration of the shoot. We put our kit and servants up on them and walked. It became cooler and cooler as we climbed up through those gorgeous hills. How we appreciated it! The splendid scenery—miles and miles of green forest as far as the eye could see, fresh and cool in the morning sunlight! We gratefully filled our lungs with the cool air—so different from the scorching "loo," the hot wind of the plains. The elephants swung along, their bells ringing at each step. They also seemed to glory in the change of climate, and



gave their mahouts no need to urge them on. A halt for breakfast, a cheery picnic, and so on up the winding hill^{road} towards our destination. We mopped up a good many miles that day, fitting in with the elephant's capacity for travelling. We spent the night in a traveller's bungalow surrounded with green lawns with red and white roses growing up the walls. Next day at lunch-time we reached the shooting ground, with the forest bungalow set in a valley on the edge of the river, just where the waters of two streams met. How can I describe it? I can only quote the eulogy on another watersmeet: "How calm could I rest, in that vision of peace with the friends I love best." It was a vision of peace, and there we might have been content to rest, but it was not to be; we had come to shoot, and were eager to get on. The shikaries held out hopes of tiger, sambhur, spotted deer, and perhaps a black bear or panther; time was short, and we had to divide up and go to different ends of the block and work inwards. We tossed up and Algy lost. I was to stay where I was while he went on to another bungalow at the north end of the block. We only had four days in which to shoot. Algy took an elephant and moved off some miles to his side of the block. I must leave him there for the present.

From where I was standing by the bungalow I could see the spotted deer (chital) coming down to drink on the far side of the river. The shikari said that they were out of range, but that we could cross the river by a ford higher up and work down towards them.

I started out with my Rigby Mauser, crossed the ford on one of the elephants, dismounted, and stalked down the river bank until I got within range of the herd. There were some good heads. I chose out what seemed to me to be the best. It was an easy shot. His horns measured 38 inches, he had a very symmetrical head, and a rich golden brown skin spotted with white. Of all deer they are to my mind the most beautiful. We put him up on the elephant, and as it was getting dusk, made tracks for home. As we reached the ford, the old mahout got very excited on seeing certain large round holes in the mud,


which he pointed out to me, saying: "Jungli hathi, jungli hathi!" (wild elephant). The shikari explained to me that they were tracks of a wild elephant, probably a male. I went to see our elephant settled in for the night. I was allowed to give her her sweetmeat—a large ball of sugar and gram, mixed. She was thirty years old and the joy of the old mahout's heart. I went back to the forest bungalow, held a consultation with the shikaris, and talked over the plan of campaign for the next few days' shooting. Moony, my servant, was awaiting me with a drink, a hot bath and dinner. He was an excellent servant. A cheery faced Madrassi with a smile worth anything, and quite imperturbable! On one occasion he surpassed himself for coolness. I came in from a morning ride, feeling rather last-nightish, having been at a hectic guest night in another Mess. I had given a standing order for iced mango-fool, a most refreshing drink after a hot and dusty ride. On this particular morning I said: "Moony, bring the fool." "No fool to-day, Sir." "Yes, there is; you are a d— fool," said I. Moony answered not a word, went into the house, and in due course appeared with a salver, a bottle of Andrew's liver salts, and some cold water!

After a much-needed bath and the evening meal I sat in a long deck-chair listening to the belling of a sambhur stag, an Indian stag about the size of a red deer. It recalled to me the belling of the wild red deer on Exmoor, to be heard on September and October nights from Porlock, Porlock Weir and other haunts of the staghunter. And so to bed, to the sound of running water, little of which I heard until I was awakened about midnight by loud trumpeting, coming from the direction of the ford. I jumped out, seizing my rifle, hoping that he might come up my way and cause enough trouble to justify my having a shot at him. To shoot at an elephant in those jungles you must be able to prove that it was done in self-defence, or in someone else's defence. Something put him off, and he never came up, much to the relief of the mahout with the lady elephant. After a lot of noise and trumpeting he cleared off. Next morning I went down to the ford, and there were

his fresh footmarks in the mud, and very large ones at that. I spent part of that day in following him up, and towards evening came up to him. There he was, standing broadside on, a hundred yards away, breaking bamboos, perfectly unsuspecting of danger, rocking his head backwards and forwards and flapping his ears to and fro; a very large elephant, but where were his tusks? I thought it must be a cow after all. I worked closer with the shikari, and got up to within 20 yards of him. Yes, he was a male, no doubt of it, but a tuskless male. There are such things, but I had never seen one before. He was worth seeing as an interesting specimen, but as he was of no use to shoot, I retraced my steps and looked for other game. I found a herd of chital on the way back, and stalked a very fine stag. He was very cute and would not give me a chance. I was reluctantly making for the ford on the elephant, passing along a nullah with a steep incline leading down to it; was luckily ready, having my .275 with me, when suddenly, through the bamboo jungle came half-a-dozen hinds, galloping down the slope with their antlered lord in close attendance. I got him with a lucky shot, and over he rolled like a shot rabbit. He had a magnificent head, and I have little doubt that he was my original friend who had been frightened and driven in our direction. I left some men to skin him and bring him in, and hurried on to get the elephant over the river before dark.

The rain came down that night, and the river became a torrent; quite impassable, so I was confined next day to my own side of the river. As we had a long way to go to the ground where we were to try for bear, sambhur and ghooral, I had borrowed a pony from the police. To cut the story of a long day short, I got a ghooral in the morning, a small animal not unlike a chamois, and missed a black bear as it was descending from a fruit tree. The afternoon started rather dull; nothing seemed to be about. About 4.30 p.m. I mounted the pony and handed over the rifle to the shikari. Our way back took us along the river bank. The river was in spate; a roaring rapid torrent of red muddy water, the sight of which

fascinated me so much that I kept my eyes on it as I rode along. Suddenly the pony snorted, started and stopped dead ! There, standing within 20 yards of me and facing me, was a magnificent tiger ! I was unarmed, except for a stick. I sat still ; the tiger stood and looked at me and then settled the matter by bounding up the slope into the jungle. He had been drinking at a pool. It was an awkward situation. If I had had my .275 and fired and hit him, I might have done more harm than good ; but there was no getting away from the fact that it was madness to go unarmed !!!



The next morning the river had gone down considerably. I was able to cross with some difficulty, and to spend the day on the far side, looking for an old sambhur stag which was reported to be in the forest on the hill facing the bungalow. At daybreak I went off with an old shikari to try for the veteran. We crossed at the ford where the water was only waist high, and climbed the hill. We crept and dodged about the tops of the crags and peered into the glades here and there in the vast jungle at our feet. We were on the top of a high rocky hill, when the shikari pointed out a sambhur feeding at the edge of a small wood. I looked through my glasses and made out the horns of a very fine stag with a hind beside him. It was a difficult stalk though not so bad as it looked. I crept through the grass like a cat, between boulders which cut my knees


badly. Just as I was getting within shot the hind put up her head and saw me. Not a moment was to be lost, or both sambhur would have dashed into the jungle. I was out of breath and sweating profusely and, even resting my rifle on a rock, found it difficult to take a steady aim. I covered the old stag's shoulder and aiming for the heart took a deep breath and pulled the trigger. With a mighty leap in the air over he went. I got up and ran eagerly forward to examine my first sambhur stag, but on arriving at the spot he was gone; I could not see a trace of him at first. Knowing that I had not missed him I searched for traces of blood, was soon rewarded, and with little trouble traced him by his blood and found him lying quite dead by a rock. I was much struck by his size. He was bigger than any red deer. To show the vitality of these fine stags; the bullet had gone completely through his lungs, after which he had travelled several hundred yards. His horns looked enormous, but in actual measurement were disappointing. Though very thick in the beam and symmetrical they were some inches short of the record in actual length.

After a makeshift breakfast we put him on the elephant which was to meet us later at a fixed rendezvous. I took my Rigby Mauser, and with the shikari started off in search of another stag. Passing down a deep glen I saw a small deer the colour of a bay horse, with a head like a roe-deer, but rather a larger animal. I got an easy shot and bagged him, "a barking deer" or "Munt-Jac," sometimes called a "jungle sheep." A few hours after that we caught sight of a sounder (herd) of wild pig, feeding on an open stretch of grass. As it is impossible to ride wild boar in these hills it is legitimate to shoot them. I stalked to within 50 yards of the old boar of the sounder, who turned and looked in my direction. I knew that if I missed him he would almost certainly charge me, and was about to take a very careful aim to make sure of him when off he went with a "whoof, whoof," followed by his family. The smallest of the sounder was slow off the mark, and had not gone farther than 60 yards from me when there was a roar as a spotted yellow mass flashed past and was upon him with a lightning

spring. For one second the panther and the young boar rolled over and over together on the grass in a deadly struggle ; but only for a moment, and next instant the dreadful fangs were buried in his neck and he was carried off much as a cat would take a rat. This all happened so quickly that I could only get in a quick but futile shot at about 100 yards as the panther bounded over the green sward and disappeared into the jungle. Had he tackled the old boar instead of his son there might have been a different story to tell, for a wild boar in his native jungle is said to be a match even for a tiger, and is " the bravest beast God ever made ! " As it was now getting late we made for the river and home. As I approached the river the old shikari touched my arm and pointed to the opposite bank, where on the sand was a family of five or six full-grown otters, playing games. They were larger than the English otter and of a darker colour ; some were standing upon their hind legs, and all apparently enjoying life immensely ; an interesting and pretty sight to watch. I watched them for a while and moved quietly away towards the ford. The sun was just setting and all the western sky was tinged with pink. The jackals were starting out on their evening prow. The belling of deer echoed through the forest and over the crags ; all nature seemed to add its charm to this glorious sunset. We crossed the river just as it was dusk, and sadly I thought of the morrow, when I must start on the homeward journey back to the heat of the plains.

Algy came in that evening. He had got a good sambhur, a cheetal, and a bear, and was quite pleased. He said he ought to have got a tiger the second night. He sat up over a kill, but as he was a martyr to mosquito bites, he covered his face and hands with citronella, a powerfully smelling liquid which keeps them away. The tiger was quite close to his machan all night, but did not come near enough to give him a shot. The citronella kept him at a safe distance. We had a long talk that night over our experiences, and agreed that we had not done too badly. If only we had had two tigers to take back with us all would have been perfect. As to the journey

back, I have only one thing of note to relate. The first evening out we were trekking along the same river which had cleared a lot. I had my .275 with me in case of emergencies. We had halted and were looking at a rapid, when I saw a large fish working slowly up the rapid against the powerful stream, much as a salmon would. I fired, and by the greatest fluke hit him. He came back down the stream, and the shikari picked him out of the river by the bank. It was a large mahseer. So ended a wonderful leave. I look back upon it with pleasure mingled with sadness. Algy was killed in Gallipoli just after being awarded a D.S.O. George was killed early in the war, flying over Dunkirk. His plane crashed into the quicksands.



THE GERMAN CAVALRY ON THE MARNE

By LIEUT.-COLONEL A. H. BURNE, D.S.O., R.A.

UNTIL the last few hours of the battle the only troops opposed to the B.E.F. on the Marne were cavalry. It therefore becomes a matter of some interest to investigate the doings of these cavalry, all the more so because practically nothing has been recorded of them in the English language, if we except the notes in the new edition of the official account.*

There has recently appeared in the "*Revue de Cavalerie*" a fairly detailed account of the battle compiled from German sources.† The author has consulted these sources very fully and transcribed them accurately (if we may judge from such of his translations as we have checked with the originals). The sources are mainly as follows :—

The various regimental histories ;

The German official account ;

Poseck's book, already mentioned ;

"*Das Marnedrama*," an official monograph on the battle.

Though his account is written admittedly from the German point of view, the author is reasonably fair to us, and if his criticisms are at times severe, they are mild in comparison with his strictures on the French Cavalry. In fact, he is one of the few French writers on the battle who appears to have studied and profited by our official account. If the only other English work that he has consulted is Lord French's "*1914*" he is scarcely to be blamed, for very little else of value has been written on the battle from the British side. Our unit war diaries are disappointingly brief, most of them dismissing the

* But Poseck's "*The German Cavalry in Belgium and France, 1914*," has been translated into American.

† "*La Defense de la Brèche Kluck-Bulow*," by Colonel Pugens.

battle in a few words or pages. Strange as it may appear, the most detailed account of the fighting that has been published up to date appears in the Official History of the R.A.M.C., whilst the work of the cavalry is best described in "From Mons to Ypres," written by an American chauffeur named Coleman !

In this paper we are, therefore, mainly indebted to Pugen's admirable marshalling of the facts from the German side which, with its pithy and penetrating criticisms, makes very good reading.

THE GERMAN CAVALRY

At this point it will pay the reader to get clearly fixed in his mind the composition and "order of battle" of the German Cavalry Corps concerned, namely the Ist Corps attached to the Second Army and the IIInd Corps attached to the First Army (a rather confusing arrangement).

Ist Cavalry Corps—Lieut.-General Baron von Richthofen

<i>Garde Cavalry Division :</i>	<i>5th Cavalry Division :</i>
Lieut.-General von Storch.	Gen.-Major von Ilseman.
1st, 2nd and 3rd Brigades.	9th, 11th and 12th Brigades.
1 Garde jäger Battalion.	1 Garde Schützen Battalion.

IIInd Cavalry Corps—General von de Marwitz

<i>2nd Cavalry Division :</i>	<i>9th Cavalry Division :</i>
Gen.-Major Baron von Krane.	Gen.-Major Comte von Smettow.
5th, 8th and Hussar Brigades.	13th, 14th and 19th Brigades.
3rd, 4th, 9th and 10th Jäger Battalions (Corps troops).	

Each cavalry brigade consisted of two regiments. Each division had one horse artillery brigade of three six-gun batteries; also one machine-gun troop of six guns. Jäger and Schützen battalions, which were a sort of "light infantry," also had a machine-gun company of six guns.

General von Richthofen, who was thought very highly of, had commanded the Garde Cavalry Division up till mobilization, consisting of crack troops. Unfortunately, three of his

jäger battalions had been taken away,* but his two remaining Garde Jägers and Schützens were perfectly magnificent troops, as the story will reveal.

His mounted troops had suffered fairly heavily during the advance, receiving a sharp blow from our 5th Cavalry Brigade at Cerizy on 28th August; and their horses had reached an extreme state of exhaustion. The infantry, however, were as hard as nails, and capable of wonderful feats of marching.

General von Marwitz occupied the post of Inspector-General of Cavalry up till mobilization. He had a forceful character, was energetic in his ways, and capable of forming quick decisions. His corps was in an even greater state of exhaustion than the 1st. They had suffered heavily at Le Cateau, both in men and horses, and had not been made up in either. The horses were in a pitiable condition, and the troopers were finding the greatest difficulty in keeping them shod.

THE BEGINNING OF THE BATTLE

We will take up the story of the Marne on the evening of 5th August. On that day the First German Army had continued its advance, leaving its IVth Reserve Corps facing Paris on the River Ourcq.

But that evening, as a result of alarming news from his IVth Reserve Corps, General von Kluck, the First Army commander, ordered his IInd Corps to move to its help. This it did during the night. Next day, 6th September, the IVth active Corps was withdrawn slightly to Rebais, and at 4.30 p.m. ordered to join the IInd and IVth Reserve Corps on the Ourcq. The remaining two corps of the First Army, the IIIrd and IXth, were thus separated from the remainder by a space of nearly 30 miles. Thus opened the famous "gap" which resulted in the battle of the Marne.

But without delay Kluck, realising the danger, formed the project of filling this gap with the 1st and IInd Cavalry Corps. A liaison officer was accordingly summoned from the IInd Cavalry Corps on the evening of the 6th, and General von Kuhl

* Our Official Account appears to be in error here (p.p. 311, 319 footnotes);

dictated to him an order which, after explaining the new situation, went on: "The Ist Cavalry Corps and the IIInd have the task of closing this gap."

But Kuhl was premature. The Ist Cavalry Corps belonged to the Second Army, and permission had not yet been obtained from the Army Commander, General von Bulow. When, eventually, permission did come, it was evidently in a modified form, for the order which Kluck issued by wireless at 10 p.m. to both Cavalry Corps, in place of the words "close the gap" merely enjoined them to "cover the right flank of the IIIrd Corps."

Meanwhile the situation grew worse. Kluck had just placed his IXth Corps under the orders of the Second Army, and had ordered the IIIrd Corps to protect the other's right flank, when news came in that the B.E.F. was not only advancing but heading straight for the gap. The First Army Commander began to be alarmed and to repent of having parted with his IXth Corps. The IVth Corps had just reached billets on the River Marne, and the situation was as shown on map I.

Kluck decided to draw back both III and IX, behind the Petit Morin between Montmirail and La Ferté, and his 10 p.m. order prescribed as much. But Bulow, delighted at the prospect of having another corps at his disposal, had already issued attack orders for the morrow, not only to IX but also to III. Kluck's new orders came hot-foot on top of Bulow's, but a copy of them was not sent to the Second Army. A state of confusion naturally arose, especially in IX, which after a good deal of hesitation did not act on Kluck's order till dawn on the 7th. III, however, decamped in the night.

The task ahead of the two Cavalry Corps was not an enviable one. In the first place, the system of command was ill-defined—Bulow had merely authorised First Army to give a common mission to the two Cavalry Corps. Now, a single mission should have a single commander, but Richthofen had not been placed under Marwitz. Secondly, no system or means of inter-communication were placed at their disposal. The two cavalry leaders were 12 miles apart, and wireless was practically their

only means of communication. Thirdly, they had not conferred together, and consequently had no common conception of the task. Marwitz had already retired during the day and was prepared to retire still further, whereas Richthofen had visions of further advance. Whilst Kuhl was penning his 10 p.m. order of withdrawal, Richthofen was issuing orders to his own corps and to the 2nd Cavalry Division (which Second Army had informed him was to come under his orders) to continue the pursuit to the south on the 7th.

Whilst Marwitz was obsessed with the weight of the task, Richthofen was lightheartedly scheming a pursuit, and neither was aware of the plans and projects of the other.

On such an unsound basis good results could hardly be looked for. Marwitz had the truer conception of the two; Richthofen, in spite of having clashed with the now advancing French Fifth Army that day, had appreciated the situation so badly that he actually counted on reaching the outskirts of Paris next day.

But the events of the night were to bring him disillusionment.

THE EVENTS OF THE NIGHT 6/7TH SEPTEMBER

The 9th Cavalry Division, IInd Corps, had had a hard day. It had bumped into vastly superior forces and, though it had done well, it was very fatigued when it went into billets around Coulommiers. But it was to have little rest that night. At 11 p.m. the 14th Brigade were surprised in their billets 4 miles west of the town and driven out to the north. The remainder of the division followed suit, abandoning the line of the Grand Morin to the enemy. The bulk of the division wandered about for the remainder of the night seeking fresh billets, but finding none until it was nearly dawn.

The cause of all this trouble and disturbance was the 1st Wilts of the 7th Infantry Brigade, who approaching their allotted billets at 11 p.m. discovered that by some shocking oversight the billets had also been allotted to the German 14th Cavalry Brigade. It proceeded to turn them out. This

trifling cause led to big results ; for Marwitz discovering next morning that his 9th Cavalry Division had abandoned the crossings of the Grand Morin, and fearful of having his right flank turned, ordered his 2nd Division to prepare to retire also.

Thus the Grand Morin was abandoned with scarcely a shot fired. The results of a nocturnal squabble for billets had been almost as striking as they had been at Landrecies.

Marwitz had scarcely given the above order when he tapped the following rather distracting wireless message addressed to Ist Cavalry Corps : " Where are the Cavalry Corps ? In case of hostile attack it is absolutely essential to hold the valley of the Petit Morin between La Ferté-sous-Jouarre and Boitron, and also to observe the line of the Marne from Meaux to La Ferté."

An hour later came a second wireless, calling on the IIInd Cavalry Corps to send artillery support to the left flank of the Ourcq battle about Trilport. Evidently the First Army must be in dire straits if a Cavalry Corps which had just been given an exceedingly difficult task of its own was required to part with its artillery. Marwitz therefore decided to send the 9th Cavalry Division complete, whence it followed that the 2nd Cavalry Division could not be left in an isolated position but must retire too. Orders were accordingly sent to it to withdraw to Doue. But if it was difficult before to close the gap it became increasingly so now, with one division removed and Richthofen's instructions and moves entirely unknown.

At 1 p.m. yet a third wireless was received from the First Army, giving the unfortunate IIInd Cavalry Corps yet a third mission, namely to " cover the flank of the Army in the direction of Coulommiers and the lower course of the Grand Morin." This appeared to make the task of " closing the gap " still more impossible of attainment. Marwitz, after scratching his head for some time over this message, eventually decided to do nothing about it !

Meanwhile the 9th Cavalry Division was wandering off towards Trilport. On arrival there it found the bridges blown up ; then it made for Lizy, where it crossed the Marne and went into billets after a day's ineffectual wanderings without being

of any assistance either to Marwitz or to the First Army. The withdrawal of the 9th Division naturally exposed the right flank of the 2nd Division as the British 4th Division steadily advanced north-east from Crecy. Marwitz, leaving his 8th Brigade as rearguard south of the Marne, withdrew the remainder of the 2nd Division to La Ferté for the night. This withdrawal was carried out without molestation, for our 4th Division obligingly halted 7 miles short of the river.

Marwitz can hardly be blamed for this big withdrawal. Once the line of the Grand Morin was abandoned he could scarcely hope, in the face of such vast superiority, to hold any line for long, short of the Petit Morin. To the action of the Wiltshire Regiment in fighting for their billets on the night of the 6th we can thus directly trace our easy and almost unopposed advance right up to the Petit Morin.

And all this time Marwitz was in ignorance of what was happening to the 1st Cavalry Corps. Verily his task was not an enviable one.

THE 1ST CAVALRY CORPS ON 7TH SEPTEMBER

We have recorded that the 1st Cavalry Corps was to advance on the 7th. As dawn came the forward movement commenced, the troopers "very joyous; they were only 60 kilometres from Paris, imbued with the spirit of victory, and believed that the end of the war was near." But a cruel awakening was in store for them. Orders suddenly arrived for the 1st Cavalry Corps to cover the retirement of the right flank of the Second Army (meaning the IXth and IIIrd Corps). Richthofen, discovering at dawn that III and IX had disappeared in the night, and conscious of the fact that he was not yet in touch with the IIInd Cavalry Corps, realised that he was isolated. To make matters worse, his most advanced and isolated troops were his slowest moving—his Jägers and Schützen.

Richthofen did a bit of hard rapid thinking, and at 5.45 a.m. he issued his orders. They are full of interest. In them he indicated for the first time a common mission between the 1st and IIInd Cavalry Corps, which he expressed simply and

tersely as "to cover the right flank." He gave as the cause of this changed mission "a new enemy debouching from Paris making for Rozoy" (i.e., marching south-east). His 5th Cavalry Division was to go to Chevru, block the road thence to Rebais, and get in touch with the 2nd Cavalry Division, 4 miles south of Coulommiers. (Actually, as we know, the 2nd Cavalry Division was at that moment well north of Coulommiers, and the two cavalry divisions would, therefore, still be 7 miles apart).

The Garde Cavalry Division was to remain *in situ* less the two Jäger and Schützen battalions, which were to withdraw as soon as possible. The transport was to go north of the Marne, an enactment which was followed by the curious remark: "the precaution is not useless, for the transport and vehicles that follow the 1st Cavalry Corps are considerable in number, they have been increasing ever since Belgium and encumber the roads." This explanation was evidently inserted in order to minimise the disheartening effect of the order.

The two battalions began to withdraw at 8.30 a.m., and the 1st Dragoons of the Guard—"the proudest and finest cavalry of the German Army"—was sent towards Vaudoy to protect their flank—a very sensible manœuvre. In doing so they clashed with the British 2nd Cavalry Brigade near Moncel, whereupon ensued one of those rare actions on which both participants look back with equanimity, if not pride.

The engagement, though small and brief, possesses several points of interest. The 9th Lancers had first occupied the village of Moncel and 1½ troops (30 strong) were halted just to the north of the village, when they suddenly realised that they were being charged by a superior force of cavalry (120 according to our account, 70 according to the German). Instantly clapping spurs to their horses' sides they met the charge at full gallop, whilst the Germans could only muster a canter out of their tired horses.

Our troopers crashed through the hostile ranks, but the Dragoons being in a longer line their flanks overlapped ours, and the 9th Lancers had to swing to their right and seek safety

in the village, closely followed by the foe. The Germans, curiously, declare that our troops received the charge at the halt and fired from the saddle, and that several Germans fell in the course of the charge from this fire. There seems no reason why they should deliberately insert such a story, and probably the writers of the German account saw a few men stationary on the flanks possibly belonging to another troop who did not actually take part in the charge.*

But the charge of our handful of men was certainly a gallant affair, and one of which we may well be proud. The Germans were driven off from the village by fire power and lost heavily, whilst we had only 7 casualties. "A fair charge, the smaller force scoring off the larger one by pure merit in handling of horses and weapons," writes Coleman.

Meanwhile the 18th Hussars had occupied the village of Faujus, one mile to the north. One squadron was dismounted just to the south of this village when two troops of the German Hussars attempted to charge through them. Our troops received them coolly with rifle fire, and they were laid low almost to a man. Another brilliant affair in its way. Yet the Germans claim that it was a success for them, and it is worth while examining their claim. They maintain that at the cost of under 100 casualties they held up our pursuit and allowed their very exposed infantry to get away. They claim to have remained unmolested until 11 a.m., and only a mile north-east of Faujus.

Clearly this is a matter of examining times; and both sides are very vague as to times. Our diaries are nearly useless, except that of the 2nd Cavalry Brigade, from which it appears that the two engagements took place between 8 and 9 a.m.

At about 11.30 a.m. the Cavalry Brigade moved one mile north of Faujus and watered. At 12.30 it moved another 2 miles north, and ultimately went into billets about 1 mile further on. The 18th Hussars diary states that they billeted at noon. In any case, neither side record any further contact

* Coleman, who was an eye-witness, records that "the Germans widened appreciably, and their lances waved downwards to the rest. Their pace was slow compared with the whirlwind rush of the smaller band."

that day, and the opposing billets were as much as 8 to 10 miles apart.

Coleman's testimony is in agreement : " The forenoon passed in peace and inaction after the stirring events of the earlier part of the day. . . . At two o'clock we were on the move." He however attributes the delay to G.H.Q. who, he states, had sent instructions that they were not to advance till further orders.

It therefore appears likely that the German Cavalry remained in the vicinity of the battlefield for at least two hours after the engagement was over, and that the vigorous and resolute action of one German regiment had the effect of holding up the advance of three British cavalry brigades (1st, 2nd and 4th) and thus saving their own infantry. Further, that as a result of this action our pursuing cavalry lost touch with the enemy for the remainder of the day. Indeed, when evening came our infantry on the left and the French Cavalry on the right had both outmarched the Cavalry (1st) Division.* It is a curious fact that the only artillery on either side to take part in this cavalry action was a 60-pdr. battery.

Meanwhile Richthofen was giving orders for the 1st Cavalry Corps to retire north of the Grand Morin. He still was under the impression that the 2nd Cavalry Division had come under his orders, but he had not been able to gain touch with it ; he was still unaware that it was well to the north of the Grand Morin. However, his line of retirement between La Ferté Gaucher and St. Simeon was a judicious one, and it had the effect of bringing him into touch with the errant division. We have just seen how and why his pursuers lost touch with him on the west. On his other flank the French Cavalry also lost touch, for the direction they took was to the north-east, which a glance at the map will show was bound to take them into the void, the IIIrd Corps having withdrawn in the night.

But touch was not entirely lost. The Scots Greys of the 5th Cavalry Brigade pushed on across the Grand Morin far

* On 5th September the 1st, 2nd and 4th Cavalry Brigades formed the 1st Cavalry Division, and the 3rd and 5th Brigades formed what afterwards became known as the 2nd Cavalry Division. For convenience we shall refer to it as the 2nd Cavalry Division in this paper.

ahead of the remainder of the Army, and part of one squadron charged with great dash into Rebais. Its very gallant leader, Sir A. Baillie, was killed, but it caused consternation in the hostile ranks and a very hasty evacuation of the town by the enemy. Pugens signals it out for special commendation: "of all the allied cavalry, it alone showed proof of audacity and dash in the course of the day." And he goes on to add sadly and a trifle bitterly: "What a rich harvest of laurels the rest of the allied cavalry missed gaining by their prudence which bordered on pusillanimity." Thus the 1st Cavalry Corps successfully extricated itself from its dangerous position, and by nightfall had placed the Petit Morin between it and its pursuers.

That evening Richthofen chanced to meet the Commander of the IIIrd Corps, who explained to him that both III and IX had been summoned to the Ourcq, leaving a gap of 24 miles between Montmirail and Varedes. He was also by now vaguely aware of the position of the IIInd Cavalry Corps, and so was able to make intelligent plans for the morrow. These consisted in holding the crest of the ridge on the north bank of the Petit Morin from La Ferté to Villeneuve, the 5th Division on the west and Garde Division on the east. As the 2nd Division was holding from La Ferté to Changis (both inclusive), the greater part of the gap would be closed though lightly. There still, however, remained an empty space of 7 miles from Villeneuve almost to Montmirail, and exactly opposite this gap—all unsuspectingly—was massed the three divisions of Conneau's Cavalry Corps and the XVIIIth Corps. But the advance of the French on the 7th had been so slow and cautious that they dropped 8 miles behind the retiring Germans, so that it is hardly surprising that they were not aware of the gap in front of them.

NIGHT OF 7TH/8TH SEPTEMBER

At 1.45 a.m. Second Army sent a wireless to 1st Cavalry Corps, ordering that the British (estimated at one division only) must be prevented at all costs "from intervening against the right flank of the Army." Note the wording of this. Bulow, as ever, is thinking purely of protecting his own flank. He is

not concerned about holding out a hand to link up with the First Army. He is thinking parochially, as he had done throughout the retreat, and as he was to continue to do during the next few days. There was a singular omission in this order ; where *was* the right flank of the Army ? Actually it was north-west of Montmirail, 7 miles (as we have seen) from Villeneuve, which Richthofen had fixed on for his left flank.

But the Cavalry Corps Commander did not extend his front to the left on receipt of the Army order. No reason is given from German sources to account for this extraordinary oversight. Possibly Richthofen believed that the right flank of the Army was further west than it actually was. But he did not confirm this ; no messages appear to have passed, extraordinary though it may seem between him and the 13th Infantry Division (the right-hand unit of the Second Army). Possibly he considered that he had already "bitten off more than he could chew" in attempting to hold the 15 miles from Villeneuve to La Ferté. (Actually, as we have seen, La Ferté was held by the IInd Cavalry Corps and his own flank rested 3 miles short of that town). Probably 1st Cavalry Corps, 13th Division and Second Army are all to blame ; the affair shows into what a state of confusion only one day of retreat had thrown the German Staffs.

8TH SEPTEMBER

Richthofen's orders had been to hold, not the river itself, but the line of heights to the north of it. This order was disobeyed by both divisional commanders. They placed their infantry, with small cavalry elements, down in the valley within close range of the bridges, but retained the bulk of their cavalry as a mobile reserve on the high ground to the north.

There were obvious defects in this position. In case of eventual retreat the infantry would have a long exposed slope to retreat up. It would be difficult to reinforce ; their field of fire was small and liaison with their guns up on the ridge behind them was almost non-existent.

We do not intend to go into the details of the fight that ensued ; it is well summarized in the official account,* and as

* 6½ pages only.


it resolved itself mainly into an affair of infantry *versus* infantry, it does not directly concern us. But we can sum it up by saying that two magnificent German battalions, the Garde Jägers and Schützen, held up four British infantry divisions for about 7 hours, but paid dearly for it.

The thick woods (our pre-war troops were seldom exercised in woodland fighting) and a supposedly unfordable river were mainly responsible for our slow advance. It is interesting to consider that if the battle were re-fought in 1924 our modern equipment and methods would not avail us much. The solution to the problems must be looked for elsewhere, but this is not the place to discuss it.

Nor need we enquire why the French took still longer to cross the totally undefended sector east of Villeneuve.

Richthofen realised by now that his left flank was in the air, and at 8 a.m. sent off his celebrated wireless to the Second Army: "Petit Morin line broken at Villeneuve and Orly; Ist Cavalry Corps retires slowly on to the Dollau" (meaning Dolloir). It was picked up at German Headquarters at Luxemburg, and nearly caused Moltke a nervous breakdown. To him it appeared that the battle, if not the war, was lost; it might become necessary to order a general retirement, and in order to decide this question on the spot he sent Lieut.-Colonel Hentsch to visit the armies in turn, with full power to order a retirement if he considered it necessary. To place such an important decision on the shoulders of so junior an officer seems a case of "passing on the baby" with a vengeance. It was probably occasioned by the fact that the army commanders, who were profuse with their reports while they were winning victories, suddenly became taciturn when the tide turned; the only means left for discovering the true position was to send a Staff officer to the spot. Hence Hentsch's mission.

But the French Cavalry did not push on into the gap, and Richthofen soon changed his mind, and so far from retreating voluntarily ordered his 5th Division to make a counter-attack in support of the hard-hit Garde Division.



LOOKING ACROSS THE PETIT MORIN FROM NEAR LE TRÉTOIRE
TO BOITRON (on the skyline).

This shows the slope up which the Garde Cavalry Division had to retire.
The farm at the bottom is LE GRAVIER, after which the Germans name the
action at this spot.

It was held by their Machine Gunners, few of whom got away.



ONLY FROM SOUTH OF THE PETIT MORIN.

The slope up which the German Cavalry galloped is to the Left of and beyond
the village.

The river bridge is directly above the white gable, with road and railway to
the right of it.

THE
AMERICAN

Such a counter-attack required time to mount. But Richthofen was impatient and was probably getting slightly "rattled," for only 45 minutes after issuing the counter-attack order—influenced no doubt by the increasing pressure that was being put upon the Garde Division by our 2nd Division, which had captured Boitron—he, at 11.45 a.m., issued orders for a general retreat of his corps to the Dolloir; 5th Division to hold Azy-Essises, Garde Division Essises-Fontenelle.

Richthofen was no doubt influenced in his line of retreat by the receipt of a wireless message from First Army, ordering the IIInd Cavalry Corps and two brigades of the IXth Corps to hold the line of the Marne from La Ferté to Azy.

The line he selected would thus connect up with the First and Second Armies, and fulfil the two roles severally enjoined by the two armies, namely to fill the gap and to protect the right flank of the Second Army.

On paper his order appears an excellent one, but certain events beyond his control were to render it of no effect. However, he was not to know that for the moment, and he might justly congratulate himself on getting away at all, for in the opinion of Colonel Pugens he was only saved by the "slowness of the hostile attack, and the hesitation evinced during the course of the day by Conneau's Cavalry Corps."

It was with great difficulty that the mounted unit of the Garde Cavalry Division got away. The Jägers had a still more trying time; to many the order never came, to others the direction of retirement was not given. The troops had nearly expended their ammunition and were in an extreme state of exhaustion. The mere appearance of French Cavalry on their flank would probably have entailed disaster; the whole Garde Division was on the verge of panic. But there was no visible pursuit, and gradually the sorely tried division sorted itself out and gained its appointed place on the River Dolloir.

5TH CAVALRY DIVISION

It was the same, only more so, with the 5th Division. They also had been hard put to it to hold up two complete infantry

divisions. But the line was still holding when shortly after 11 a.m. the order reached them to counter-attack with their mounted troops in support of the Garde Division on their left. The ground to the north of the Petit Morin is favourable for mounted manoeuvre, but the troops were rather scattered and by the time General von Ilseman had collected one-and-half brigades and one battery and led them in accordance with orders to Hondevilliers, the Corps Commander and the Garde Division had vanished. To make matters worse, they were spotted by "Z" Battery* and heavily shelled. There appeared to be nobody to counter attack, the battlefield was empty, and they had no orders. What should they do? To stop where they were would evidently be suicidal. The course Ilseman adopted was the one that might be least expected. Although he had by this time become aware that the Garde Division had disappeared in a north-east direction, he decided to retire *due north*. Evidently the temptation to place the Marne between him and his pursuers was too attractive. The Commander of the 5th Division," writes Pugins, "seems very anxious to get out of reach of the enemy; coolly he separates himself from the remainder of the 1st Cavalry Corps."

Without a word to anyone he led his three regiments northwards—always pursued by British shells—crossed the Marne, cut roughly through lines of transport, and did not draw rein till he was 6 miles to the north of the river, abandoning the precious crossings and the remnants of his own division and cutting adrift from his own corps.

It was practically a panic flight, and was probably caused largely by the drubbing the division had received throughout the day from the British guns. The 11th Brigade had been caught by them in the early morning as they climbed the hill out of Orly. The history of the 8th Dragoons gives a graphic description of it: "At the trot we went up the hill. On the winding road beside us was a dense mass of transport and cavalry. All were hurrying uphill. There! An infernal noise like a terrible thunderstorm. The road disappears in a gigantic

* One section from "D" Battery; one section from "I" Battery.

cloud of smoke. Shells and shrapnel clatter down on every side. A mad confusion reigns—vehicles crash into one another, horses roll in their blood, and loud yells are heard. Everything rushes madly up the hill. Those left behind are trodden mercilessly underfoot.” And so on. And all this disturbance was caused by two puny 13-pounder guns !

The 11th Brigade continued to be chased by our shells, especially when the 4th Cavalry Brigade took up the pursuit, ably supported by the 135th Battery, R.F.A., who have, unfortunately, left no record of their doings on this memorable day.

The remainder of the 5th Division—left to its fate without orders—eventually extracted itself painfully and expensively and joined in the retreat. It also elected to retreat northwards ; no doubt the 4th Cavalry Brigade was instrumental in heading it off in that direction.

Of those two splendid battalions, the Garde Jägers and Schützen, only a few scattered parties made good their escape. They are justly proud of the action at Orly.

The retreat was carried out in inexpressible confusion, which got worse as darkness came on. French civilians told us next day of visions of galloping Uhlans on shoeless horses. When cavalry gives way to panic it is much worse than an infantry panic.

The IIIrd Corps’ transport, hopelessly congested, blocked the way. So much the worse for the transport ! The desperate troopers almost hacked their way through it, and left it stationary behind them in the river valley, an easy prey for the allied cavalry, whom they expected to see charging down the hill on them at any minute.

But the allied cavalry had no intention of doing any such thing. They went into billets ! The average hour at which they did this was 5 to 5.30 p.m. For some units it was the earliest hour at which they had gone into billets since the battle of Mons.

Pugens estimates that a glorious opportunity was allowed to slip. The 5th Cavalry Division was scattered over the face

of the country, its morale and cohesion gone, without orders, and without any idea—except to put the Marne and distance between it and the accursed British shells.

Such an opportunity might never occur again in the whole course of the war. . . . But it did—and only 24 hours later.

IIND CAVALRY CORPS ON 8TH SEPTEMBER

This need not detain us long. The 2nd Cavalry Division had retired on the evening of the 7th to the north of the Marne at La Ferté, leaving one brigade as rearguard a few miles to the south. On the approach of the British IIIRD Corps on the 8th this rearguard retired somewhat prematurely, and joined its division on the north of the river. By nightfall our 4th Division had reached the outskirts of La Ferté, but the bridges were all blown, and they were brought to a standstill.

Meanwhile, the 9th Cavalry Division was doing one of its usual circular tours, approaching different parts of the battlefield in turn, and moving on elsewhere without ever coming into action. At nightfall it came to rest in the bend of the river to the east of Changis.

SITUATION AT NIGHTFALL—8TH SEPTEMBER

The IIND Cavalry Corps had held fast, but the IST had retreated, one division to the north-east and the other to the north, the River Marne separating them. At the same time a detachment that Kluck had ordered for the defence of the Marne bridges was only then concentrating at Montreuil, 3 miles north of the river. The 5th Cavalry Division was no longer capable of organised resistance. Thus not only had a gap of 15 miles appeared between the two corps, but the 12 bridges over the Marne between La Ferté and Chateau Thierry had been left intact and undefended.

KRAEWEL'S DETACHMENT

General von Kluck, increasingly anxious for his left and rear, had ordered IXTH Corps to find two mixed brigades to guard his threatened flank. Like the Second Army commander, he was thinking parochially; the mission of the detachment was *not* to connect up with the Second Army, but to protect

the flank of the First. It was to hold the line of the Marne from La Ferté to Nogent, and to blow up the bridges if necessary. No arrangement was made to join up with the Second Army at Nogent, no instructions were given as to how long it was to hold on, nor details as to the position of the cavalry or to co-operation with it.

The IXth Corps merely passed on without comment or explanation this "laconic and incomplete order" of the First Army. It did worse; it disobeyed it in an important respect. Kluck had ordered it to find *two* mixed brigades. A brigade being half a division this meant that General von Quast would be deprived of a whole division, half his command. To this he was so much averse that he flatly disobeyed the order, limiting the detachment to one brigade. This was composed of one regiment from each of his divisions and two artillery brigades under the command of General von Kraewel. This force of 6 battalions and 6 batteries was detached from the corps as it was passing on its way to Mareuil. The force assembled at Montreuil at 6 p.m. on the 8th. A company of pioneers should also have formed part of the force, but the order did not reach it till the following morning. As a result Kraewel was not able to blow up the bridges, had he been in a position to do so. To add to his difficulties his only map was on a scale of 1/300,000, in addition to one cut out of a newspaper!

He started by disobeying his orders. In view of the obscurity of the situation and the extreme fatigue of his men (one of his battalions had just marched 40 miles in 36 hours) he did not attempt to hold the line of the river as detailed, but with the exception of a patrol sent towards Charly, he kept his detachment concentrated at Montreuil, nearly 4 miles from the river. Further than that, believing his chief danger to come from the direction of La Ferté, he formed his line facing south-west.

Meanwhile Kluck was making commendable efforts to create a single command on the Marne. He placed Kraewel's detachment under Marwitz and informed the latter that the 5th Cavalry Division was also to come under his command. Unfor-

tunately, the 5th Cavalry Division was not aware of the fact. In any case, no arrangements were made to co-operate with the 1st Cavalry Corps, nor to inform Richthofen that his 5th Division was being taken from him. It recalls a similar effort of the 1st Corps on the 7th to annex one of its neighbours' divisions.

But whether 5th Division was nominally under Marwitz's orders or not was only of academic interest, because he was completely out of touch with it, had no means of communication to it or to Kraewel except wireless, and the 5th Division evidently had little intention of obeying his orders even if it received them.

It should be recorded that the First Army did make one attempt to co-operate with the Second. It took the form of a wireless, which said "agree as to necessary measures for protection of the flank on the Marne." The Staff Officer at Second Army who received this scratched his head over it for some time, then wrote in the margin the two words "utterly incomprehensible" and took no action. Evidently the defence of the Marne did not interest the Second Army, which was much too preoccupied with its own difficulties.

Under such unpropitious circumstances Kraewel essayed the formidable task of holding up the advance of the victorious B.E.F. We will leave him studying the problem, in order to glance at the startling events that were happening at the other end of the gap.

SECOND ARMY, NIGHT OF 8TH/9TH

A local attack made by the French on Bulow's right flank in the touchy hour of dusk had caused a panic in the German 13th Division, resulting in a disorderly retreat through the night of nearly 10 miles. In their flight they carried with them a brigade of the 1st Cavalry Corps and two batteries. Dawn found them at Marigny; it also found the two brigades still remaining to Richthofen isolated for the second time in this battle. His position, as commander of a crack Cavalry Corps, was pitiable. One of his divisions had completely disappeared into the blue; a brigade of the other had done the

same, likewise two batteries; the infantry who should be on his left had also vanished. Thus he was left with only two brigades and one battery, isolated and without information or orders. One thing seemed clear: the 13th Division must have gone back—they could scarcely have gone forward—and Richthofen decided that the only course open to him was to follow suit. He therefore ordered the remnant of the Garde Division to Condé, and he sent a Staff officer in search of the errant 5th Division with orders to direct it via Chateau Thierry on to Courboin. The Garde Division reached Condé in safety and found their missing brigade 3 miles south-east of it, but the two batteries wandered about orderless throughout the day—a significant sign of the degree of disintegration and chaos that had set in.

Bulow's nerve had by now almost gone, and hearing at 10.45 a.m. that five columns of the B.E.F. were crossing the Marne, he ordered the whole Second Army to retreat. As showing the haste in which this order was drawn up, the 1st Cavalry Corps is not even mentioned in it. It was left entirely to its own devices. Richthofen decided to withdraw the Garde Corps to Dormans. He was still out of touch with his 5th Division. The latter had indeed tapped Bulow's wireless ordering the retreat, but considered itself "out of action."

Dormans was a good selection on the part of Richthofen, as the right wing of the army was making for Binson, 10 miles to the east of it. This move placed 30 miles between Bulow and the First Army fighting on the Ourcq. In this immense gap the only effective troops were the IIInd Cavalry Corps and Kraewel's detachment; worse than that, between Montreuil and Dormans (both exclusive) there were *no* troops capable of putting up an organised resistance, and into this gap were marching:—

		<i>Infantry Divisions</i>	<i>Cavalry Divisions</i>
French	5 (later 7)	3
British	3	2
Total	<hr/> 8 (later 10)	<hr/> 5

IIND CAVALRY CORPS

We left General von Marwitz ruminating over his task. To the south all was quiet, and, with the bridges all blown from Changis to La Ferté, he rightly considered that no immediate danger threatened there, and withdrew his mounted troops to Cocherel, leaving only his Jägers and an infantry battalion lent to him watching the river line. This showed not only good judgment but courage on the part of the Corps Commander. He also wirelessly the 5th Division to reconnoitre towards the line Nanteuil-Nogent. This was not at all to the liking of Ilseemann, who pretended not to understand it and asked under which army he was, adding "I am engaged at Marigny." This statement was startlingly untrue. At that moment (7 a.m.) there were no British troops within miles of Marigny.

KRAEWEL'S DETACHMENT

At about 7 a.m. our 5th Division having crossed the Marne unopposed, attacked Montreuil. This action being a purely infantry one does not concern us. Largely owing to the wooded nature of the country, Kraewel's six battalions held up the 5th Division till dusk, and the 3rd Division on its right—which might have turned Kraewel's flank and threatened his retreat—was stopped advancing by G.H.Q.

THE CENTRE OF THE GAP

The unfortunate 5th Cavalry Division spent the morning collecting its scattered units, like a covey of partridges collecting after a day's shooting. They had succeeded in doing this about 3 miles east of Marigny when, at 11 a.m., news reached them that the B.E.F. was crossing the Marne. This was too much for Ilseemann; though already 6 miles north of that river he promptly moved his division another 4 miles to the north. Pugens' comment on this is pungent: "The 5th Cavalry Division has but one idea, namely to escape towards the north and avoid all contact with the enemy, thus abandoning to their unhappy fate the parks and convoys of the IIIrd and IXth Corps, uncovering the rear of the First Army and definitely renouncing any effort to close the breach."

And he goes on to say: "What a magnificent chance for an enterprising allied cavalry. It is no exaggeration to say that the army of General von Kluck runs the risk of being completely cut off, and is heading for the gravest disaster. But on the side of the allies no Murat appears to inundate with cavalry the plateaux situated on the north of the Marne. Yet again does war consist of lost opportunities."

How come it that the opportunity was lost? Let us see.

At dawn on the 9th the B.E.F. had continued its advance. The 1st Cavalry Division went forward on the right, crossing the river at Azy, Nogent and Charly. The 3rd Cavalry Brigade behind the infantry on the left, had no scope for movement and indeed one of its regiments did not leave its billets till 3 p.m.

The 5th Cavalry Brigade received no orders from the 3rd, so the 1st Corps took it under its wing and it followed the 2nd Division. The 1st and IIInd Corps crossed the Marne unopposed, and at 11.30 a.m. the situation was as shown on map 2. The merest glance at this map will show what a favourable position it was in for carrying out Joffre's order for the 9th, namely to advance against the left and rear of the Germans on the Ourcq. What then prevented it? At this moment an airman reported "large hostile forces" to the north of Chateau Thierry.

In view of the fact that the French Cavalry on our right had not come up as ordered, it was not deemed prudent to advance any further till the intentions of this "hostile force" had become manifest. After a halt of four hours airmen reported "all clear" on the 1st Corps front, and so the advance was resumed. G.H.Q. orders for the 9th had enjoined that the enemy was to be attacked "wherever met," so that by waiting for the enemy to clear off before advancing, neither Joffre's nor French's orders were being very strictly adhered to. Joffre's orders involved a left wheel. Now, such a wheel would automatically expose our right flank to any enemy there might be in the gap. Therefore a certain amount of risk was inherent in the operation. This applies to nearly all turning movements; however much you extend the front, *someone* has

to be on the flank. On this occasion it should have been the French Cavalry, but as they were not up it might have been possible to switch our 2nd Cavalry Division over to the right flank, and assist our 1st Cavalry Division in protecting that flank. Actually the "large hostile forces" consisted of transport. Hostile transport often makes fools of us in war, just as spectators' cars do in peace manoeuvres. It is as well to ascertain from airmen who make reports in vague terms at what height they were flying; were they low enough to tell cannons from cookers? But if we were a trifle slow and cautious the French Fifth Army was very much more so. General Franchet d'Espèrey has been blamed for this. But it was hardly his fault, if one is to judge by his orders for the 9th, which seem admirable in every way.

"The enemy is in full retreat. Our troops must not allow themselves to be stopped by the resistance of rearguards which will sacrifice themselves in order to retard our march. The rearguards must be crushed by heavy artillery fire, turned by the infantry and pursued by the cavalry. Only a vigorous pursuit will enable us to gather the full results of the present situation."

Pugens suggests that one of the reasons for the "stickiness" of the French was that "the blow that had been inflicted upon them on the Sambre had remained engraven in their memory."

MARWITZ'S COUNTER-ATTACK

General von Marwitz was full of fight, and at 9.30 a.m. he ordered the 2nd and 5th Cavalry Divisions to drive the English across the Marne. But the 5th had already decamped in a northerly direction and the 2nd had just started cooking their dinners, and evinced no particular enthusiasm for the fight. Meanwhile decisions of moment were being made at First Army Headquarters. The optimistic Kluck was by this time thoroughly alarmed. He was aware that the B.E.F. had crossed the Marne and equally aware that there was a horrible gap in front of it. Evidently it was not safe to leave his left wing on the Oureq any longer.

He therefore decided, whilst continuing to attack with his right, to draw back his left. When the manœuvre was completed the First Army would thus be facing approximately south. This was the exact reverse of the manœuvre the Second Army was carrying out. By standing fast with its left and pulling back its right, it was beginning to face west !

In order to allow his left wing to fall back it was essential to prevent interference from the B.E.F., and Kluck very wisely ordered Marwitz to attack. Further, he allotted him for the purpose the 5th Infantry Division, which was in reserve behind the left wing. (Actually only six battalions were available, the remainder being dispersed).

Marwitz received this order at 12 noon. He had now a considerable force available to strike with, for his Cavalry Corps was concentrated, and three out of his four Jäger battalions had joined him (the 4th Battalion was still holding La Ferté and being heavily shelled from the south side of the river). Excluding the 5th Cavalry Division, it amounted to 6 cavalry brigades and 15 infantry battalions. General von Marwitz gave a quick glance at the map, and in the remarkably short time of 15 minutes he had got out his orders for a combined attack.

The pivot of the attack was to be Kraewel's detachment. The 5th Infantry Division was to attack on its left, and the 9th Cavalry Division on its right ; the 2nd Cavalry Division was to cover the right flank, and the phantom 5th Cavalry Division was to retard the British advance on the line Charly-Chateau Thierry. This order looks impressive on paper, but a stage is reached in battle when generals may order, but troops fail to carry out (Foch was experiencing this at the same moment, 40 miles to the east). The 9th Cavalry Division set about the unwelcome task with such deliberation that their attack took four hours to mount. (Like a dog that is called to heel for punishment they moved slowly and with numerous "half-halts"). The mission of the 2nd Division was simpler. They merely had to face south in their present position, which they did.

At 12.30 p.m. the 4th Jäger Battalion, having rendered splendid service in holding up the IIIrd Corps for 24 hours, evacuated La Ferté; it had only suffered 27 casualties in two days. Two hours later a hostile force was seen on the ridge 2 miles N.N.E. of La Ferté. Evidently the English 4th Division had crossed, and was advancing north. This was alarming news, because if this advance continued it would strike Marwitz's attack in flank. Two Jäger battalions were accordingly placed in position to defend this flank, and an attack that was about to be launched by a third, with good prospects of success, was cancelled. The attack that the 9th Cavalry Division was so deliberately preparing was also postponed.

And what was the cause of this setback to the German attack? Far from the 4th Division advancing, they had not even started to bridge the river.* What had happened was that the Essex, followed by the Lancashire Fusiliers, of the 12th Infantry Brigade had managed to cross by a weir 2 miles to the north-east of La Ferté, and climbing to the top of the ridge halted there for the remainder of the day. The official account does not explain why they did not move on. However, their mere presence stationary was enough, as we have seen, to hold up Marwitz's southern attack.

Meanwhile the 5th Infantry Division was advancing through Dhuizy, making for Marigny. But Kraewel was hard pressed and begged for help. Instead of continuing on towards Marigny, therefore, it diverted one battalion to Montreuil. This battalion made a successful attack on the D.C.L.I. of the 5th Division and drove them back. The remainder of the German 5th were preparing to follow up this attack when more alarming news was received, this time from the left. English troops were reported south of Marigny. This news reached the Commander of the 5th Division as he was sitting in Dhuizy, having just been wounded by a British shell. Under these circumstances he might be excused for having a shaky nerve. At any rate, he immediately called off the attack his division was about to make, and resumed his march towards Marigny. Thus for the

* It was started at 5.45 p.m. and finished at 6.30 a.m. on the 10th. (See the excellent account in the R.E. Journal, Jan., 1934).

second time that afternoon an attack was called off just when it was on the point of being delivered, and as the result of misleading information. (Both sides suffered from the results of misleading information on this critical day). On this occasion the true situation was that a standing patrol sent out from the 3rd Division had been sighted; the division itself was 2 miles further south, where it had been halted ever since morning, and apparently had no intention of advancing further. So no real danger threatened. This division had a fairly quiet day on 9th September, and a German patrol reported that it could see British Tommies engaged on milking cows as they stood at pasture.

At the moment that the 5th Division was called out of the fight the 9th Cavalry Division was on the point of entering it. Only the lightest touch was, however, gained, and British artillery fire sufficed to bring the cavalry to a standstill.

During this encounter Marwitz received from the First Army the order for a general retirement. For a long time he refused to believe it, but when it was confirmed and he was given the mission of covering the retreat with his own corps and the 5th Infantry Division, he decided very rightly that this could best be accomplished by a counter-attack. He therefore ordered the 5th Division to attack the enemy reported south of Marigny, while the 9th Cavalry Division was to draw out of the fight and extend the line to the north of the infantry. This would be a complicated manœuvre for the tired 9th Division to carry out, but scarcely had it been issued than it was cancelled. British columns were reported advancing from Chateau Thierry towards Bussiares, whence they would threaten Marwitz's left. This report was utterly untrue. No British force was advancing at that moment; most of them were preparing to go into billets. For the third time false information was doing Marwitz a bad turn, and for the third time an attack was cancelled at the last minute.

The retirement was carried out in the utmost confusion. The Cavalry Corps collected in Cocherel, and at 7.30 p.m. resumed the retreat towards the north. A few miles further

on, at Coulombs, they bumped into the 3rd Infantry Division. The congestion became inextricable. Marwitz, himself, who happened to be passing through the village, tried in vain to sort it out. To add to the confusion, the 5th Infantry Division—who had received no orders at all—were endeavouring, on their own, also to retreat through Coulombs. A few British shells would have had a rich bag.

At 11 p.m. Marwitz, the cavalryman, orders the unfortunate infantry division to cover the retreat of the horsemen. But quite different and more acceptable, orders arrive simultaneously from the IXth Corps Commander. Marwitz's order is disregarded, and the 5th Infantry Division goes off in search of its own corps.

Kraewel also had received no orders for some time, but though he saw troops on both sides of him retiring he resolved to hold on. As night fell the order for retreat reached him, and under cover of darkness he broke off contact without difficulty or detection and joined in the general retreat.

Meanwhile the cavalry remained stuck fast in Coulombs. There was a complete breakdown of rations, and all the troopers could do was to lie down beside their horses holding the reins. At length, at 3 a.m., the retreat was continued, and by dawn the bulk of the Cavalry Corps was north of Gandelu, in an extreme state of moral and physical depression. They were no longer in a condition to put up an organised resistance to attack; but that did not really matter—there was no danger of attack, the enemy was nearly 10 miles away.

5TH CAVALRY DIVISION

We left this division retiring north. It was receiving orders at intervals from both corps and obeying neither. At 11 a.m., in response to a twice-repeated order from 1st Corps, it turned south-east towards Chateau Thierry, but slowly. "No one was burning to regain contact with the enemy." On reaching Etrepilly enemy patrols were reported to the south. This report was incorrect, but it resulted in a long halt. But nothing happened. The enemy opposite them was also sitting still as we have seen.



MONTREUIL (the roofs of which are visible in the centre) FRON LE LIMON. Whence our 5th Division attacked. The attack by the German 9th Cavalry Division crossed the fairly open ground on the skyline on the left.



THE MONTREUIL ENGAGEMENT, from LUZANCY (S. of the Marne) looking North.
Our 5th Division attacked from the ridge on the Right,

German 9th Cavalry Division attacked from the ridge on the Left.

MONTREUIL itself is just over the skyline in the exact centre of the photo. The village on the Left is MOITIÉBARD.

A 10x10 grid of dots forming the number 10. The '1' is formed by a single vertical column of dots in the 4th column from the left. The '0' is formed by a ring of dots in the 5th to 6th columns from the left, with the top and bottom rows of the ring being complete, and the middle four rows having dots in the 5th and 6th columns only.

At 2.30 p.m. the march was continued. Ten minutes later a report that French Cavalry were advancing south of Chateau Thierry caused General Ilseman to halt again. The French Cavalry did the same ! Eventually the French entered Chateau Thierry and went into billets on the north side, and Ilseman turned in his tracks and bolted to the north.

At about the same time (4.30 p.m.) Ilseman received a truly astonishing order from Ist Cavalry Corps : " The Garde Division is going north of Dormans. The 5th Cavalry Division will remain, according to circumstances, in the region of Chateau Thierry or at Crezancy. If it is free to do so it will go into billets south of the Marne, at the same time keeping open the river crossings for to-morrow." In other words : " The Garde Division is taking refuge north of the Marne, while you are to stand south of that river, between the Garde Division and the enemy."

But the order was couched in vague and conditional terms, which gave a half-hearted commander ample scope to evade its conditions. This Ilseman was quick to do. Instead of moving south, he retreated further to the north-east, to Beuvarde.

Pugens, after recording the flittings of this " phantom " division, goes on to say : " However, the strange comings and goings of the 5th Cavalry Division have induced the allies to halt on the line Chateau Thierry-Montreuil at the moment when they were gaining a fugitive contact. The sole presence of the wandering cavaliers of the 5th Cavalry Division have awakened in the French and English a feeling of exaggerated prudence, at a moment when the general situation, justifying great boldness, ought to have dictated to them a course of action, even rash, but fruitful in decisive results."

THE FRENCH CAVALRY

The advance of the French Cavalry on the 9th was as slow and cautious as on the previous days, and Pugens is severer in his comments than our official account : " The role played by the 4th Cavalry Division was practically nil. Instead of

fulfilling its mission and gaining as rapidly as possible the plateau near Etrepilly, it had, throughout the afternoon hesitated to push on freely towards the north, at no single moment was it in a position to make its presence felt." At 5 p.m., the enemy having disappeared, "it had but one idea, namely to go into billets." At the same moment, according to this delightful writer, their opposite number, the 5th Cavalry Division, also "had but one idea, namely to reach billets in a zone free from the investigations of the enemy," which it did by hiding itself in the middle of the forest.

CONCLUSION

Colonel Pugens and the notorious German Military Professor Banse are agreed in this that the allies missed a great opportunity of smashing the German First Army on the Marne. Banse's criticism is directed more particularly against us: "The aggressive spirit is not highly developed in the English. Their slowness at the Marne, where the English Army might have landed the German right in Queer Street by a rapid and resolute thrust between the First and Second German Armies, shows this."

And Pugens embraces both armies in the following pungent criticism: "It is remarkable to note how the allies seized on every excuse that offered to avoid committing themselves, and how frequently they endeavoured to temporise and to avoid any decisive action."


Are the strictures of these two critics justified in our case? If they are, the battle may be taken as an illustration of the truth of General Wolfe's dictum: "Experience shows me that in war something must be allowed to chance and fortune, seeing that it is in its nature hazardous and an option of difficulties, that the greatness of an object should come under consideration as opposed to the impediments that lie in the way, and that in particular circumstances the loss of a thousand men is rather an advantage than otherwise."

Or to put it rather more crisply, in Mr. Winston Churchill's words: "'Safety first' may be a good motto in politics, but it is a bad one in war."

BER 6TH 6-30 P.M.

Map 1.

Beuvarde



HUNTING IN AUSTRALIA

By CAPTAIN A. H. GIBSON.

Unattached List : Australian Light Horse

MANY of those who live in a hunting country and spend the happiest days of their lives hunting the fox in it, no doubt from time to time delve into the pages of the invaluable Baily's Hunting Directory.

The more insular will perhaps skip from the foremost pages concerning Foxhounds and Harriers in the United Kingdom to those at the back devoted to Foxhound Sales and Point-to-Point Steeplechases.

Those, however, who venture past the stiff green pages containing enticing advertisements of hunting boots and modern stable fittings, arrive immediately in foreign parts, and in imagination may proceed on a sporting tour eastward and to the South.

Hamburg, Berlin, Amersfoort, Pau, Milan, Rome will all have entertained our Mr. Sponge, and he may board his Orient liner at Naples, and proceed ever Eastward and Southward—across the equator to Colombo, where he must resist the lure of the Errebodde Hunt Club and the jackal, and continue for a further 10 days until he first touches the "Last Continent," at Perth, Western Australia. Perhaps he will be lucky enough to arrive on a Saturday morning and be able to follow hounds with the W.A. Hunt Club—hunting wallaby, galloping through scrub within two or three miles of the Perth General Post Office—and Perth is a city of over 200,000 inhabitants! The quarry and the country he will find unorthodox, but he will enjoy the sport.

Another 1,400 miles eastward will bring him to South Australia, where the veteran Adelaide Hunt Club will show

him sport. The Adelaide was established in 1869 and has hunted every winter since. Unfortunately here he will first encounter wire, the bugbear of all Australian hunting folk, and although foxes are plentiful, the country is so enclosed and earths are so numerous that he will find that normally a drag is laid. Leaving Adelaide a further 500 mile journey will bring the traveller to Melbourne, Victoria—the centre of fox-hunting in Australia, where four excellent packs will give him hunting six days a week from the end of May to the middle of September.

The Clubs in seniority are the Melbourne, established in 1854; Findon Harriers', 1872; Oaklands, 1888; and Yarra Glen and Lilydale. With the exception of the Melbourne, which hunt only fox, all clubs hunt fox and hare.

The country hunted by the four clubs lies roughly in a circle around Melbourne fifteen to thirty miles from the centre of the city.

The Findon and Oaklands country is open plain, north of Melbourne, mainly grazing and sparse crops.

It is characterized by several outcroppings of volcanic rocks which, whilst providing numerous hares, are not without risk to horse flesh. Stone walls and rail fences, provide ample jumping, and wire enclosed paddocks are suitably capped in places.

The Melbourne has valley and marsh country with ditches, post and rail, and five strand wire inset with panels. This is good going country with numerous foxes but is liable to extreme boggiess in wet weather. The 1931 Season for the Melbourne was completely spoilt by an excessively rainy winter.

The Yarra Glen and Lilydale possess beautiful rolling open country crossed by three rail post and rail fences 3 ft. 6 in. to 4 ft. high, and rising away to mountains on three sides.

Generally speaking all areas hunted are small in comparison to England, mainly due to the general use of wire for fencing, and the expense to the clubs of panelling such wire.

The first establishment of hunting in Victoria is due to the Watson family from Ireland who, in 1854, first imported English hounds with the dual purpose of hunting deer and pro-



FINDON HARRIERS HUNT CLUB
Proceeding to draw first covert, 1933.
Woolert, Victoria.



FINDON HARRIERS.

The First Jump of the Opening Meet. Epping, Victoria, 1933.



**Fox "Tree'd" in large gum tree.
Melbourne Hunt Club.
Cranbourne, Victoria.**



**Typical Post and Rail Fence.
Melbourne Hunt Club Country.
Cranbourne, Victoria.**

tecting their sheep from marauding dingos or wild dogs! Mr. George Watson was master of the Melbourne for over fifty years—until 1906. He was a magnificent steeplechase rider, and came of an old hunting family. At the same time his father was master of the Carlow, and his nephew John Watson, master of the Meath.

Records of entry of puppies date from 1882, and record importations in 1888 from the Duke of Buccleuch's and in 1892 from the Grafton—since then there have been regular importations of purely English Fox hounds until 1930 when the Welsh strain was introduced into the pack by importations from the Lady Curre's and Penylan. There is a distinct tendency for hounds to become rakish when local breeding is not supported by imported strains.

Every effort is made to breed on recognised lines, and kennel management and routine is similar to best English practice. The Kennels are a copy of Beckford's standard. Puppy walking is extensively practiced. Pups are weaned and enter the pack at fifteen months, and begin cub hunting at sixteen months.

The Findon Harriers were first conducted as a private pack in 1872 by the late Sir Edward Miller. At first they were hunted in conjunction with a pack of beagles kept by a former Chancellor of the University of Melbourne—later they were transferred to the famous Redleap stables at Mill Park, from where they have hunted ever since. Redleap who was owned by the Miller family was one of Australia's most famous steeplechasers and won the Grand National in 1889. In 1898 the family agreed to the formation of the Findon Harriers Hunt Club, as a subscription pack, but a Miller was still master until 1930, when Mr. Hubert Miller, master for 37 years, was killed at the last fence of the last run of the season.

Daryl Lindsay's painting "The Findon Hunt" was exhibited at the 1933 Royal Academy, and was chosen as the cover plate for the Christmas number that year of the "Sporting and Dramatic News."

Whilst hunting has been popular in Victoria for nearly eighty years, there is not the same tradition in the country

hunted over as exists in England or Ireland. With the exception of the minority who hunt, the small land owner is somewhat lacking in sympathy, although tactful handling by the Masters and Committees smooth away many difficulties. Fields are smaller than England—a maximum field in Australia would perhaps total a hundred. Pace is much the same as over similar country in England. The traditions regarding dress are not upheld to the same extent. Excluding hunt servants probably not more than an eighth of the field will sport the pink.

Financing of the clubs is done partly by donations, and subscriptions—which are extremely low in comparison with England, and there is no capping. The main funds are obtained from four race meetings held each year by the combined hunt clubs. The race-course which is privately owned is lent to the clubs, which put up expenses, and pool profits.


Whilst horses are kept at the respective kennels, the majority of hunting folk keep their horses in stables close to the city, and transport them by either train or motor-float to the place of meeting on respective hunting days.

In comparison with England, hunters are cheap. Fifty to sixty guineas will normally secure a good sort of a horse, but this cheapness in price is balanced by a lack of manners and schooling in the average Australian hunter and the cost of educating is high. In England a hunter can jump, has manners,, and is schooled. In Australia a hunter can jump, the manners and schooling must come from the owner if he has the time and knowledge.

Unfortunately there has been a change in the type of horse available in Australia. The old type of hunter has practically gone. To-day the speed is better, but the substance and the stamina have deteriorated. The South African and Great Wars made for high prices; and took away most of those that had substance and bone. Weedy mares were left, and the consequent deterioration in blood has been hard to make up, although latterly better demand from India and Java, coupled with local demand have again tendered to turn the thoughts of breeders from speed to stamina once more.

But now our hunting traveller has reached the half way mark around the world, and his thoughts will again turn homewards. He may, before he goes, cross Bass Strait to the Apple Isle, Tasmania, and join the Midlands Hunt Club in pursuit of Master Reynard. Yet should he halt a little longer to cross the walls and hawthorn hedges of Van Dieman's Land, he will no doubt wait until early November, and join the massed thousands, packed tier upon tier in the stands and blackening the green lawns, roaring for their favourites as the mass of bright colours and glistening horse flesh thuds down the straight to tell the story of yet another Melbourne Cup Race.

But now the thoughts of crisp winter days in English shires will be too strong, and so our traveller will hurry eastwards and homewards, across America. And unless he finds himself caught in the hospitality of Virginian hunting folk, he will soon be once again in his familiar country side, with memories of unfamiliar countries and places but familiar traditions and habits, that make fox hunting world-wide, and hunting folk a universal brotherhood.



MOBILE WARFARE, 1648 AND 1934

By MAJOR A. L. PEMBERTON, M.C., R.A.

THERE is nothing so satisfying to the student of military history as a genuine "lightning campaign," in which hostilities arise, armies are set in motion, and a decisive combat is waged, all within the space of a few weeks. For, in a campaign of this nature, there is no time for diplomatic or economic complications to set in and obscure the picture. Some simple, yet vital, issue is at stake; a few simple but rapid manœuvres have to be made; and then the fatal blow is struck. A miniature war has been staged in which the doctrines of F.S.R. are revealed at a glance.

Such a campaign was that waged by Cromwell against the Scottish Royalists in 1648. Indeed, this short and little discussed operation of Cromwell's is not only an epitome of war; it has a peculiar interest for the British Army of to-day in that it represents the conflict between a small but highly trained professional army and the much more numerous but less efficient forces of a second-class power; a conflict in which the final victory was due almost entirely to a skilful use of the factors of mobility and surprise.

We have to-day something in the nature of a New Model Army; not in spirit perhaps, but in armoured mobility and striking power. It is, therefore, worth our while to consider how a modern Cromwell might employ this New Model against a twentieth century edition of the Duke of Hamilton's "Engagers." In the following pages an attempt will be made to draw a comparison between the Preston Campaign of 1648 and the same campaign as it might work out amid the conditions of 1934; the course of the latter being determined not merely by the writer's imagination, but by the results of a war game in

which he was recently privileged to take part, and in which the general and special ideas were essentially a replica of the situation that confronted Cromwell and the Duke of Hamilton on the 3rd of August, 1648; but so disguised that the analogy was not apparent to any of the players.

Now a commander, when engaged upon an operation of this nature, is faced with three important problems:—

- (1) To find the enemy.
- (2) To concentrate his own forces as rapidly as possible for the delivery of the knock-out blow.
- (3) To maintain control of his own forces in such a way as to ensure the effective exploitation of any initial success.

First, then, let us consider how Cromwell coped with these problems in 1648.*

The situation at the commencement of hostilities was roughly as follows:—In England, the Royalist Party, though beaten in the field, was still powerful and ready at any moment to rise again; the Presbyterian Party, predominant in Parliament and led by London City, the "Purse-bearer of the Cause," was actually in negotiation with the King; while the Army, already much reduced in strength by disbandment, was still further weakened by the presence in its midst of a Republican or Levelling Party that undermined discipline by questioning the authority of its leaders. In Scotland, the Royalists under the Duke of Hamilton had gained control of the civil government and were preparing an army of some 40,000 men for the invasion of England, in conjunction with some Scottish regulars whom they expected to be able to bring over from Ireland.

About the middle of May insurrections broke out in Kent and Essex; Pembroke Castle was seized in the King's name, and shortly afterwards the whole of Wales, influenced by the news of the Scottish army, broke into open revolt. At this juncture Cromwell, with a portion of the Army, was ordered into Wales, while Fairfax, with the remainder, dealt with the risings in Essex and Kent. Till these disturbances had been quelled, a small force of cavalry under Lambert, assisted by

* An interesting account of the Preston Campaign is to be found in Lieut.-Colonel T. S. Baldock's "Cromwell as a Soldier," Chapter xviii and xix. Another appeared in the "Army Quarterly" for Oct., 1933.

the local levies of Yorkshire and Lancashire, was all that could be spared to watch the Scottish border. Royalist partisans were numerous in Westmoreland and Cumberland, a Royalist garrison held Pontefract, and Manchester was suspected of Royalist sympathies.

Fortunately for the Parliament, however, it was able, thanks to its liaison with the Scottish Kirk Party headed by the Earl of Argyll, to obstruct and delay the preparations of the Scottish Royalists. Armed risings of Covenanters occurred in Glasgow and the south-west, and the concentration of Hamilton's army at Annan was still far from complete when the precipitate action of the Northern English Royalists under Langdale and Musgrave forced the hand of the Scottish Government.

These two leaders had raised a body of some 3,000 levies, captured Berwick and Carlisle, and advanced into Yorkshire, but were soon driven back by Lambert to Carlisle. In answer to their appeals for assistance, Hamilton entered England on the 8th July with only 10,000 men, marching slowly so as to allow time for his reinforcements to come up.

On the 11th July, Cromwell broke the back of the rebellion in Wales by the capture of Pembroke Castle, and, as Fairfax was still busy with the siege of Colchester, and was, in any case, urgently required for the defence of London, Cromwell was ordered to move with all possible haste to meet the threat from the north. Part of his cavalry had already been sent on on the 25th June, in reply to Lambert's call for help, and on the 14th July he followed with the remainder of his force, though his foot were destitute of shoes, stockings and money. On the 3rd August he reached Nottingham, whence he got into touch with Lambert and practically assumed control of the operations.

At this point, then, it will be interesting to see what Cromwell's plan was and what steps he took to solve the three main problems mentioned above.

Thanks to Lambert, he had been kept well informed of the enemy's movements since they had passed Carlisle. Spies had visited their army daily and had brought back intelligence of their "numbers, as near as could be computed, and their

postures and demeanours.”* On the 19th July, Appleby was reported to be occupied by enemy cavalry, and it soon became apparent that the main advance of the Royalists was being made via the west coast, through Westmoreland and Lancashire.

In the meantime, however, Cromwell had felt obliged to proceed with the concentration of his own widely scattered forces, and for this reason he had already made his preliminary appreciation and plan. His appreciation was, as a matter of fact, wrong; for he had thought that Hamilton would take the Yorkshire route; but, in selecting Knaresborough for his point of junction with Lambert, he had left himself free to deal with an advance from either side of England.

Having made up his mind, Cromwell acted with his usual vigour and thoroughness. He re-equipped his foot with new boots at Leicester on their way north, and an artillery train, hastily collected at his request and despatched by sea to Hull, joined the column at Doncaster. Everything that could be done to increase the mobility and striking power of his force was done.

He had, moreover, taken good care to conceal from his opponent the strength and direction of the blow that he was preparing to deliver. The cavalry that he had sent on ahead from Pembroke moved via Chester, partly in response to an appeal for reinforcements from the governor there, but also to act as a screen to the movements of the main body, which he took across the Midlands. And the instructions that he gave to Lambert on his arrival at Nottingham show a similar intentness upon the preservation of secrecy. Lambert, then at Barnard Castle, was ordered to “forbear fighting” until he came, and to show only single horsemen at a time so as not to disclose the fact that he had been reinforced.

Cromwell was, in fact, determined not to prejudice his chances of a decisive victory by the premature commitment of his mobile arm; and, in order to make his control of the operation more certain, he himself joined the advanced guard on the 12th August, the day of his union with Lambert at Knaresborough, and remained there until after the battle had been joined.

* Taken from the “Memoirs” of Captain John Hodgson.

By this time it was clear that the Royalists were taking the Lancashire route, and Cromwell probably also knew that they were marching in three columns with an interval of a day's march between each. Now was his chance to swoop down upon their flank and defeat these three detachments in detail. It would mean leaving behind his artillery, which even his energy and resourcefulness were unlikely to force through the passes of the Pennines, impaired as they were by the rain that had fallen almost incessantly throughout the summer. It would also mean sacrificing the mobility of his cavalry amid the enclosed and boggy country of Lancashire. But Cromwell never hesitated; mobility was to him no fetish; it had served its purpose by helping to create his opportunity; now it must yield pride of place to discipline and striking power. So on the 13th August he set out to cross the hills, and on the 16th he reached Hodder Bridge, where he became aware that Hamilton had reached Preston with his main body, that his cavalry were already south of the Ribble, but that the rear guard under Monro was still far behind.

Again Cromwell had to make a rapid appreciation of the situation. Was he to play for safety, himself keep south of the Ribble, and aim merely at heading off the Scots' advance? Or was he boldly to cross the river, risk the loss of his only avenue of retreat, and stake all upon a single throw? The problem was weighty enough to induce Cromwell to summon a council of war, but the result, with a man of his iron determination, must have been practically a foregone conclusion. Relying upon the excellence of his information, and anxious not to lose the advantage of surprise, he chose the bolder course, and, in the early hours of the 17th August, fell upon Langdale's detachment on the eastern outskirts of Preston.

For some hours Langdale defended himself with skill and determination, but, as the day wore on and the assistance that he had demanded was not forthcoming, he was forced to give way, and, under the continuous pressure of superior forces, retreat quickly developed into a rout. Mobility now once more came into its own, but no one knew better than Cromwell that mobility, to be effective, must be controlled. So, leaving a

detachment to guard the 4,000 prisoners that had been taken at Preston, he set off in hot pursuit of the Scottish foot, which he overtook and routed at Winwick (3 miles north of Warrington) the following evening. Then, leaving the pursuit of the Scottish cavalry under Hamilton to Lambert and the local levies, he himself turned north again to deal with Monro. The latter, realising the uselessness of continuing the struggle, retired before him and successfully made his way back into Scotland.

With this exception Cromwell's victory had been complete. Hamilton surrendered to Lambert at Uttoxeter on the 25th August, and on the 17th September, Cromwell and Lambert joined forces at Chiswick. The Scottish invasion of England was no more, and on the 19th September Cromwell crossed into Scotland with three regiments of horse in answer to a request for help from Argyll.

* * * * *

Such was mobile warfare at its best in the 17th century. Now let us turn to our imaginary campaign of the 20th century.

The opening situation, as given in the war game referred to above, was briefly as follows. England, a poorly developed agricultural and pastoral country under the protection of Redland (a Great Power situated several thousands of miles away) had rebelled against its Redland rulers. Outbreaks had occurred in Wales and Kent, a party of northern insurgents had surprised and captured York, and the situation of the Redland army of occupation was similar to that of the Parliamentary forces in July, 1648. The three divisions of which this army was composed were employed—one (the 13th Division) in Wales and two round London—in quelling the insurrections, while the 1st Cavalry Brigade and a brigade of English levies were left to watch the Northern frontier, where further trouble was known to be brewing. Scotland and Ireland, two independent states of uncertain political stability, and with armies of second-rate efficiency, had combined to take advantage of Redland's difficulties, and had assembled a corps of three divisions (the 1st and 2nd Scottish Divisions about Annan, and the 1st Irish Division in transports at Belfast) and one cavalry brigade for the invasion of England.

By the 3rd March, when this invasion began, the 13th Redland Division had completed the subjection of Wales and had reached Nottingham on its march northwards; one of its brigades—the 39th—having already been sent on to deal with the rebels in York. That afternoon its commander was visited by the C.G.S. from London, who explained that the political situation round the capital was serious, placed all the available troops at his disposal, and urged that the invading force should be met and defeated at the earliest possible moment.

The armoured force, which had been collecting at Nottingham, consisted of one light and one medium tank brigade. The medium artillery brigade and the army field brigade were being sent by sea to Grimsby, where they were expected to arrive on the 5th March; and sufficient M.T. had been collected to supply the force across the gap that lay between the Redland and Scottish railheads.

On receipt of these instructions Cromwell—we will, for the sake of simplicity, retain the names of the principal actors in the drama as they were in 1648—at once set about improving his knowledge regarding the enemy. Extensive use was made of Lambert's armoured car regiment from Barnard Castle, but the information thus obtained was meagre, owing to the interference of enemy cars and road blocks. Air reconnaissances were also employed to search for the landing place of the Irish division, but owing partly to the distance that separated the opposing armies (over 100 miles on the 3rd March), and partly to a misinterpretation of the instructions issued to the Redland air force, this division was not located until the 8th March, by which time it had passed Kendal.

The intelligence situation was, in fact, distinctly less favourable than it had been three centuries earlier. The only real consolation lay in the absence of air activity on the part of the enemy. Neither Scotland nor Ireland could boast of a military air force, and the Duke of Hamilton had, therefore, to be content with the services of twelve picked civilian pilots of the Renfrew Light Aeroplane Club, whose machines had a very limited performance.

One thing, however, was certain; Lambert must be reinforced as soon as possible. So Cromwell sent up his armoured force, accompanied by a field company carrying extra explosives for demolitions, to Skipton, where it was timed to arrive on the 5th March. As in 1648, however, he had no intention of employing this force prematurely and thus abandoning the possibility of effecting a surprise. His idea was to delay the enemy's advance as much as possible with Lambert's cavalry brigade and the English infantry brigade from Durham, while the armoured force lay in wait about Skipton, and the 13th Division hurried northwards. Regarding the unmetalled road from Penrith to Barnard Castle as incapable of sustaining the movement of any appreciable force, he ordered Lambert to move during the night 3-4 March to Hexham, where he was to be joined by the 1st English Infantry Brigade, marching via Newcastle. Thence he was to delay the Scottish force if it attempted to advance eastwards from Carlisle, or threaten its flank if it advanced southwards. Meanwhile, the 39th Infantry Brigade was to attempt a *coup de main* against York, and, if this failed, it was to be relieved there by the 2nd English Infantry Brigade from Lincoln in time for it to rejoin the main body of the division, which was expected to be in the Leeds area on the 7th March.

Thus, had everything gone according to plan, the concentration of the Redland forces would have been completed on or about the 8th March in an area, and with a secrecy, akin to those of 1648. Fate, however, decreed otherwise, and in order to understand what happened it is necessary to consider for a moment what had been going on in the opposing camp.

The Duke of Hamilton, appreciating the advantage of moving on a broad front when threatened by armoured forces, and wishing to ease the strain on the main roads during his move across the railless territory, decided to transfer the 2nd Scottish Division (Langdale, let us suppose) by M.T. from Dumfries to Newcastle. This move was to take place on the 4th March, and on arrival at Newcastle, the 2nd Division was to operate from a railhead at Berwick. The Irish Division (Monro) was to disembark at Whitehaven on the 5th, and the subsequent advance of the whole force was to be made as follows :

Monro, on the right, via Keswick—Kendal.

Hamilton, in the centre, via Penrith—Barnard Castle—Richmond.

Langdale, on the left, via Newcastle—Darlington.

The result of these orders was to bring Lambert and Langdale into conflict just west of Hexham on the 4th March. Langdale was forced to debus, but, having done so, experienced no difficulty in sweeping aside Lambert's cavalry and the English infantry brigade, which were thus left in the air with large hostile forces hurrying round both their flanks. Hamilton, realizing this, ordered his own cavalry brigade to make a dash for Barnard Castle the next day with the idea of intercepting their retreat; and Cromwell was forced to use two of his light tank battalions and the army field brigade (which had been hastened up from Grimsby) to hold off the Scottish cavalry while Lambert made good his withdrawal.

By the evening of the 8th March the location of the opposing forces was as shown in Appendix "A." Cromwell, at last aware of Monro's movements, ordered Lambert back to Richmond, and concentrated his armoured force at Leyburn during the night 8-9 March. Meanwhile Hamilton pressed on, and by dusk on the 9th had seized the crossings over the Swale about Richmond. Langdale, delayed by enemy demolitions in the Darlington area, was still about the line of the Tees. Monro reached Settle.

Everything now depended on Hamilton's plans for the 10th. If he and Langdale continued their rush southwards, there was still time for Cromwell to attack with his whole force and win a decisive victory before Monro could come up. In any case, an offensive against Monro in the difficult country round Skipton seemed out of the question. So Cromwell moved his armoured force to the Bedale area during the night 9-10 March, ordered Lambert's now much exhausted cavalry brigade to move from Leyburn to Skipton on the 10th, and delay Monro's advance, and hoped for the best.

Hamilton, however, was too wary a soldier to be caught in this way. Aware of the presence of hostile tanks, and realizing the value of the Tees and Swale as tank obstacles, he assumed the defensive with his two Scottish divisions about Richmond

and Darlington, while Monro closed in from the west. His plan was now to entice Cromwell into the gap between himself and Langdale, and then to strike his left flank with Monro's Irish division. It seemed indeed as if Cromwell's only hope was to push boldly into the trap that had been laid for him, and to trust to his superior discipline and to his armoured force to give him the victory.

* * * * *

Here the war game came, unavoidably, to an end. A tactical exercise with troops on the ground might have carried the operations a stage further and produced some interesting lessons, but nothing short of an actual battle could determine upon whose brow the laurel wreath should rest. As it stands, however, the exercise affords material enough for an interesting comparison with the campaign of 1648.

Note first the difference in the Scottish plans on the two occasions. In 1648, subsistence problems arising out of the custom of living on the country, and the friction between the English and Scottish contingents, led to a longitudinal dispersion into three columns at intervals of a day's march; in our imaginary campaign of to-day, fear of a possible tank attack, and the desire to ease the strain on the roads during the advance across the railless territory, led to a lateral dispersion into three more or less converging columns.

It is probable that in the future this lateral dispersion will become normal during the phase of concentration, and if it does, the task of finding and keeping touch with the enemy will become more difficult. We have seen how the Redland aeroplanes failed to locate the Irish division until four days after it had landed, and how the action of the armoured cars was hampered by enemy cars and road blocks. It is true that the efficacy of the road block is largely a matter of guesswork, and will diminish as the cross-country capacity of the armoured car increases; but what experience we have seems to show that the collection of information is going to be no easy matter.

It is not that the armies of to-day move any quicker than those of Cromwell's time. The modern cultivation of mobility has hardly affected the rate of movement of the infantry division.

It has, however, greatly increased the radius of action and delaying power of protective detachments, and has thus increased the difficulty of discovering the enemy dispositions in detail. The aeroplane may, in favourable weather conditions, detect the movement of hostile columns from the moment they leave their mobilization stations, but the information thus obtained will be of a general nature, and must, as the campaign proceeds, "be supported by reconnaissance carried out by the army."*

Now if we consider the present scarcity of mobile units, and the variety of calls that are likely to be made upon them, we shall see the importance of conserving their powers to the greatest possible extent; and this will necessitate a careful co-ordination of the action of the three principal means of reconnaissance—aircraft, armoured cars and cavalry. The first thing to be done is to ensure that the airman, whose field of investigation—already vast—is still increasing, is enabled to conduct his search intelligently. For this reason he must be told not only "the general area which is to be observed," but also "the intention of the commander issuing the instructions."† At present there is a tendency towards excessive formality in the framing of orders and instructions; one of the many undesirable legacies, we believe, of trench warfare, which too often hampers the initiative of the recipient. In mobile warfare reconnoitring officers, and particularly air observers, must look at the country as far as possible from the commander's point of view, and be prepared to follow up at once any clue that may lead to the discovery of vital information.

Nor must this act of following up the clue be left entirely to the airman. Detailed investigation is the duty of ground troops, and it is the business of the armoured car in particular to supplement and confirm information received from the air.‡ If, as is probable, the air observer is the first to locate the hostile forces, he will indicate their position and direction of movement to the armoured cars, who will then be responsible for keeping these forces under observation.

* See "F.S.R.," Vol. II, Sec. 30-3.

† See "Cavalry Training," Vol. II, Sec. 91-7.

‡ See "Armoured Car Training," Vol. II, Sec. 4-2.

Even the most careful co-ordination of effort, however, will not always guarantee to the force commander the information that he requires. He must be prepared for failures and omissions in his preliminary reconnaissances, and he will, if he is wise, keep something up his sleeve for the last minute discovery of information that is vital to his plan. For this purpose the armoured car again appears eminently suitable; it has considerable speed and a wide circuit of action, and, if equipped with wireless or assisted by aircraft in the transmission of information, should be capable of clearing up a doubtful point at very short notice.

The part played by cavalry in the collection of information has, of course, changed considerably during the last half century. The work that Lambert's horsemen had to do in 1648 is now shared between aeroplane, armoured car and cavalry, and the role of the latter is confined to "duties requiring dispersion and the detailed examination of ground."* It is, therefore, not easy to illustrate amid the conditions of a war game; but this is no reason for belittling its importance. In point of fact, the cavalryman—as a link between the slow-moving infantryman, the fast-moving armoured car, and the still faster moving aeroplane—is as important to-day as ever he was. And, as this exercise proves, he may still exert a decisive influence upon the course of a campaign by action other than reconnaissance. Had it not been been for the Scottish cavalry brigade's dash on Barnard Castle Lambert would not have been threatened with separation from his main body, Cromwell would not have been forced to the premature commitment of his tanks, and the blow against Hamilton might have been struck with considerably more secrecy and despatch—perhaps even before he had had time, and warning, to settle down his two Scottish divisions in tank proof localities behind the Tees and Swale. How fitting that in an exercise designed and conducted under the spell of a great Cromwellian tradition, this distinction should have fallen upon an arm so closely and gloriously associated with the immortal Oliver!

Passing now to the second main problem of the "lightning campaign," that of concentrating one's strength for the delivery

* See "Cavalry Training," Vol. II, Sec. 2-2.

of the knock-out blow, we see the difficulty to-day of maintaining control over widely scattered and rapidly moving forces engaged on a single tactical operation. In 1648, it will be remembered, Cromwell was careful to get his whole force concentrated before allowing himself, or Lambert, to become involved in any serious fighting. In our imaginary modern campaign, however, Lambert was sent forward to Hexham with a delaying role which led to his losing touch with Cromwell at certain critical moments and thus dragging his leader into a dog fight round Barnard Castle, quite contrary to his intentions.


It is not, of course, suggested that the assignment to cavalry of a delaying role is wrong. On the contrary, Cavalry Training tells us that this is one of the tasks for which mobile forces are peculiarly suitable.* It is suggested, however, that, in the application of our new-found mobility, we are apt to lose sight of the importance and difficulty of maintaining control. Wireless and line telegraphy are no doubt of enormous assistance to the modern commander; but circumstances may sometimes impose wireless silence, the range of our wireless sets may prove inadequate, telegraph lines may be cut, and despatch riders, even on motor bicycles, are unreliable in hostile country.

In the near future, we hope, the aerial despatch rider will help to solve this difficulty; the autogyro should be an invaluable adjunct to the service of intercommunication in the field. In the meantime, however, we must be careful to make our employment of our mobile forces conform to our existing powers of control; and it is in this light, we suggest, that the campaign of Preston should be studied. It serves as a beacon for all time for those who would win lightning victories, and its brightest feature is not the dash nor the heroism of the New Model, but its complete and instant obedience to the man who led it.

* See "Cavalry Training," Vol. II, Sec. 2-5.



POSING FORCES ON EVENING OF 8TH. MARCH.



SCALE

10

20

30

40

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9 Miles

GERMAN CAVALRY OF TO-DAY.

By "CARBINE."

"IF I fight, I win." Such was the summary of Confucius on the whole philosophy of war. How far, or to what extent that axiom may be said to represent the guiding principles of fighting men in Europe would be difficult to forecast, but there appears to be little doubt that it admirably expresses the *raison d'être* of the German Cavalry of to-day.

I had been studying the German language and, with a view to preparing for certain examinations, proposed to spend my leave in Berlin. I had hopes during my visit of seeing something of the German Army. I was fortunate beyond words, since I found on entering the family with which I was to stay, that the eldest son was the adjutant of a cavalry regiment stationed less than a mile away.

At the risk of being tedious I will quote a few striking figures. The total number of infantry regiments in Germany is 21, whilst there are 18 cavalry regiments, which are organized into three divisions of six regiments each. It is diverting to compare this proportion of infantry to cavalry with other European armies.* Perhaps, after all, the saying of the enthusiast for mechanization that "the days of cavalry are over" is not yet true.

One other most interesting fact about the German Cavalry is also worth recording, since it provides something of an analogy with the amalgamation of cavalry regiments in the British Army.

Before the Great War, there were 113 German cavalry regiments, a truly large number. Faced with a reduction to 18 regiments, the German authorities have resorted to a clever

* The proportion of cavalry to infantry in the German Army was definitely laid down in the Treaty of Versailles and does not, therefore necessarily represent the views of the German authorities.—EDITOR.

expedient to ensure the preservation of traditions of the old regiments. The existing regiments are organised into four trained squadrons, and one training squadron with, in addition in some of the regiments, a sixth squadron, which acts independently as divisional cavalry. The number of present-day squadrons, therefore, very nearly approximates the number of pre-war regiments. Consequently, instead of trying to embrace the traditions of two or more regiments, as is the case with amalgamated regiments of the British Army, each of the German squadrons has been recognised as carrying on the tradition and honours of only one former regiment. To all ranks this glory of the past has become a vitalising force, inspiring an *esprit de corps* as vivid and fervent as that of the former parent regiment.

One other very interesting feature is the administration of the regiments. All the squadrons seldom live together in the same barracks or even in the same town. Sometimes, squadrons are as far apart as ten miles. This system has extraordinary potentialities. Each becomes a self-contained entity, and the officers therefore receive practical administrative opportunities for fitting themselves for higher command. In peace, the tactical advantages of this splitting-up of regiments can easily be appreciated when the still disturbed conditions of continental countries is borne in mind, whilst the militarist can well imagine the enormous ease with which such well trained nuclei could be expanded into regiments in the event of war. In England, before the War, there was an example of this, when one squadron was detached from its regiment and was stationed at Hampton Court. Whether this was an arrangement instituted for the purpose of helping the civil power in cases of emergency, or whether it had any military object in view, I have been unable to ascertain.

During my stay in Berlin, through the kindness of our Military Attaché, and through the courtesy of the German authorities, I was permitted to make a two days' visit to the 4th Reiter Regiment in Potsdam, with *carte blanche* to see anything that I wished; an Oberleutnant was detailed to accompany me and explain anything I wished to know.

Before entering the adjutant's office, I was required to report my arrival at the regimental guard room. Here I was immediately struck by two things, i.e., the extreme cleanliness and tidiness of the rooms and its environs, and secondly by the type of man I saw around me. The latter brought to my mind the words of Ruskin, "The best man is he who is the highest bred, the most self-denying, the most fearless, the coolest of nerve, the swiftest of hand and eye." Later, when I had completed my tour of the regiment, this instantaneous impression was strengthened to conviction.

Enquiry brought me information which may account for this very striking feature. The minimum service with the regiment is twelve years with the colours. Consequently, the annual intake of recruits is very small, and as the numbers who offer themselves for service are far in excess of those vacancies, none but the best are accepted. This, coupled with the fact that militarism in Germany is very popular, and a very honourable profession, makes it easy to see why the cavalry recruit and soldier represents, possibly, the finest type that can be found.

My first visit was to the barrack square to see the recruits practising the famous "Gänsemarsch" or "Goose step." It was here that I ventured my first query—that which I suppose the reader has already been tempted to ask, viz.: "Why the extraordinary large proportion of cavalry in such a small army." The answer of the adjutant was simple but illuminating, and explained many things. He said: "A cavalryman has to know everything that an infantryman knows—and a great deal more besides that." This indeed, in the case of the German Army sums up the situation admirably, and is a sage remark which those, who advocate the abolition of cavalry, would do well to bear in mind.

With regard to the splitting up of regiments, in the 4th Reiter Regiment, the headquarters, the training squadron, and two of the other squadrons are quartered in Potsdam, with the two remaining squadrons in Perleberg. The C.O. and adjutant make frequent visits to the detachments in a staff car provided for that purpose.

Each of the five squadrons has its own riding school; in these, I saw training of various kinds being carried out, machine-gun practice, competition jumping, equitation training for young N.C.O.'s, etc. The jumps, obstacles, etc., were very similar to those used in the training of British recruits, but in these riding schools one thing in particular attracted my attention.

This was the similarity between the uniform worn by officers and other ranks. The only difference in their service dress appeared to be that the officers wore badges of rank on their epaulettes, and a pair of silver cords on their forage caps in place of the usual chin straps. All ranks wear black knee-boots, since puttees would have a very short life where the training is so concentrated.

Whilst dealing with the uniform of the cavalry, the accompanying picture is of interest. In the right-hand illustration two yellow bands round the cap are depicted. Distinguishing colours round the cap have been adopted in the German Army to indicate the arm to which the wearer belongs, e.g., yellow bands denote the cavalryman, white an infantryman, black engineers, red for artillery, whilst service corps wear light blue.

Incidentally, the German Cavalry, in fact the whole of the Germany Army, are fortunate enough to possess a walking-out uniform, as distinct from service dress. This is particularly smart, whilst it is also inexpensive. Only officers are permitted to wear plain clothes, and they avail themselves very little of this prerogative. Whenever I met them—at cocktail parties in the afternoon, or at one of the big charity dances in the evening—always they were dressed in uniform. As for the other ranks, the possession of this walking-out dress appeared to be a highly appreciated privilege. Dressed in this uniform, every individual I met looked immaculate, with perfectly cut tunic and well creased overalls. It is this privilege of wearing a smart and distinctive uniform which gives a great fillip to personal pride and appearance, and is, moreover, a considerable spur to recruiting.

I was greatly interested in a visit to the squadron stables. On entering, I was surprised to see that all the horses were unclipped and enquiry elicited the fact that under no circum-



Sergeant-Major (Service Dress).



Shoeing Smith (Walking-out Dress).



N.C.O. AND MAN AT MACHINE-GUN PRACTICE

stances were the horses clipped; the principle appeared to be that a mobile force such as cavalry must be as independent as possible, and must not be dependent upon horse rugs, etc., when required to take the field. This theory is diametrically opposed to that of the British Army, and in view of the fact that our horse rugs are carried in 2nd line mechanical transport vehicles, and will not always therefore be at our beck and call, lends scope for thought for the British cavalryman.

The actual condition of the horses could not be described as being up to the standard of British cavalry horses, and the majority were very hollow about the flanks. When inspecting the horses, I noted the saddlery, and observed that the German universal bit is unlike our own. It resembles the old bit in use in England before the Boer War, having a long cheek piece.

An inspection of the men's barrack rooms showed that these were scrupulously clean and well kept. They appeared to me more comfortable than those in our own barracks, the six-foot table and form being conspicuous by their absence; these were replaced by a number of small round tables, overlaid with bright coloured cloths, and with chairs for them. It was amusing, when I remembered how the young soldier of to-day is often "chaffed" for drinking "char" and eating "wads" in the regimental institute, to note that the German soldier goes one better and for his refreshment practically drinks nothing else but milk!

Finally, I went into the "Kasino" or officers' mess, where I was shown round. The mess in Potsdam was a much more sumptuous affair than the general run of officers' messes in this country. It comprised a breakfast room, writing room, library, ante-room, and a large dining room in which dances are held at intervals.


The officers were charming, and I talked with a great many of them. They appeared to be anxious to show to a stranger what they know to be a very efficient organization. I learned that a cavalry officer obtains his commission as follows: An aspirant must first serve sixteen months in the ranks as a trooper. If, then, selected as a suitable candidate for a commission, he is sent to the Infantry School at Dresden for a course of instruc-

tion lasting ten months. If he successfully passes the final examination at Dresden, he is passed to the Cavalry School at Hanover, for a further ten months' instruction, and must qualify at a final passing-out examination before being commissioned.

The scale of pay for officers is about equal to that of a British officer. An adjutant, however, receives no extra pay for his special appointment and, what is more, in the case of the adjutant of this particular regiment, he was required to pay a Bachelor's Tax of 10 Marks a month!

The actual work of a cavalry officer in a German regiment corresponds almost exactly with that of an officer in the British Army. One difference is, however, to be noted, namely, that every "ride" in the riding school is taken by an officer. There is, further, a "ride" for all officers up to the rank of Rittmeister, or captain, every day.

The two chief points that are emphasized by officers in the training of cavalymen are the full use of his mobility, and the encouragement to individual soldiers to use their own initiative. With twelve years' service with one regiment, it is possible to train the individual, not only to fight with the weapons of his particular arm, but also to think out for himself solutions to problems and, when necessary, to take over command.



COMPENSATIONS IN EQUINE CONFORMATION

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL SIDNEY G. GOLDSCHMIDT.

IN my previous articles I have tried to show that we cannot hope to buy perfection, indeed we are fortunate if we can approach it at all closely within the limits of our purse. In the buying of any horse there is nearly always some point which could be called a cause for rejection by the meticulous. In show-ring judging, the question is not of rejection but of placing horses in their order of merit, but in either case, it is important to be able to appraise the relative value of good and bad points. It is not enough to train the eye to recognise these good and bad points, in addition our *judgment* must be trained to decide which faults should rule out a horse altogether for saddle purposes and which can be forgiven because of exceptional excellence in some other and compensating direction.

This judgment, which *inter alia* enables a man to mount himself cheaply, is perhaps the most difficult to acquire of all the arts of horsemanship and there seems nothing adequately to take the place of a wide experience involving losses and disappointments.

For this reason the subject should be approached from two angles—the theory of the visible and mechanical reasons based on experience should be mastered as far as possible, and as many examples as possible should be studied.

In considering compensations one must not lose sight of the necessity of good proportions. A horse with light slender limbs should be of light build generally. One part must not unduly outweigh another in strength or the disability of the weaker

part will be accentuated rather than diminished. Age must also be considered, a crooked limb or imperfect action would not be as serious in a seasoned working horse that was sound, without bony enlargements and with no evidence of recent brushing than in an unbroken four-year-old. Size is a further important factor. The bigger the horse the more one must expect imperfections and therefore look for compensations. There are infinitely more horses of good conformation round about 15 hands than amongst the bigger animals.

While there are certain points of conformation for which there is no compensation, there are others for which there is. Of these there are notably three, and if they co-exist in the same horse it is impossible to over-estimate their value. In their order of merit these are—*quality* (the fact that a horse is thoroughbred or nearly so), *the carriage of the head and neck*, and the *sloping shoulder*.

As quality has been exhaustively dealt with it is only necessary for the subject of this article, to point out that one can be more forgiving of all faults (within reasonable limits) in a horse showing the characteristics of the thoroughbred while on the other hand an absence of quality should be an absolute bar to purchase. Nevertheless, a consideration of the type of country that has to be crossed and the kind of rider to be carried, must be counted a modifying circumstance. To take an extreme example; some coarse-bred horses can heave themselves over a stone-wall country with harriers with a certain amount of success, but would be useless in a scurry for a good place at a gap and indeed, utterly exhausted after a few fields with fox hounds, but such horses are not for connoisseurs.

Pursuing the same order as in the earlier articles, the head must be the first consideration. A big heavy head on a light badly-shaped neck would be more objectionable than one at the end of a well-developed muscular crest. If, in addition, leverage is lessened by a high carriage of the head and neck, the objection is further minimised. It must be remembered that besides the mechanical disadvantage, a large head is a reversion to a coarse ancestor and is a sign of under breeding, so one

should see that it is accompanied by no other signs of coarseness. Here one must look for a silky coat, fine hair of mane and tail and scant hair on the heels. The physiognomy must also be studied, alert ears not necessarily very small, sensitive nostrils and a wide open eye with a kindly docile expression would go a long way to compensate for a big head. A thin, stringy neck conversely should be balanced by a neat small head and obviously, one would leave untouched the mane on a light-necked horse while the contour of one with a heavy neck would be improved by hogging.

Balance is largely dependent on a lofty carriage of the head and neck and if combined with these two further important points—quality and a sloping shoulder, it is fairly certain that the horse will bridle well and be a “good ride” and when all is said and done the ride is the determining factor, *especially in cases of doubt*.

A shoulder somewhat steep would also be compensated for to a certain extent by a perfect carriage of the head and neck and if combined with a very well shaped fore-leg (or even one slightly back at the knees) and a pastern with a marked slope, here are further items of compensation.

Slightly tied-in below the knee and hock would be less objectionable if the “bone” was of the clean thoroughbred type with tendon and ligament standing out cleanly and if the fetlock joint were flat rather than round. There would also have to be no tendency to calf knees or sickle hocks. It is doubtful whether there is any point to counteract the mechanical disadvantage of sickle hocks, especially in a hunter. As this malformation existing with a very sloping pelvis (goose rump) is doubly objectionable, one might say that any but the best angle of hock should be accompanied by very level quarters with the tail set on high.

There is also a point which I approach with reserve—“Back at the Knees” is a very noticeable fault and because it is so noticeable it is usually execrated to my mind in excess of its demerit as if it is not too pronounced it will mechanically counteract the evil of a straight shoulder. There is no doubt that back at the knees is a conformation that makes for sure-

footedness; as a horseman of experience puts it "You never see a horse back at the knees with a marked knee." If it is excessive, however, splints that may accompany this particular malformation have a tendency to form close to the knee, which is the worst position of all.

If a horse is over at the knees, to my mind a most objectionable fault, one must consider his age and the work he has done, for if it is a sign of wear it is more objectionable than if it is, as in many thoroughbreds, congenital.

A flat-sided horse would not be so objectionable if he had great depth of girth, especially through the lowest point of the back, and good width between the fore-legs, and the same applies to one with a rather long back. Conversely, a horse somewhat shallow should have widely sprung ribs and the space between the last rib and the hip bone should be small. A horse with a somewhat slack loin would not be so objectionable if he showed evidence of a vigorous constitution, with a good deep colour of coat growing markedly darker to the extremities.

A very short coupled horse should have quick vigorous action at the gallop to obviate a tendency to over-reach.

Well-developed quarters and strong gaskins and second thighs accentuate the disability of cow-hocks as this increased power of locomotion throws a greater strain on these joints. Bowed hocks are objectionable under all circumstances. The only compensation for bowed or cow-hocks, if indeed there be any, would be that these joints should be big and clean with free action and that there should be well developed parallel bone below.


A hollow back should be accompanied by strong loins and hind legs well under the horse with extra, light, free action in front.

A horse with a broad chest must have particularly free shoulder action or he will roll in his gait. With a narrow-chested horse or one that "goes close" one would look for brushing marks on the fetlocks, the absence of which would minimise the fault, especially if in addition the feet were not unduly big.

All the above comments are based on the assumption that the disabilities are not marked. The strength of a chain is that of the weakest link and any really bad point of conformation neutralizes any number of good ones and is a sure indication of where the breakdown will occur.

I take it that most of us have owned horses with weak links but with compensating advantages—some immediately visible, others only to be proved after the pudding is eaten. The most outstanding example I can recall is worth reciting. A dark bay mare with black points, 15 hands, bred and bought in Ireland. I do not as a rule take any notice of pedigrees unless they are of thoroughbreds, authentic and in the Book, but as I was in touch with the actual breeder who had also bred the dam, I accepted his assurance that she was by a thoroughbred horse but the origin of her maternal grand dam was unknown. A catalogue of her disabilities and the compensating advantages both as they appeared at the time of purchase and developed since, reads as follows: She had a big head and a Roman nose but a well-developed neck carried well up with the bend at the poll. She had a particularly wide open eye with an expression so conscientious as almost to be described as “smug.” The muscles of her well-sloped shoulder were so developed that they might be described by the inexperienced as lumpy, till one saw their movement in action. When on her back, one’s knees came well behind the shoulder which swung forward with delightful freedom. She had upright pasterns compensated for by her excellent shoulders and her being slightly back at the knees. She was shallow but with a great spread of her ribs and her spine formed a groove between rolls of muscle. There was no fault to find with her back, loins, quarters and hind legs. She had a coat of the finest hair but her mane was as stiff as bristles and her tail somewhat bushy with a distinct curl. Of course, she won my heart by her action and with the ride but even these were by no means faultless at first. As she had done a certain amount of work in harness the slow canter was beyond her and like all harness horses she preferred to increase her pace at the trot till forced into a gallop.

It took her a long time to learn her "foot-drill" and to develop the slow canter which she found irksome for a whole year. However, she took to hunting without any schooling whatever and carried my wife and myself five seasons faultlessly, and in addition, played polo three seasons with hardly any preparation. She was a great stayer and was not put out by the longest day and would feed up without hesitation. She was seldom outpaced and her legs at 13 were perfectly clean. She has a great reputation and is the best example I know of compensations and of all adverse considerations being outweighed by perfect action and by the excellence of "the ride."



THE YEOMANRY ON GALLIPOLI

By MAJOR OSKAR TEICHMAN, D.S.O., M.C., T.D.,
Late M.O., Queen's Own Worcestershire Hussars.

“ And you, good Yeomen,
Whose limbs were made in England, shew us here
The mettle of your pasture; let us swear
That you are worth the breeding; which I doubt not,
For there is none of you so mean and base,
That hath not noble lustre in your eyes.
I see you stand like greyhounds in the slips
Straining upon the start. The game's afoot,
Follow your spirit; and upon this charge
Cry—‘ God for England, Harry and St. George—’ ”

*(Henry Vth's speech before battle of Agincourt).**

THE history of the Yeomanry on Gallipoli is not one of splendid victories nor of gallant landings; it is a story of a long drawn out and bitter struggle which went on day and night for the last five months of the campaign; and during this period only one general action (the Battle of Scimitar Hill, Aug. 21st-22nd, 1915) took place. Gallipoli must, however, always be of interest to Yeomen, for no fewer than thirty-one Regiments of Yeomanry saw their first active service, in the Great War, on the Peninsula. To record their gallantry and to honour the memory of the fallen this account has in the main been written.

The story of the Yeomanry in the Dardanelles Campaign must necessarily be preceded by a brief description of the formation and earlier movements of the 2nd Mounted Division, the first and largest Yeomanry formation to land on the Peninsula.

* Shakespeare's *Henry V.*, Act III. Scene I.

The Division, consisting of twelve first line Yeomanry Regiments from the Midlands, South Midlands and London (for Battle order see below), together with four R.H.A. Batteries from Notts, Berks, and the H.A.C., was formed in the Newbury-Churn area towards the end of August, 1914, under the command of Major-General W. E. Peyton, C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O.

After two months' training on the Berkshire Downs and five months' duty on the East Coast, it embarked early in April for the Near East.

The submarine menace was not so acute in April, 1915, as it became later, but one of the transports carrying the Warwickshire Yeomanry's horses was torpedoed outside the Bristol Channel. "The gallant conduct and devotion to duty displayed by Major R. A. Richardson and the officers, N.C.Os. and men of the 1st Warwickshire Yeomanry"—was recognised in a special Army Order (May 27th, 1915).

At dawn on April 25th, which heralded the immortal heroism of the landings at Helles and Anzac and the beginning of the ill-fated Gallipoli Campaign, the Division commenced to disembark at Alexandria.

The Official History tells us that Lord Kitchener had intended it as a reinforcement for Gallipoli, "if Sir Ian Hamilton needs it." But Sir John Maxwell, commanding in Egypt, could not spare it, and for the next three months, although the Dardanelles Army was sorely in need of reinforcements, the 2nd Mounted Division was retained for garrison duty in Alexandria, Cairo, and on the Canal.

The Hertfordshire Yeomanry and the Westminster Dragoons were already in Egypt before the Division arrived, having replaced two regular Cavalry Regiments in September, 1914.

After prolonged "arguments"* between Lord Kitchener, Sir Ian Hamilton and Sir John Maxwell, it was finally decided on August 9th to send the 2nd Mounted Division, with the Herts. and Westminsters, to Gallipoli dismounted.†

* Official Gallipoli Pt. II. 334-5.

† The R.H.A. Batteries did not accompany the Division.

As each of the fourteen Regiments had to leave five officers and about 100 men behind to look after its horses, when the Division embarked on August 14th it could only muster 5,000 rifles, each unit being re-organised on a two-squadron basis.

After transhipment into small craft at Mudros, the Division arrived in Suvla Bay on the night of August 17th-18th and commenced to land. At this date the IXth Corps had already been ashore for ten days, its commander Lieut.-General the Hon. Sir F. Stopford had been superseded by Major-General de Lisle pending the arrival of Lieut.-General the Hon. Sir Julian Byng from France, and there had been several changes amongst its Divisional and Brigade Commanders. These facts alone gave the Yeomen food for thought and presaged that all was not well at Suvla.

In point of fact at Anzac (where the 13th Division of the IXth Corps had been deflected) the third attempt on Sari Bair had ended in failure: and at Suvla the IXth Corps, forestalled on the surrounding hills, had been driven back after a week's desultory fighting with heavy losses to the plain.

The British forces at Anzac and Suvla were holding a front of about 20,000 yards with only 50,000 rifles (when it should have been not less than four men per yard, allowing for normal reliefs). The Turks, on the other hand, had 75,000 rifles in this area, and their numbers were steadily increasing.

Our front line at this date extended from the sea on the North over the Kiretch Tepe Sirt across the Suvla Plain through K. Anafarta Ova to Sulajik Farm, thence in front of Chocolate Hill over Green Hill and West of Hetman Chair to the Azmak Dere, whence a thin chain of sentry groups only half a mile from the sea connected IXth Corps with Anzac. It was held North to South by 54th, 53rd, 10th and 11th Divisions.

The beaches and the open country beyond them were in full view of the Turks, and there were no covered approaches to the Corps front line which was only one to two miles from the sea. In fact the enemy's guns, 84 pieces in all, overlooked the British lines like an audience in the dress circle overlooks the stage.

2ND MOUNTED DIVISION—ORDER OF BATTLE, AUGUST 18TH, 1915.**Major-General W. E. Peyton, C.B., C.V.O., D.S.O.****1st (S. Midland) Mtd. Brigade—Brig.-General E. A. Wiggin.**

1/1 Warwickshire Yeomanry.

1/1 R. Gloucestershire Hussars.

1/1 Q.O. Worcestershire Hussars.

2nd (S. Midland) Mtd. Brigade—Brig.-General Earl of Longford, K.P., M.V.O.

1/1 R. Bucks Hussars.

1/1 Q.O. Dorset Yeomanry.*

1/1 Berkshire Yeomanry.

3rd (Notts and Derby) Mtd. Brigade—Brig.-General Paul Kenna, V.C., D.S.O., A.D.C.

1/1 Sherwood Rangers.

1/1 South Notts Hussars.

1/1 Derbyshire Yeomanry.

4th (London) Mtd. Brigade—Brig.-General A. H. M. Taylor, D.S.O.

1/1 County of London (Middlesex Hussars).

1/1 City of London (Rough Riders).

1/3 County of London (Sharpshooters).

5th (Attached) Mtd. Brigade—Brig.-General Tyndale-Biscoe.

1/1 Hertfordshire Yeomanry.

1/2 County of London (Westminster Dragoons).

The Division suffered a few casualties from the enemy's guns on landing at "A" Beach and then proceeded to bivouack, on the S.W. slopes of Karakol Dag, next to the 29th Division which had just arrived from Helles. During the next day working parties were called for to assist in making a road from "A" Beach to the Salt Lake which resulted in a few casualties.

On the morning of August 20th the Division received orders to move at dusk. Another attack on the centre of the position at Suvla had been planned, with a view to the capture of "W" Hills and Scimitar Hill as a preliminary step towards the capture of the Anafarta spur and the Tekke Tepe ridge. Even

* Substituted for the Oxfordshire Hussars who left the Division September 19th, 1914, for Antwerp.

if the latter did not materialize the possession of the first two would not only protect the Suvla beaches from shell fire, but in the event of it becoming necessary to abandon the Suvla area the occupation of these hills would simplify the problem. The line "W" Hills—Chocolate Hill—Lala Baba would offer a good North flank, and the simultaneous capture of Hill 60 from Anzac would strengthen the communication between that corps and IXth Corps.

Before moving off at dusk the troops were ordered to cut discs out of biscuit tins, to be slung between their shoulder blades. The idea was that the sun shining on these bright tins would enable the ships' guns to pick up the attacking line, and regulate their fire accordingly. Unfortunately the sun refused to shine next day, and no more was heard of the tin discs during the campaign.

Towards midnight the 2nd Mounted Division had arrived on the Western slopes of Lala Baba, a small hill of some 130 feet at the South extremity of the bay.

BATTLE OF SCIMITAR HILL.

The next morning, August 21st, the whole country was shrouded in a thick white mist, a fact above all others which led to the failure of the coming attack. It was planned to take place early in the afternoon, when on any ordinary day : "The enemy trenches would have been sharply and clearly lit up, whilst the enemy gunners would have been dazzled by the setting sun. But under this strange shadow the tables were completely turned; the outline of the Turkish trenches were blurred and indistinct, whereas troops advancing from the Aegean against the Anafartas stood out in relief against a pale and luminous background."*

General de Lisle's orders for the coming battle were briefly as follows :—

The 29th Division was to capture Scimitar Hill and 112 Metre Hill and the 11th Division the "W" Hills (both these Divisions were already in the trenches between Sulajik and the Azmak Dere). When these points were reached part of the

* Sir Ian Hamilton II, 127.

Corps Reserve (10th and 2nd Mounted Divisions) would pass through the 29th and 11th and establish a line astride the Anafarta spur from 101 Metre Hill to Abrikja.

At the same time Anzac troops were to co-operate on their extreme left and join hands with the Suvla force.

At 2.30 p.m. the preliminary bombardment by our artillery, aided by the guns of "Swiftsure," three cruisers and two destroyers, commenced with a simultaneous roar, but it effected very little. Many of the Turkish gun positions had not been located and, according to the Official History, our 5-inch howitzers again proved inaccurate, several of our 60 pdrs. developed defects, and "Swiftsure's" armour-piercing projectiles were of little or no avail. At 3 p.m. the bombardment ceased and the attack of the 29th and 11th Divisions was launched over a front of about two miles.

Meanwhile the 2nd Mounted Division was sitting on Lala Baba waiting impatiently to advance, "like greyhounds in the slips," as Henry Vth is supposed to have said before Agincourt.

Shortly after 3.30 p.m. orders arrived to march to Chocolate Hill, and all five Brigades moved off in the following order : 2nd, 4th, 1st, 3rd and 5th.

As soon as this large body of men reached the open plain just south of the Salt Lake (dry at this time) it offered a marvellous target to the Turkish guns.* Most of the H.E. fell on the edge of the lake where it caused few casualties in the soft ground, but the shrapnel took heavy toll of the Yeomen.

The formation ordered was column of squadrons, each squadron in line of troop columns, 20 yards interval and distance (but increased on their own initiative by some units subsequently to 100 yards); a familiar formation which in certain circumstances has its advantages, but it is not one to be recommended against concentrated shrapnel fire from a flank.

Sir Ian Hamilton watching the scene through his glasses from the top of Lala Baba describes the scene in his despatches as follows :—

* A Turkish artillery officer, met in Constantinople after the war, said that the 2nd Mounted Division presented a target such as artillerymen thought impossible outside the world of dreams.



SCIMITAR HILL, and TEKKE TEPE IN DISTANCE. (From
GREEN HILL). O.T.



LALA BABA FROM TOP OF CHOCOLATE HILL,
SHOWING GROUND OVER WHICH YEOMEN
ADVANCED 21-8-15. Digitized by Google

Digitized by Google

“ Whilst this fighting was in progress the 2nd Mounted Division moved out from Lala Baba in open formation to take up a position of readiness behind Yilghin Burnu (Chocolate Hill). During this march they came under a remarkable and accurate artillery fire. The advance of the English Yeomen was a sight calculated to send a thrill of pride through anyone with a drop of English blood running in their veins. Such superb martial spectacles are rare in modern war. Ordinarily it should always be possible to bring up reserves under some sort of cover from shrapnel fire. Here for a mile and a half there was nothing to conceal a mouse, much less some of the most stalwart soldiers England has sent from her shores. Despite the critical events in other parts of the field I could hardly take my glasses from the Yeomen; they moved like men marching on parade. Here and there a shell would take toll of a cluster; there they lay; there was no straggling; others moved steadily on, not a man was there who hung back or hurried. But such an ordeal must consume some of the battle winning fighting energy of those subjected to it, and it is lucky indeed for the Turks that the terrain as well as the lack of trenches forbade us from letting the 2nd Mounted Division loose, at close quarters to the enemy without undergoing this previous too heavy baptism of fire.”

The H.E., which the Turks were alternating with their shrapnel, set fire to the thick scrub which extends from the Salt Lake to Chocolate Hill, making the speedy collection of wounded an urgent necessity. The flames also disclosed several snipers, who must have remained behind our lines in the scrub and amongst the branches of a few stunted oak trees for some days, and who had caused us the loss of several officers.

By five o'clock the whole division, depleted by casualties, formed up under Chocolate Hill, where orders awaited it for a far more formidable task than was originally anticipated. The 29th and 11th Divisions had, after very heavy losses, failed to reach their objectives, and the Yeomen were to try where the Infantry had failed.

After a very hurried explanation to Brigadiers, which gave not the slightest idea of the real situation in front, or when and where the Turks would first be encountered, the Yeomen were soon on the move again.

On the left, the 2nd S. Midland Mounted Brigade was ordered to advance North of Chocolate Hill and through the front line of the 87th Brigade, in order to capture Scimitar Hill.

On the right the 4th (London) Mounted Brigade with the 1st (S. Midland) Mounted Brigade on its left was ordered to pass South of Chocolate Hill and Green Hill through the 86th Brigade and to capture 112 Metre Hill.

The 3rd (Notts and Derby) Mounted Brigade was in support and the 5th (attached) Mounted Brigade in reserve.

From an examination of these orders it will be noticed that a concerted attack was out of the question with one part of the division moving North and the other South of Chocolate Hill. The élan of the Yeomanry was unmistakable, but the fog of war hung in a heavy pall on the 2nd Mounted Division as it stumbled blindly forward in its frontal attack.

“Brigadiers had been given no time to explain even what they knew themselves of what lay in front of them, and at least two did not know what they were meant to do. No one in the Division had any idea of the situation in front, or what had befallen the 29th Division. The mist was thickening, scrub fires were raging and smoke blotted out the view. Streams of wounded were struggling back, the din of battle was deafening, and daylight would only last one hour.”

About 6 p.m. the 2nd Mounted Brigade, led by Lord Longford in person, stormed and captured the crest of Scimitar Hill, but they were driven off the top by enfilade fire after some of the Yeomen had actually descended the Eastern slopes before being annihilated. Lord Longford and his staff were all killed. The Dorsets led by Lieut.-Colonel Troyte-Bullock, their only officer left, actually penetrated up the Valley between Scimitar Hill and Hill 112.

Meanwhile the 4th Mounted Brigade (led by Brig.-General Taylor) had reached the front of Green Hill, when it came under concentrated fire from “W” Hills. Many small and disconnected

detachments, losing touch with their units as they advanced across the scrub-covered hillside,* pushed on straight ahead and were never seen again.

The 1st Mounted Brigade, led by Brig.-General Wiggin (who had lost two of his staff), advanced over the smouldering top of Green Hill into the valley South of Scimitar Hill where some squadrons gained touch with the remains of the 2nd Mounted Brigade and the S.W.B. (29th Division).

Soon after dark the 3rd Mounted Brigade led by Lieut.-Colonel Cole (temporarily in command) was ordered to attack the Turks in the vicinity of Hetman Chair (Chair meadow). But no one had been told where the Turkish position was. Sir John Milbanke, V.C. (commanding Sherwood Rangers), who had been summoned to B.H.Q. to receive his orders, could only tell his officers that : " We are to take a redoubt, I don't know where it is, and I don't think anyone else does either, anyhow we are to go ahead and attack any Turks we meet."

The Brigade went ahead in the dark and was met by a withering fire. Amongst others Milbanke was killed leading his regiment, and the Brigadier was seriously wounded. They had made a frontal attack on the Turkish strong point.

So ended the Battle of Scimitar Hill. The Yeoman had fought with distinguished bravery, and with numbers less than those of the defenders had tried to capture by frontal attacks (as ordered) positions of great and natural strength. The Turks were well provided with artillery and their trenches were well protected by flanking machine gun fire.

The Division suffered 30 per cent. casualties on this day, the 2nd Mounted Brigade suffering actually 50 per cent.

In addition to the two Brigadiers mentioned above, Brig.-General Paul Kenna, V.C., was killed and Brig.-General Wiggin was wounded a few days later.

The first V.C. to be won in the Great War by a member of the 2nd Mounted Division was gained by Trooper F. W. O. Potts, Berks Yeomanry, at the battle of Scimitar Hill :—
" Severely wounded in the attack on Scimitar Hill, Potts re-

* " Dense holly-oak scrub, so nearly impenetrable that it breaks up an attack and forces troops to move in single file along goat tracks between the bushes."—Sir Ian Hamilton.

mained out on the hill for 48 hours rather than desert a wounded comrade who was unable to move and whom he himself was too weak to carry. Eventually, using a shovel as an improvised sledge, and fired at by the Turks on the way, he dragged his friend to safety. For this act of courage he was awarded the V.C."

After the battle of Scimitar Hill the 2nd Mounted Division was utilised in trench warfare until the end of the campaign. No more attacks on a grand scale were made. It was a trying time for the Yeoman at Suvla owing to the prevalent dysentery, the flies from the thousands of unburied Turks in front of our trenches, and the fact that real periods of rest were practically unknown in the area. Nowhere could shelter be obtained from enemy shell fire, the mile and a half behind the trenches was in full view of the Turks and consequently the front line was often the safest place to be in.

The limited cover behind Lala Baba was occupied by various Headquarters and some horse lines, but even there 113 mules were killed by one round of a 5.9 from a Turkish howitzer.

There was a shortage of maps in the 2nd Mounted Division, and one morning a certain Mounted Brigade H.Q. was delighted to receive a large packet; but as these maps were found to depict the Norfolk coast they were of little practical use. However, the Yeomen were not in so bad a case as the 159th Brigade (53rd Division), none of whose officers had ever *seen* a map of Suvla when they landed on August 9th, or the 163rd Brigade (54th Division), who three days later went into action with maps depicting another part of the Peninsula!*

Although no units in the 2nd Mounted Division were reinforced by drafts from England to replace wastage caused by casualties and sickness, early in September the 1/1 Scottish Horse Brigade (1st, 2nd and 3rd Scottish Horse), commanded by Brig.-General the Marquis of Tullibardine, M.V.O., D.S.O., landed† and was attached to the Division.

"The Scottish Horse (the author of a certain Yeomanry History tells us) introduced a fresh horror into an already

* Official History.

† At C Beach, losing 38 men from shell-fire.

horrible campaign, in the shape of their bagpipes, with which they made the nights hideous!" The Turks, however, appear to have appreciated the entertainment as they actually thanked the Brigade for its "music."

Towards the end of September the 1/1 Highland Mounted Brigade (1st and 2nd Lovat's Scouts, and the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry), commanded by Brig.-General Lord Lovat, K.C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O., was another welcome addition to Major-General Peyton's command. As both these Scottish Brigades had come direct from England without their horses they were much stronger in numbers than any of the other Brigades in the 2nd Mounted Division had been on landing. At this date the average duty strength of the original Yeomanry Regiments in the Division was about 6 officers and 70 O.R.s. each, and they had to occupy 100 yards of fire trench for which a minimum of 88 men was supposed to be provided.

When the enemy guns were not active Suvla Bay was quite a pleasant place and the Yeomen resting on the beach enjoyed bathing during the autumn. Every morning and evening a long stream of some type of sea bird, brown with white breasts, long narrow wings and no tails, about the size of plovers, used to fly up and down the coast. They are a peculiar characteristic in the Gallipoli landscape and will be remembered by all Yeomen. They are known as the "lost souls"—the souls of all the wives drowned by various Sultans in the Sea of Marmora!

Another legend has it that a Sultan tied a message to the leg of one bird and sent it to look for a favourite wife who had run away: the bird flew up and down the Straits and over the Peninsula looking for the girl, and others joined it, and all have been doing so ever since!

On October 8th the 1/2 South Western Mounted Brigade (Royal 1st Devon Yeomanry, Royal North Devon Hussars, and West Somerset Yeomanry), commanded by Brig.-General R. Hoare, arrived on the Peninsula and joined the 11th Division in the Northern Suvla sector, in the trenches on Karakol Dag. A month later (November 14th) this Brigade was transferred to the 2nd Mounted Division, and took over the trenches south of Green Hill.

Early in October Anzac saw the first landing of a Yeomanry Brigade on that front. This was the 1/1 Eastern Mounted Brigade (Royal Norfolk Yeomanry, Loyal Suffolk Hussars and the Welsh Horse), commanded by Brig.-General W. H. Hodgson, C.V.O. The landing was delayed by a gale, the piers of Anzac cove being badly damaged. The Brigade was at first attached to the 54th Division, which at that time occupied the line south of Azmak Dere, but later was moved further south opposite Hill 60, between the 29th Indian Infantry Brigade and the New Zealand and Australian Division of the Anzac Corps.

Colonel Lord Kensington's Regiment of Welsh Horse contained many miners whose practical knowledge of mining was most useful.

During October the 1/1 South Eastern Mounted Brigade (Royal East Kent Yeomanry, Queen's Own West Kent Yeomanry and Sussex Yeomanry), commanded by Brig.-General Clifton Brown landed at "W" Beach, Helles. This Brigade was attached to the 42nd Division on the Western (coastal) sector of the Helles front, and occupied the line across Gully Ravine and before Krithia.

During the same month (October) the 1/1 Lowland Mounted Brigade (Ayrshire Yeomanry and Lanarkshire Yeomanry), commanded by Brig.-General F. Lee, also landed at Helles and was attached to the 52nd (Lowland) Division on the right of the Krithia road.

Towards the end of October rumours were current that the 2nd Mounted Division would be withdrawn from Suvla to Mudros, where it would refit and remain until its numbers had been made up to strength. So seriously were its ranks depleted by casualties and sickness since August 21st (when it had suffered a loss of 30%), that some such course had become imperative. Regiments did not reach the number of one squadron.* Attempts had been made towards an amalgamation of units, by which groups of three Regiments were put under one Regimental Commanding Officer; but as each Regiment retained its own C.O. and its own identity, the amalga-

* The Hertfordshire Yeomanry were only 18 strong all told when they "re-inforced" the 1st Mounted Brigade on October 18th.

tion only resulted in friction. If the Division was to continue as Infantry it was evident that it would have to be reorganised on an Infantry basis. But the 7,000 horses of the 2nd Mtd. Division in Egypt, however, became the deciding factor in the destiny of the Division. Without them there is no doubt that it would have remained as Infantry until the end of the War, as was the case with the six mounted Brigades which had left their horses in England, and which eventually formed the 74th ("Broken Spur") Infantry Division in Palestine.

During the first days of November all the units of the original 2nd Mounted Division, less their Machine Gun sections, embarked at "C" beach under Lala Baba for Mudros.

Many of the officers and men were so debilitated by dysentery as to be quite exhausted by the short march down to the beach. The story goes that a certain London Yeomanry Regiment was reduced to one officer, one S.Q.M.S. and one man, and that the latter was wounded by a shell while embarking on the lighter.

General Peyton wrote at the time: "The performance of both officers and men are written deep in my heart and I shall never forget the pride and grief with which I saw the remnants of that gallant Division, containing as it did the flower of the youth of 14 English counties, stagger to the boats which were to carry them to Mudros."

The 2nd Mounted Division had taken part in the most tragic chapter of the Great War. But in the following year (1916) they had before them work of a character more suited to their training. They were destined to prove the value of the *Arme Blanche*. With their swords they were to help to free the Holy Land from the enemy and to force the surrender of the Turkish Empire.

On November 26th the great gale commenced and lasted three days. For the Yeomen in the trenches, particularly at Suvla, it was three days of agony. "A violent thunderstorm was followed by a torrential downpour which soaked men to the skin. An icy hurricane then began to blow from the North; the rain turned first to a blizzard and then to heavy snow; this was succeeded by two nights of very bitter frost." At Anzac the front line trenches were to some extent protected by the surrounding hills.

At Helles where the trenches were mostly on sloping ground, they suffered little from flooding and the Yeomen of the South-Eastern and Lowland Mounted Brigades bore the strain remarkably well. But at Suvla the Yeomen suffered terribly. All the trenches were flooded in the plain, and the dry water-courses became foaming torrents.

On the Southern flank, where the front line defence across the Azmak Dere consisted of a barricade held by the Fife and Forfar Yeomanry, a wall of mud and water came rushing down the wadi, carrying away both the Turkish and Highland barricades, and washing drowned Turks and pack ponies into the British lines. Throughout the Suvla plain many sections of the trenches were uninhabitable and a number of Yeomen were drowned. The 2nd Lovat's Scouts were completely washed out and had to take refuge on the parapets or in the sodden ground near the coast. Many of the parapets began to collapse (owing to lack of material it had been impossible to revet the trenches). By the morning of November 28th many of the Yeomanry's positions were only held by snipers. Fortunately the Turks were no better off. And in some places dazed and benumbed Yeomen and Turks stood about in the open for several hours without firing. The severe cold and snow which followed were the last straw. Numbers died from exposure; exhausted Yeomen struggling back to the beach collapsed by the way and were frozen to death.

A few days later the wind abated and a spell of sunny autumn weather followed; but the blizzard had left its mark, 16,000 cases of frostbite, 12,000 cases of them from Suvla where over 200 men had been drowned or frozen to death.*

During the next three weeks, with the evacuation of Suvla and Anzac in sight, for periods of three days at a time, orders were issued that the enemy should only be fired on if he threatened attack or offered an exceptional target, and that all normal artillery fire should cease. By these periods of silence, which were continued at intervals, the enemy was taught that complete silence in a trench did not mean that its occupants had been withdrawn; and he learnt that to his cost.

* The late Mr. Ashmead-Bartlett wrote:—" . . . there is no parallel in warfare since the retreat of the Grand Army from Russia in 1812."

The masterly evacuation of Suvla and final retirement of the rear parties on December 19th-20th is common knowledge. The 2nd Mounted Division, consisting at this date of the attached Scottish Horse, Highland and South Western Mounted Brigades, took part in these operations, retiring from the line between Green Hill and Azmak Dere to "C" Beach. 120 officers and O.Rs., out of a total strength of 1,140, performed the onerous and dangerous duty of rear party for the Division on the night of December 19th-20th.

The Eastern Mounted Brigade, 530 strong in the Anzac area marched from opposite Hill 60 to Ocean Beach on December 18th, leaving 110 as a rear party in the trenches who successfully completed the Brigade's evacuation on the following night.

At Helles the South Eastern Mounted Brigade left the Peninsula with the 42nd Division on Christmas Day, but the Lowland Mounted Brigade took part in the final evacuation with the 52nd Division on January 8th-9th, 1916.

When the seventeen Yeomanry Regiments, which took part in the final evacuations at Suvla, Anzac and Helles, filed down to their respective beaches at night and embarked for Mudros, there were few who did not leave the scenes of their bitter struggles and hardships without feelings of intense relief. But they, like the original 2nd Mounted Division, were destined to take part in a victorious campaign in Palestine and to give the Turks a *quid pro quo*.

The twelve Regiments of the 2nd Mounted Division with the Herts and Westminsters attached, which took part in the battle of August 21st, 1915, received the Battle Honours: "Suvla," "Scimitar Hill," "Gallipoli 1915."

The other seventeen Yeomanry Regiments which landed after August, 1915, received the Battle Honour: "Gallipoli 1915."

* * * * *

The Gallipoli Cruise of 1934 was arranged by the Royal Naval Division Association. Representatives from most of the units which fought on the Peninsula took part in it, including a number of Yeomanry officers and O.Rs.

The itinerary in addition to three days on Gallipoli included a day each at Naples, Constantinople and Athens.

During the voyage interesting lectures (followed by discussions) were given on the Helles landing and the River Clyde by Major-General Sir Steuart Hare, K.C.M.G., C.B. (29th Division); the Anzac Landing, by Colonel J. A. Clark, C.B., C.M.G. (R.M.); the Suvla Landing, by Lieut.-Colonel P. Villiers-Stuart, D.S.O. (30th Brigade, 10th Division), and the Evacuation of the Helles Area, by Lieut.-General Sir F. Davies, K.C.B., K.C.M.G. (G.O.C. VIIIth Corps).

The well-known War Correspondent, Mr. H. W. Nevinson, also gave two lectures on the Gallipoli Campaign, being a *resumé* intended for those who had not taken part in it.

At dawn on April 30th we passed through the Narrows between the forts of Kilid Bahr and Chanak, meeting a long stream of "lost souls" tearing down the straits on their usual apparently aimless flight, and anchored half a mile north of Maidos in Kelia Bay.

A few hours later a Turkish Deputation consisting of Military and Civil Officials from Chanak came on board and were entertained to breakfast. After mutual greetings, General Sir Francis Davies, during the speeches, said that we were looking forward to revisiting the Peninsula, and apologised for leaving Helles nineteen years ago without informing the Turks beforehand!

Our steamer remained at anchor for three days, during which a day was spent on the Helles front, a day at Suvla and Anzac, half a day on Achi Baba and, in the case of some passengers, a few hours at Chanak. We also had the opportunity of examining the coast very closely between Maidos and Sedd-el-Bahr during our journey to and from Helles, from our anchorage. This journey was made in a small Turkish steamer chartered for the occasion. During our trip to and from Constantinople we passed close to the Bulair Lines and the town of Gallipoli, and by sunset on May 4th when our steamer entered the Aegean, *en route* for Athens, many of us had a clearer conception of the Turkish positions and lines of communication than we ever had in 1915.

Landing at "V" Beach (Helles) at the identical spot where the epic of the gallant "River Clyde" occurred, we found the

remains of a pier and a mass of scrap iron including a small railway engine. Just above the beach the frontal and enfilading trenches, used by the Turks on April 25th, 1915, could still be plainly discerned. On the right stood the battered fort of Sedd-el-Bahr, and to the left the mighty Helles Memorial, a silent tribute to all those who made the supreme sacrifice during the Gallipoli campaign. On it may be read the names of the Yeomanry Brigades which fought at Helles, Anzac and Suvla. A short walk across the tip of the Peninsula, past the twisted remains of the heavy guns destroyed by our fleet in March, 1915, brought us to "W" Beach (Lancashire Landing), where relics of the busy scenes enacted in 1915 were still apparent.

Iron skeletons of piers jutted out into the sea, iron lighters red with rust lay awash in the surf, the remains of a Decauville railway skirted the shore, and we ate our lunch in the stone-faced rock dwellings once occupied by the fortunate denizens of VIIIth Corps H.Q. Inland many of the trenches had fallen in and some contained large fig trees. In places the ground had been recently broken up by wild boar which, we were told, are a great trouble to the native farmers. As we walked along Gully Ravine we put up a fox, and a little further on some vultures were feeding on a dead boar. Towards the front line between Fusilier Bluff and Twelve Tree Copse, where the S.E. Mounted Brigade fought, the trenches were in a better state of preservation, and on the Turkish side were still to be seen some of the grim realities of war. Krithia we found a mass of ruins and uninhabited.

From the summit of Achi Baba (visited two days later) a wonderful view was obtained of the Peninsula and surroundings. Standing on the top and looking North Eastwards one wondered whether Achi Baba really did dominate the Narrows as we were given to understand during the War. We were told then that possession of this hill would give us an O.P. to direct the fire of our ships on the forts in the Narrows. The Kilid Bahr forts, however, were quite invisible, as they were tucked away under the cliffs (round the corner) and were also obscured by the Southern prolongation of the Kilid Bahr plateau.

Another point which struck the observer on Achi Baba was that after the capture of that hill it was necessary to cross the deep valley of Soghanli Dere before ascending again some 600 feet to the Kilid Bahr plateau which appeared to be *the* key to the Narrows.

From Kelia Bay (on our visit to Anzac and Suvla) our road took us inland and due Westwards straight across the Peninsula, ascending slightly most of the way. On our left lay the Kilid Bahr Massif, on the right the hilly country ascending to Sari Bair, with the conical hill of Mal Tepe in the foreground. Under this hill were Liman Von Sanders's H.Q., only four miles from our front line trenches.

In front of us lay a fertile and undulating plain extending to Gaba Tepe and later on the left towards Krithia. On this plain the Turks had many camps, invisible from the sea, as the ground rose gently towards the cliffs which extend down the Western side of the Peninsula. From Lone Pine above Anzac we obtained a wonderful view Southwards, but from the New Zealand Monument on Chunuk Bair nearly the whole of the battle areas could be seen. This was the furthest point reached by the New Zealanders and the 7th Gloucesters, the only British troops who, for a short time, caught a glimpse of the Dardanelles, in the August battle of Sari Bair. From Chunuk Bair looking S.E. one sees Maidos and Chanak clearly, but the forts of Kilid Bahr are hidden by the cliffs of the Kilid Bahr plateau. Southwards lies Gaba Tepe and the cliffs to Helles, showing well the dead ground between them and the slopes towards Kilid Bahr Plateau and Achi Baba.

The Turks, Kannengiesser and others have told us, always feared a landing in the Gaba Tepe sector followed by a rapid advance over the $3\frac{1}{4}$ miles of plain to Maidos. But looking at this proposition from Chunuk Bair it struck one that with the Kilid Bahr Massif occupied by the enemy the passage of an army beneath it would be none to easy.

Looking Northwards one can see Suvla Bay and the Salt Lake, Karakol Dag, Kiretch Tepe, Turshun Keui (and the plain beyond where the Turks carried out their tactical exer-

cises), the Anafarta villages, " W " Hills, Chocolate Hill, and all the familiar sights of Suvla Bay.

Liman Von Sanders tells us, in his Memoirs, that what he most feared early in August was an attack to turn his right on Kiretch Tepe Ridge, and that if the British reached Ejelmer Bay and then succeeded in forcing back the Turkish right past Turshun Keui, there would be nothing to stop them from advancing down the plains to Ak Bashi, just North of Kelia. This Liman says, would have meant the defeat of the Turkish cause, for Ak Bashi was the main ammunition depot of the whole Turkish Army on Gallipoli.

Looking at this proposition from our bird's eye view one could see how Liman's fears might be justified. August 15th was the critical day, when this *might* have happened.

It is easy to moralise on an event which took place nineteen years ago, with all the facts at one's disposal. But with a few " ifs " things might have turned out differently!

If Lord Kitchener had ordered the 2nd Mounted Division *early* in August, to Gallipoli. If its first action had been to assist the New Army Division on the Kiretch Tepe Ridge, imbued with the cavalry spirit (although dismounted) and led by resolute leaders like Peyton, Longford, Kenna, etc., the men ready to follow their officers, whom they had known for years, anywhere—might they not have won through?

The 2nd Mounted Division arrived too late. The Official History tells us that by August 15th the chance of success at Suvla, without great numerical superiority and artillery support, had already disappeared. The magnificent physique and *élan* of the 31 first line Yeomanry Regiments, which were dribbled on to the Peninsula when the campaign was already lost, were wasted. Would that three complete Divisions of Yeomanry could have taken part in the original landing at Suvla!

* * * * *

After leaving the Anzac positions, which to-day appear a network of hills, ravines, gullies and old trenches, all choked with brush, our car took us along the road above Anzac Cove, past Ari Burni and along Ocean Beach out into the Suvla area.

Crossing the (dry) Azmak Dere we were soon at Chocolate Hill. Here and in front of Green Hill the remains of our trenches could still be identified, especially the big communication trench running down the East side of Chocolate Hill. We were able to identify most of our positions easily. Below Scimitar Hill cattle were grazing peacefully. "W" Hills when viewed close up after crossing the Valley from Green Hill looked more sinister than ever, a veritable wall of rock—which the Yeoman were ordered to assault in the dark, on August 21st-22nd, with the enemy ensconced on the top! Looking Westwards from Chocolate Hill we were able to reconstruct our march across the open from Lala Baba; and even a stunted oak tree in which the writer saw a sniper, disclosed by the bush fire, shot, could still be identified. The fact that there has been no building and no additional cultivation on Gallipoli since 1915 makes that battle area easy to reconstruct.

The Salt Lake at this time of year had not yet dried up, and was awash with the waters of the Mediterranean. At Lala Baba our "evacuation" trenches were still deeply cut in the stony soil, and in some places they were six feet deep; they had not suffered like the trenches in the plain from the water coming down from the hills.

On our return journey to Kelia Bay *viâ* the beach and Lone Pine (Anzac) our road took us down the Eastern slope of the Sari Bair Massif, and one realised that this was not nearly as steep as the Western side and therefore easier for the enemy to get up his guns.

During a drive from Kelia to Achi Baba (the latter has already been dealt with) a good idea was obtained of the enemy's communications in the Southern zone. Ammunition and to a certain extent other supplies were brought by ship to Ak Bashi and thence by road, about five miles through Maidos (now in ruins, as it was destroyed by our naval guns not being protected by the cliffs) to Kilid Bahr town. This place was a very important link in the Turkish line of communications, as in addition to the supplies and reinforcements which came *viâ* Maidos, others came across the straits from Chanak. Kilid Bahr town



CHOCOLATE HILL, W. HILLS and on R. 331. (From LALA
BABA). O.T.



GREEN HILL and W. HILLS from CHOCOLATE HILL. O.T.

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and forts had escaped bombardment, sheltered as they were by the cliffs which terminate the Plateau. Even its slender minarets had been untouched. The road continues along the coast past the valley of Hauslar Dere, a deep indentation into the Plateau, and then turns right up the deep valley of Soghanli Dere, between the Plateau and Achi Baba. The Turks had a light railway up this Valley. Colonel Head has pointed out that this road, about $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles in length, must have been very vulnerable from our ships in the Aegean. After supplying the rear of Achi Baba it turns left for Krithia.

An alternative route, and used especially by garrisons along the West coast in the dead ground (referred to above), was from Kelia along the Gaba Tepe road and then left handed between the hills and the cliffs to Krithia. From Ak Bashi supplies and ammunition were also taken by road to the rear of Sari Bair to the Anafartas and the Kiretch Tepe Ridge, etc. Supplies for the Northern sector were also landed at Gallipoli town whence a road runs to Turshun Keui connected up with the Suvla front. It was by this road that the troops hastening from Bulair, *via* Gallipoli town reached the Suvla front some thirty hours after the landing. It was of considerable interest to examine the Bulair Lines through our glasses, and to look over the isthmus as we steamed slowly by. The question was asked by someone on board: "Why do they face N.E. instead of S.W.?" The answer is that they were designed by British and French engineers at the commencement of the Crimean campaign, in order to prevent the Russians (coming overland) from getting control of the Narrows and thus cutting off Turkey's allies. 1915 was not the first time that a British and French Army landed on the Gallipoli Peninsula; for in April, 1854, a very considerable Anglo-French force landed at Gallipoli town and was encamped for two months between it and Bulair.

The "Bulair Lines" became such a catch word during the War that the following letter (from Mr. W. H. Russell, "Times" correspondent), dated Gallipoli, May 6th, 1854, describing their actual commencement may be of interest:—

"The works at the intrenched camp at Bulari are progressing with such speed that our portion of them will be


finished by this day fortnight at farthest. The emulation between the French and English troops at the diggings is immense, and at the same time most good humoured. As stated in a former letter these lines are about seven miles long, and about three miles are executed by our men. They are at present simple field works, running along the crest of a natural ridge from the Gulf of Saros to the Sea of Marmora."

Although these lines would have been useless to prevent the anticipated landing by the British in 1915, as they did not face the Gulf of Saros, they were of importance to the Turks during the Balkan Wars (1912) in case Bulgaria should attempt to seize Turkey's most valuable strategic asset.

The writer spent a few hours in Chanak, which had apparently suffered considerably from our naval bombardment of its forts. The front of the town has been rebuilt and presents quite an imposing appearance.

On the Northern side of Chanak bay, about a hundred feet up, on the green hills the Turks have put up the following inscription in white figures: "18—3—15," to commemorate the action on that date when the Turkish shore batteries (and mines) repulsed the combined English and French naval attack. This inscription is so large that it can be seen some miles away as one approaches Chanak from the South.

The cemeteries on Gallipoli are extremely well kept—about thirty have been erected in the Helles-Anzac-Suvla areas. When seen at a distance they have been likened to patches of daisies on the landscape. Each consists of a central cenotaph, with an avenue of large rosemary bushes leading up to it, and on either side the inscription stones of the fallen. The turf in each case is well watered from a neighbouring well, and roses in bloom were to be seen in many. The whole is surrounded by a stone wall which includes within its boundaries groups of cypress and fir trees. Perhaps the most beautiful is that at Ari Burnu, where the well kept turf, inset with giant irises, slopes right down to the blue sea. The Graves Commission Official, who lives at Chanak, has a launch and motor car, and employs some forty labourers permanently. These live in huts near the cemeteries



not possible to include maps of "Southern Gallipoli" and the 1915" submitted by the Author.

which they attend. Most of the Yeomen who fell on August 21st lie at Green Hill and Lala Baba, the remainder in other cemeteries scattered up and down the Peninsula.


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At sunset on May 4th, 1934, we took leave of the Peninsula.

As our ship ("The Duchess of Richmond") steamed slowly out of the Dardanelles we, representatives of nearly every unit which fought on the Peninsula, fell in bareheaded and silently paid a last tribute to our comrades. The white marble memorial at Helles, lit up by the last rays of a setting sun, stood out bravely against the sombre landscape. Almost we could hear it answer triumphantly: "Their Name liveth for evermore," the inscription which appears on every British cenotaph on Gallipoli.

(The writer wishes to acknowledge his indebtedness to Brig.-General Aspinall-Oglander's stirring narrative of the "Gallipoli Campaign," Official, Vol. II, without which this article could not have been completed; also to Colonel Viscount Cobham's "Yeomanry Cavalry of Worcestershire"; and to Colonel Head's "A Glance at Gallipoli.")





UP TO DATE "SPORTSMANSHIP"

THE man who has lain out on a wintry night in a duck punt or has slithered his way through mud and half frozen water to stalk his wild-fowl will appreciate the sporting character of a party to which I was invited not long ago for a duck shoot.

(I may add that this was not in England.)

I did not go, so I missed staying in a charming central-heated bungalow from which ran brushwood tunnels to the butts at different parts of the jheel. The routine was that the guns sat in the bungalow playing bridge after dinner while ghillies kept watch at the different butts. When the birds came in the ghillies pressed electric bell pushes which called up the guns in the bungalow so that they were able to finish their rubber, take up their guns and proceed down their respective tunnels to go wild-fowling.

Why face cold and wet, as in the old days, when with a little up-to-date organisation you could do it in comfort like this?

Then in East Africa there was an invasion of sportsmen from another country who found that the real way to make a good bag of elephants, or lions, or other game was no longer to creep after

them on foot as one used to do, but to drive up to the beasts in motor cars from which they could not escape and in which you could make a rapid get-a-way if they turned nasty at your coming.

Now that the British authorities have made this form of sport illegal, the sportsmen have to content themselves by hiring a room which an enterprising hotel-keeper has erected in a tree over a waterhole. It is fitted with a powerful spotlight so that when the animals come to drink at night the sportsmen are able to take flashlight or movie photos with which to bear out their stories of adventure "in the jungles of Central Africa."

On the day in which I read in the CAVALRY JOURNAL of July that stirring story "Concerning a Tigress," I also saw an account, in a well-known weekly, of a more up-to-date method of dealing with the big cat.

"Six stone watch towers," it says, "have been erected in the panther country. To one of these the Rajah's guests repair before sundown. They drive up to the tower, garage the car, climb up to a room where dinner is served. As night falls conversation is forbidden. The servants take care that there is no single clink of china, and the soda water bottles containing drinks are already opened lest the slight sound of opening them penetrate into the night. One servant watches through the slatted windows. It may be at midnight or it may not be till just before dawn that he gives the sign. The guests creep to the windows."

They can in perfect safety there see a panther who has been attracted by a goat tied up for him to slay and mangle. When daylight comes his tracks are followed up by the native shakari to his lair. He is then driven out and shepherded by an army of 200 beaters till he is forced to come into the open at a point to which the guests have been conveyed in their motor cars.

"The guns come to the ready," says the account. "For a brief second or two there is a flash of a tawny body through the grass. The rifles (N.B., plural) crack. He rolls over, charges at his adversary and dies."

But even after the "rifles" have "cracked" we are told that there is the danger of his not dying as promptly as desired so "one of the crack shots (the others having presumably 'cracked' ineffectually) is always ready with a shot-gun in case he approaches too near for safety. . . . He may approach within five feet of the guests. . . . It is necessary now to have calm nerves and muscles. For the panther means business when he is wounded."

The account goes on to say that when finally done in "the long tawny body is borne off proudly. The inevitable silver teapot comes from an attendant car, and deck chairs are placed in position—this in the heart of the panther country! A servant hands round a silver cigarette box. The soda water for the decanter is iced. . . . The day's sport costs little less than £50. But it has meant an unforgettable thrill."

There is of course the usual photograph of the guns, among whom is the usual bright young thing in jungle get-up, showing her teeth.

But in spite of this thrilling kind of adventure I believe a still more up-to-date method could be used if in that country they were to erect a few concrete, loop-holed "pill-boxes," provide both beaters and guns with gas-masks, and, as Mr. Stripes, or Spots, comes along, squirt a good jet of poison gas at him. It would be just as sporting and really safer all round.

This all opens up the question as to what we can do to bring other forms of sport up to date.

I see in the "Journal" of the 5th Inniskilling Dragoon Guards they already foresee, through the recent introduction of shaps into the game of Polo, that a certain amount of lariat and automatic play will come in.

But what about Hunting and Point-to-Point riding?

As this form of sport is equally popular in all the three Services, probably some kind of co-operation will be evolved whereby Army horses ridden by Naval Officers and attached to Airplanes could get over a country with less exertion and fewer falls than in the old-fashioned way; nor would hounds be necessary, so the objections to fox-hunting on the part of ladies of the R.S.P.C.A. would be largely discounted.

And as to Pigsticking—well, there are apparently two schools of thought on this subject; one, realising the danger of horses getting cut and men injured by a charging boar, favour the idea of pursuing the pig with armoured cars; the other party feel that Pigsticking is essentially a horseman's sport and that at all costs the horse should be retained; but to obviate those dangers incidental to trappy country and ferocious swine, the more humane and up-to-date method would undoubtedly be to hunt an electric pig on a well-laid course.

B. P.



CORRESPONDENCE

The Editor, THE CAVALRY JOURNAL.

Concerning Ulans in the Prussian Army.

SIR,—The reason that provoked Frederick the Great's disparaging remark quoted by your correspondent Oskar Teichman, is that as the Ulans of that time carried the butt of the lance in a bucket on a bandolier when charging, they were apt suddenly to assume a sitting position on the ground. This was not the effect the great King desired.

Yours faithfully,

B. GRANVILLE BAKER.

The Editor, THE CAVALRY JOURNAL.

SIR,—Regarding Major Oskar Teichman's note on Frederick the Great's Lancers in the July CAVALRY JOURNAL, it is stated in the "Guide to the Armoury in Berlin" (1914 edition), that Frederick William III introduced *Uhlands* for the first time into the Prussian Cavalry. This was in 1808.

The small number of Lancers in Frederick the Great's Cavalry were apparently called "Bosniaks," and later known as 'Towarzysz' after the renowned corps of King John Sobieski of Poland.

Yours faithfully,

J. E. N. RYAN.

The undermentioned have become subscribers for 1934 :—

Captain M. T. Henderson, 16th/5th Lancers; Captain C. C. C. Farran, 13th D.C.O. Lancers, I.A.; Lieut. Donald Ross, 13th D.C.O. Lancers, I.A.; Indian Officers' Club, 13th D.C.O. Lancers, I.A.; Captain J. M. Bryan, Ph.D., O.C. Cavalry Squadron Cambridge University O.T.C.; Lieut.-Colonel Sidney G. Goldschmidt; Lieut. P. W. Ironside, 13th/18th Hussars; 2/Lieut. D. C. N. Baring, 3rd Carabiniers.

HOME AND DOMINION MAGAZINES

Except for two articles by Captain Liddell Hart on mechanization, and by General Golovin on the Russian forces in the Far East, and the Bertrand Stewart prize essay—won this year, it is pleasing to see, by an officer of the junior division of the O.T.C.—the “Army Quarterly” for July is entirely given up to historical articles. This, however interesting these may be, seems a pity, and it is to be hoped that the proportion of contents devoted to current topics, military and political, may soon revert to its normal. The historical matter is, however, full of varied interest for those with a liking for such things, and in particular may be noted General Bird’s discussion on the application of the principles of war, and the notes by Captain Koeppen on the fateful mission on which he accompanied Colonel Hentsch at the battle of the Marne.

The June “Fighting Forces” contains a most interesting account of a little known French cavalry exploit in the Macedonian theatre of the Great War at Skoplje, compiled by Captain Cyril Falls, the British official historian. When the final break through occurred General Jouinot-Gambetta’s cavalry brigade was ordered to break through the connecting Bulgarian lines and seize Skoplje and cut off the retreat of their right corps, the LXII, which had to pass by that town to make its escape to the north. The task was brilliantly performed; passing by a difficult and unreconnoitred mountain track, the brigade reached and carried the town by surprise, riding over all resistance met with and holding on despite increasing enemy pressure by heavily superior forces, until the arrival of infantry help after forty-eight hours enabled the brigade to accomplish its mission and force the surrender of the 60,000 men of the enemy LXII

Corps, cut off from all hope from rescue. Captain Falls deserves the thanks of all cavalymen for rescuing from oblivion this fine achievement, the few foreign accounts of which have received little or no attention in this country. Of the other contents of the number attention may be directed to Captain Tuke's bright little article on Service Cricket and Lieutenant Hazelrigg's suggestion—a somewhat radical one—for a revision of the present system of attachment of officers, infantry and gunners, to each others' arm of the Service.

The "Royal Artillery Journal" for July has an article by Major Fiennes, in reply to the article in the July, 1933, CAVALRY JOURNAL disclaiming some of the accepted advantages of mechanization for that arm. He points out that expansion in a modern war will be facilitated by the fact that recruits who come up are more likely to have mechanical than horse knowledge; that the necessary tradesman can more easily be found, and that the mechanized unit will have more time to train and greater ease in doing so, because of the absence of the demand of stables and horse maintenance. Embarkation and disembarkation problems will be simplified and duties on voyage much less onerous. In the field a tractor-drawn battery is more mobile in reconnaissance and can get quicker into action, and petrol and oil are less bulky and more easily transportable than forage and daily water. If the R.H.A. is to remain in the van of progress, mechanization, in the writer's opinion, must replace the horse, and the sooner the better. In another interesting article Lieut.-Colonel Body pleads for greater attention to topography in tactical matters; practical details such as the influence of the ground on the range and effectiveness of weapons, the necessity for careful estimation of such influence in the major planning of an attack, or the selection of a long defensive line and organisation of a fire plan, and in operations in close or wooded country, tend to be neglected in these days of large numbers of troops and large scale maps. Here is food for thought for all of us.

The "R.E. Journal" and the "R.A.M.C. Journal" have little of other than specialised interest this time.

Three numbers of the "Royal Tank Corps Journal" have reached us, for the first time we believe. The main items of interest are a useful summary of the various tank operations in the Great War compiled by Major-General Fuller, and an account of the first battle of Bullecourt by the late Major Watson, who at the time commanded one of the tank companies engaged in it. The greater part of the space in the journal is, however, devoted to Corps news and topical items.

The "R.A.V.C. Journal" must always be of interest to those who take an intelligent interest in horses and their ailments, and by those with a taste for lighter fare Major Duncan's recollections of his war-time experiences in Egypt and Palestine will repay perusal, as will Major Shaw's sketch of the history of the Mogul Empire in India.

The "Journal of the R.U.S.I. of India" for April and July contain a wealth of interesting articles from a general, if not from a purely cavalry, point of view. We can do no more than merely mention those on "Pacifism v. Militarism," "What is Military Genius?" "Modern Attack," "Sour Grapes," "Smoky Notes," and the two historical accounts by the Russian General Golovine on the Tannenberg Campaign. These are not the only, but the most, interesting articles in two highly creditable and praiseworthy numbers.

The "Ypres Times," the "Proceedings of the Canadian Cavalry Association" for the year 1933, and the "Quarterly Journal of Lord Strathcona's Horse" for May, 1934, have also been received and will well repay reading.

The "R.A.F. Journal" has as its most interesting items an account of the evacuation of British civilians from Kabul by air in 1928-29, and the Gordon Shepherd Memorial prize essay dealing with the topic recently so much discussed in the Press—the alleged inhumanity of air control of undeveloped countries as against the former policy of control by ground troops.

E. W. S.

FOREIGN MAGAZINES

THE foreign military Press during the past quarter has not published any article of unusual cavalry interest. The mechanization of the cavalry division is everywhere being discussed and accepted as inevitable; most writers, therefore, content themselves with illustrations of their opinions, most of which are merely elaborations of the recognised uses of mechanized cavalry. In particular this is the case in France, where, as already outlined in previous numbers, the cavalry division is now considered as being in a more or less fixed condition of mechanization. Thus in the May-June and July-August numbers of the "*Revue de Cavalerie*" the most important contributions made by Colonel Argueyrolles turn on a discussion of last year's exercises by mechanized cavalry in the valley of the Meuse. The orders and instructions are given in full; these are far too lengthy to reproduce or even to summarize. But they appear to be highly practical and take into account, what appears to be easily forgotten, that is the effect of terrain on mechanized manœuvre. It is interesting to note that the French mechanized division relies much on aerial reconnaissance. The author speaks approvingly of British views and of the employment of armoured formations; in particular he mentions the complete circuit of the enemy's forces achieved by a Tank Brigade on Salisbury Plain. Nevertheless he questions whether this would be feasible manœuvre in war against an enemy prepared for attack by armoured formations; he further doubts whether British opinion concerning armoured warfare pays sufficient attention to obstacles of ground. He doubts whether the crossing of the Thames by the new British amphibious tank is as yet a practical solution of the bridging difficulty. On the whole he does not consider that the mechanized cavalry raid across the

enemy's communications is likely to produce any definite result except under favourable conditions.

Major Gazin publishes two long articles entitled "Lost Opportunities," which deals with the use made of cavalry during the German advance through France in August, 1914. He blames the German High Command for having remained too far in rear and for having lost control of the cavalry formations. These were too often switched over from one task to another; in this connection he names the diversion of the II Cavalry Corps on 21st August from its task of reconnoitring for the Second Army in order to join the First Army at the moment of going into action. This tendency sprang from the desire to make cavalry take part in the decisive battle that was to be. Again he criticises the use made of the German cavalry after the Battle of Guise when Kluck, thinking the British to have been utterly defeated at Le Cateaux, turned his horsemen to assist Bülow's Second Army. Thus there came about the action at Néry and in the end the services of the cavalry were wasted; the French Fifth Army thus escaped on the 1st September from a situation that might have become critical. The writer is perhaps not quite generous in his appreciation of what the fighting at Néry did for the French Fifth Army; but that question is to be discussed later.

M. de Chevigny has a thoroughly interesting contribution on the horse-supply and horse-market in Ireland. He states that the present economic difficulties of the Free State, complicated by its quarrel with the British Government over tariffs on imported horses, is having a deleterious effect on the Irish horse industry. He attended several sales and horse shows, mainly in Dublin, and his experiences are worth reading.

An anonymous writer gives an account of the work done by the French cavalry in the High Atlas during the operations carried out in that district (April-August, 1933). The author claims that cavalry mounted on barb ponies and supported by mechanized elements is capable of action in a terrain and under conditions which possess some similarity to those prevalent on the North-West Frontier of India. The fighting, though not

severe, ended decidedly in favour of the French and so the writer can claim to prove his contention.. But he does not show that armoured vehicles played a great part in the result. It would seem that the horsemen, supported by motorized machine guns, were the chief element in the result. More information is promised.

Captain Simon describes the crossing of a river by a regiment of "dragons portés," virtually motor-borne infantry. The stream was 160-170 feet broad and was crossed by means of one-man gangways, slung across the water, as well as by rafts capable of taking motor-cycles and side-cars. The article is thoroughly well illustrated with photographs and diagrams.

The "Cavalry Journal" of the United States does not contain much of outstanding interest except a long, well-written biographical study of Custa, the impulsive and fearless Federal cavalry leader. At the close of the Civil War Custa had reached the rank of general and commanded a cavalry division with some considerable success in the final battles of the war. The writer does full justice to a picturesque, long-haired, leader who resembled in more ways than one our Prince Rupert. Another similar article deals with R. M. Johnson, who is called the Father of American Cavalry; he shone mainly in the fighting of 1813. Elsewhere there is given the text of the order by which the sword is completely abolished in the United States cavalry. There is also the text of the Act of June, 1933, by which the National Guard is re-organised on a basis which permits of its control by the Central Federal Government during embodiment on emergency; on cessation of such an emergency the Guard returns to the State which supplies the units.

The Swiss journal, "Der Schweizer Kavallerist," has a good summary of the present situation of the problem "Horsed or Motorized Cavalry." The writer comes to the conclusion that country and terrain can alone dictate an answer to this question. He quotes Great Britain, Italy and Germany as having decided to preserve horsed units.

RECENT PUBLICATIONS

“The Lure of the Indus.” By Lieut.-General Sir I. MacMunn. (Jarrolds.) 18s.

In this large and handsomely illustrated volume General MacMunn, continuing his researches into the military history of British India, tells the story of five past wars; our first invasion of Afghanistan with its disastrous outcome, Napier's Scinde campaign, the “four-days'” war in Gwalior, and the conquest of the Punjab—in two instalments. He sees the underlying cause of them all in the necessity laid upon the East India Company, as the natural successor of the Mogul Emperors, to push the western boundary of its territory to the Indus, the natural frontier in that quarter—a necessity inexorable despite the reluctance of all concerned to extend further dominions already too great for the resources of a mere trading company. From this point of view he gallantly, if not altogether successfully, embarks on the defence of our policy *vis-a-vis* Afghanistan, which for most people will still remain a crowning example of Nemesis overtaking an ill-judged and unrighteous undertaking. The remaining wars, all forced upon us in a sense by the circumstances, had at least the merit of being ultimately successful, and there will be few now found to defend the Amirs of Scinde, to quarrel with our intervention in Gwalior, or to suggest that we could have done other than take up the challenge of the military anarchy in the Punjab and restore order and peace there.

General MacMunn makes of these five wars a spirited and breezy story, more suited perhaps to the civilian with a taste for history and romance than for a soldier seeking military lessons from the past for the present. Some evidence of this is to be found in the fact that, while there are a number of reproductions of the fine military prints of the period, the maps are so scanty

that only the most general idea of the operations can be gathered from them. From this point of view, however, the book can be read with ease and pleasure, somewhat discounted by the author's peculiarities of style and neglect of the accepted rules of proof reading and punctuation, and one is left sharing his regret that the disappearance of the Company's native army and its records in the Mutiny, and the abolition, too, of those famous Irish regiments, the heirs of its European battalions, have caused the memory of many fine deeds of arms to be lost in undeserved oblivion.

"The Army and Navy Club, 1837-1933." By C. W. Firebrace. (Murray.) 12s.

This history of the "Rag" told by an old member is, of course, of primary interest to members of the Club. Some sidelights on social and military characteristics are cast in the course of the story of the Club's development, and in the anecdotes told of some of its members and staff. A full list of officials and honorary members, an inventory of the portraits and statuary in the buildings, and a selected list of distinguished members are given at the end of the volume, and some of the more famous pictures are reproduced.

"The Man and the Hour. Studies of Six Great Men of Our Time." Edited by Arthur Bryant. (Allan.) 5s.

These brilliant little sketches were originally given as lectures at the 1933 course held at the Conservative College at Ashridge. King Edward VII was the monarch who brought England back from her isolation to membership of Europe, and more than any one man prepared the victory of Western democracy over militarised monarchy. Lenin brought Russia out of the Middle Ages into the modern world and created her anew, laying foundations which her future builders will never be able to reject. Briand was the apostle of peace, the father of the idea of a united Europe, a dream yet to be fulfilled, but which must be fulfilled if she is to survive. Pilsudski was the creator and preserver of the new Poland throughout all the manifold perils, internal and external, which attended her difficult birth. Mussolini founded the first

of the new model Corporate States, and brought back to Italy the dignity and strength of her ancestral Rome. Hitler rescued Germany from despair and anarchy and gave her a new ideal and a new life. Such, writes Mr. Bryant in his admirable epilogue, are these men, whose common characteristic above all their manifold differences, were that "they preached to the people by the light of their own burning convictions and offered their own labour and lives that the people may live and the nations be reborn."

"Notes and Comments on the Dardanelles Campaign." By Lieut.-Colonel A. Kearsey. (Gale & Polden.) 4s.

This little work comprises a short sketch of events, a diary of dates, and sixteen pages of comments on various points of interest arising from the history of the campaign. The main causes of failure are considered by the author to have been: the warning given by the premature naval attack; the delay in concentration of the military forces; underestimation of the enemy; faulty equipment of the expedition; and the difficulties of the country. Its main lessons are said to be: necessity for a preliminary joint appreciation and plan; influence of submarines in amphibious warfare; ineffectiveness of naval gunfire against shore targets; necessity for quickly available reserves to hand. Short as the book is, it might have been made still shorter and handier but for the author's habit of printing each of his brief sentences as a full paragraph. There are four sketch maps, and the book as a whole should serve as a useful introduction to further study of the campaign.

"Lawrence of Lucknow." By J. L. Morison. (Bell.) 15s.

Sir Herbert Lawrence has long lacked a worthy biographer; in this work—a labour of love, at which he has worked for four years—Mr. Morison has tried to fill the gap, and if one feels that he has hardly fully succeeded, it is perhaps due to the fact that his hero, despite the greatness of his work for India and the sterling worth of his character and abilities, was a difficult person to work with and live with. He had a genius for understanding the Indians, an immense love of the country and the

people born of that understanding, and a fearlessness of responsibility not entirely to the taste of his superiors, especially to that most masterful of Viceroys, Dalhousie. It was most unfortunate for India that at the time of Lawrence's prime, he should have had to work under a chief who never really liked or trusted him. Nevertheless his work on the North-West Frontier and in the Punjab was of abiding value, and his personality and deeds would have achieved immortality in the history of British India even without his legendary death at the beginning of the siege of the Lucknow Residency, the memory of which will abide as long as the British flag is kept hoisted day and night over the ruins, as it has been ever since that day, a perpetual memorial to a heroic episode. Lawrence comes before us in these pages with all his faults upon him, yet these are but spots on a glorious luminary, the light of which shines even to-day in the country for which he gave of his best.

E. W. S.

"Fifty Years on the Test." By C. Ernest Pain. (Philip Allan.) 10s. 6d.

A book to be read and enjoyed by all dry-fly anglers, and to be bought by all chalk-stream riparian owners and their fishing tenants. The first part contains interesting reminiscences of the Test from Colonel Hawker's day onward, with many observations and "wrinkles" of the nature always so welcome from a fisherman of great experience. The later part is mainly devoted to stocking and fishery management of chalk stream waters generally. Mr. Pain writes on this important subject in the most practical and interesting way. One closes the book with a feeling that one would like to know more of his views, especially on breeding for edibility. In many chalk streams to-day trout are white-fleshed, tasteless, and almost uneatable. Fish which are pink-fleshed get rarer each year. What is the cause? Mr. Pain does not tell us. Is it because unsuitable imported stock drives out the old indigenous fish, or some form of pollution as yet unknown? The problem is surely important, for however successful a breeder may be, he must fail to give satisfaction if his product is uneatable. No true sportsman derives pleasure if he kills uselessly.

G. A.

"The Houghunters' Annual." 7s. 6d.

It is refreshing for those at home who can no longer enjoy pigsticking to be able to keep in touch with the sport as carried out in India and other countries, and to read the records of the various clubs. The Houghunters' Annual fills a big gap and should be widely popular. Volume VII. just issued, contains a review of 1933 season, with a full account of the Kadir Cup, Tent Club summaries and several bright stories, not only concerning pigsticking, but also big game shooting. It is sad to read that the past season has been depressing, the total number of pig killed being 479 as against 538 in the previous season. A coloured frontispiece, "Mad Dogs and Englishmen" is included in this volume.

Copies are obtainable from The Agent, "Houghunters' Annual," Withington House, Andoversford, Glos., or from "The Editor," 24, Park Street, Calcutta.

The following have also been received and will be reviewed in the next issue of the Journal :—

"The Legion Advances." By Rex Ingram. (Ivor Nicholson & Watson.) 7s. 6d.

"The Silver Horn." By Gordon Grand. (Illust.). (Country Life.) 10s. 6d.

"Rum 'Uns to Follow. Memories of Seventy Years in the Shires." By A. Melton Rough-Rider. (Illust.). (Country Life.) 10s. 6d.

"Florence Nightingale." By I. B. O. Malley. (Thornton & Butterworth.) 5s.

"The Baton in the Knapsack." By Laurence Currie. (John Murray.) 12s.



SPORTING NEWS

BISLEY, 1934—CAVALRY SUCCESSES

The Army Week this year opened on 2nd July, in a blaze of sunshine, and weather conditions remained very good throughout the week, although occasionally there was, perhaps, too much "glare" from the shooting point of view.

The scores generally this year are higher than those of last, but this, it is thought, is due to the larger bull now being used.

The best performance of the week was put up by Sergt. J. Holmes (11th Hussars); this N.C.O. figures in the prize lists of the Army Hundred, Roupell and Roberts Cups. The undernamed deserve mention for their consistently good shooting:—

Lieut. H. Mackeson (Royal Scots Greys).

Sergt. F. Ward (11th Hussars).

Sergt. E. Imms (5th Inniskilling Dragoon Guards).

Cpl. J. Phillips (11th Hussars).

Tpr. A. Crofts (3rd Carabiniers).

But for a very moderate score (19) in Practice 3 of the Roberts Cup, Tpr. A. Cheswick (11th Hussars) might have been the winner in Class "C" of this competition, instead of finishing eleventh.

Lieut. Mackeson (Royal Scots Greys) and Sergts. Holmes and Ward (11th Hussars) secured places in the fifty qualified to compete for the King's Medal.

In addition to the prizes shown below, various sums (amounting approximately to £25) were won by the Cavalry in the rifle pool and sweepstakes.

ROUPELL CUP (h.p.s. 150)				
<i>Order of Merit</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Score</i>	<i>Prize</i>
CLASS "A"				
13	Major A. S. Turnham, O.B.E.	10th ussars	124	£1
39	Sergt. J. Holmes	H11th ussars	119	£1
60	Sergt. A. Picker	4th Hussars	117	£1
71	Sergt. D. Mulcahy	3rd Hussars	115	£1
CLASS "B"				
12	Cpl. F. Hillier	3rd Carabiniers	116	£1
33	Tpr. W. Childs	3rd Hussars	110	10/-
38	L/Cpl. H. Howarth	11th Hussars	110	10/-
CLASS "C"				
20	Tpr. A. Findlay	R.S. Greys	107	10/-
23	Tpr. A. Crofts	3rd Carabiniers	106	10/-
28	Tpr. W. Houston	4th Hussars	104	10/-
29	Tpr. G. Rockliffe	9th Lancers	104	10/-
36	Tpr. J. Anson	4th/7th D. Gds.	103	10/-
40	L/Cpl. B. Newton	3rd Carabiniers	102	10/-
43	Tpr. A. Johnston	3rd Hussars	101	10/-
44	Tpr. T. Kelly	11th Hussars	101	10/-

ROBERTS CUP (h.p.s. 150)

CLASS "A"

4	Sergt. F. Ward	11th Hussars	123	£2
12	Sergt. E. Imms	5th Innis. D. Gds.	114	£1
16	Sergt. J. Holmes	11th Hussars	112	£1
19	Lieut. H. Mackeson	R.S. Greys	110	£1
43	Sergt. H. Douglas	R.S. Greys	101	£1
51	Sergt. McLoughlin	11th Hussars	99	£1
76	Major D. S. Frazer	15th/19th Hussars	95	£1

CLASS "B"

21	Cpl. J. Phillips	11th Hussars	102	£1
24	Farr. B. Cook	4th Hussars	98	10/-
25	Tpr. C. Ross	4th Hussars	98	10/-

CLASS "C"

11	Tpr. A. Cheswick	11th Hussars	87	10/-
16	Tpr. A. Moodie	R.S. Greys	84	10/-
35	Tpr. A. Crofts	3rd Carabiniers	75	10/-

ARMY HUNDRED CUP (h.p.s. 200)

32	Sergt. J. Holmes	11th Hussars	154	£2
36	Lieut. H. Mackeson	R.S. Greys	152	£2
47	Sergt. F. Ward	11th Hussars	149	£2
101	Sergt. E. Imms	5th Innis. D. Gds.	121	£1
109	Cpl. J. Phillips	11th Hussars	99	£1

The three matches named above form the 1st and 2nd stages of the Army Championship (at Home), for which there were no less than 692 entries.

1st Stage—RouPELL and Roberts Cups.

2nd Stage—Army Hundred Cup.

The hundred best scorers in the 1st stage go forward to the 2nd stage and shoot for the Army Hundred Cup.

The best aggregate score in the two stages wins the Army Championship, which carries with it the Army Rifle Association Gold Jewel; the runner-up receives the Silver Jewel, and the Bronze Jewel goes to the third.

These Jewels have been won by Cavalrymen in the past. The Bronze Jewel was won by Pte. T. C. Clunie (Royal Scots Greys) in 1908; the Gold Jewel was won by S.S.M. J. Anderston (19th Hussars) in 1914; and the Silver Jewel was won by R.S.M. J. Goddard (14th Hussars) in 1922. It is hoped by this time next year that we can record another cavalryman as the proud possessor of one of these Jewels.

BRITANNIA TROPHY (h.p.s. 900)

This is a Regimental team match, open to all regiments and battalions at home. The trophy, which is a silver model of the Nelson Statue in Trafalgar Square, was presented to the Army by the Royal Navy and Marines in 1923. Neither the Royal Scots Greys nor the 11th Hussars finished in the first eleven. This trophy has never been won by the Cavalry.

METHUEN CUP (h.p.s. 1,600)

13th	Cavalry Regiments	1,135
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This Cup has never been won by the Cavalry.

THE KING'S MEDAL

This Medal is shot for by one hundred competitors ; fifty from the Regular Army and Militia and fifty from the Territorial Army. The fifty representatives of the Regular Army are nominated by the Army Rifle Association, and are the fifty highest scorers in the Army Championship Competition. Three cavalrymen obtained places in this shoot ; names and scores as follows :—

21st	Sergt. J. Holmes (11th Hussars)	158
80th	Lieut. H. Mackeson (Royal Scots Greys) ..	131
82nd	Sergt. F. Ward (11th Hussars)	131

The Medal has never been won by a cavalryman.

ROYAL CAMBRIDGE SHIELD

1st	11th Hussars	1,369
2nd	Royal Scots Greys	1,290
3rd	3rd Carabiniers	1,203

This Shield has been held by the 11th Hussars since 1929.

The match is fired concurrently with the Army Championship, and the Shield is awarded to the Cavalry team which makes the highest aggregate score in the 1st stage of the Army Championship.

REVOLVER THIRTY CUP

4th	Major D. S. Frazer (15th/19th Hussars) ..	*168
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* Winning Score was 176.

N.R.A. SILVER MEDAL

Major T. G. Upton, O.B.E., D.C.M., late 11th Hussars, won this Medal with a score of 146.

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CHARGER TEST FOR THE PROBYN'S HORSE CUP

The test was held at the Equitation School, Saugor, on 3rd, 4th and 5th April, 1934. The test was originally initiated with the object of encouraging student officers attending Courses to obtain and train horses of the right stamp for Cavalry and Artillery chargers.

The test included the following :—

- (a) First day.—An endurance and horsemastership test, consisting of a ride of 40 miles at an average speed of not less than 8 miles per hour, starting with a circuit of the 'chase course at 15 miles per hour.

On completion of the ride, horses were judged for loss of condition, distress, galls, etc.

The rider was allowed no assistance, and any feeding, watering, grooming, etc., which the rider wished to do had to be carried out by himself.

- (b) Second day.—A cross-country and weapon training test. The course of about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles included varied going, 22 obstacles and 10 dummies (representing enemy riflemen) in awkward places.

No practice over the course was allowed, and competitors were expected to attack the dummies with the object of killing in what they considered to be the most effective way.

There was a time limit for the course based on a fair hunting pace.

- (c) Third day.—Manners and training of horse were tested by certain exercises in an open manege.

Allotment of Marks :

'Chase course and endurance test	125
Cross-country and weapon training	150
Manege test	100
Conformation	25
				<hr/> 400 <hr/>

The number of entries this year, which was considerably less than usual, was disappointing.

The test was won by Lieut. Lamb's ch. Ind. g. Little Willie, with 319 marks; Lieut. Shoolbred's b. Aust. g. Parting Ways being second with 252 marks.

The winner was ridden by Lieut. Chaplin (19th Lancers), as the owner was in hospital as a result of a fall 'chasing.

The Equitation School Point-to-Point Race Meeting was held at Makronia on 24th and 27th April. The going was good, but owing to lack of rain there was more dust than usual.

RESULTS :

1ST DAY—24TH APRIL

THE POONA HORSE CUP.—For horses regularly ridden by I.Os. and I.O.Rs. at the Equitation School during the Course. About 2 miles.

- 1st Naik Arjun Rao (33rd Field Troop, Madras S. & M.) Butterplay.
- 2nd L/Dafadar Par-Upkari Singh (P.A.V.O. Cavalry) Pigeon.
- 3rd Jemadar Naiz Mohd (The Scinde Horse) Gold.

Thirteen starters, six finished ; Butterplay winning by a distance.

OPEN RACE—LIGHTWEIGHT, 24TH PUNJABI CUP.—Open to members of the I.C.S., Police, I.F.S., and officers of the Army and States Forces on full pay. About 3 miles.

- 1st Lieut. J. F. Williams Wynn (73rd Field Battery, R.A.) Hope.
- 2nd Lieut. Malet (10th Royal Hussars) Racketeer.
- 3rd Lieut. Cotton (8th K.G.O. Light Cavalry) Donald.

Eleven starters, seven finished. Lieut. Ritchie's Guy came in third, but was disqualified as he could not draw the weight.

THE NETHERAVON CUP.—For horses the bona-fide property of officers of the Equitation School. About 3½ miles.

- 1st Lieut. Mohammad Iftikhar Khan (3rd Cavalry) Ahmed.
- 2nd Capt. C. Goulder (R.H.A.) Colleen More.

Seven starters ; only two finished.

THE HAMBRO CUP.—For horses regularly ridden by British Warrant and Non-Commissioned officers at the Equitation School during this Course. About 2 miles.

- Dead { 10th Royal Hussars) Grey Sprite.
- Heat { S.S.M. Frisby, Bombdr. Thomas (14th Field Battery, R.A.) M.G.C.
- 3rd S.S.M. Midgley (1st The Royal Dragoons) Severn.

Eleven starters. Grey Sprite and M.G.C. were together for the last mile and the result was a dead heat.

OPEN RACE—HEAVYWEIGHT, 24TH PUNJABI CUP.—Open to members of the I.C.S., Police, I.F.S., and officers of the Army and States Forces on full pay. About 3 miles.

- 1st Lieut. Wood (13th/18th Hussars) Ginger.
- 2nd Lieut. Burnaby (1st Field Battery, R.A.) Roza.
- 3rd Lieut. Verma (16th Light Cavalry) Hurrio.

Fifteen starters ; thirteen finished.

2ND DAY—27TH APRIL

2ND LANCERS' CUP.—An inter-ride relay race on second-year remounts. Teams of four per ride. Run over a natural line of country, starting at the Equitation School and finishing on the Point-to-Point Course.

- 1st " B " Ride.
- 2nd " A " Ride.

Eleven teams competed.

THE NORMAN CUP.—Teams of four from British Officer and Indian States Forces Rides. About 3 miles.

- 1st " B " Ride 26 points (deducted).
- 2nd " A " Ride (1st Team) 32 points.

Four teams started. Lieut. Malet's Racketeer was first past the post.

THE ROYAL DECCAN HORSE CUP.—Teams of four from British and Indian N.C.O. Rides. About 2 miles.

- 1st " E " Ride 22 points.
- 2nd " J " Ride 30 points.

Three teams started. Naik Arjun Rao's Butterplay was first past the post.

POLO

LORD STONEHAVEN CUP

Whilst Governor-General of Australia, Lord Stonehaven presented a silver cup to be competed for by polo teams in the 1st Cavalry Division (New South Wales and Queensland).

This trophy was first competed for during the year 1931-32, when the final was played between the 16th Light Horse Regiment (Hunter River Lancers) and 12th (New England) Light Horse Regiment, the 16th winning. This regiment again won during the year 1932-33, when the final was between them and the 6th Light Horse Regiment (New South Wales Mounted Rifles).

For the year 1933-34, the elimination contest was carried out during Camps of Continuous Training, and the final between the 6th Light Horse Regiment and the 16th Light Horse Regiment was played on the first day of the Australians Polo Association's Annual Tournament, which was held on the Kensington ground, Sydney, New South Wales, from 23rd to 30th June, 1934. The 6th Light Horse was represented by a team from the Forbes troop, consisting of T. L. Bray (capt.), back ; R. D. Bray, 3 ; A. N. Bray, 2 ; D. Delaney, 1 ; and the 16th Light Horse by a team from the Dungog troop, the members being C. W. Hooke (capt.), back ; R. J. Alison, 3 ; R. T. Mackay, 2 ; J. K. Mackay, 1.

(The Forbes troop comes from sheep country 300 miles west of Sydney, and the Dungog troop from cattle country 150 miles north of Sydney).

Dungog commenced well and R. T. Mackay gained possession of the ball, but R. D. Bray saved the position for Forbes. Dungog's captain headed a run and a backhand swing sent the ball along the field. Close play continued for a time without either side gaining an advantage, and there were two stoppages owing to saddle troubles. Forbes made a number of determined rushes, but these were frustrated by Hooke. From a penalty, R. D. Bray opened Forbes' score and Dungog made the score equal by a fine goal after a struggle near the line by R. T. Mackay. Misses by the Dungog men lost them opportunities, then Forbes' second goal was scored by Mackay. Hooke prevented Delaney from racing through to the goal line, then Dungog carried play through and equalled the score, to add another goal by Mackay quickly after. A. N. Bray, for Forbes, again made the score equal, and a free hit was awarded to Forbes, but the attempt at goal failed. The second period terminated with the scores equal—3 each.

Alison and Hooke shared in a strong effort to reach the Forbes line, but R. D. Bray saved and rode through with the ball, and there was close play near the Dungog goal. Hitting was erratic and there were many examples of packed play ; J. K. Mackay made two good saves, outriding his opponents, and Hooke's attempt at goal after the ball had gone outside the line failed. Delaney rode past the Dungog back but the latter players prevented a score, and the period closed without any alteration in the score.

Play in the fourth period was for a time concentrated in the centre of the field, and a run through to Dungog ended in a free hit to that side. Bray

sped past the Dungog back but missed the ball. Alison made a determined effort, but the ball went outside the posts and a second effort failed, with the ball later going beyond the side line. A fast run ended in A. N. Bray goaling for Forbes, giving that team an advantage of one with the score 4—3. Forbes kept playing in Dungog's territory until A. N. Bray left the other players in the rear but his hit at goal failed. Then in a great rush Dungog gained possession, and scored, making the teams level again. The fifth period closed with the scores 4 each.

Both sides showed anxiousness to decide the issue in the final period. Alison had an opportunity, but the ball was hit outside the line, and Forbes' effort at goal later was wide. R. D. Bray and A. N. Bray shares in a fine ride to take the ball through but it went behind. Dungog's captain made a great hit, but it travelled over, and after a run through the field, A. N. Bray drove the ball between the posts. It was the winning hit for Forbes, and the match ended a few moments later with the final score :—6th Light Horse 5 ; 16th Light Horse 4. T. L. and A. N. Bray played the outstanding game for the winning side, whilst the games of J. K. Mackay and C. W. Hooke were predominant for the losers. C. W. Hooke certainly played the best game on the ground.

SPORTING NEWS—CANADA

From the sporting angle the Lord Strathcona's Horse (R.C.) have had a most successful season.

In the Guide's Cup Race, a fifteen mile point-to-point ridden on compass bearings, Captain F. C. Powell, M.C., D.C.M., was second.

The race was won by Major J. Beatty of the 15th Canadian Light Horse.

A similar race, but over a course of ten miles, ridden by senior N.C.Os. of "C" Battery, R.C.H.A., and L.S.H. (R.C.) was won by R.S.M. (W.O.1) C. Fallas, L.S.H. (R.C.), with Q.M.S.I. (W.O.11) A. G. Jacobs, L.S.H. (R.C.) second.

In Polo the Regiment made a clean sweep of all their tournaments. Early in the season they won the " Sheep Creek " Challenge Cup from High River. The holders of this Cup may be challenged by any other Club, the game to be played on the holder's ground.

Two weeks after capturing the Cup, a challenge was made by the Calgary Club, and later in the season by High River. In each case we were successful in retaining the Cup.

The Provincial Polo Tournament was held on the Regimental grounds at Sarcee Camp on 9th and 11th August.

The Calgary Club, with the help of Lieut. J. Lane, R.C.H.A. and Mr. T. Hugill, R.M.C., were able to field two teams, and although High River,

owing to absentees, could not put in a team, Mr. E. Capers raised a team from his ranch which played as the Round Tee team. The T is the brand of Mr. Capers' ranch.

The draw for the tournament resulted in L.S.H. (R.C.) meeting the Calgary Strollers in the first round.

The Regiment got away to a good start, scoring two goals in the first chukker, and was never headed.

Their team play was much in evidence against a scratch team, and they eventually won by a score of 6-1.

In the other first round game the Calgary Hawks were too good for the Round Tee, but a fast, hard-riding game resulted, which ended with the Calgary team winning 8-4.

In the finals against the Hawks the Regiment won by a score of 4-1.

In the first chukker the only score was chalked up by Calgary on a penalty.

Goals by Campbell and Morton in the second chukker and one each in the third and fourth by the same players accounted for the score. There was no scoring in the last two chukkers.

In this tournament the Regiment was without the services of Major F. M. W. Harvey, V.C., M.C., who was on the injured list.

SUMMARY

FIRST ROUND :

L.S.H. (R.C.) (6)

- (1) Lieut. F. E. White
- (2) Capt. F. C. Powell, M.C., D.C.M.
- (3) Lieut. C. H. Campbell
- (4) Capt. R. E. A. Morton

Calgary Hawks (8)

- (1) Lieut.-Col. F. Scott
- (2) Mr. W. Adams
- (3) Mr. C. Gardner
- (4) Mr. H. C. Francis

Calgary Strollers (1)

- (1) Mr. T. Hugill
- (2) Mr. D. Yorath
- (3) Mr. J. B. Cross
- (3) Mr. J. Lane

Round Tee (4)

- (1) Mr. R. Fleming
- (2) Mr. K. Roenish
- (3) Mr. E. Capers
- (4) Mr. R. Pollard

FINALS :

L.S.H. (R.C.) (4)

Calgary Hawks (1)

WESTERN CANADA POLO TOURNAMENT

This tournament was also played on the Regimental ground at Sarccee Camp on 30th August and 1st and 3rd September.

Besides the Regimental team, teams were entered by Calgary, High River and Kamloops B.C.

The draw resulted in the Strathcona's meeting Calgary and High River playing Kamloops in the first round.

The weather was cold and wet, and playing conditions were of the worst.

The first game, Strathcona's *versus* Calgary, was very one-sided, and while the final score was only 5-0 in favour of the Strathcona's, the play throughout the game was confined to Calgary territory. In fact, not once did the ball cross the Strathcona back line.

The other semi-final was equally one-sided, Kamloops winning from High River by a score of 8-0.

The finals were played on 1st September; the weather was bright but windy, and ground conditions were much better.

Strathcona's pressed from the throw-in, but while having the better of the play were unable to score in the opening chukker. The play throughout the game was fast and open.

Strathcona's scored two goals in the second chukker and one in each of the others. Kamloops scored in the fifth, the final score being: Strathcona's 6; Kamloops 1.

SUMMARY

FIRST ROUND:

Strathconas (5)

- (1) Capt. R. E. A. Morton
- (2) Capt. F. C. Powell, M.C., D.C.M.
- (3) Lieut. C. H. Campbell
- (4) Major F. M. W. Harvey, V.C., M.C.

Calgary (0)

- (1) Mr. D. K. Yorath
- (2) Mr. C. Gardner
- (3) Mr. W. Adams
- (4) Mr. H. C. Francis

Kamloops (8)

- (1) Mr. P. Lodwick
- (2) Mr. F. Ward
- (3) Mr. T. Talbot
- (4) Mr. F. Fulton

High River (0)

- (1) Mr. K. Roenish
- (2) Mr. C. Arnold
- (3) Mr. E. Capers
- (4) Mr. W. Holmes

FINALS:

Strathconas (6)

Kamloops (1)

Two fast exhibition games were played on 3rd September, when Kamloops beat Calgary and Strathcona's scored an 8-3 win over High River.



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